What the Crowd Tells Us About Free Agent Trends

Every year, FanGraphs asks our readers to provide contract predictions for the game’s top free agents and every year, our readers do an admirable job with their winter forecast. The predictions for this offseason’s most notable free agents can be found in our Top 50 Free Agents post; if you prefer a sortable, filterable table where you can easily see all the predictions, plus players’ actual contracts (when signed), we have that option as well. While their predictions are important and valuable to the site, I hope our readers will not take offense when I say that over the last few years, their contract prognostications have not been as good as they were in the past.

Going back to the winter prior to the 2014 season, here is what our readers predicted teams would spend, as well as the actual dollars spent, by year, with some figures coming from this 2018 post and Max Rieper’s prior research:

Free Agent Contract Crowdsourcing Results
Year Players Crowd ($/M) Contract ($/M) Difference % Difference
2014 43 1320.8 1366.9 $46.1 M 3.5%
2015 45 1396.0 1498.4 $102.37 M 7.3%
2016 52 2340.0 2215.0 -$125.0 M -5.3%
2017 42 1441.0 1147.0 -$294.0 M -20.4%
2018 50 1711.0 1279.0 -$432.0 M -25.3%
2019 63 2068.3 1707.4 -$360.9 M -17.5%
TOTAL (’14-’19) 295 10277.1 9212.6 -$1064.4 M -10.4%

Over six offseasons, the crowd’s predictions were roughly a billion dollars too high. That total is only about 10% off, which doesn’t seem so bad. Looking at the individual years above, we can see that the billion dollar difference is housed almost entirely in the last three winters. From 2014 through 2016, the crowd fluctuated a bit but with over five billion dollars in predicted salary, the crowd was off the actual mark by just $23 million, less than half a percent off the total amount. Over the last three seasons, major league payrolls have remained static. The lack of upward movement in spending has come almost entirely at the expense of free agents, who make up roughly two-thirds of total payroll. Based on the crowdsourced predictions, it’s fair to say that readers expected payrolls to rise. The lack of a decent increase in 2017 was a surprise, as was the fact that there was no upward correction in 2018. Last year, readers were closer than they had been the previous two offseasons, but still missed the mark by 17% compared to the actual contracts signed.

To take a closer look at the split, we’ll separate the seasons above into two groups, and break them down by predicted contract value. Here’s 2014-’16:

Free Agent Contract Crowdsourcing 2014-’16
Predicted Contract Players Crowd ($/M) Contract ($/M) Difference % Difference
$80 M+ 17 2185.5 2434.3 $248.8 M 11.4%
$40 M – $80 M 22 1141.0 1066.0 -$75.0 M -6.4%
$10 M – $40 M 79 1591.5 1387.6 -$204.0 M -12.8%
Under $10 M 22 139.0 192.5 $53.5 M 38.5%
TOTAL (’14-’16) 140 5057.0 5080.3 $23.3 M 0.5%

For the players with the highest predicted contracts, the crowd undershot by the totals by 11%. It came pretty close on the upper-to-mid-range deals and tended to overshoot the large middle tier of free agents. At the very bottom, players got more than expected, but the totals were so low as to not make a huge difference. Over the last three years, the crowd has accurately predicted the top contracts while getting considerably worse in the middle-tiers:

Free Agent Contract Crowdsourcing 2017-’19
Predicted Contract Players Crowd ($/M) Contract ($/M) Difference % Difference
$80 M+ 12 1594.0 1567.5 -$26.5 M -1.7%
$40 M – $80 M 24 1340.0 1075.7 -$264.4 M -19.7%
$10 M – $40 M 95 2131.0 1360.8 -$770.2 M -36.1%
Under $10 M 24 155.0 129.0 -$26.0 M -16.8%
TOTAL (’17-’19) 155 5220.0 4133.0 -$1087.1 M -20.8%

When it comes to the accuracy of the crowd’s wisdom, we can see a decently-sized gap on the predicted contracts from $40 million to $80 million, and a significant difference in the $10 million to $40 million tier. This group had the biggest gap from 2014-’16 as well; it includes 71% of the difference between the crowd and the actual contracts while only accounting for 61% of the players and 41% of the expected contracts. When we compare the differences from the last three years to the three offseasons prior to that, we can see the outsized role the $10 million to $40 million group plays:

Shift in Free Agent Crowdsourcing Accuracy
Predicted Contract Contract-Crowd (2014-2016) Contract-Crowd (2017-2019) Change % of TOTAL Change
$80 M+ $248.8 M -$26.5 M -$275.3 M 24.8%
$40 M – $80 M -$75.0 M -$264.4 M -$189.4 M 17.1%
$10 M – $40 M -$204.0 M -$770.2 M -$566.2 M 51.0%
Under $10 M $53.5 M -$26.0 M -$80.0 M 7.2%
TOTAL $23.3 M -$1087.1 M -$1110.1 M 100.0%

As one would expect, the change in that group occurred in part because so few of the players in it were able to land deals worth more than the predicted amounts, and because many players signed deals that fell far short of expectations. From 2014-’16, 10 players signed contracts worth at least $10 million more than was expected, for a total of $151 million, while 14 players undershot their predicted deals by at least that much, for a total of $282 million. Over the last three years, only three deals have resulted in the player receiving at least $10 million more than expected, for a total of $34 million, while the 40 players who received guarantees at least $10 million below expectations signed deals that amounted to $698 million. The deals landing far below the crowd’s predictions are responsible for the bulk of the downturn in free agency.

We can’t blame the crowd for these predictions; it’s difficult to anticipate the bottom of any individual player’s market falling out. Since 2017, more than half of the predictions for players in the $10 million to $40 million group have been within $10 million of the actual contract. When forecasting any one player, taking the one-in-seven shot that they end up with undershooting what might be typically predicted by $20 million or more isn’t the wisest bet. In the aggregate, we might know that a bunch of these players will do worse than what we might expect, but choosing precisely which ones will actually meet that fate is a bit more difficult given their roughly similar value in an increasingly difficult market.

Of course, the crowd here isn’t a static group, and it is certainly aware of how the free agent landscape has changed; these predictions aren’t and shouldn’t be uniform from year to year. But there’s been a significant overestimation of the size of their eventual contracts for the players starting around No. 15 through the end of the Top 50 Free Agents list. We don’t know who will be left holding the bag in February or March, but it is likely that some in that group will end up very disappointed in their contracts.

Pinpointing the exact cause of these changes to the free agent market isn’t the purpose of this post, but it is hard to argue that these players aren’t being hurt by two sorts of competition. The first comes in the form of competition from a large group of younger, cheaper, very talented players, who have benefited from improved scouting and player development and who are still playing on their first major league contracts. With no increase in the number of jobs, and these players’ salaries significantly lower than they would be were they themselves to hit the open market, many teams are content to fill their rosters with the young and the cheap, which brings us to the second kind of competition, or rather, its absence, namely the lack of competition for free agents’ services. Tony Wolfe just detailed how older players tend to be clustered on playoff teams, which will limit a player’s market in free agency if the only teams interested in their services are increasingly small number of clubs that view themselves as contending.

As we begin free agency, the crowd still provides a good starting point for how much players are likely to receive in free agency, even if its predictive power has waned some in the last few seasons. If the last few years of this exercise are any indication, expect the elite players to come pretty close to the predicted amount and the next tier of players to come up short but not outrageously so, while the most meaningful divergence will be for the huge middle tier of free agents to fall short of expectations.





Craig Edwards can be found on twitter @craigjedwards.

37 Comments
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regfairfield
7 years ago

Love to ask people to put in the effort to do this then crap all over them

Famous Mortimer
7 years ago
Reply to  regfairfield

No idea why this was downvoted so much. It’s literally what happened in the article.

CC AFCMember since 2016
7 years ago

Cause that’s not what happened? Pointing out the fact that the crowd’s guesses differ from the results isn’t “crap[ping] all over” the crowd.

Also, maybe work on the use of literally, because it would be shockingly powerful work if Craig literally managed to take a crap on the entire crowd.

szakylMember since 2024
7 years ago
Reply to  CC AFC

Craig’s work has been impressive in the past, but boy has the bar been set up high this time. This feat would truly impress.

PC1970Member since 2024
7 years ago
Reply to  regfairfield

I totally disagree. I like it when we see the results of what our predictions are. If we’re off, it helps to understand why, so we can come closer the next next time.

antone
7 years ago
Reply to  regfairfield

It’s fair to say that the readership population has changed over time as well. Fangraphs isn’t niche like it used to be.

DDD
7 years ago

Craig, I enjoy reading your work – a couple of quick questions.

1. How has the crowd-sourcing compared with the “expert prognosticators” at Fangraphs and other sites?

2. How much has the crowd-sourcing been influenced by the Fangraph articles written on the subject (e.g. has the crowd-sourcing been somewhat close to $/WAR values and projected stats that are used in articles, etc.)?

3. You mentioned two probable causes for the downward trend. What about the possibility that front offices are just becoming more shrewd about the value of their dollars spent based on historical data and other sources?

4. Has tanking (or rebuilding, or other aspects of not trying to be competitive) been more prevalent over the past few years? If so, this might also have an impact on market size.

5. Lastly, why has Fangraphs focused so many articles on front offices’ lack of paying free agents over the past few off-seasons (as if encouraging more spending)?

Thanks

DDD
7 years ago
Reply to  Craig Edwards

Thanks Craig. I greatly appreciate your response. Regarding #3 (being more shrewd), I’m assuming you mean “the young and the cheap” – correct? While that is certainly one aspect, other aspects include: avoiding albatross contracts, risk aversion to injury-prone players, mental makeup/clubhouse impact, etc.. While I have no inside information on the subject, I sincerely believe the Yankees were… tepid… on Harper and Machado because of their mental makeup/clubhouse impact in addition to their potential albatross price tags.

Thanks again.

DBA455
7 years ago
Reply to  Craig Edwards

Apologies if I missed this, but how is contract duration being accounted for?

EG, if a player is forecast to sign for $90/5 but instead agrees to $80/4, would that be shown as (11)% “difference” despite the materially higher AAV?

Secondarily, how are player options – which seem to be more prevalent now than 5 years ago, and clearly have worth – being valued?

Shalesh
7 years ago

None of Castellanos, Moustakas, or Gibson get more than 2/$24M. Keuchel only gets 2/$28M. Ozuna less than 3/$42M.

stonepie
7 years ago
Reply to  Shalesh

moose gets scraps every year, dont expect this offseason to be any different

sadtromboneMember since 2020
7 years ago

This isn’t that much of a surprise, is it? We already kind of knew that guys who we thought would get 2 year deals are getting one year deals, and the guys we thought would get one year deals are getting minor league deals. And it also makes sense, because teams are still willing to pay for guys who they think will start for them, but not for reserves.

slingerMember since 2016
7 years ago
Reply to  sadtrombone

I actually do find the disconnect between the crowd-sourced predictions and real spending to be surprising. The crowd at FanGraphs is generally savvy, and I would expect them to fairly quickly self-correct for real trends in player valuation. I would hazard to guess that the reason for lack of tracking is that the change has not been in player valuation at all, but in a shift in front office thinking about profit maximization.

sadtromboneMember since 2020
7 years ago
Reply to  slinger

Well, but the problem is as Craig described: You know someone is going to get lost in the shuffle, but you don’t know who. If you asked “collectively, how much money will these 10 free agents get” you could account for that. But the crowdsourcing individual player contracts means you don’t know who is going to be part of that 1/3rd who are going to have a tough time.

slingerMember since 2016
7 years ago
Reply to  sadtrombone

I agree that this uncertainty could explain part of the recent overestimation, but shouldn’t that have been a factor before 2017 as well?

cs3
7 years ago
Reply to  sadtrombone

That is exactly it. Its impossible to guess which FA’s will get shafted on an individual basis, but if the crowd were simply asked to estimate the collective total spent in Free Agency as a whole (or just for a the top X number of free agents) the the guess would be much closer than summing the individual contract estimates.

Shalesh
7 years ago
Reply to  slinger

I like the beginning of your comment, but attributing decreased demand for the $10-$40M range FA’s to “profit maximization” is dumb and lazy. Craig gives you the answer in his “larger, cheaper, very talented group of younger players” link. Please read that terrific article and you’ll see why teams prefer their own Nick Solak’s to paying the Moustakas’s 3/$45M. It’s for sustained winning over multiple seasons.

slingerMember since 2016
7 years ago
Reply to  Shalesh

I don’t disagree with the argument about the pool of talented young players. However, given that only about 40% of MLB teams are really trying to win, and the value of older talent described inTony Wolfe’s article yesterday, I think something fundamental has changed.
So, dumb and lazy as charged.

Shalesh
7 years ago
Reply to  slinger

So how has only 40% of teams trying to win changed over time? Craig says Rob Arthur is working on that. One thing WAR has done is it’s given front offices more certainty on their teams’ chances and has driven home the idea that being “stuck in the middle” is bad because you hold on to good veterans too long instead of trading them for big prospect packages.

This seems to anger a lot of fans, but that may be a deficiency in the MLB & NBA. Talent is everything and if you don’t have enough of it, tank. (I think coaching plays a much bigger role in the NFL, though it might be worth studying if there are more “surprise” teams in the NFL than other sports.). It doesn’t anger me. I think the game is better from more-informed team construction. Today’s non-contenders are rebuilding themselves into tomorrow’s contenders by using the models of today’s contenders. We only need to be patient.

ScottyB
7 years ago

I wrote a community research post last year that found that 2018-19 free agents signed for about 92% of what the crowd predicted. (however, I can’t locate that article through the search function). I also noted that the middle of the scale was where we went most wrong.

MorboTheAnnihilator
7 years ago

Craig, I think that the biggest problem with both the crowd sourced contract estimates and the estimates written by members of the media are one and the same. Both groups assume a linear relationship between WAR and salary i.e. that each WAR is worth a specific amount of dollars. This is a faulty assumption that directly results from another more basic assumption that is also faulty. Specifically, that all WAR is fungible and by extension so are all free agents. The smarter teams in the game have realized this fact but the media and the public seem to lag behind.

A simple analysis of the limited nature of roster spots should be sufficient to illustrate this point. Each team has 25 roster spots, 8 starting position player spots, approximately 5 starting pitcher spots, and 8 or so relief pitcher spots. Lets assume a top tier free agent is worth approximately 4 to 7 WAR (the $80M+ range) and a league average player is in the 1 to 2 war range (the $10M – $40M range). Signing a top tier free agent over a league average nets between 2 and 6 additional WAR over a league average player. To off set this difference a it would be necessary to sign between 1 and 3 additional league average free agents to make up the war difference, assuming you have no prospects that you reasonably believe can produce between 1 and 2 war per year over the course of the free agent’s contract. The disparate valuation between is further widened by the fact that on average there are only 4 or 5 free agents a year in the top tier class while there are 25 to 30 players a year in the league average class with and additional 7 or 8 players a year in between the two classes. Not many teams have the requisite number available roster spots to sign 3 or more league average players to make up not signing a top tier free agent. Further more signing a league average free agent represents an opportunity cost in that it takes up a roster spot and prevents teams from evaluating prospects at the Major League level. On the other hand, just about every team in baseball and certainly every team that views itself as contending for a playoff spot has room on its roster to add a top tier level player and the significant bump in WAR that player typically represents over their other options.

All of this is to say that free agent players and their salary predictions are evaluated based on the implicit assumption that the market for all free agents is roughly the same. This is a faulty assumption and it is pretty clear that there is a much smaller supply of top tier players and a greater market for their services. Whereas, there is a much larger abundance of league average players and a somewhat smaller market for their services. The results of this discrepancy is that the value of WAR is nonlinear and skews towards higher valuations per WAR at higher WAR values.

CC AFCMember since 2016
7 years ago

This has been argued ad nauseum. Dave Cameron did this analysis a long time ago and found that there is not a higher value placed on each additional expected win.

https://blogs.fangraphs.com/linear-dollars-per-win-again/

Noah BaronMember since 2016
7 years ago
Reply to  CC AFC

Sees like Cameron’s analysis might be outdated though

CC AFCMember since 2016
7 years ago
Reply to  Noah Baron

Maybe so! But that was good research Dave had and I haven’t see any research to counter it. If I see any data to prove that what Dave showed has changed, I’d be happy to revise my view. Otherwise, it’s just people making the exact same argument that Dave showed was wrong.

MorboTheAnnihilator
7 years ago
Reply to  CC AFC

The above graphs show pretty much exactly what I’m arguing for

MDMember since 2017
7 years ago

I’d be interested to see if the difference was an increasing tendency for the crowd to overvalue a players future (in terms of production, rather than dollars per production unit). Curious if there is any easy way to bucket these free agents in terms of 3 Year WAR average coming into the offseason, or some way to include recency bias and/or outlier years (maybe 3 Year Average divided by difference between High and Low over that time?…large number over small number – hopefully)?

Also, the concept of highly valuable (from a production sense) young players creating less of a “need” for more risky older players as a (potentially) short term aberration rather than trend interests me. Has anyone seen any sort of correlation analysis between these contracts and the % of WAR produced by pre-Arb and Arb guys?

MDMember since 2017
7 years ago
Reply to  MD

Like an idiot, I overlooked the fact that your comment relating to the younger players was a link…seemingly covering what I asked about in my second point (though I don’t have time to read this moment, will soon…)

Famous Mortimer
7 years ago

When Fangraphs readers think teams are paying their players too little, then you know you’ve gone too far. But agreeing with your readers means you might not be on the FG writer > team FO analyst fast-track, and we wouldn’t want to upset that, would we?

Original Greaser Bob
7 years ago

It’s obviously the Cubs fault for not signing all of the free agents.

#$incl@!rR!ckett$Con$p!r@cy

mslowins
7 years ago

Could some of this be caused by how $/WAR is calculated from actual results, as opposed to projected results? As in, the crowd likely has some bias (conscious or not) towards thinking a win is worth $7-8MM, and that impacts how they assign contract value regardless of if that framework was built for projecting free agency?

I’ve always found it counter-intuitive that $/WAR isn’t based on the dollar amounts teams paid compared directly with our best models of what they knew at the time, but that’s a bit of a separate discussion.

Noah BaronMember since 2016
7 years ago

I think the fundamental problem is that it’s ridiculous to assume that teams are paying $9M per WAR. Anthony Rendon has averaged roughly 6 WAR per season the past 4 seasons. Yet nobody is going to pay him $54M per season, nor are Anthony Rendon’s agents asking for it. Trout also signed a deal with an AAV of $36M despite averaging around 9 WAR per season over his career, which would give you an expected AAV of $81M per season. Do you think Trout and Trout’s agents are that stupid, accepting an offer for half of what he’s worth? I doubt it.

As good as Trout or Rendon is, you need roughly 40 WAR, ideally 45, to compete for a championship. The luxury tax for 2019 was $206 M. If you paid $9M per WAR, you would need to have a payroll of $360-$405M to be competitive. If you spend that type of money per WAR on free agents with any sort of regularity, you’re going to have an incredibly difficult time controlling your team’s payroll. Especially when it is often very hard to know if the player you sign is even going to produce the WAR you expect! It’s much more cost efficient to either develop talent through the farm system or identify undervalued assets. Maybe you can do that via signing a free agent, but not with the idea that you’re spending $9M per WAR.

So it’s no surprise that teams are not going to be spending $18M to get a 2 WAR (otherwise known as league average) player, which is why the mid tier free agents are being especially overvalued. You can see this in the Yankees not giving Didi Gregorious a qualifying offer, despite Didi averaging roughly 3 WAR over the past 5 seasons and with the potential of a draft pick if he was to decline it.

Noah BaronMember since 2016
7 years ago

I’ll also add that I think the top free agents are predicted better by the crowd because the crowd doesn’t rely on the $/WAR framework as much for the top tier guys. Nobody is predicting Gerrit Cole to get a $50M+ AAV because it’s easier to intuitively understand that tying up 1/3 of your team’s payroll in one player – who even at his best still leaves you with 40 WAR to find – doesn’t make sense. For the lower tier guys I think the crowd is relying more on $/WAR, which is leading to the greater inaccuracy.

Shalesh
7 years ago
Reply to  Noah Baron

That’s why the very best players in the game get long-term contracts:. Assuming they stay healthy, teams get a relative bargain on the first few years and then take “losses” on the back-end of the deal as the player declines.

I don’t think it’s $/WAR. Teams think they can squeeze 2.5 WAR out of their 24yo FV50 prospect so they don’t want to pay market-rate for that and if they can’t, they can trade cheaply for an expiring contract at the trade deadline. This is especially true since the contenders of recent years seem the have the best minor league player development systems. Thus, the bottom has fallen out for the Moustakas’s & Kuechel’s of FA.

sadtromboneMember since 2020
7 years ago
Reply to  Shalesh

Right, this is what everyone seems to miss. Teams don’t say “we’ll pay $9M per win” (which is a number that is based on flawed methods, probably too high, definitely different for players at different positions and in different roles, and potentially nonlinear although that’s always been a tough one to prove).

What teams say is “we will pay as little as possible to get as much production as possible.” Teams set targets for how much they want to improve, then figure out the least expensive way to get there.

Mike NMN
7 years ago

It seems that many of us failed to foresee that some very solid players would either hold out too long or just somehow have their talents discounted as severely as they did. Keuchel alone was $60M+ short, Grandal opted for one year, with a possible $40+M haircut. Kimbrel got $@25M less, Gio Gonzales’ market evaporated, and a lot of players projected for two years got one.

Shalesh
7 years ago
Reply to  Mike NMN

Good point. Could be that a lot of the difference was concentrated in only a few cases.