Archive for 2008

A continuation of the series of retrospectives looking back at the regular season and how teams fared. They will be presented, from first to last, in order of their run differential as given by the BaseRuns formula and adjusted for strength of schedule, which I feel is the best measurement of a team’s actual talent level.

Number Thirty: Washington Nationals

And so we come to the end and with little fanfare and even less surprise, we finish off our run of reviews with the Washington Nationals. It may not be surprising that the Nats finished last, but it was closer than you probably thought. Going by straight BaseRuns differential, the Pirates actually finished worse than Washington by a full win, 62.5 to 63.5. However, Pittsburgh had some mildly stiff competition in the NL Central while the Nats faced a weaker overall schedule and there was enough of a spread to help push the Nationals back into the bottom slot.

Washington finished dead last in scoring according to BaseRuns, accruing just 639 runs against 808 runs allowed, which was actually good (bad?) enough to rank 24th overall, though given that they’re a National League team, that’s still pretty bad. Only two other teams in the league (the Reds and the Pirates) were slated to have allowed more. What might be horrifying is that these Nats were all together a better group of players than last year’s version.

Last year, the Nationals defense finished 17th overall according to John Dewan’s Plus/Minus ranking. This year, they improved by 42 plays and ten slots, coming in 7th with almost the entire difference coming out of the middle infield. The return of Cristian Guzman meant that Felipe Lopez could be moved back off shortstop, which helped to solidify the team up the middle. Though perhaps they should have just ditched Lopez on another team sooner as his offense wasn’t up to par while Belliard continued to be adequate at the plate. Guzman even finally put together a respectable season in the final year of his heavily-mocked four-year deal. Nick Johnson and Dmitri Young had too brief roles in the 2008 team, but both were positive in nature and newcomer Elijah Dukes chipped in as well.

The one area that the Nationals did falter in 2008 was in the bullpen. Last year they received an astounding amount of support from the duo of Jon Rauch and Chris Schroder. Together they were worth something around 30 runs over average covering about 130 innings of relief. That’s tremendous, one of the best relief pairs in baseball. In 2008, Schroder was back in Triple-A for some reason and though Rauch was still effective, he was hard-pressed to match 2007 and also ended up in Arizona by the end of the season.

The rotation however boasted zero, that’s right zero, members with above average core numbers. And amazingly, that group was still better than their 2007 counterparts by a good 30 or 40 runs, underscoring just how wretched the 07 rotation was. The change in 208 was that while everyone was mediocre, they were all mediocre. Mike Bacsik was gone and Matt Chico saw his innings cut dramatically. Tim Redding and Odalis Perez actually did fair jobs holding down a regular rotation spot and eating enough innings at just a below average pace.

Washington is a deeply flawed team filled with a farm system that needs help and time. They’ll get some help with the upcoming draft in which they have the first overall pick and though they have signed no one of substance as of yet, they remain constantly linked to big name free agents and thus might make a splash before the winter is done (or started, to be seasonally accurate).

When Jayson Stark broke the story that the Phillies and Raul Ibanez were in hot pursuit of each other, I immediately e-mailed him to see if this was a half-hearted rumor or something serious. Of course, his reply implied that Ibanez to the Phillies was much more of a reality than a rumor. And, as many of us saw today, Ibanez officially inked a 3-yr/$30 mil deal to become the everyday left-fielder of the defending World Series champions. Signing Ibanez officially ends the Pat Burrell chapter in Phillies lore.

I presented Stark with my opinions on the deal, with which he agreed, and then asked him why their front office truly felt Ibanez would be the best bet. His answer, at which we both had a hearty web-chuckle, was that Ruben Amaro, Jr, wants to get better defensively at the position. For those unaware, Pat Burrell has been one of the worst left-fielders in baseball over the last three years.

UZR data has him costing the team -38.2 runs on defense from 2006-2008, the third lowest total for any left-fielder. Manny Ramirez is worst, at -42.6. Guess who comes in second place, slightly worse than Burrell and just a smidgeon better than Ramirez? That’s right, folks: Raul Ibanez.

The Phillies just replaced the third worst left-fielder over the last three seasons with the second worst. That could potentially be okay, though, if Ibanez could at least equal Burrell’s offensive productivity. I mean, they won with Burrell, and if Raul could provide similar offense, he would likely be had for a lesser fee, right? Well, let’s see. Ibanez signed for 3 yrs/$30 mil, an average annual value of $10 mil. Burrell, at most, would have cost the team $16 mil in arbitration for this year, or something like 3-yrs/$45 mil.

Therefore, if Ibanez could equal Burrell’s offense, and equal his putrid defense, then the Phillies would get the same player for $5 mil less. Unfortunately, the offense of Ibanez is not going to be equal to Burrell’s. Burrell is projected to be about +19 runs on offense. Marcel doesn’t like Ibanez, putting him at just +6 runs on offense, but I would tend to think that +11 is a more appropriate figure.

Therefore, we are talking about two players equally bad on defense who would get the same adjustments for position and value above replacement, not average, and one who is almost one full win less valuable on offense. Well, there goes that theory. Ibanez is projected to be worth 1 WAR next season, Burrell at 1.7. Neither is an elite player and both will be overpaid relative to their actual contribution, but if the goal truly involved improving defensively, then this is an absolutely horrendous move. I mean, if the goal is to improve defensively, then going out and signing one of the only two players worse than your lame duck left-fielder really does not help you reach that goal.

Add in that Ibanez is five years older than Burrell and this just makes no sense. Assuming Raul loses 0.25 wins each year, he would be a 0.5 WAR player by the time this contract ends, commanding something like $3-4 mil at fair market value and earning over double that figure. If Burrell were to lose the same 0.25 wins, he would go from 1.70 to 1.45 to 1.20, a total of 4.35 compred to Raul’s 2.25.

The other issue many in the Phillies blogosphere bring up is the fact that Ibanez is a Type A free agent, meaning the Mariners will receive the team’s first round draft pick this year. And even another issue is that he is a left-handed hitter, meaning that the only realistic right-handed threat is Jayson Werth.

Something important to keep in mind here is that there is a big difference between disliking a deal and disliking a player. As a devout Phillies fan, it isn’t as if I’m going to turn the television off whenever Raul bats, or constantly rail on his abilities. I’m going to root for him and hope he pulls through. I like him as a player and a person, but I dislike the move Amaro made in bringing him here, especially if the goal is to improve defense at the position. I think we are well past the stage when statistical analysis is not implemented in each and every front office, and I just cannot fathom the idea that nobody in the Phillies FO understood that Raul cannot field. Or, that they did know, publicly stated the goal of improving defensively, and STILL went out and signed him.

And before I wrap this up, let me just say that I HATE when people try to justify moves by saying a player is “a good clubhouse guy.” Who cares? To me, this is the hitting equivalent of calling a pitcher an “innings eater.” These are inane characteristics that are only used to describe players whose production does not speak for itself. I don’t care if Raul Ibanez can console Eric Bruntlett after a bad game, if he loves to discuss Jim Varney movies with Jamie Moyer, or can teach Geoff Jenkins and Matt Stairs the intricacies of Stratego. I care about wins, and as a fan and analyst, this move is not going to add wins to the team relative to the other alternatives.

If Amaro wanted to add a solid bat to man left-field not named Pat Burrell, why not sign Adam Dunn? In that case, he wouldn’t lose a draft pick and Dunn likely isn’t going to cost that much more than Ibanez. And even if he did, he’s 29 years old! All told, they got a nice player, but one that will serve as a downgrade from the alternatives. I hope this isn’t the sign of things to come in the Amaro era. Regardless, Phillies fans like myself will root on Ibanez in every way possible, but this deal is unequivocally poor.

For five years and 82.5 million. That’s 16.5 million annually, or paying for 3.3 WAR (on a 4.84 mil/WAR scale). Eric covered the Yankees potential super-rotation yesterday, and it appears the Yankees dreams (and everyone else’s nightmare) is becoming a reality.

Kudos to Dave for nailing the years/money here, A.J. Burnett is a 3 WAR starter, and he’s being paid as one. This is a buyers market, and the Yankees are absolutely thriving in it. A lot can be said for spending money and a lot more should be said for Brian Cashman and the Yankees paying these free agents exactly what they’re worth. Of course, the Yankees are one of the few teams who can pay what they’re worth, but that might be a market inefficiency within itself.

What does this mean for the other American League East teams? Well, it pressures the Red Sox into signing Mark Teixeira, and the Rays to get a designated hitter. If we assume the Yankees can work out the kinks with Milwaukee and trade for Mike Cameron and place him in center, their lineup looks something like this:

CA Jorge Posada
1B Nick Swisher
2B Robinson Cano
3B Alex Rodriguez
SS Derek Jeter
LF Johnny Damon
CF Mike Cameron
RF Xavier Nady
DH Hideki Matsui

Marcels projects those nine players to be worth 82.2 offensive runs and seemingly decent defensively. If Cano and Swisher bounce back and the lineup stays relatively healthy, you’re looking at a good lineup, and if they splurge for Teixeira or Manny Ramirez (as a DH) things get really hectic for opposing pitchers. There’s still talk of Andy Pettitte returning, and if not him, possibly another starting pitcher, and that would indicate the Yankees still possess quite a bit of expendable cash.

Much like with Pat Burrell and Raul Ibanez (Eric will have more on that signing later), Bobby Abreu’s suitors have to understand and account his defensive shortcomings in order to accurately project his worth. Jon Heyman is reporting the Chicago Cubs, Los Angeles Dodgers, Los Angeles Angels of Anaheim, and Tampa Bay Rays as potential suitors for the soon to be 35-year-old. The Angels and Rays plan on using Abreu as a designated hitter while the Dodgers and Cubs want to use Abreu in left and right field respectively.

With the exception of 2007, Abreu’s wRAA has exceeded 20 each season since 1997, his first part-time season in the majors. Last year Abreu notched 22.4, an while Abreu is not quite the hitter he was in the late 1990’s or early 2000’s, Marcels still has him projected at 13.3. As a DH, Abreu’s value is going to come near teammate Jason Giambi’s value, but as a corner outfielder some team is throwing away money.

UZR has Abreu at -25.9 over 150 games, PMR at -12, Chone at -11, and Dewan’s +/- at -25 plays (-22 runs), for an average of -15 to -17 runs defensively. Noticeably that all but wipes away Abreu’s offensive value and we have yet to apply a positional adjustment of -7.5 runs or a replacement level adjustment (20*(612/700) which result in Abreu being worth 0.7 WAR. However as a DH, Abreu shoots up slightly more than a half-win to 1.3 WAR. That’s the difference in market value of about three million, and if Abreu repeats his 2008 performance he’ll be worth over 2 WAR.

For those NL teams without the DH role at their disposal, signing Bobby Abreu is going to result in some less than optimal results. That suggests both teams should aim elsewhere, or look within their organization for their next corner outfielder, but as we discovered with Raul Ibanez, not all teams have a firm understanding of how defensive shortcomings can effect total value.

There are alot of questions in various threads in the forums and in the blog entries over the past few months as to what all these stats mean, especially those in which I’ve played a role. And David has a great series of “getting to know”, and he posts references, etc.

The intent of this thread is for me to capture all those questions, and provide a more complete and nuanced set of responses.

In this thread, no question is too simple or too complex. The question itself doesn’t even have to make sense. The only criteria to posting here is that you are confused.

Think of me as “Dear Abby”.

Fire away, and I’ll answer as I can…

Update: Just to let you know I have more answers starting here. You can make more comments in this thread.

You cannot help but be impressed by the Colorado Rockies’ middle infield depth. The Major League club has infielders Troy Tulowitzki and Clint Barmes, as well as the likes of Omar Quintanilla, Jeff Baker and Ian Stewart (the latter two profile better as corner infielders, though) serving as back-ups.

At the minor league level, the club has Jonathan Herrera, Chris Nelson, Eric Young Jr., and Hector Gomez – all of whom are currently on the 40-man roster. The Rockies also lost speedy A-ball infielder Everth Cabrera to the San Diego Padres in the recent Rule 5 draft (although he could be returned if he is unable to stick in the Majors for all of 2009). Two more interesting minor league infielders were also left unprotected during the Rule 5 draft – Corey Wimberly and Daniel Mayora – mainly due to the overwhelming depth in the organization.

Of the six players who do not have (all but) guaranteed roles in the Majors in 2009, Herrera is the closest to helping out at the Major League level. He made his MLB debut in 2008 and appeared in 28 games for Colorado, while posting a line of .230/.277/.279. The 24-year-old spent the majority of 2008 in Triple-A, where he managed a batting average of .310 and stole 15 bases.

Young is not far behind Herrera. Although he has yet to appear in the Majors, Young had a solid 2008 season in Double-A where he hit .290/.384/.392 with 46 stolen bases in 105 games. He broke out in a big way in the Arizona Fall League after the regular season concluded. Young hit .430/.504/.640 with another 20 stolen bases (in 21 attempts) in 31 games.

Nelson was the club’s first-round draft pick in 2004 and he realized his potential in 2007 with an excellent offensive season in High-A ball. Unfortunately, he struggled with injuries in 2008 and hit just .237/.321/.346 in 283 Double-A at-bats. He should return to that level in 2009, but could move quickly if he is fully healthy.

Wimberly has almost zero power but he can run like the wind and has stolen 181 bases in 354 career games. He hit .291 in Double-A last season and showed a willingness to get on base via the walk – at least more so than in other seasons. Daniel Mayora will likely begin 2009 in Double-A with Nelson, while Hector Gomez should visit High-A ball.

Every single one of those minor league middle infielders has enough potential to be considered amongst the organization’s top 25-30 prospects. That, ladies and gentlemen, is what you call depth.

For the last month or so, we have primarily been focusing on dollar valuations and factors outside of offense that need to be added into any type of evaluation. This has enabled us to determine the fair market values for several players as well as figure the fee certain teams are paying for each added win. One player left out of such posts is Manny Ramirez. Per reader request, we will figure out exactly what Manny’s fair market value is, taking into account his offense, defense, and baserunning.

Offense
One of the best hitters of all time, Manny is still one of the best hitters today, even at 36 years old. In 2008, he hit .332/.430/.601, good for a .432 wOBA and +56 runs above average, his best offensive season since 2002. In fact, via WPA/LI, 2008 was the best offensive season of Manny’s entire career! Moving forward, Marcel projects Manny to produce a .389 wOBA in 2009, which would translate to +30 runs above average. Not as potent as last year by any stretch, but still more effective offensively than the likes of Adam Dunn, Pat Burrell, Bobby Abreu, and the recently-signed Raul Ibanez.

Defense
Defensive excellence and Manny Ramirez, quite simply, do not belong in the same sentence. Unless, of course, the sentence is sarcastic and designed to point out how much of a liability he can be with the glove. UZR has him all over the place since 2002, ranging from +4 runs back then to -23 runs in 2005. From 2005-2008, his UZR numbers are -23, -20, -18, -5. His defense looked substantially better in 2008, but that does not make him solid in the field. A convervative UZR projection would peg Manny as a -10 runs fielder in 2009.

Baserunning/Adjustments
Via BP’s equivalent baserunning runs, Manny was worth +0.25 runs on the bases last year, and -2.05 runs the year before. Then, for whatever reason, the data does not seem to be there. Let’s call him -1 run on the bases, not terrible, not impressive.

As a corner outfielder, Manny should be docked -7.5 runs per 162 games. Projected to play 150 games next season, Manny’s prorated adjustment would be -6.9 runs. To determine value above replacement, and not average, the +20 runs per 700 PA also needs to be added. Prorating that, based on 584 projected plate appearances, adjusts this to +16.5 runs.

Overall
Adding the rounded results together: +30 + 17 – 10 – 7 – 1 = +29. Manny is a +2.9 win player in 2009. Assuming a going rate of $5 mil/win, Manny’s fair market value right now is $14.5 mil. A 3-yr deal, in a vacuum, would be worth closer to $42 mil. Suffice it to say, he is going to make much more than this. It is too difficult to quantify the merchandise and ticket sales that he will add to a team, but even with that, he does not seem to be worth the $22.5 mil/yr the Dodgers offered him earlier. Then again, accounting for the value of the actual marginal wins he is adding, he could very well be worth that fee.

Then again, perhaps the team feels that his -5 defense in 2008 is more a sign of things to come than the putrid numbers posted from 2005-07. If that is the case, then they are valuing Manny as a +34 run player, or +3.4 wins. That fair market value would be $17 mil/yr, and with the ticket sales and merchandise that would follow, it does seem more realistic that he could be worth about $22 mil/yr. For him to truly command a deal that impressive, he would have to be worth closer to four wins offensively than three, show that his defensive shortcomings are closer to a half-win docked rather than two full wins, and really keep a fanbase entertained.

Assuming -10 runs defensively, for Manny to truly command $22.5 mil/yr, he would need to be +45 runs on offense/baserunning combined. 45 runs offense + 17 over replacement – 10 defense – 7 position = +45. +45 runs = +4.5 wins. +4.5 wins * $5 mil/win = $22.5 mil.

Amidst all of the excitement surrounding the Paulino-Jaramillo deal, the Waechter/Farnsworth/Horacio signings, and the impending fate of Ramon Vazquez, many of us missed the interesting scenario presented by one Roy Oswalt. The 31-year old ace of the Drayton Gang has expressed interest in restructuring his contract. Roy wants to win and feels that his salary may hinder GM Ed Wade from signing someone like Ben Sheets.

Oswalt is due to earn $14 mil in 2009, $15 mil in 2010, and $16 mil in 2011. All three of those seasons are guaranteed under the 5-yr/$73 mil contract extension he signed during the 2006 season. The deal also includes a club option for 2012 worth $16 mil, that Oswalt can opt out of for a buyout lower than the $2 mil designated by the team. The exact details of his proposal are not known, but Richard Justice is speculating that it may involve Oswalt decreasing his 2009 salary to something like $6 mil in exchange for a couple more years added to the current deal.

Restructuring contracts is very tricky, because the Players Union is not very likely to allow a player to receive less than he signed for. However, this sort of restructuring is not entirely taboo. In fact, one instance of such a move occurred in 2006 with Tom Glavine and the New York Mets. Glavine had signed a 4-yr/$42.5 mil deal to pitch in New York from 2003-2006. He was set to earn $10.5 mil in 2006, but restructured the deal to pay him $7.5 mil. Added onto the contract were options, both club and player, for the 2007 season.

Initially, Glavine’s $10.5 mil included half of the money deferred at 6% interest. Upon restructuring the deal to $7.5 mil, the deferred total fell to $2.5 mil, meaning that, no matter what, he would earn $5.25 mil and then the rest of that year’s salary deferred at 6% interest. The player option for 2007 would earn him $5.5 mil with an increase of $1 mil each for logging 180, 190, and 200 innings. The club option was worth $12 mil. In either case, if his salary fell below $14 mil, he could earn that amount through bonuses and incentives.

In essence, Glavine restructured his deal to pay him a lower fee in 2006, yet guarantee himself security for the 2007 season.

Oswalt is likely looking to do something similar, in terms of trading current money for a bit of extra security in the future. Perhaps he will not look to reduce his 2009 salary by $8-9 mil, but I can definitely see him renegotiating to earn something like $8 mil in 2009 in exchange for the 2012 season becoming guaranteed and the option shifting to 2013.

Oswalt had a “down year” in 2008, but Marcel projects him at a 3.70 FIP in 185 IP. Translated to runs and wins, as well as a slight bonus for pitching that amount of innings, Oswalt’s true talent level calls him a +3.7 win pitcher next season. Were he to sign a 1-yr deal at fair market value, the deal would be close to $18 mil. He is already signed to a deal that “underpays” him, and now he is looking to earn even less than that so the team has a better shot at competing next season.

Who knows if anything will come of this, as Ed Wade has not publicly discussed the situation, but it sure would be interesting if the team could afford Ben Sheets due to Oswalt restructuring. He could not accept a paycut, as the union prohibits such practices. His decreased salary in 2009 would have to be made up for in the form of more money and/or years down the road.

Drayton does not want to go over $100 mil on his payroll, and his supposed unwillingness to be flexible bugs me. The team was not that good in 2008, vastly outperformed their talent level, and realistically has little chance at contending in 2009. Signing someone like Sheets will not guarantee them the division or wild card, but at the very least shows someone like Oswalt that the team is serious about winning. Regardless, I find it quite odd that McLane wouldn’t be willing to up the payroll by whatever it takes to sign Sheets, or someone along those lines.

Tonight we’ve completed the phasing out of Runs Created (RC) and Runs Created per 27 Outs (RC/27). In their place you will find two run stats based off wOBA, which is a sounder metric than the previously used Runs Created.

Big thanks to Tangotiger for both creating the stats and walking me through how to calculate them correctly!

wRC – This is total runs created based of wOBA. It is calculated as (((wOBA – lgwOBA) / wOBAScale) + (lgR/PA)) * PA

wRAA – This is the number of runs above average based off wOBA. It is calculated as (wOBA – lgwOBA) / wOBAScale * PA

wOBAScale is typically around 1.15, but changes slightly from year to year depending on the weights used in wOBA.

Also, the previously named BRAA has been renamed to RE24 to clarify that it is based off the 24 base/out states.

Earlier today, we took a look at the potential super-rotation the New York Yankees may feature next year. They already signed CC Sabathia to a monster deal and are considered the front-runners for both A.J. Burnett and Derek Lowe. With Mike Mussina retiring, and Andy Pettitte’s uncertainty, the aforementioned three would join forces with Chien-Ming Wang and Joba Chamberlain to improve the rotation by approximately six full wins above replacement.

Brian Cashman left the Winter Meetings today to fly to Texas, in order to make a final offer to Andy Pettitte. The one-year offer is believed to be worth $10 mil, a paycut from Pettitte’s $16 mil salary in 2008. While Andy has not discussed wanting more than his fee last season, he has made it clear that he does not want to take a paycut. Cashman said that the offer for Pettitte would be to claim the final spot in the starting rotation. Assuming that the decision here is between Lowe and Pettitte, let’s weigh the pros and cons.

First off, what are their true talent level projections for 2009? Marcel forecasts Lowe to produce a 3.67 FIP in 185 IP. I would bump that up to around 3.80 given that he is going from the NL to the AL, so we can call him a 3.80 FIP pitcher in 185 IP. Compared to the replacement level, with a slight reward for pitching all those innings himself, and not allowing a poor reliever to enter, those numbers translate to +35 runs, +3.5 WAR.

Pettitte is projected to log 182 innings, with a 3.98 FIP. To make the comparison a bit easier, let’s bump him up to 185 IP, the same figure as Lowe, with a 4.00 FIP. Factoring in the same replacement level and slight reward, Pettitte in 2009 comes out to +31 runs, +3.1 WAR.

Therefore, Lowe is worth a bit under a half-win better than Pettitte based on their true talent levels. The fair market value for each, assuming $4.8 mil/win, would be $16.8 mil for Lowe and $14.9 mil for Pettitte. Replacing Lowe with Pettitte in the super-rotation will cost them 0.4 wins, meaning they would be worth +19.4 wins as opposed to +13.8 in 2008. This is still a substantial improvement, meaning the differences between Pettitte and Lowe are not that significant.

In terms of salary, however, it isn’t likely that either will earn their fair market value. As I mentioned earlier, Pettitte is being offered a take-it-or-leave-it, 1-yr/$10 mil deal. With a 10% discount rate factored in for the security of a long-term deal, Lowe would sign for 3-yrs/45 mil, or 4-yrs/60 mil. Therefore, that extra half-win of Lowe’s value would cost around $5 mil.

As commenter Steve Sanders pointed out, though, signing Pettitte instead of Lowe would give Cashman greater flexibility in the future. Pettitte would sign for a 1-yr deal, be an above average pitcher less than a half of a win worse than Lowe, and after this season, come off the books, freeing up more money to be spent elsewhere. In the past, Cashman would sign a plethora of players to multi-year deals, hamstringing himself in the process.

With Lowe, if we assume a dropoff of 0.35 wins per year, over the course of a 3-yr deal, he would go from 3.50 to 3.15 in 2010, to 2.80 in 2011. Perhaps the contention of those fans in favor of bringing back Pettitte for the 1-yr deal as opposed to signing Lowe is that they will get similar value in 2009, and be able to avoid paying $15 mil to a 2.80 win player in 2011, when some of their prospects may be ready for full-time rotation duty.

What say you, Yanks fans? Do you want Pettitte back for one year, or Lowe for a few years?