Archive for Scott Boras

Jose Altuve Signs Updated Joey Votto Deal

Unless another major deal comes out in the next few weeks, the Houston Astros have signed Jose Altuve to the biggest contract of the winter. The deal is notable for several reasons.

  1. Under his previous contract, Jose Altuve would not reach free agency for another two years, after the 2019 season.
  2. Jose Altuve’s agent is Scott Boras, and he has long been loathe to give away any free-agent years ahead of free agency.

As Travis Sawchik noted last night, Altuve will reportedly sign for five years and $151 million, and the contract will begin after Altuve’s current contract runs out. Altuve will earn just $12.5 million over the next two seasons in one of the biggest bargain contracts baseball has ever seen. While he wasn’t all that good when the Astros signed him back in 2013, Altuve has been one of the best players in baseball since 2014, with his 24 wins third to only Mike Trout and Josh Donaldson among position players in that span. Altuve just finished off a fantastic MVP season for the World Series champions, and historically, he’s on one of the better runs for a second baseman in history. The table below shows second baseman since 1947 through their age-27 seasons.

Best Second Baseman at 27
Name Team PA HR SB wRC+ WAR
Bobby Grich Orioles 3344 70 77 132 33.6
Roberto Alomar – – – 5064 77 296 118 31.2
Willie Randolph – – – 4178 25 180 110 29.7
Chuck Knoblauch Twins 3857 34 214 116 27.4
Jose Altuve Astros 4311 84 231 124 26.2
Lou Whitaker Tigers 4042 52 76 108 26.2
Joe Morgan Colt .45’s 3920 61 195 123 25.3
Dustin Pedroia Red Sox 3201 75 82 121 24.7
Rod Carew Twins 3641 29 99 123 23.9
Ryne Sandberg – – – 4034 90 210 108 23.7
Edgardo Alfonzo Mets 3887 104 39 113 23.7
Paul Molitor Brewers 3479 60 190 114 21.6

Five of the 11 non-Altuve players on that list are in the Hall of Fame. Grich and Whitaker, meanwhile, represent some of the biggest snubs of the last half-century, while Pedroia remains active still building a case.

When the Twins signed Logan Morrison to a deal for $6.5 million, most agreed it was a bargain. By comparison, the Astros have the reigning MVP locked up for that price in his prime for the next two seasons. That leads to obvious questions regarding the Astros’ motivation here. Why sign a player to an extension before it is necessary? Anyone who remembers the Ryan Howard contract, for example, might look at this extension and wonder if it’s simply a gift from the Houston front office.

This is not a gift, though. It’s a fair deal.

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The Last Time Scott Boras Screwed Up

It’s possible Scott Boras has misread the market. It wouldn’t be the first time.
(Photo: Cathy T)

As has been documented in some depth this offseason, the new collective bargaining agreement is bringing about consequences that might not have been fully understood — by the players, at least — at the time both sides were celebrating labor peace.

These latest developments weren’t entirely unexpected, however. Consider, for example, some previous statements by Scott Boras on the matter.

“The integrity of the game is at hand here,” Boras said. “Clubs are refusing to employ premium free agents for their true market value because of an artificial, collectively bargained process that does not help the game or the fans’ perception of the game. These players earned their free agency and played at very high levels to get it.

…

“Like any players, they want to play baseball. But they’re also looking at the long-term aspect of their careers. This system has placed them not in free agency, but it’s placed them in a jail.”

…

“The system they’ve been dealt has basically prevented them from free agency,” Boras said.

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A Brief History of Late-Winter Signees

This offseason has been so full of thrills and spills it’s been easy to forget that two of the FanGraphs Crowd’s four most-valued free agents went unsigned well into 2015, with Max Scherzer waiting to become a Washington National until January 19. We don’t yet know why Scherzer waited so long to sign, or why the almost-as-valuable James Shields has waited even longer. Perhaps they have been sitting with fingers crossed in hopes that they would receive a substantial offer from a team other than the Houston Astros. Maybe they just want to take their time making such a big life decision.

Regardless of their reasons for remaining on the free agent market for so long, we’re just about reaching that point in the offseason when Pitchers & Catchers Reporting is visible on the horizon’s crest. One of the perks of being a phenomenal major league player on the level of Scherzer and Shields is that you are afforded comparatively ironclad job security, especially compared to their journeymen peers, many of whom have to annually shuttle their families to new locales across the nation.

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Death Match: The Wells Trade Versus the Zito Contract

Did you hear that the Toronto Blue Jays traded Vernon Wells and his Massive Albatross Contract to the Angels? Probably. It has received plenty of commentary here and elsewhere, and that should be enough, but then someone asked Dave Cameron how the Angels’ trade for Wells was better or worse a move than the Giants notorious seven-year, $126 million contract with Barry Zito signed before the 2007 season. The Zito contract looked like a bad move at the time and pretty much everyone currently agrees that the Wells trade is, too. But the Nerdosphere demands an answer: which was the worse decision?

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Choo Prolly Made Himself $26 Million on Friday

South Korea beat Taiwan 9-3 Friday in the Asian Games baseball final. Fans of South Korean baseball are celebrating, but Cleveland fans are probably excited, too, as this likely exempts outfielder Shin-Soo Choo from his mandatory two years of South Korean military service. That’s obviously good news for the Cleveland franchise, as he’s been their best player the last couple of seasons. It is also great for Choo himself, given his age and his arbitration status. During the 2010 MLB playoffs, certain writers on Twitter made comments that went something like this: “[Player X] prolly made himself $15 million dollars with that home run,” which led to much parody among the snarkier circles of the Nerdosphere. It was all in good fun, as such claims were more than a bit silly. However, in Choo’s case he may very well have made tens of millions of dollars with this one game.

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Good GMs, Bad Agents

Ryan Howard’s massive new extension brought forth various responses, many of them focusing on Philadelpha General Manager Ruben Amaro and his front office. Most of the reactions I read were negative, some were positive. None of what I read praised Howard’s agent, Casey Close.

Andrew Friedman and the Tampa Bay Rays’ front office are regularly and rightly praised for transforming a laughingstock with a small budget into a stacked monster with a small budget. The crowning achievement of Tampa Bay’s front office (so far) is undoubtedly signing third baseman Evan Longoria, then (2008) quite new to the big leagues, to a contract that guarantees him less over the guaranteed portion of the the contract (2008-2013) than Ryan Howard will be paid in 2010. It also includes three club options for 2014-2016. Longoria’s 2010 base salary (without prorating his signing bonus) is less than one million dollars. Nothing I have read says anything about the job done by his agent, Paul Cohen.

Last month, in reference to Barry Zito, R.J. Anderson wrote,

Should we really mock players for making prudent financial decisions when we praise management for doing the same?

I’m curious about something very much like this, with agents standing in for players. When we (and “we” here is not merely rhetorical, it includes me) praise/condemn a deal, we usually mean good or bad for the team’s budget. I know that some of us will sometimes call it a “win” for the player, or a “fair deal for both sides,” but I don’t think I’m being inaccurate in saying that is not the usual discourse on these matters. If the deal is good/bad for the team, we say that the general manager or front office did a good/bad job.

Take an agent like Casey Close, or, I don’t know, let’s pick someone non-controversial… Scott Boras. Close or Boras will come up, but usually the best that is said about them outside of sabermetric circles is that “they are part of the process” and that “it’s their job to get their clients the most money.” Sabermetric circles mostly avoid “Boras is the devil” talk. This isn’t another “agents are just doing their job” peice. Well, not exactly, although that is true.

What interests me is not the lack of praise for agents who are good at their job (although I think Mystery Team is probably sick of being unable to sign anyone). What interests me is the comparison of the negative cases: while someone might call a general manager “terrible” or “incompetent” because of foolish contracts, I’ve never read a piece going on at length that an agent should be fired because of an extremely team-favorable contract. One can quibble over specific circumstances, but just as it is the GM’s job to look at his team’s future and the player’s likely performance down the line when establishing what he can pay a particular player, it is the the job of the agent to do the same in the players’ interest. The agent has to be able to evaluate talent and the market down the road. I’m not trying to pick on any agent in particular — one would need to look at each agent’s clients to see how they made out. This would be an interesting comparative project.

Our current focus is understandable. Most of us are fans first, we want our teams to do well, and so we admire/denigrate GMs who sign good/bad deals. This also give us the urge (that some resist) to get angry with agents for “just doing their jobs.” My question to us, not as fans, but as (amateur) analysts going forward: what about the agents who (might be) doing their jobs badly?


How Would Damon Fit in Atlanta?

Everyone knows about Johnny Damon’s longtime love for the Detroit Red Wings and octopus by now, but have you heard that he’s also a big Matt Ryan fan? He also loved WCW. WolfPac 4 ever!

Jokes aside, in addition to the Tigers, the Atlanta Braves have also allegedly shown interest in signing Damon (at least according to the rumor mill). For reasons I mentioned in this week’s podcast, I don’t think Damon is a great fit for Detroit — even if you think he adds a win or two to the Tigers, that isn’t likely to put the Tigers anywhere near the playoffs. The Braves, on the other hand, are in a position to spend a bit for a marginal win. They look like a team that could give Philadelphia a run for its money in the NL East, and failing that, would be a favorite for the wildcard.

What does Damon offer? Offensively, CHONE projects .352 wOBA, or about 13 runs above average per 700 PA. That projection doesn’t adjust for league, so let’s give him a couple extra runs for moving into the NL for +15. Damon’s defense has come under a lot of fire recently, but it’s probably not quite as bad as it seems. After taking positional adjustments, speed scores, and age into account, I have Damon at about minus 10/162 position-neutral outfielder (so about -13 CF, -3 LF). Despite his age, Damon has been pretty durable lately, so 85% playing time is still fair. +15 offense -10 fielding + 22.5 replacement level times 85% = a 2.3 WAR player. That’s a decent player even at $7M for one year.

How does this compare to Atlanta’s current major league outfielders? Nate McLouth is slated to start in center. CHONE projects .355 wOBA, or +15/700. I have him as a -5 position-neutral outfielder. +15 offense -5 fielding + 22.5 replacement times 85% = 2.8 WAR.

Bobby Cox is apparently discussing having Matt Diaz and recently-acquired Melky Cabrera share playing time. CHONE projects Diaz at .349 wOBA, about +12/700, and although he’s been platooned heavily due to massive splits, as a righty I estimate his split to be about even. I have Diaz as a -5 defender, but he also never plays full-time due to injuries and platooning — 75% seems about right. +12 -5 +22.5 times 75% = 2.2 WAR, although that might be high due to injury concerns and platoon uncertainty.

What about Cabrera? I’m with Dave on Melky — people focus too much on his alleged “tweener” status and miss his age relative to performance. CHONE agrees about offense, and projects Cabrera for a .358 wOBA, +17/700. His “tweener” status on defense might mean you don’t want him in center too much, but it also means he’s be a plus defender on the corners, I have him at -3/162 position neutral. +17 -3 + 22.5 times 85% playing time = 3.1 WAR. Far from being a 4th OF part-timer, Melky shouldn’t be taking a backseat to anyone in Atlanta.

McLouth and Cabrera are probably better players than Damon at this point, but Damon is better than Diaz, especially if you think Diaz’s platoon issues and injuries make him worse than the projection above. In any case, as Dave has argued in the podcasts, having four good outfielders is a good idea, especially given Diaz and McClouth’s recent playing time woes and the Braves’ hopes for contention. For the right money, Damon could make a lot of sense for the Braves if they distribute playing time properly. But…

…you’re probably screaming “What about Jason Heyward, the best prospect in baseball that the Braves are going to give the shot in right field?” And you’d be exactly right. I’m not going to bother with projections for Heyward. In short, if Atlanta thinks he’s ready and has him in the majors, they have play him every day, otherwise it’s a waste. At that point, you’ve got McLouth, Cabrera, and Diaz fighting over two spots that should go to Cabrera and McLouth, with Diaz as the 4th OF. If they bring Damon in, there would be a lot less playing time to go around, and the marginal value to the Braves is much lower.

So if Johnny really wants $7 million per from the Braves, it looks like he’d better bust out some new attire.


Holliday Returns to the Cardinals

In a stunning turn of events, Jon Heyman managed to break a story about one of Scott Boras’s clients, reporting that Matt Holliday has resigned with the Cardinals for seven years and 120 million dollars with a full no-trade clause.

Make no mistake about it: Although he didn’t receive “Mark Teixeira money,” Holliday, who turns 30 next week, is a tremendous baseball player. Over the last 4 years, he’s accumulated about 24 Wins Above Replacement — an average of 6 wins a year. Of course, the Cardinals aren’t paying for what he’s already done, but what he will do in the future.

What are the Cardinals paying for? The market is still working itself out, but assuming an average market value of $4.4 million per marginal win, seven percent annual salary inflation, and 0.5 WAR a year decline, seven years, $120 million dollars indicates a 4.5 WAR player for 2010. With that number in mind, what is a reasonable projection for Holliday?

CHONE’s context-neutral projection for Holliday’s 2010 offense is .303/.379/.513, 29 runs above average per 150 games. (by the time you’re reading this, Sean may have moved Holliday to the Cardinal’s team page and adjusted for league and park). My own projection is very close to CHONE’s.

Holliday’s defensive reputation may have taken a hit in the minds of many during the 2009 playoffs, but most fielding metrics see Holliday as an above-average left fielder. Earlier this offseason (before most projections had come out), I used UZR and the Fans Scouting report and estimated Holliday’s defense at +4, and Jeff Zimmerman’s recent UZR projections get the same result. Taking into account the positional adjustment for left field (-7.5/162), let’s call Holliday a -3 fielder per 150 games.

Adding it all up: +29/150 offense, -3/150 fielding, +20/150 replacement level = 4.6 WAR player. For all practical purposes, given the assumptions we’re working with (and dealing only with the guaranteed years of the contract), St. Louis gave Holliday a contract almost exactly in line with his market value.

It has been said before, but it’s worth repeating: paying average market value for a win isn’t necessarily a “dumb” move, but it isn’t “smart” either. It’s “average” …on average. Moreover, straight market value isn’t the only factor to consider in this particular case. Leaving aside the possibility that the actual value of a win might actually be lower this offseason (dropping it down to $4.4 million, the market value of a 4.5 WAR player over 7 years drops to about $109 million), seven years is a long time for a corner outfielder in his thirties. Yes, the 0.5 win-a-season decline curve takes this into account to a certain extent, but when a team gives a player a contract this long, it not only guarantees their “control” over the player, but also gives him a higher degree of security through his likely decline years. For this reason, players usually give something of a “discount” for that security. The Cardinals did not get such a discount. Moreover, the no-trade clause inhibits the Cardinals’ flexibility down the road — and even if Holliday is willing to waive the clause, that is almost always just another negotiating ploy for more money. In other words, that is more value the Cardinals gave up on top of the money for the deal. [I’m leaving aside the vesting option for an eighth year based on MVP voting.]

The Cardinals get a player who should be very good-to great for a couple of years, and above average for maybe a few after that. Perhaps that is worth it to make a run while Albert Pujols is still under contract (and perhaps to convince him to re-sign if there’s enough left in the budget to do so while filling the other 23 spots on the roster). Still, paying market value long-term for a player in his thirties involves a great deal of risk for a franchise, and even without the no-trade clause, an expensive Holliday in his mid-to-late thirties would be very difficult to move if St. Louis needs to do so. The road to ruin for many a general manager and franchise is littered with long-term “average” contracts for players like Holliday — it doesn’t take much of a drop-off (injuries, anyone?) to turn a seemingly “reasonable” contract into an albatross. Flags may fly forever, but the only sure winners in this deal are Matt Holliday and Scott Boras.


A Shot of Borbon

Player agent Scott Boras has been in the news a lot lately, with controversy surrounding the legitimacy of the signings of 2008 first round draft picks Pedro Alvarez and Eric Hosmer. You may be asking yourself, for the 15th or 16th time, why teams even bother to deal with Boras clients. Simply put, he represents some of the best talent in professional baseball, including soon-to-be pros.

On of those amateur clients, Julio Borbon, flew under the radar a little bit before the 2007 draft, thanks in part to his allegiance to Boras, as well as a poorly-timed ankle injury that ruined a good portion of his junior season. Despite that, the Texas Rangers still made Borbon a supplemental first round selection (35th overall) out of the University of Tennessee and signed the Dominican Republic native to Major League contract, complete with an $800,000 signing bonus. Only Boras could finagle a Major League contract for a player drafted outside the first round after coming off a poor season.

Borbon signed late in the 2007 season and managed to appear in just nine regular season games. In 37 at-bats, the speedy outfielder hit .189/.250/.216 with just one extra base hit and three stolen bases. Well, the real Borbon stood up this year. He was advanced to High-A ball to begin the season and hit .306/.346/.395 with two homers and 36 stolen bases in 291 at-bats. Borbon was then promoted to Double-A where he proceeded to hit .332/.371/.457 with five homers and 16 stolen bases in 247 at-bats.

The downside to Borbon is that his running game has shown some holes with him getting caught 11 times in 27 attempts at Double-A, but he has still stolen 52 bases on the season. He also has just 27 walks this season, which is far too few for a slash-and-dash, lead-off type hitter. The left-handed hitter is doing OK against southpaws at the Double-A level with a .281 average but his slugging average dips 100 points and he has yet to take a walk in that situation.

Borbon has quietly flown under the radar for more than a year now, but that is surely going to change soon. He could be making good on the Major League contract before you know it… Perhaps even before the Alvarez/Hosmer mess is settled.