Witt, Royals Dash to ALDS

Tommy Gilligan-Imagn Images

BALTIMORE — You don’t achieve superstar status in baseball on speed alone. Evidence of Bobby Witt Jr.’s speed is all over his 10.4-WAR season — 31 stolen bases, 45 doubles, 11 triples — but that’s not why he’s a 10-win player. He’s a 10-win player because he posted a 168 wRC+ while playing elite defense at a premium position.

“That’s what makes him so unique is because he’s got the power,” Royals manager Matt Quatraro said after the game. “He’s got the bat to ball skills, but he’s also got the speed that he gets infield hits, he can do a lot of different things. He is literally the total package when it comes to physical ability on the field.”

It was that speed that made the difference in Kansas City’s 2-1 win over the Orioles on Wednesday night. The second tense, low-scoring game in as many days extended Baltimore’s postseason losing streak to 10 games over 11 years. The Royals, now bound for the Division Series, have won nine of their past 10 postseason series, dating back 40 seasons.

But back to Witt’s legs. For all his other attributes, it’s important to remember that the presumptive AL MVP finalist is freakishly fast. Certainly Jordan Westburg won’t forget anytime soon.

The Orioles’ second baseman went up the middle to make a diving stop on a Witt grounder with two outs in the top of the sixth and runners at the corners. It was a great stop, made by the hair on his chinny-chin-chin, full extension evidence of Westburg’s commitment and his anticipation of a ball hit at 108.7 mph.

Westburg’s opposite number, Michael Massey, made a near-identical play two innings earlier to rob Ryan O’Hearn of a likely RBI single and preserve a 1-0 lead, and at the time I thought Massey’s stop was season-altering.

The difference: O’Hearn is a slugging DH with 64th-percentile sprint speed. Witt, one of the fastest players in the league, if not the fastest, hauled ass out of the box and beat Westburg’s throw. Not by much, but he beat it. That effort, which could’ve come off the bat of any Punch-and-Judy speedster instead of the most dangerous hitter the Royals have had since George Brett, extended the inning and allowed Kyle Isbel to score the go-ahead run from third.

It was Witt’s second game-winning RBI in as many career postseason appearances.

With a 1-0 Royals win on Tuesday and a 2-1 Royals win on Wednesday, it’d be reasonable to assume that both games had similar contours. That wasn’t really the case. A man-on-man pitchers’ duel in Game 1 led into a buffet of missed opportunities in Game 2. Traffic on the bases was constant. Both starters, Seth Lugo and Zach Eflin, persistently flirted with danger but avoided going home with it. Neither lasted five innings, though each departed having allowed only a single run.

The Royals and Orioles combined to score three runs but leave 21 men on base and go 2-for-13 with runners in scoring position, both Royals singles on unremarkable groundballs. In fact, the two clubs combined to go 4-for-23 with runners in scoring position. All four hits were singles. One was Witt’s decisive infield hit in Game 2; the other three maxed out at 90.5 mph. The Orioles’ lone hit with runners in scoring position in the series, a Cedric Mullins knock in the fifth inning of Game 1, didn’t even score a run.

The Royals, who waited until the sixth inning to score on Tuesday, drove home their first batter of the afternoon Wednesday. Massey led off the game with a double, moved to third on a grounder to the right side by Witt, who was deep into his Freddie Patek tribute act all afternoon, then scored on a single by Vinnie Pasquantino.

Eflin and Lugo traded zeroes for the next four innings, but in contrast to Game 1, when Cole Ragans and Corbin Burnes might as well have been throwing to empty batter’s boxes, openings kept appearing. The Orioles, having scored a single run in 18 innings of a home playoff series, will spend all winter tossing and turning over the ineptitude of their offense — and they should — but they were on the verge of getting to Lugo.

In contrast to pitchers who might keep something in reserve early in the game, so as to give different looks on subsequent trips through the order, Lugo threw eight different pitch types to his first nine batters. And it was just barely enough. The Orioles had baserunners in the first and second innings. They put two men on with one out in the fourth, moved them both into scoring position with two outs, and thanks in part to Massey’s acrobatics, came away with nothing.

Mullins, Baltimore’s lone offensive bright spot in Game 1, crushed a home run to start the fifth inning, and then the Orioles went to work on a rally. A single, a walk, and a fielding error by Lugo loaded the bases with nobody out, and brought 40-homer man Anthony Santander, an Orioles lifer playing what could well be his last game in black and orange, to the plate.

The past decade has been pretty rough for Orioles fans. Thanks to front office ineptitude followed by ownership neglect disguised as a half-decade-long tank job, the Orioles went eight years between home playoff games. In last year’s ALDS against Texas, with the games coming on a weekend and Baltimore a heavy favorite, there was an irrepressible excitement in the crowd.

This time around, having been frustrated last October, the atmosphere was a little more subdued. This being a big ballpark in a tiny city on a weekday afternoon, there were some 6,000 empty seats in Camden Yards for Game 2. But more than that, the happy-to-be-here was gone. The crowd would not settle for another runner-up’s ribbon.

Instead, they were begging for a reason to explode. Lugo, the man of a million pitches, grooved a 93 mph four-seamer right down the pipe to Mullins, who might not be the 30-homer threat he was a few years ago, but is hitter enough to blast a meatball like that into the seats.

Concurrently, decade’s worth of catharsis poured out of the stands. When the Orioles loaded the bases and chased Lugo within the next four hitters, it only got louder. This was the moment. Obviously. Baltimore’s star-studded offense was about to erupt like an unclogged pipe.

The optimism lasted a matter of moments. Reliever Angel Zerpa managed to strike out Colton Cowser on a pitch that actually hit the Orioles outfielder, causing what turned out to be a season-ending hand injury. Adley Rutschman followed. The star catcher has been mired in a half-season-long slump, and earlier in the game had crushed a ball that would’ve gone over basically any wall in the park, except the 410 foot mark in deep center field. Which is where he put it.

Rutschman grounded out to Witt to end the inning. No further damage, and a few minutes later, the guy who got drafted one pick after Rutschman drove in the final run of the series.

The Orioles scratched out two-out baserunners in both the seventh and eighth innings, but the bases loaded, no out situation they wasted in the fifth… well, they’ll have to wait until April to see another chance that good.

The Royals pride themselves on their pitching and defense. “That’s what we preach as Royals,” Witt said. “We play defense, run hard, be aggressive, so that’s what we’ve got to do to keep winning.”

And you could argue that this sweep is a triumph of Kansas City’s run prevention. Witt and Massey were superb defensively, Ragans electric in his first postseason start. The Royals’ bullpen had been a liability for most of the year, and apart from Lucas Erceg, I did not have much faith in it entering the series. In 7 2/3 innings of work across two games, those relievers were superb. Flawless, you might say, since they didn’t allow a single run to cross the plate on their watch.

I’ve been impressed with Pasquatino’s toughness, and Massey’s persistence, and Quatraro’s steady hand on the tiller as a manager getting his first taste of postseason action. We’ve already seen one underdog Royals team turn into a postseason juggernaut in the past decade. Why not two?

“I think it’s the start of something special,” said Witt. “Like I keep saying, we didn’t come this far just to come this far, so we’re going to keep getting after it, keep trying to create our own legacy.”

As much as the Royals have seized this opportunity with both hands, there’s an obvious contrast to their opponents, who did a lot of things well in this series. Baltimore’s pitching was championship-quality. The Orioles made several superb defensive plays, and kept stringing together tough at-bats, even as they went unrewarded.

But for the second time in as many years, this team, the product of five years of frustrating preparation, went out in the first round to a heavy underdog after going 0-2 at home. They don’t need anyone to remind them to be disappointed. Their two franchise players, Rutschman and Gunnar Henderson, will both forever be linked to Witt for one reason or another. And while both kept their heads on the field, their frustration was visible from the press box after every unproductive out.

The tank got the Orioles a preposterously talented core that has thus far gone oh-fer in October. Now Burnes, Santander, and John Means are going to be free agents this offseason. Mullins can walk in a year. Is it churlish to point out that Rutschman, who unlike Witt has not been signed until the Rapture, is only three seasons short of his walk date?

We’ll see in the series to come how much of the Royals’ magic is durable. Their narrative is, at most, only half-written. But the Orioles close the book on 2024 at a moment of great import. They’re no longer cute. They’re no longer the young upstart with more baby-faced and towheaded All-Stars than they have lineup spots for. They’re a club that’s rapidly approaching a put up-or-shut up moment.

The fans are begging for a reason to cheer. How much longer must they be made to wait?





Michael is a writer at FanGraphs. Previously, he was a staff writer at The Ringer and D1Baseball, and his work has appeared at Grantland, Baseball Prospectus, The Atlantic, ESPN.com, and various ill-remembered Phillies blogs. Follow him on Twitter, if you must, @MichaelBaumann.

21 Comments
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jdbolickMember since 2024
3 months ago

The tank got the Orioles a preposterously talented core that has thus far gone oh-fer in October.

Can we please retire this false narrative? The preposterously talented core came from the 2019 draft, which was based on the 2018 season when the Orioles had the 14th highest payroll at $142 million. They weren’t tanking, they were just terrible.

The fans are begging for a reason to cheer. How much longer must they be made to wait?

Rubenstein didn’t take over until March 27th, so there wasn’t time to increase payroll significantly for the 2024 season but that will come. Presumably, an extension for Rutschman will happen this offseason. One for Gunnar would be a dream, but Boras hasn’t done a pre-arbitration extension since Carlos Gonzalez.

The reality is that it’s hard to win in the playoffs, and thus far those talented young bats haven’t shown up in October. But as someone who went through fourteen straight losing seasons, I’m happy that they made the post-season at all. This team is usually fun to watch and they played hard, they simply lost to a Royals team that made more plays when it counted. I have reasons to cheer and I don’t mind waiting a little longer for a piece of metal.

drewsylvaniaMember since 2019
3 months ago
Reply to  jdbolick

I think it depends on what is meant by “core” (from both you and Michael). I agree that the 2019 draft and its effects (Gunnar, Adley, and Burnes via Ortiz) is probably the biggest part of the core. Still, that’s just three guys. Do we include the guys drafted after the salary purge of 2018 who contributed at lot at the major-league level this year (Cowser, Westburg)? Do we include guys drafted 2020 and up who haven’t had an impact yet (Holliday, Mayo)?

I don’t know. And how do we measure “tanking”? I tend to think “tanking” is when payroll is small and it directly affects competitiveness. If that is a good definition, then I count four seasons where Baltimore might have been tanking–2019, 2020 (which I include because Baltimore was 29th in salary despite the pandemic), 2021, and 2022 (which I include despite their 83-79 record because spending could/should have put them over the top).

They’ve spent in the bottom six payroll-wise for six straight years. Four of which the team was lousy or could have spent to make the playoffs. In the Baltimore market. If that’s not tanking, it’s being burned from the years where they spent poorly.

So, to me it is more complicated than either “tremendous core built on tanking” or “tanking narrative is false”.

jdbolickMember since 2024
3 months ago
Reply to  drewsylvania

Still, that’s just three guys.

Those three guys from the non-tanking season have been worth a combined 31.4 fWAR. The other names you mentioned have been worth a combined 6.8 fWAR. Saying that “the tank got the Orioles a preposterously talented core” is factually wrong.

markymarc767Member since 2020
3 months ago
Reply to  jdbolick

So the counter-argument to “the immense bounty of highly-regarded prospects fueled speculation that the Orioles would be perennial pennant contenders” is “actually those other guys weren’t worth the praise in the first place”?

jdbolickMember since 2024
3 months ago
Reply to  markymarc767

Adley Rutschman and Gunnar Henderson did not come from tanking. The counter-argument is that the entire rest of the Orioles’ collection of drafted prospects combined has not been worth what either of those players has been worth individually, much less put together. And that’s without even adding Ortiz/Burnes to the picture.

If not for the 2019 draft, which once again came from a season when the Orioles were actually trying to win, Baltimore would not have made the playoffs either of the last two seasons.

The tank” hasn’t really had much at all to show for it thus far, albeit that could change five or ten years from now.

HatcherieMember since 2018
3 months ago
Reply to  jdbolick

The 115 loss 2018 Orioles may not have gone into the season as a tanking effort, but they started terrible and then traded away a lot of productive guys: Machado, Schoop, Gausman, Britton, O’Day, and maybe some others I didn’t see. Not unreasonable to consider it the start of the tanking years.

jdbolickMember since 2024
3 months ago
Reply to  Hatcherie

they started terrible and then traded away a lot of productive guys: Machado, Schoop, Gausman, Britton, O’Day, and maybe some others I didn’t see.

Out of all those trades, the best and only player of any significance that the Orioles received was Dean Kremer. So even if you want to count those trades as part of “the tank,” saying that “the tank got the Orioles a preposterously talented core” is still factually wrong.

Baltimore was trying to win in 2018. We Orioles fans are tired of the narrative that the team tanked its way to a rebuild when the fact is that Elias completely nailed the 2019 draft that came from a non-tanking season. Twenty nine teams could have taken Gunnar Henderson and didn’t. All thirty teams could have taken Joey Ortiz and didn’t.

Tanking is not what got the Orioles back to the playoffs. Mike Elias did that.

HatcherieMember since 2018
3 months ago
Reply to  jdbolick

I was thinking of the trades as more of an indication of the teams direction, not necessarily that the return helped rebuild. Being bad helped the Orioles get good either way, is it better if they were unintentionally bad first?

jdbolickMember since 2024
3 months ago
Reply to  Hatcherie

There has been a consistent narrative in the media that the Orioles tanked their way to success; that they intentionally avoided being competitive in order to accrue assets that accomplished their rebuild. That narrative is factually wrong.

The Orioles didn’t game the system. They tried to win, were historically terrible due to abject incompetence at all levels of the organization, got tremendously lucky to hire arguably the best General Manager in Major League Baseball, and subsequently have benefited from his excellence.

Saying that “the tank got the Orioles a preposterously talented core” diminishes what Mike Elias has accomplished. It’s pretending that any other team could do what he has done just by intentionally being terrible and amassing a collection of very high draft picks.

That narrative even ended up hurting teams like the White Sox by prompting draft changes that weren’t needed. The White Sox didn’t set a record for futility by tanking intentionally. They did it by being horribly mismanaged, yet because of the false narrative about tanking, they can’t pick higher than 10th in the 2025 MLB Draft.

Last edited 3 months ago by jdbolick
HatcherieMember since 2018
3 months ago
Reply to  jdbolick

I can see how that could be frustrating, I think there is certainly a bit more nuance to it. Past execs’ contributions do often get overshadowed when a rebuild come to fruition.

Either way I hope the end product of the rebuild gets a bit further next year. They are really fun team when everything is going right.

Old Washington Senators FanMember since 2020
3 months ago
Reply to  jdbolick

Tanking enabled Elias to get high draft picks and he nailed almost every one of them, if not every one. After 2017, the Orioles knew they had to rebuild. You can split hairs on the word, but they were not going all out to win after that. Maybe 2018…but not many people saw them as contenders in 2019.

In any case, they’re loaded with young talent now. How Rubenstein does or does not open his checkbook and if they young core does or does not want to remain in Baltimore will tell the tale for this team.

But, for the next 3-5 years they will be contenders and they will get over the postseason hump one of those, probably all the way to the World Series. They are legit loaded with talent. It takes a while to win in the postseason sometimes (see Nationals, Washington 2012, 2014, 2016-2017. Then, 2019, magic!)

jdbolickMember since 2024
3 months ago

Tanking enabled Elias to get high draft picks and he nailed almost every one of them, if not every one.

The Orioles’ picks in the 2019 MLB Draft did not come from tanking. Baltimore spent $142 million being terrible that season.

After 2017, the Orioles knew they had to rebuild. 

This is clearly not true. After 2017, many people outside the Orioles organization believed that they needed to rebuild. Instead, Baltimore kept Manny Machado and foolishly decided to try to win. You can’t pretend that “the Orioles knew they had to rebuild” when they gave Alex Cobb 57 million dollars.

Last edited 3 months ago by jdbolick
rickdugo3000
3 months ago
Reply to  jdbolick

orioles choke — 9 straight postseason losses — unserious organization for my entire lifetime