The Patrick Corbin Signing Made the Difference for Washington
The Nationals would not be here today without Patrick Corbin.
In a season with many ups and downs — really, just one “down” and then one much larger “up” — Corbin was a consistent arm in the Nationals’ rotation, especially as the ace of the staff, Max Scherzer, dealt with injuries in the second half and relative (by his standards) ineffectiveness upon his return. He was not the only rock — Stephen Strasburg was also superb — but he was the new rock, the highlight of the Nationals’ offseason, their prized signing.
On December 4, the Nationals inked Corbin to a six-year, $140 million deal, the largest contract given to any starting pitcher the entire offseason. With one full season in the books, it’s clear that Corbin has come to Washington exactly as advertised. As their third ace, Corbin’s presence in the rotation helped put them over the top. A team with three of the best 13 pitchers in baseball likely won’t stay defeated for long, and the Nationals overcame a horrid 19-31 start to win 93 games and clinch the top NL Wild Card spot.
Of course, this turnaround is not solely due to Corbin’s contributions, but having him in the rotation certainly didn’t hurt. He pitched 202 innings this year to the tune of a 3.25 ERA, 3.49 FIP, and 4.8 WAR. He outpitched both Steamer’s (3.3 WAR) and ZiPS’ (3.5) preseason projections. As a result, the Nationals had the best rotation in baseball, and they hope that their top three starters will be the difference here in October:
| Rank | Team | WAR |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Nationals | 21.4 |
| 2 | Dodgers | 19.7 |
| 3 | Mets | 19.7 |
| 4 | Astros | 19.3 |
| 5 | Indians | 17.9 |
“[Corbin’s been] a great complement to our big two right-handers,” Nationals general manager Mike Rizzo told 106.7 the FAN last Wednesday, via Patrick Reddington of Federal Baseball. “We feel comfortable rolling any one of those guys out there. It’s a luxury that few teams have, and we’re lucky enough to be able to run three quality No. 1 type of starters out.”
Corbin not only gave the Nationals the statistically best rotation in baseball, he also gave them their best rotation in franchise history. Ever since they signed Scherzer in 2015, Washington’s strength has been the success of their starters, but never before have they collectively surpassed 20 WAR in a single season. The closest they came was in 2017, when Scherzer (6.4), Strasburg (5.9), Gio Gonzalez (3.8), Tanner Roark (2.8) and the rest of the supporting cast combined for 19.4 total WAR. And, if you think back hard enough, you may remember how that year ended (Justin Klugh does). Their postseason run concluded with a crazy 9-8 loss to the Cubs in Game Five of the NLDS.
Gonzalez pitched quite well in Game Two of that series, resulting in a Nationals’ 6-3 win. This is to say that while Corbin certainly is an upgrade, it might not really matter when everything is said and done. And, if things really go poorly, Corbin might not start at all, though he will be available to pitch out of relief in the NL Wild Card Game if need be.
Still, Corbin had an excellent year, continuing to rely on the pitch that earned him his big contract: the slider. Prior to 2018, Corbin had been a bland, middle-of-the-road starter, occasionally flashing brilliance. He never topped 3.3 WAR in his first five major league seasons, never striking out more than 22% or less than 18% of hitters. He struggled with injuries at times, but even when he was on the field, he was a slightly above-average starter at best. Then 2018 came, and Corbin famously began throwing his slider as his primary pitch. His strikeout rate jumped to 31%, his walk rate dropped a tick, and he became the fifth-most valuable starting pitcher in baseball.
So when the Nationals signed Corbin, they were banking on a 2018-esque season. At the time, I wrote that I was sold on Corbin and thought he would be worth his contract. One year in, and the Nationals must be pretty pleased.
Corbin has continued throwing his slider as his primary pitch, though its usage did dip by about four percentage points. It was nearly just as effective though, generating 21.3 runs of value (2018: +27.0), and 1.74 runs of value per 100 pitches (2018: +2.08). Hitters whiffed on 52% of swings, and when they did make contact, it was weak. Corbin allowed a .198 xwOBA against the pitch, putting him in the 92nd percentile in the metric. Corbin also added in an even-slower curveball this season — the pitch’s average velocity dropped from 72.5 mph to 67.9 mph year-over-year — which provided Ben Clemens a lot of joy.
In all seriousness, Corbin has clearly been a difference-maker in Washington. By Championship Win Probability Added (cWPA), Corbin increased the Nationals’ odds to win the World Series by 1.3% this season. That’s the 19th-highest mark of any starting pitcher and the second-highest on the Nationals’ staff, ranking below Strasburg (1.8%, 10th) and just above Scherzer (1.2%, 20th).
While Corbin was unquestionably impressive, calling him the sole reason why the Nationals made the playoffs is likely a bit far-fetched. The team was aided by the continued dominance of Anthony Rendon, an excellent sophomore season from Juan Soto, the quality innings from Aníbal Sánchez, the defense of Victor Robles, and of course, the midseason bullpen moves. But we shouldn’t overlook the impact that Corbin has had thus far, especially as an outside addition. The Nationals had to go out and get him, which, given baseball’s current state of affairs, is worth highlighting. Now, with our eyes turned to the postseason, Corbin hopes to have a similar positive influence on the Nationals’ playoff fortunes.
“I’ll be ready to go [on Tuesday] if my name’s called,” Corbin said following Sunday’s game. “It’s a do-or-die game, so it will be exciting.”
For a Nationals team that endured quite the rough start, it’s worth celebrating the key moves made to assist in the recovery. While there are still five years to go on the contract, it’s hard to call the Patrick Corbin signing anything but a success thus far, though his permanent impact on the Nationals’ franchise may have not yet been established.
Devan Fink is a Contributor at FanGraphs. You can follow him on Twitter @DevanFink.
I’d say the Anibal Sanchez signing was as big as well. In recent years that 4/5 hole has been just that- a black hole for the Nationals. Sanchez was big, and then Ross/Voth/Fedde 3 headed monster has stabalized that 5th slot in a way they haven’t had in a long time.
In reality, it’s three fold. Corbin coming in. Sanchez coming in. And maybe most importantly Strasburg staying healthy this season.
I guess in a way spending $140 million dollars to improve your team and your team improving is noteworthy, if only because it seems some segments of the moneyball crowd seem to think it’s impossible. Hard to imagine calling this a success 1/6 the way through (absent a championship, I guess). We’ll see what happens when everything is said (not set) and done.
Thanks, fixed!
I think there’s increasing pessimism that signing anyone at all, or moving to improve your team in any way for the present, is fruitless because any single move fails to move the projections much. Cleveland seems to provoke a lot of these reactions. Before the season, people argued they shouldn’t sign anyone because they’re a lock to win their division. Now, the same people are out in force saying they made the right move because the Twins were so much better than them that small moves wouldn’t have made a difference. Both of these assertions, and the many other ones out there, ascribe some sort of predestination and level of accuracy to the projections that are simply not present. It’s pretty obvious that when you have a huge hole in your rotation, signing the #15 starter in MLB is going to improve the team quite a bit, and that they’re at the right spot on the win curve for it to make a difference.
With how close they were to the wild card, that second line of argument is just flat crazy. I don’t know how one could defend the Indians front office this year with a straight face. Whether you consider it unlikely or extremely unlikely, everyone should stand behind the results and the results for the Indians were a massive disappointment.
Cleveland made a ton of good moves in the offseason. But they have spent several seasons now thinking they can just figure out the outfield and the relief corps along the way. That works when other things go right, but this season they didn’t go right because the rotation had some serious health issues. I don’t entirely blame them for not building up the rotation in the offseason, but if they had dealt with the other more obvious issues on the roster it wouldn’t have hurt them so much.
I’m not sure what you think they should have done.
They made a number of moves over the past year and a half that strengthened both the bullpen and the OF.
Bullpen
-Traded for Hand and Cimber
-Signed Clippard
-Resigned O. Perez
-Traded for Wittgren
Outfield
-Traded for Luplow
-Traded for Bauers
-Traded for Mercado
-Traded for Reyes (and Puig as rental)
Bauers didn’t work out and some of their short-term moves were a disaster (Gonzalez, Ramirez, Martin).
But overall they had one of the best bullpens throughout most of the year, until it faded down the stretch. And the outfield was much improved once they got rid of some of the dead weight.
There was also an attempt to improve depth behind the starting 5 by signing Salazar and trading for Jefry Rodriguez. Unfortunately, Salazar never really came back and Rodriguez also got hurt.
The two big issues were:
-Twins unexpectedly won 100+ games
-The team was devastated by injuries, not just in the starting rotation but also in the IF and (somewhat) the OF. I’d guess that they were hurt by injuries more than any team not named the Yankees.
Those are hard to plan for. And yet, at the end of the day, they won more games this year than they did the year before. And only one less than the WS team.
They should have resigned Brantley or at least done the QO. His 124 wRC+ last year was better than any full-time outfielder they had this year, and that’s before he made big strides on offense this year.
Luplow and Mercado worked out pretty well, but that was absolutely a matter of getting lucky, not any great moves on their part. Neither had ever shown much offense before. Their process was terrible, regardless of the outcome.
I don’t blame them for what happened to Ramirez or the bullpen, and I credit them for the Puig trade. And letting Perez catch full time was brilliant. But that outfield was a mess at the beginning of the year.
At a certain point, you need to improve the output, efficiency be damned
In as much as there are 7 billion people in the world and you can find some segment of them spouting any given opinion … that’s not the predominant argument about CLE’s offseason as I recall it. The way I remember it was that most people were rather skeptical of CLE’s rather lackluster offseason. They were critical of CLE’s apparent belief that winning the AL Central was a foregone conclusion as demonstrated by their not making much in the way of significant offensive upgrades, letting Brantley walk, and even flirting with selling off rotation pieces.
Fair enough–I don’t think I meant to imply they were the dominant position. And even then, perhaps they are just overrepresented in my memory of the Fangraphs’ comment section.
sadtrombone believes that unless you give Adam Jones a 1yr, $4M contract, you aren’t committed to winning.
Ownership didn’t exactly give Mike Chernoff a choice of $300M to sign Machado or Harper or Machado. He had no budget to work with so sorry if some of us thought scrounging for value through trades might work better. Who knew the Twins’ moonshot of signing 4 mid-market FA’s and picking up other castoffs like Schoop and Cron would all have career seasons in the same year?
I think most of the criticism can be directed at ownership. And it wasn’t a terribly large shock to see Cron and Cruz pan out, since they were good the year before (Schoop’s production, no matter what it is, always comes as a surprise).
So these “people (who) argued…they shouldn’t sign anyone” must indeed be over-represented in your memory.
Lesson: Don’t slag other people based on your faulty memory of a past Indians’ thread in a current thread about the Nationals.
Except here they are! Including you, apparently!
Sure, when you figure out how to expand budget in defiance of the owners, let us all know.
If I’m an owner, it’s easy.
You aren’t so can we at least rely on you to present a coherent argument based on the facts at hand? Or do you want to focus more on score-settling against strawmen?
I don’t think the Indians’ front office saw it that way (i.e, that they could win the division by standing pat). In fact, they made a number of moves during the offseason in an attempt to strengthen the team and get younger. The flirting with trading off rotation pieces was also an attempt to get better. The FO was quite clear that they would only do so if they got back more in return than what they were giving up.
Most of the criticism was about the failure to re-sign Brantley. But given his injury history and the fact that the Indians have gotten burnt by several players in similar circumstances (Sizemore, Hafner, Swisher), you can hardly blame them for letting him walk.
Then they could have at least done the QO. He got 2/32 from Houston, so it’s questionable if he would have turned it down.
I mean, the Indians won 93 games despite injuries to their two best position players and much of their rotation…
Yep, signing the 3rd best FA on the market who went on to have a great season proves that signing FA’s always leads to team improvement. Never mind, Chris Davis, Eric Hosmer, Arrieta, Darvish, and the vast wasteland of FA’s who didn’t perform.
Now Rizzo has offered Rendon 7 yr/$210M. Rizzo always has to screw up the White Sox’s off-season plans. Thanks Rizzo!
No, but then again it also disproves that signing FA’s never lead to team improvement… Max Scherzer says hello.
Who ever made a categorical statement like that? The statement is that Free Agents are proven poor investments since so many more under-perform their contracts than over-perform. That is to say, at the margin, they destroy economic value.
well lets look at last winter-
https://blogs.fangraphs.com/2019-top-50-free-agents/
7 of the top 8 free agents performed pretty darn well this year. Only Machado didn’t.
Keuchel (0.9 fwar) and Pollock (0.8 fwar) performed “pretty darn well?” Look at the top 50 over the last 5 years. Not good.
This is true, that free agents have historically been a terrible investment. But if you want to win more games next year and your player development system doesn’t have replacements ready, your options are (a) trade prospects or (b) sign free agents. Neither of these moves are “efficient” in the aggregate (although with the way teams are valuing prospects these days we may be heading closer with “a”) but they do get you more wins.
This has to be the worst strawman I’ve seen on fangraphs.
“A team with three of the best 13 pitchers in baseball”
That would be true only if we ignore the fact that Corbin is a poor contact manager; I recommend you to visit his Baseball Savant page.
“As a result, the Nationals had the best rotation in baseball,”
* FIP-/ERA-/wOBA/xwOBA *
Dodgers: 81/74/.280/.281
Nationals: 82/79/.294/.296
Fangraphs shows the same thing. xWOBA (the only thing Fangraphs doesn’t have) tells the same story as the other stats. The Nationals led the majors in WAR because they threw more innings than the Dodgers.
looking at it
Nats 938.2 IP 3.53 ERA/3.72 FIP/3.94 xFIP 21.4 WAR
Dodgers 893.2 IP 3.11 ERA/3.52 FIP/3.72 xFIP 19.8 WAR
So yeah 45 innings more. That doesn’t explain 1.6 WAR though. I’m guessing the difference is park factors. Nats park more of a hitters park than Dodger Stadium.
There’s little difference between the two teams’ rotations in terms of FIP, but you can clearly see that that’s not the case with regard to ERA-, wOBA and xwOBA.
This is where the rudimentary xwOBA WAR that Craig put together would be useful. Granted, it wouldn’t be all that different because most of xwOBA is strikeouts and walks anyway, but at least it would permit a more straightforward comparison.
You couldn’t be more wrong about this matter because K and BB only make up about 30 percent of an average SP’s plate appearance outcomes.
BTW, do you know how the heck did Tom Glavine (career 14.0 K%, 8.1 BB%) became a Hall of Famer? Yup, it was all about the contact management. Specifically, his ability to mute authority across all BIP types, since he wasn’t particularly adept at inducing low-output batted ball types (grounders, pop ups).
No, but the certainty of those outcomes is far higher than for batted ball events. xwOBA is surprisingly opaque about the exact formula (proprietary, maybe?) so I can’t verify this, but it’s pretty remarkable how similar the top performers in xwOBA are to xFIP. This suggests that they’re weighting walks and strikeouts more heavily than uncertain outcomes (and I’d include home runs in that category). Here are the ranks by xwOBA with xFIP in parentheses:
1) Gerrit Cole (1)
2) Verlander (5)
3) Scherzer (4)
4) deGrom (2)
5) Strasburg (7)
6) Maeda (38–if anyone can parse exactly what happened here, considering that his ERA and FIP are both pretty average but his xwOBA is awesome, I’d be interested to know)
7) Morton (6)
8) Flaherty (14)
9) Buehler (10)
Aside from Flaherty, not a single one of these have a big divergence between ERA and FIP, and aside from Flaherty and Maeda, they all are basically the same in terms of rank between xFIP and xwOBA. So what does this tell us? It’s telling me that (probably) a huge input into xwOBA are walks and strikeouts, precisely because of their certainty.
There’s an interesting counter-scenario, where two of the Nationals other key acquisitions were just as important as Corbin but in the completely opposite way.
Trevor Rosenthal and Kyle Barraclough were signed/acquired with the intention of rebuilding the Nationals’ permanently broken bullpen. Two lively arms who’d put up highly impressive seasons in the recent past. Mike Rizzo had to be thinking he might be getting the Barraclough of 2016, who put up a 2.2 WAR season, or the Trevor Rosenthal of 2013-2017 who averaged 1.5 WAR/season and exceeded 2 WAR twice in that five year span. Together, it wouldn’t have been too far fetched, though very optimistic, to get 4 WAR between the two relievers. Instead, the Nationals got worse than the worst imaginable scenario. Barraclough and Rosenthal combined for -0.9 WAR in only 32 IP. Altogether, the two were worth 4.9 WAR less than their optimistic projections. Patrick Corbin was worth 4.8 WAR.
Barraclough was worth -0.6 WAR in 2018. Rosenthal missed all of 2018 due to Tommy John. Together they were paid less than $9M for 2019. Zips preseason projections for them, combined, was 0.5 WAR. It was much more likely that they were worth negative WAR than 4 WAR.
Good stuff. Hopefully FG will do this on a broader scale and evaluate the value of the 2019 free agent contracts. I’m always glad for players that get “paid” however the select Fangraph writers who incessantly whined during the Fall/Winter/Spring free agent period this year would be well served to self-evaluate what the data show as well as what they sound like post after post.
It would also be helpful to see writing on the pre-arb/arb value equation on the other end of the aging curve. Clearly this will be the fulcrum of the 2021 CBA, readjusting paying for value and I’d like to be informed on what may be a painful process.
At quick glance it looks like the Nats captured almost a third of the perceived value of Corbin in year one of six year deal. Looks like its on track to be a great value signing (on top of heavy back loading).