Wild World Series Tactics: 2015-2016

Now that we’re clear of Even Year Magic and rapidly approaching the modern day, you might expect there to be fewer strange decisions to take issue with. You’d be right — we’re no longer inundated by a flood of sacrifice bunts. Bad pitchers aren’t heading through lineups a fourth time. Better hitters bat higher in lineups.

But these two World Series, while light on truly baffling decisions, featured a number of interesting ones. A decision that obviously lowers a team’s chances of winning — well, what can you say about that? It’s bad! But a decision that’s a coin flip, a 50/50 proposition with offsetting costs and benefits? That’s a gold mine for analysis, and both 2015 and 2016 were rich with them — particularly 2016.

2015

You know this one. We’re going to end up talking about Matt Harvey talking his way into pitching the ninth inning of Game 5. But let’s go through the motions of the rest of the series first. The Mets brought a powerful lineup with new-age leadoff hitter Curtis Granderson and newly powerful Daniel Murphy keying the top of the order. The Royals countered by batting their worst batter, Alcides Escobar, first. In fairness to Ned Yost, the rest of the lineup looked fine, but Escobar hit .257/.293/.320, and it’s not like it was a down year; his career line is .258/.293/.343.

Naturally, Escobar led off the game with an inside-the-park home run, courtesy of some of the worst outfield routes you’ll ever see from center fielder Yoenis Céspedes and left fielder Michael Conforto. That amusing diversion aside, the game was straightforward; both teams got six innings out of their starters before relying on a parade of bullpen arms, and the Royals eventually prevailed in 14 innings.

Game 2 was all about the struggles of a good, but not yet transcendent, Jacob deGrom. He struggled through the first four innings with only two strikeouts, and the wheels fell off in the fifth; walk, single, single to lead off the inning, two quick outs on a grounder and a line drive, and then three more consecutive singles. The four-run outburst was hardly preventable; pulling your 5-WAR starter in the fifth inning a day after a 14-inning game is a tough decision to make.

The rest of the game was academic; the Mets never mounted another charge and the Royals hung three more runs on Jon Niese in the eighth. Ned Yost pushed Johnny Cueto the full nine innings, which looks suspect given the Royals bullpen. While it was a strange decision, however, his last 16 pitches (and his fourth time through the New York order) came with a six-run lead. Leaving him out to pitch the seventh and eighth with a three-run lead bears scrutiny, but again, the teams had played 14 innings the day before. It’s natural to push the envelope a bit with your starter.

After the Mets took Game 3 without much drama — they scored five runs off of Yordano Ventura and then four off of the parade of relievers who followed — Game 4 introduced a new wrinkle. Chris Young started for the Royals, which doesn’t sound weird, but he had thrown three innings of relief in the Game 1 slog. He lasted only 58 pitches and 4 innings this time, though he only allowed two runs; he simply didn’t have the stamina to go deeper.

Yost even found a high leverage pinch hitting opportunity when replacing Young — Kendrys Morales singled to put two runners on base with two out in a one run game. Just one problem — Escobar was due up next. Whoops! He popped out and ended the threat. Dang leadoff hitters and their dang inability to get on base.

After both teams held serve for a few innings, Terry Collins went new-school; he brought in closer Jeurys Familia for a five-out save when Tyler Clippard put two men aboard in the top of the eighth. About that: a Daniel Murphy fielding error preceded two straight singles to right field, and the Royals turned a 2-3 deficit into a 5-3 lead. Good process, bad result.

Game 5 is the Harvey game, and with five intervening years, it’s easy to forget how dominant Harvey was. Through eight innings, he’d allowed four hits and only one walk while striking out nine. That doesn’t mean he should have come out for the ninth — he was over 100 pitches and facing the order for a fourth time — but it’s not as though he’d only muddled through to that point. He truly was having an outstanding game. Doesn’t mean he shouldn’t have been lifted for a reliever.

In any case, Collins didn’t pull him, and he gave up a walk and a double. One Eric Hosmer mad dash later, the game was tied. The Royals put up a five-spot in the 12th, and that was that. One last postscript: Escobar was what we thought he was. He hit .231/.231/.462 for the series, the slugging percentage boosted by that inside-the-park homer. The Royals won anyway, but yikes!

2016

The Cubs brought an optimized and powerful lineup to the table for this battle of long-drought teams. The Indians weren’t quite as good — they put Rajai Davis, who had the second-lowest OBP among all their starters, in the leadoff spot. The rest of the lineup was excellent, however, and Davis only led off against lefties, so the decision isn’t as weird as it first seems. Sure, it looks like it’s just a matter of Davis being fast, and maybe it is — but it’s also a reasonable platoon choice.

When it comes to the games themselves, both managers played it straight. Terry Francona went to Andrew Miller early and often — in Game 1, he brought in Miller after Corey Kluber allowed a leadoff single in the seventh, and Miller went two innings before Cody Allen closed it out. In Game 2, Joe Maddon pulled ace (and 2015 Cy Young winner) Jake Arrieta in the sixth inning with a four-run lead. Arrieta looked to be tiring, and Maddon wasn’t interested in acting too late — he went to Mike Montgomery for two innings and then Aroldis Chapman for the last four outs.

In Game 3, with both bullpens fresh after a day off, both managers doubled down on their bullpen management. The Indians were short starters due to drone-related shenanigans, and Francona leaned into it. When the Cubs brought in a left-handed pinch hitter in the fifth inning — tie game, man on second, two outs — he countered with Miller, who pitched 1.1 perfect innings with three strikeouts. From there, Allen and Bryan Shaw combined to handle the last nine outs — the three best bullpen arms combined for 13 outs, as compared to 14 for starter Josh Tomlin.

Tomlin wasn’t even the first starter out of the game, though. In the top of the fifth, Kyle Hendricks was scuffling; he loaded the bases while retiring only Tomlin (on a sacrifice bunt). Maddon turned to Justin Grimm, who got a Francisco Lindor double play. That luck didn’t hold up. In the top of the seventh, the Indians put runners on the corners with one out, and Francona pinch hit for Miller. Coco Crisp lined a single to right, providing all the offense the Indians needed. Maddon pulled out all the stops to keep it a one-run game, using Chapman in the ninth and a parade of his best relievers as a bridge there, but Cleveland held on for the 1-0 victory.

Game 4 featured a low-key strange decision from Francona. The Indians scored three runs on Chicago starter John Lackey to take a narrow 3-1 lead. They piled on against the Chicago bullpen; a run off of Mike Montgomery, two off of Justin Grimm, and one more off of Travis Wood. When Kluber hit the showers, Cleveland led 7-1. This would have been a good time to dust off the less-prominent members of the bullpen, with Miller in reserve if things went haywire.

Francona didn’t do that. He went straight to Miller, who threw 27 pitches over two innings — scoreless, naturally. At long last, Francona called off the dogs, using Dan Otero for the last three outs. But if using your best pitchers in the biggest spots is the biggest sabermetric contribution to bullpen management, its corollary is that you should avoid burning your best relievers when they are unlikely to change the outcome of the game. A ham sandwich was likely to hold onto the game for the Indians there. Using Miller for those outs looks overly cautious — and not just with the benefit of hindsight.

Facing elimination, Maddon pulled out all the stops. Jon Lester managed six innings, though he looked at his worst in the sixth as he faced the order for a third time. Maddon went to Carl Edwards Jr. for the seventh — for exactly one out. He then brought in Chapman for a staggering eight-out save. Chapman did it, and looked dominant doing so — four strikeouts, a hit batter, and one lone hit. He threw 42 pitches to get there, a season high. He threw even 30 pitches only three times all season. Managing in the postseason is different, and Maddon and Francona certainly knew it.

Game 6 was mostly a washout; the Cubs won 9-3. But Chapman appeared in the seventh to protect a five-run lead with two men on base. He stayed in for the eighth — another scoreless inning. Even after the Cubs added two runs in the ninth, he stayed in. When he walked Brandon Guyer to lead off the inning, Maddon sent in the mop-up squad. But what was his best reliever, gassed after a season-high number of pitches two days ago, doing protecting five- and seven-run leads the day before a pivotal Game 7?

Game 7 got off to a strange start — Roberto Pérez laid down a sacrifice bunt to move Coco Crisp from second to third with no one out in the third inning. It was out of character for the Indians, but Perez was a truly awful batter that year. Crisp tied the game, but only briefly; Kluber was attempting his second straight start on three days’ rest, and the Cubs got to him for two more runs in the fourth, making it 3-1. When Javy Báez led off the fifth inning with a home run, Francona went to Miller.

Miller was less than his dominant self, despite a few days off to rest. He allowed a run on a brilliant piece of baserunning when Kris Bryant scored from first on a single, then another on a David Ross home run. But the Cubs weren’t pulling away, merely holding serve; Lester made a relief appearance on two days’ rest and promptly uncorked a two-run wild pitch — the ball kicked off the ground, hit Ross’s mask, and skidded far enough away for Jason Kipnis to score from second.

Chapman, too, was less than his best. He entered the game in the eighth, his third appearance in four days (with 62 pitches on his odometer) and immediately gave up a double, a game-tying home run, and a single. He looked gassed, and it wasn’t hard to imagine why; he hadn’t had a workload like this in his major league career. He recovered to finish the eighth and gut through the ninth, and after some rain, it was time for extras.

Francona made a fateful decision in the 10th. With a man on second and one out, he had the choice of pitching to Anthony Rizzo or walking him. With Bryan Shaw pitching, Rizzo had the platoon advantage — but so did Ben Zobrist, standing in the on-deck circle. Francona walked Rizzo, and Zobrist promptly cranked a double. Francona then handed out another free pass — this one putting righty Addison Russell on base so that Shaw could face lefty Miguel Montero.

Strangely, I like the second walk more than the first. With a runner on third and less than two outs, already down a run, the Indians badly needed a force at home or a double play. The plodding Montero was their best chance at it, even if he had the upper hand platoon-wise. But the first walk — I hate it! Rizzo isn’t enough better than Zobrist that it’s worth an extra runner there.

The runner on second wouldn’t end the game; he’d give the Cubs the lead, sure, but that’s notably different than an automatic win. It’s not that Rizzo was all that likely to score — but his run still counts, and I’d like to get more of an advantage than merely facing a different left-handed batter with a near-.400 OBP (Rizzo checked in at .385 for the season, Zobrist at .386) for my walk. I don’t think this was a tremendously bad decision — but I think it was probably wrong.

In any case, Rizzo scored! Montero managed a single that plated Rizzo before Trevor Bauer shut the door on the Cubs. The Indians rallied back for a run — a run that may not have scored had the Cubs been up 7-6 rather than 8-6, as Brandon Guyer took a base on defensive indifference. The walk probably didn’t matter. But it might have. In a series deep in aggressive substitutions and quick hooks, intentional walks had a big role to play.