Archive for 2008

Last week, the Dodgers decided not to tender an offer to Takashi Saito, who has been one of the best relievers in baseball since coming over from Japan in 2006. The elbow problems that sidelined him for two months certainly played a factor, as did the presence of Jonathan Broxton, Hong-Chi Kuo, and the surprise of the ’08 bullpen, Cory Wade. With those three youngsters all coming off wildly successful seasons, the Dodgers were willing to let Saito go, believing that they had capable late inning relievers already on the roster.

However, there may be another reason they were willing to part with Saito – Ramon Troncoso. He doesn’t have the prospect pedigree of Broxton or Kuo or the shiny 2008 ERA of Wade, and if didn’t follow the Dodgers closely last year, there’s a good chance you may have never heard of Troncoso. However, if I was going to pick one guy who had a chance to emerge as the Next Big Thing from obscurity, I’d go with Troncoso – he’s the hidden gem of young hurlers right now.

Troncoso’s big weapon is a heavy power sinker, and it’s one of the best in the game. The average velocity on his fastball was 92.8 MPH last year, which is outstanding velocity for a sinkerball pitcher. 17 major league pitchers sported a GB% of 60% or higher last year, and only Troncoso, Fausto Carmona, and Brandon League had an average fastball velocity of 92.0 MPH or higher.

Carmona’s actually an excellent comparison for Troncoso, skills wise. Both throw something that could be considered a turbo sinker, pounding the strike zone with high velocity sinkers that both cause groundballs and cause hitters to swing and miss. In 2006, when Carmona worked mostly in relief for Cleveland, he posted a 59.6% GB% and hitters made contact 76.8% of the time. Last year in Los Angeles, Troncoso posted a 60.8% GB% and hitters made contact 74.5% of the time.

Carmona was viewed as something of a disappointment in 2006, as his ERA was driven up by a .341 batting average on balls in play and a 13.8% HR/FB rate, both of which were mostly out of his control. His home-run adjusted FIP was 4.46, a full run lower than his 5.42 ERA, and suggested that his debut season had been quite a bit better than most people believed. Obviously, we remember his breakthrough 2007 season where he took his power sinker to the rotation and became one of the best young pitchers in baseball.

Troncoso seems to be going through a similar period of a lack or recognition for his ’08 campaign. His 4.26 ERA doesn’t draw amazement, especially for an NL relief pitcher, but that’s based on a .336 batting average on balls in play – his 3.00 FIP is tremendous, especially for a kid making his major league debut. It’s pretty amazing that there’s such a little amount of talk about a 25-year-old who just posted a 9.00 K/9 and a 3.44 GB/FB rate simultaneously in his major league debut and has the stuff to back it up. For comparison, hitters made contact against Tim Lincecum 74.1% of the time and Derek Lowe had a GB% of 60.3%. I’m not sure you can invent a better combination than Lincecum’s swing-and-miss rate and Lowe’s groundball rate, and that’s effectively what Troncoso posted in 2008.

The Dodgers have sent Troncoso to the Dominican Winter League to work on his curveball and get some action in, and he’s actually working as a starting pitcher for Aguilas and dominating in the role. In 16 innings, he’s allowed 14 hits, walked 1, struck out 11, and is posting a 3.24 GB/FB rate. While winter ball stats don’t mean much, the fact that he’s able to shut down professional hitters while working in five inning stints is worth taking note of. Perhaps, instead of replacing Saito in the bullpen, the Dodgers should look into having him replace Derek Lowe in the rotation?

No matter where he ends up, Troncoso has shown all the skills necessary to be a terrific major league pitcher. Just on the strength of his sinker, he’s going to be a nightmare for right-handed hitters, and his slider and curve have made enough progress that he’s a legitimate option as a potential relief ace or a starting pitcher. For whatever reason, the world hasn’t jumped on the Ramon Troncoso bandwagon yet, but I’d imagine that will change twelve months from now.

One of the most interesting aspects of the baseball offseason is tracking which players change teams. Another aspect our eyes focus on involves how much money these players sign for. My colleagues and I have posted dollar valuations of players for the last month or two, and on many of the comment threads, a valid point continues to surface: shouldn’t we be evaluating the contracts based on how the players will perform throughout as opposed to multiplying the fair market value by the number of years?

Normally, the answer to a question like this would be a resounding yes. However, in baseball, for whatever reason, the majority of contracts signed seem to do the latter. Ideally, a team would pay the player based on his value moving forward over the duration of the contract, factoring in inflation as well. Sometimes contracts may reflect this mindset. Sometimes they will reflect the fair market value mindset. And other times, neither of these can effectively describe the logic behind the contract (cough, Ibanez, cough).

To put both of these primary valuations to work, I decided to take the recent contracts signed by both A.J. Burnett and CC Sabathia. Both were signed by the Yankees, which will enable us to see if Cashman used a singular logic, or if it changed from deal to deal.

Burnett signed a 5-yr/$82.5 mil deal which will keep him employed through the 2013 season. Based on his runs saved relative to the replacement level, as well as a slight bonus for logging a good amount of innings himself, Burnett’s projection is +3.3 WAR for 2009. His fair market value for a one year deal calls for $16.5 mil. Now, players will generally give a discount of around 10% in exchange for contract length and security. With this discount factored in, a 5-yr deal for Burnett would be worth $74.3 mil.

He received over $8 mil more. So how did Cashman arrive at this number? While I cannot, with 100% confidence, speak for the Yankees GM, what I can do is show that a 5-yr deal at Burnett’s fair market value, without the discount for length and security, would be worth exactly $82.5 mil. Whether Cashman realized it or not, he signed Burnett to his fair market value in 2009, for five seasons.

What would happen if Burnett signed to a deal that properly balanced the inflationary rate of dollars per win with his projected performance? Assuming a 10% inflationary rate, and that Burnett would decline by 0.40 wins per season, he would be worth +12.5 wins over the life of the deal. With the dollars per win rate increasing, his deal would begin with $16.5 mil in 2009, and steadily decrease to $12.5 mil in 2013. All told, the deal would be approximately $74 mil, which is nearly identical to the 5-yr fair market value contract with the discount for security factored in.

What about Sabathia? CC signed a 7-yr/161 mil deal, with an opt-out clause after three years. His projection calls for +5.5 WAR next season, putting his fair market value at $27.5 mil. A 7-yr deal with a discount factored in would be valued at around $174 mil. Without the discount, $192.5 mil. His actual contract was worth significantly less than both of these, meaning that Cashman did something different with Sabathia than with Burnett. Was Sabathia signed to a deal appropriately paying him for his projected decline over the life of the deal?

If CC loses a half-win of effectiveness each year, by year seven he will be a +2.5 win pitcher. With the rate of dollars per win rising by 10% each year, this would give CC +28 WAR and $180.8 mil. That deal is almost $20 mil more than he signed for. With that in mind, perhaps Cashman sees Sabathia declining more quickly. If CC loses 0.6 wins each year, he will go from +5.5 WAR to +1.9 WAR, making him a league average pitcher by 2015.

This contract would be worth $164.7 mil, right around the deal he actually signed. Though this is still about $3 mil more than his contract, it is safe to say that Cashman and the Yankees are anticipating a steeper decline for Sabathia than for Burnett. After all, A.J. was signed to five years worth of his current fair market value and CC is being valued at a +5.5 WAR pitcher right now who will lose over 0.6 wins of effectiveness each year. This just goes to show that even though we think baseball teams tend to use a standard approach to valuing contracts, it really does depend on the who and the where.

It’s safe to say the Seattle Mariners organization has made some interesting moves and decisions in the last year or more. One of those transactions – re-signing Kenji Johjimas to a three-year, $24-million contract extension in April of 2008 – continues to have ripple effects throughout the minor league system.

The club’s top pick from the 2005 draft, Jeff Clement, has seen his MLB catching career come to a screeching halt thanks to the presence of Johjima, whose career line of .272/.313/.412 and three-year offensive slide, fails to instill fear in the hearts of opposing pitchers (and the .227 batting average in 2008 just adds insult to injury). The move also keeps the underrated Rob Johnson from receiving the opportunity that he deserves.

Johnson, 25, was selected out of college in the fourth round of the 2004 draft. After his second pro season, he was jumped all the way to Triple-A to begin 2006 despite having played just 19 games above A-ball – due to his excellent leadership skills and developing defence.

Johnson has now been stuck at Triple-A for the last three years. His numbers have increased significantly each of those past three seasons and he finished 2008 with a line of .305/.361/.441 with an ISO of .137 in 417 at-bats. He also posted rates of 8.1 BB% and 14.6 K%. Johnson struggled in a brief MLB call-up with a .127 batting average in 31 at-bats.

The right-handed hitting catcher has struggled to hit well against right-handed pitching in his career, but he improved in 2008 and managed a line of .316/.367/.466 in 320 at-bats. Johnson did, however, revert to his old ways in the Arizona Fall League when he posted a batting average of .195 in 41 at-bats against right-handers.

Defensively, he threw out 37 percent of base stealers in Triple-A with his strong arm. Johnson also calls a good game, but is still working on his receiving skills.

It’s possible that Johnson could back-up Johjima in 2009 with Clement seeing time as the third-string catcher, as well as a part-time player at DH and first base. But Clement needs to play behind the dish at least three times a week to avoid tarnishing his already questionable catching skills – and Johjima is making a lot of money to justify sitting more than two or three times a week. Johnson has the ability to be an above-average defensive catcher and at least an average offensive backstop – if he can play more than once of twice a week.

Prospect Adam Moore, an offensive-minded catcher, should spend the season in Triple-A and is not far from being ready for the Majors – and his offensive upside is stronger than everyone this side of Clement. The Mariners have a bit of a mess behind the dish with three MLB-worthy catchers (and a Triple-A prospect)… and it could have all been avoided by letting Johjima walk after the 2008 season.

Bartolo Colon made seven starts with the Red Sox last season, collecting 39 innings, and pitching quite well. Colon’s 4.34 FIP was below American League average for starters (4.48) and his strikeout and walk rates were near vintage Colon levels. As you can see below from the two pretty graphs, Colon struck out about 6.20 per nine and walked a touch over 2.30.

Colon’s fastball sat around 92 and he prominently used it, just like old times, along with a slider and change. The Red Sox and Colon had a falling out when they planned to move him to the bullpen, so if a team does want the 36-year-old it’s going to be in a starter’s role. Unlike some other injured starters we’ll talk about, Colon has actually pitched in each of the past three seasons, and combined for about 70 innings last year. Despite having an even-split of fly and ground balls, Colon is a safe bet to allow a homerun per nine innings.

Back stiffness did land Colon on the disabled list, so a team considering signing Colon should anticipate at least one DL trip. The Sox paid Colon on a split contract, 1.25 million for his time in the majors, that’s a bargain, especially if he can eclipse the 100 inning mark. That’s no guarantee, but Colon is perhaps the safest bet of any injured pitchers. We also know that his stuff hasn’t been lost through injury, getting 6% swinging strikes, only a percent lower than 2005 total.

Colon’s worthy of another shot, the question is if anyone will give it to him.

There’s been a bunch of requests for a Firefox search plugin so here it is!

FanGraphs Search Plugin for Firefox and IE7

Just go to the link, click on “FanGraphs Player Search” and you’ll now have an option in your search box to search for FanGraphs players right in your browser.

Another useful tool for writers that I haven’t mentioned in a while and incidentally has no link anywhere on the site is the FanGraphs Player Linker. Just copy and paste the text of your post into the linker, hit the “Link Players Now!” button, and all player names will be linked. Players with the same name won’t link but other than that it will link both major and minor league players.

Going by the frequency of rumors, it seems that Rafael Furcal might be on the verge of signing his likely last big payday. Since we haven’t yet done it here at FanGraphs, let’s go through what he should be worth.

2008 was obviously injury-shortened, leaving just 36 games worth of data, so projecting Furcal forward not only has to deal with a limited sample size in recent times, but also needs to account for his raised injury concerns. Marcel projects Furcal for just 310 at bats next season, roughly half a year’s worth of performance. It is also highly skeptical of his 2008 batting lines, painting him with just a .336 wOBA, giving him 1.2 runs above average, or about 2.5 over a full season.

Shortstops get 7.5 runs for their defensive position so if we want to be optimistic and give Furcal credit for a full season at shortstop, we have him so far at 10 runs above average. Looking at his past UZR’s, it seems clear that UZR rates him between 0 and -5 runs on average. Split the difference and we get those 2.5 runs back from his bat. In other words, Furcal grades out as exactly average when you combine his bat and his glove and what we are left with is how much time he is able to log at shortstop.

Therefore, we have Furcal projected at roughly 28 runs above replacement (splitting the difference between 10 and 10.5 runs per win) per 700 PAs for 2009. Assuming $5 million per win on the free market, that would make Furcal, over 700 PA, worth about $13.5 million on a one-year deal if you think he can play a full season. Marcel would have him worth half of that.

Furcal seems destined to ink a four-year deal, so we’re looking at roughly $12 million a year if you think he’s healthy enough to be a full time starter. Current rumors have the Athletics leading the bidding at $10 million per year over those four years with other teams potentially interested. If I were to guess, I’d put money on a four-year deal in the range of about $44 million for Furcal, which prorating against the $48 million 700 PAs would command means that the signing team would need Furcal to produce exactly league average offense and defense for 640 PAs a year to break even on value.

Of course there are other factors. If healthy, Furcal’s bat might be worth a lot more as it was in 2005 and 2006. His defense, which other metrics love, might be a lot better. His health might be fine. Of course, there’s the flip side to all of those as well. In the end, it looks like Furcal’s market value is coming in right around the projections, but with full health, a common occurrence that we see in baseball; GMs are rare to properly account for injury concerns.

For the last five seasons, certain truisms have come to fruition with eery consistency. Mark Prior is going to get injured and miss most of the season. Alex Rodriguez will post gaudy numbers and still become the subject of intense scrutiny. Curt Schilling will make controversial claims in interviews or on his blog. These are just a few examples. Another example, despite occurring on a somewhat smaller stage in terms of popularity or importance, is that Daniel Cabrera of the Baltimore Orioles will fail to live up to his potential.

The 6’9″, 270-pound righty has been a full-time starting pitcher since 2004. Known primarily for bringing the heat, Cabrera has always struggled with control problems. Still, everyone in the Baltimore organization held out hope that he could somehow harness his raw ability into something exceeding potential. Suffice it to say, this has not happened, outside of mere glimpses.

His FIP marks from 2004-2008: 5.10, 4.02, 4.20, 5.01, 5.61. In 2005 and 2006, Cabrera appeared to be on the verge of making himself a quality pitcher. Appeared is the key word, however, as his FIPs were a bit deceiving. In 2005, he struck out 8.76 batters per nine while posting a BB/9 of 4.85. Granted the walk rate was down from the 5.42 in 2004, and the strikeout rate had practically doubled from the 4.63 in the same season, but walking five batters per nine innings is not efficient at all.

The next season, his strikeout rate again rose, this time to a gaudy 9.55. Unfortunately, his walk rate rose to a career-worst 6.32. Somehow, Cabrera managed to post a 4.20 FIP and 4.74 ERA despite walking over six batters per nine innings. On top of his FIPs being a bit deceiving in that regard, the best ERA of his career came in 2005, at 4.52. Even when he looked good, he was not really anything special.

In 2007, his FIP rose to 5.01; his ERA jumped to 5.55; his K/9 lowered to 7.31; and, luckily, his BB/9 decreased to a still poor 4.76. He was not walking as many hitters in comparison to the previous three years, but the mark did not portend greatness by any stretch of the imagination, and his ability to miss bats seemed to be on its way down. Last year, Cabrera reduced his BB/9 to a career-best 4.50. Unfortunately, his strikeout rate fell to 4.75, which primarily led to a 5.61 FIP, below replacment level.

Daniel’s 97 mph fastball in 2004 has steadily decreased to its 92.6 mph average right now. The frequency at which batters swing at his pitches out of the zone has dropped from 23% to 19% in this stretch. Unfortunately, the rate of contact on these outside pitches has almost exponentially increased, rising from 35% to 48% to 55% to 70% over the last four seasons.

He is throwing much slower, striking batters out at a below average rate, and walking hitters at a below average rate. His strand rate has always hovered around the league average, but when you allow that many baserunners, the LOB would need to be well above average to serve as a counteracting force.

Marcel pegs Cabrera for 170 IP in 2009 at a 4.95 FIP. How does that stack up? Well, a Replacement SP would pitch about 150 IP at a 5.50 FIP. The remaining 20 innings would go to a Replacement RP at a 4.50 FIP. Cabrera’s projection calls for 94 runs allowed; the Replacement SP would be responsible for 92; and the Replacement RP for 10. Put together, we have the 94 runs of Cabrera vs. the 102 runs given up by the replacement level.

This puts Cabrera at +8 runs above replacement, and +0.8 WAR. Assuming a dollar valuation of $4.8-$5 mil/win, a reasonable contract for Cabrera would be for one year, ranging from $3.6-$3.9 mil. And, again, this is assuming that his strikeout rate can rebound to slightly above average at worst, and that his walk rate can remain close to the career low posted last season. Forgive me, but I am rather skeptical of either of those occurring.

Daniel was non-tendered last week, meaning that the Orioles could still theoretically bring him back, or that other teams could inquire about his services. Sometimes teams will non-tender players they want to bring back, but at a lesser fee.

Last year, Cabrera made around $2.9 mil after avoiding an arbitration case in which he wanted $3.3 mil and the team offered $2.6 mil. Even if he was offered arbitration, it isn’t likely that, given his poor 2008 campaign, he would jump up to something in the $6-7 mil range. This practically confirms that the Orioles just want to cut ties with the 28-yr old righthander.

Even though all the signs are pointing towards him lacking the skills and stuff to be a successful pitcher, it seems very likely that someone will take a flyer on him and hope to resurrect his career. Paying him anything over, say, $3.8 mil for his services would be a mistake, however. If a team can snag him for something in the vicinity of Mike Hampton’s recent contract, or even the 1-yr/$2.5 mil w/incentives deal given to Chan Ho Park, little risk would be involved, but anything more would be a mistake.

Two Phillies signings:

Jamie Moyer 2/16
Chan Ho Park 1/2.5

Jamie Moyer was a nice story last year, recording his lowest FIP since 2003, when he was 40 years old, and seeing his strikeout rates sit above career average for the second consecutive season. Moyer also saw his lowest HR/FB% under his career total. Not much else changed, a slight bump in O-Swing%, and that’s it. Moyer’s almost certain to pitch worse than last year.

The bigger issue here is the length and money to a 46-year-old starting pitcher. The Phillies have a 26-year-old prospect named J.A. Happ who pitched well in limited exposure last season. Happ’s minor league numbers suggest he would be able to at least replicate Moyer’s 2007 or 2006 FIP, if not his 2008 totals. Happ is also going to cost the minimum, giving the champs some money to spend elsewhere if they wished. Signing Moyer seems pretty redundant and more of a signing for nostalgia (or in this case: championship) effect than anything, but we’ll see.

On we go to Chan Ho Park. I talked to Eric after rumors of the signing were coming out, and he informed me of the expectation of Park potentially competing for a rotation spot. Coincidentally that roster spot will go back to Moyer, and Park will land in the bullpen. Park reemerged on the scene last season after a brief stint with the Mets in 2007 and pitched decently; a 4.37 FIP in 95.3 innings. Park still found a way to give up more than a homerun per nine, despite spending his time in the spacious Dodgers Stadium, and a 78.2% strand rate (sure to regress) made his ERA look prettier than it is.

Interestingly, Park found a few extra notches on his fastball last season. Were as in the past Park’s fastball sat around 89, in 2008 his fastball was up to 93. Park’s slider also benefited from increased velocity, which raises the question: where did the velocity come from? Park didn’t face a ton of high leverage situations last season (1.01 pLI), which should be re-emulated by the Phillies. That leaves Park as a middle reliever, and just leaves you wondering if the Phils could’ve plugged in R.J. Swindle instead and expected similar results.

On Friday, the Arizona Diamondbacks decided not to tender an offer of arbitration to Chris Burke. After coming over from the Astros in the Jose Valverde trade, Burke was a massive disappointment, hitting .194/310/.273 in 165 at-bats, yielding an awful -11 wRAA while only playing about 1/4 of a season. In short, he was a total disaster, and the D’Backs decided that they didn’t want to give him a chance to get a raise in arbitration after such a poor season.

For some team looking for a middle infield/utility player option on the cheap, however, Burke should be near the top of the list. Even with his poor 2007 and miserable 2008, his career is .241/.318/.363, which translates to a .304 wOBA. That’s not good, certainly, as Burke has racked up -29.5 wRAA over his career, but that averages out to about -13 runs per 600 plate appearances. That’s not good – Burke almost certainly won’t be an asset offensively going forward.

However, Burke is a good defensive player. In his career, he’s logged 854 innings at second base and has posted a UZR/150 of +10. He’s also logged 1,111 innings in corner outfield spots and posted a UZR/150 of +14. While he’s been used as a utility player, he’s put up very good numbers in his two primary positions of 2B/LF. Combined with positive scouting reports, we can be pretty certain that Burke’s a defensive asset.

As a guy who can be an asset as a defender at multiple positions, he doesn’t have to hit much in order to be a useful utility player, and if his offense rebounds to anything close to his 2006 performance, he’d be a league average starter.

At 29, Burke is simply too young to give up on and assume that his struggles the last two years represent a true collapse of his skills. Jerry Hairston Jr provided a great template for a resurgent player of this skillset, bouncing back from a horrible 2007 to be quite valuable for the Reds in 2008. A smart team with a need for a solid backup middle infielder with upside will bring Burke into camp and find a way to get his glove in the line-up on a semi-regular basis.

All throughout the baseball offseason, rumors circulate regarding potentially new stomping grounds for several players. Some of these players help rumors come to fruition while others stay put amidst the speculation. The most recent player seemingly linked to a new team each and every is Garrett Atkins of the Colorado Rockies. Atkins, 29, has been their everyday third baseman for the last four seasons and would serve as an upgrade for several teams. The extent to which he would upgrade a new team may surprise, however.

In 2006, Garrett had an incredible season with the stick, hitting .329/.409/.556 with 29 home runs. His .410 wOBA led to +47 batting runs. Even with his -7 runs defense, after adjustments for value above replacement level and playing third base, Atkins was a +6 WAR player. +6 wins! In that same season, Matt Holliday posted a .973 OPS with 34 home runs, and was a +5.3 win player. Unfortunately, Atkins would not even come close to repeating that production the next season.

In 2007, Atkins hit .301/.367/.486, with 25 home runs and a .368 wOBA. The dropoff in his numbers led to his offense being worth +21 runs. Defensively, he stunk the field up, costing the team -20 runs at the hot corner. All told, Atkins went from +6 wins to +2 wins, essentially the equivalent of a league average player. The 2008 season did not get any better.

This past season, Atkins’ numbers declined even more, as he hit .286/.328/.452, with 21 home runs and a .337 wOBA. Atkins saw his wOBA drop 42 points from ’06 to ’07, and another 31 points from ’07 to ’08. His offense was worth just +5 runs. Garrett’s defense “improved” to his 2006 form, costing his team just -7 runs as opposed to the atrocious figure in 2007. Put together, his 2008 campaign was worth about +1.8 wins, slightly below average.

Marcel forecasts Atkins as a .357 wOBA hitter next season, which would signal an improvement of 20 points from this past season. This would result in +13 runs offensively. If we consider his defense to be about -9 runs, then Atkins would be a +2.4 win player next season. There are several teams on which a +2.4 win player would serve as an upgrade, but it is not as if these teams are acquiring a top-notch power hitter. His 2007 and 2008 seasons have shown that this is more likely his true talent level.

A few concrete reasons exist for his offensive decline: O-Swing%, Contact Rate, BB%, and K%. Atkins’ O-Swing, which measures the frequency of pitches out of the zone at which he swung, has risen from 14.1% in 2005 to 19.1% in 2008. Adversely, his overall rate of contact has decreased from 88.5% in 2005 to 85.7% in 2008. And, over the last three seasons, in which he played a minimum of 155 games, his raw walks have decreased from 79 to 40 while raw strikeouts have increased from 76 to 100.

Atkins might be a nice fit for a non-Colorado team, given his projected above average worth as well as his being under control for a bit longer, but he is not the same player he was in 2006… at all.