Pulled fly balls, to me, are hitter highlights. Just as strikeouts showcase the nastiness of pitchers, and groundballs allow infielders to demonstrate what they can do, balls in the air promote the powerful sluggers who hit them.

I’m including “pulled” in the description because plenty of research over the past decade has established that pulled fly balls are more productive than their straightaway and opposite-field counterparts. We here at FanGraphs have certainly jumped on that trend. Even if you ignore all my articles about Isaac Paredes, our writing about hitters who either pull the ball a lot or should pull the ball a lot is voluminous.

With that introduction in mind: This article is about pitchers. Bear with me for just a minute, and I’ll explain to you how I got here. It took me a while to wrap my head around why pulled fly balls perform so well. It’s not like the wall is much closer to that side, at least not consistently, and given that both lefties and righties display this trend, that clearly can’t be the thing. But thinking about how it actually feels to swing helped clue me in.

To broadly generalize, hitters make contact with the ball out in front of the plate when they pull it. The angle of the bat starts pointing toward the pull side as soon as it crosses the plane running parallel with the front of home plate. For the most part, because bat speed and “attack angle” — the vertical angle of the bat path — increase throughout a swing, batters tend to hit the ball harder when they catch the ball out in front and put in in the air. As a result, pretty much every hitter produces better on pulled air balls. Read the rest of this entry »

Hello, and welcome to Prospect Week! (Well, closer to Prospect Fortnight — as you can probably tell from the navigation widget above, the fun will continue well into next week, including the launch of our Top 100.) I’m not your regular host – that’d be Eric Longenhagen – but not to worry, you’ll get all the Eric you can handle as he and the team break down all things minor leagues, college baseball, and MLB draft. I’m just here to set the stage, and in support of that goal, I have some research to present on prospect grades and eventual major league equivalency.

When reading coverage of the minor leagues, I often find myself wondering what it all means. The Future Value scale does a great job of capturing the essence of a prospect in a single number, but it doesn’t translate neatly to what you see when you watch a big league game. Craig Edwards previously investigated how prospect grades have translated into surplus value, but I wanted to update things from an on-field value perspective. Rather than look at what it would cost to replace prospect production in free agency, I decided to measure the distribution in potential outcomes at each Future Value tier.

To do that, I first gathered my data. I took our prospect lists from four seasons, 2019-22, and looked at all of the prospects with a grade of 45 FV or higher. I separated them into two groups — hitters and pitchers — then took projections for every player in baseball three years down the line. For example, I paired the 2019 prospect list with 2022 projections and the 2022 prospect list with 2025 projections. In this way, I came up with a future expectation for each player.

I chose to use projections for one key reason: They let us get to an answer more quickly. In Craig’s previous study, he looked at results over the next nine years of major league play. I don’t have that kind of time – I’m trying to use recent prospect grades to get at the way our team analyzes the game today. If I used that methodology, the last year of prospect lists I could use would be 2015, in Kiley McDaniel’s first term as FanGraphs’ prospect analyst.

Another benefit of using projections is that they’re naturally resistant to the sample-size-related issues that always crop up in exercises like this. A few injuries, one weird season, a relatively small prospect cohort, and you could be looking at some strange results. Should we knock a prospect if his playing time got blocked, or if his team gamed his service time? I don’t think so, and projections let us ignore all that. I normalized all batters to a 600 plate appearance projection and all pitchers to a 200 innings pitched projection.

I decided to break future outcomes down into tiers. More specifically, I grouped WAR outcomes as follows. I counted everything below 0.5 WAR per season as a “washout,” including those players who didn’t have major league projections three years later. Given that we project pretty much everyone, that’s mostly players who had either officially retired or never appeared in full-season ball. I graded results between 0.5 and 1.5 WAR as “backup.” I classified seasons between 1.5 and 2.5 WAR as “regular,” as in a major league regular. Finally, 2.5-4 WAR merited an “above average” mark, while 4-plus WAR got a grade of “star.” You could set these breakpoints differently without too much argument from me; they’re just a convenient way of showing the distribution. There’s nothing particularly magical about the cutoff lines, but you have to pick something to display the data, and a simple average of WAR projections probably isn’t right.

With that said, let’s get to the results. My sample included 685 hitters from 45-80 FV. Allowing for some noise at the top end due to small sample size, the distribution looks exactly like you’d hope:

Consider the 55 FV line for an explanation. Of the players we graded as 55 FV prospects, 17% look washed three years later – Jeter Downs, a 2020 55 FV, for example. Another 17% have proven to be backup-caliber, like 2022 55 FV Curtis Mead, or 2019 55 FV Taylor Trammell if you don’t think Mead’s trajectory is set just yet. Continuing down the line, 30% look like big league regulars – 2021 55 FV Alek Thomas, perhaps. A full 31% appear to be above-average major league contributors three years later, like 2019 55 FV Sean Murphy or 2021 55 FV Royce Lewis. Finally, 6% project as stars three years later – Jackson Merrill, a 55 FV in 2022, feels appropriate as an example.

Two things immediately jump out to me when looking at this data. First, the “above average” and “star” columns increase at every tier break, and the “washout” column decreases at every tier break. In other words, the better a player’s grade, the more likely they are to be excellent, while the worse their grade, the more likely they are to bust. That’s a great sign for the reliability of our grades; they’re doing what they purport to do, essentially.

Second, each row feels logically consistent. The 45 FV prospects are most likely to bust, next-most-likely to end up as backups, and so on. The 45+ FVs look like the 45 FVs, only with a better top end; their chances of ending up above average are meaningfully better. The 50 FVs are a grab bag; their outcomes vary widely, and plenty of those outcomes involve being a viable major leaguer. By the time you hit the 55 and 60 FV prospects, you’re looking at players who end up as above-average contributors a lot of the time. The gap between 55 and 60 seems clear, too; the 60 FVs are far more likely to turn into stars, more or less. Finally, there are only six data points above 60 FV, so that’s mostly a stab in the dark.

This outcome pleases me greatly. Looking at that chart correlates strongly with how I already perceived the grades. For a refresher, roughly 30 prospects in a given year grade out as a 55 FV or above, give or take a few. Something like three quarters of those tend to be hitters. That means that in a given year, 20-ish prospects look like good bets to deliver average-regular-or-better performance. The rest of the Top 100? They’re riskier, with a greater chance of ending up in a part-time role and a meaningfully lower chance of becoming a star. But don’t mistake likelihood for certainty – plenty of 55 and 60 FVs still end up at or below replacement level, and 45 FVs turn into stars sometimes. Projecting prospect performance is hard!

How should you use this table? I like to think of Future Value in terms of outcome distributions, and I think that this does a good job of it. Should a team prefer to receive two 50 FV prospects in a trade, or a 55 FV and a 45 FV? You can add up the outcome distributions and get an idea of what each combination of prospects looks like. Here are the summed probabilities of those two groups:

Another way of saying that: If you go with the two-player package that has the 55 and 45 FV prospects, you’re looking at a higher chance of developing a star. You’re also looking at a greater chance of ending up with at least one complete miss, and therefore lower odds of ending up with two contributors. Adding isn’t exactly the right way to handle this, but it’s a good shorthand for quick comparisons. If you want to get more in depth, I built this little calculator, which lets you answer a simple question: For a given set of prospects, what are the odds of ending up with at least X major leaguers of Y quality or better? You can make a copy of this sheet, define X and Y for yourself, and get an answer. In our case, the odds of ending up with at least one above-average player (or better) are 40.7% for the two 50s and 41.4% for the 45/55 split. The odds of ending up with two players who are at least big league regulars? That’d be 28.1% for the two 50 FVs, and 16.1% for the 45/55 pairing. Odds of at least one star? That’s 4% for the two 50 FVs and 6% for the 45/55 group. In other words, the total value is similar, but the shape is meaningfully different.

For example, you’d have to add together a ton of 50 FV prospects to get as high of a chance of finding a star as you would from one 60 FV. On the other hand, if you have three 50 FVs, the odds of ending up with at least a solid contributor are quite high. Meanwhile, even 60 FV prospects end up as backups or worse around a quarter of the time. That description of the relative risks and rewards makes more sense to me than converting players into some nebulous surplus value. Prospects are all about possibility, so representing them that way tracks analytically for me.

Take another look at the beautiful cascade of probabilities in that table of outcomes for hitting prospects, because we’re about to get meaningfully less pretty. Let’s talk about pitching prospects. Here, the outcomes are less predictable:

I have tons of takeaways here. First, there are substantially fewer pitching prospects ranked, particularly as 50 FVs and above. Clearly, that’s a good decision by the prospect team, because even the highest-ranked pitchers turn into backups at a reasonable clip. Pitching prospects just turn into major league pitchers in a less predictable way, or so it would appear from the data.

Second, there are fewer stars among the pitchers than the hitters. That’s true if you look at 2025 projections, too. There are only six pitchers projected for 4 WAR or higher, while 42 hitters meet that cutoff. It’s also true if you look at the results on the field in 2024; 36 hitters and 12 pitchers (22 by RA9-WAR) eclipsed the four-win mark. You should feel free to apply some modifiers to your view of pitcher value if you think that WAR treats them differently than hitters, but within the framework, the relative paucity of truly outstanding outcomes is noticeable.

Another thing worth mentioning here is that pitchers don’t develop the same way that hitters do. Sometimes one new pitch or an offseason of velocity training leads to a sudden change in talent level in a way that just doesn’t happen as frequently with hitters. Tarik Skubal was unmemorable in his major league debut (29 starts, with a 4.34 ERA and 5.09 FIP). Then he made just 36 (very good) starts over the next two years due to injuries. Then he was the best pitcher in baseball in 2024. Good luck projecting that trajectory. Perhaps three-year-out windows of pitcher performance just aren’t enough thanks to the way they continue to develop even after reaching the majors.

There’s one other limitation of measuring pitchers this way: I don’t have a good method for dealing with the differential between reliever and starter valuation. Normalizing relievers to 200 innings pitched doesn’t make a ton of sense, but handling them on their own also feels strange, and I don’t have a good way of converting reliever WAR to the backup/regular/star scale that I’m using here. A 3-WAR reliever wouldn’t be an above-average player, they’d be the best reliever in baseball. I settled for putting them up to 200 innings and letting that over-allocaiton of playing time handle the different measures of success. For example, a reliever projected for 3.6 WAR in 200 innings would check in around 1.2 for a full season of bullpen work. That’s a very good relief pitcher projection; only 20 players meet that bar in our 2025 Depth Charts projections.

In other words, the tier names still mostly work for relievers, but you should apply your own relative positional value adjustments just like normal. A star reliever is less valuable than a star outfielder. A star starting pitcher might be more valuable than a star outfielder, depending on the degree of luminosity, but that one’s much closer. This outcome table can guide you in terms of what a player might turn into. It can’t tell you how to value each of those outcomes, because that’s context-specific and open to interpretation.

This study isn’t meant to be the definitive word on what prospects are “worth.” Grades aren’t innate things, they’re just our team’s best attempt at capturing the relative upside and risk of yet-to-debut players. Being a 60 FV prospect doesn’t make you 17% likely to turn into a star; rather, our team is trying to identify players with s relatively good chance of stardom by throwing a big FV on them. And teams aren’t beholden to our grades, either. They might have better (or worse!) internal prospect evaluation systems.

With those caveats in mind, I still find this extremely useful in my own consumption of minor league content. The usual language you hear when people discuss prospect trades – are they on a Top 100, where do they rank on a team list, what grade are they – can feel arcane, impenetrable even. Breaking it down in terms of likelihood of outcome just works better for me, and I hope that it also provides valuable information to you when you’re reading the team’s excellent breakdown of all things prospect-related this week.

Major league job boards don’t exist, at least not for players. You can’t walk past some mythical player’s union clubhouse, see a sign that says “Team seeking middle reliever, please tear off a number and call it to apply,” and find a job that way. The team calls you, or emails your agent, and they do that after working up their own list of targets independently. Or at least, that’s what they tell us. But after seeing the Minnesota Twins acquire the same type of player for the third year running, as they did in signing Harrison Bader to a one-year deal this week, I’m not so sure.

Bader’s deal is for one year and $6.25 million, with bonuses that could kick in another $2 million. That’s a reasonable deal for a quality backup, and that’s exactly what Bader looks like. He’s put up between 300 and 450 plate appearances in six of the past seven seasons – the only year he missed that mark was in the COVID-shortened 2020 campaign. At first, that was because he couldn’t stay on the field, but in recent years, he’s turned into a defensive specialist and righty platoon bat.

How much do the Twins like those two roles? Well, in 2023, they traded for Michael A. Taylor, a defensive specialist and righty platoon bat, and then gave him 110 starts in center field. Sure, they had Byron Buxton, but that year Buxton never took the field, all the better to protect him from injuries. Taylor was so good that he got a new deal in free agency to head to Pittsburgh – so the Twins went out and traded for Manuel Margot, a “defensive specialist” and righty platoon bat. Read the rest of this entry »

Today, we released the first run of our playoff odds for the 2025 season. With both the ZiPS and Steamer projections loaded in and playing time projections added to the mix, the FanGraphs supercomputer (okay, fine, our cloud services account) can get cranking and spit out some predictions. As is customary, I’ll walk through my first thoughts on them, while later today, Michael Baumann will contribute his own takeaways on the teams most likely to surprise our model. Let’s quickly walk through the process, and then get to the takeaways.

The model itself remains simple. We use those aggregated production and playing time numbers I mentioned earlier to create team-level projections, then use BaseRuns to turn individual outcome projections into scoring and run prevention. That gives us team strength against a neutral opponent. We use those values to simulate the season 20,000 times. The odds are a summary of those simulations as of earlier this morning. That might sound intuitive, but intuition doesn’t always match reality, so let’s go division-by-division to look at how our model got there and what I think of it. Read the rest of this entry »

If you had to associate a single current major leaguer with throwing sinkers, Framber Valdez would be toward the top of the list. His standout career is all about throwing sinkers and keeping the ball on the ground. So imagine my surprise when I was perusing a leaderboard of starters who used their secondaries most frequently with two strikes in 2024. The top of that list is dotted with pitchers who confounded my classification system: We’ve got Corbin Burnes, Graham Ashcraft, and Clarke Schmidt there representing the cutter brigade. Most of the other pitchers in the top 10 mix in cutters liberally with two strikes. Then we’ve got Valdez, in 10th and looking sorely out of place.

Train your eyes on Valdez, and you’ll start to ask yourself: What’s going on here? In some ways, his statistics are consistent to the point of monotony. Take a look at his strikeout and walk rates over the years, plus some league-adjusted run prevention numbers:

After some early-career wildness, Valdez has produced a string of near-identical seasons. But while doing that, he’s cut back on using his sinker to finish off hitters. I know what you’re thinking: Sure, to throw his wipeout curveball. But nope! It’s a changeup story:

Read the rest of this entry »

Ketel Marte was one of the best 10 hitters in baseball in 2024. That’s just an objective fact – or at least as objective as facts can get in baseball. Our calculation of WAR? He was 10th among hitters. Baseball Reference has him 10th as well. Baseball Prospectus put him in seventh place. That’s not surprising; he set career highs in home runs, league-adjusted OBP and slugging, and wRC+. He played solid defense and even added a little value on the basepaths.

He was one of the best 10 hitters in baseball in 2019, too. In fact, he’s the only player to crack the top 10 in both 2019 and 2024. That’s wild. Aaron Judge, Mookie Betts, Shohei Ohtani, Corey Seager, Juan Soto, Bryce Harper, José Ramírez – they all played in both years. None of them – none! – managed the double that Marte did. This isn’t some weird defensive value issue, either: He’s the only hitter with a top-10 wRC+ in both years.

Those in between years? Don’t look too closely. Marte totaled 9.1 WAR across the 2020-2023 campaigns. He posted 6.3 WAR in each of 2019 and 2024. In that 2020-2023 span, he was 64th among hitters in total WAR. He had two seasons of roughly average offensive production in that span, and produced at a 3 WAR/600 pace instead of the 6.3 WAR/600 pace from 2019 and 2024. So it’s safe to say he’s streaky – one hitter some years, and a different guy other years. Read the rest of this entry »

It’s been a quiet winter in the AL Central. After Michael Wacha signed an extension at the beginning of the offseason, the division’s five teams combined to add only one deal worth more than $20 million in guaranteed money; that was Shane Bieber’s surgery-affected pillow contract with the Guardians. Now, finally, we can add another to the ledger, courtesy of the Royals. On Wednesday, they signed Carlos Estévez to a two-year, $22.2 million deal with a club option tacked on the end, as ESPN’s Jeff Passan first reported.

The Royals came into the winter looking for relief help. It’s not the only place their roster needed a glow-up – even after trading for Jonathan India, they could still use another bat or two, especially in the corner outfield – but the bullpen was also a particular area of need. Last year’s Royals made the playoffs on the back of pitching, but their starters were the ones doing the heavy lifting, not their relievers. Deadline acquisition Lucas Erceg was the best of the group by a large margin, and John Schreiber was the only other reliever with impressive full-season numbers.

It’s not so much that a team can’t make the playoffs with such a thin bullpen – obviously, the Royals did. But they did it by the skin of their teeth at 86-76, and that despite spectacular seasons from Cole Ragans, Seth Lugo, and Wacha. Counting on those three to combine for 94 starts, 12.9 WAR, and ERAs in the low 3.00s across the board again would be wishful thinking. Additionally, they no longer have last year’s fourth starter Brady Singer, who was Cincinnati’s return in the India trade.

The 2024 bullpen finished last in baseball in shutdowns – appearances that increased win probability by six percentage points or more – and fifth worst in win probability added. Those are outcome statistics, not process ones, but the process statistics weren’t exactly pretty either. Kansas City was middle of the pack in WAR (3.6), 20th in ERA (4.13), 26th in K-BB% (12.0%). It’s not just that this team didn’t have a “true closer” – its bullpen was light on contributors from top to bottom. Read the rest of this entry »

Here’s a sentence that you probably didn’t expect to see a few years ago: The Pittsburgh Pirates were one of the most exciting teams of 2024. They had the Rookie of the Year and an instant contender for best pitcher in baseball in Paul Skenes. Jared Jones was electric. They’re chock full of young hitting prospects. And let’s reiterate: Paul Skenes!

As you might expect, the Pirates hit this offseason with some momentum. It’s hard to find superstars, but Skenes is one of the best five pitchers on the planet, and honestly, I think he might be the best, period. This is the type of winter that lends itself to going for it. The hype will likely never be greater. Add a star or two around Skenes, fill out the bottom of the lineup, and this team could win a weak NL Central. Come playoff time, no one in the world would want to face the Pirates. So it’s with some remorse that I announce their latest signings. On Monday, lefty reliever Tim Mayza agreed to a one-year, $1.15 million contract; on Tuesday, utilityman Adam Frazier followed suit with a one-year, $1.525 million pact.

Frazier was a fun story the last time he was on the Pirates. In the depths of their despair, he was a rare burst of energy, Luis Arraez before Arraez hit the big time. He rarely struck out, rarely hit homers, and caused chaos by putting the ball in play even without blazing speed. Heck, he even drew a nice trade return when the Pirates sent him to the Padres ahead of the 2021 deadline, headlined by Jack Suwinski and Tucupita Marcano, both of whom have made contributions to the big league club. Read the rest of this entry »

Last week, Mets owner Steve Cohen addressed his team’s ongoing contract negotiations with Pete Alonso. During a panel discussion in front of fans, he expounded on the process at length:

“We made a significant offer to Pete. He’s entitled to explore his market. That’s what he is doing. Personally, this has been an exhausting conversation and negotiation. I mean, Soto was tough — this is worse. A lot of it is, we made a significant offer … I don’t like the structures that are being presented back to us. It’s highly asymmetric against us. And I feel strongly about it. I will never say no. There’s always the possibility. But the reality is we’re moving forward. And as we continue to bring in players, the reality is it becomes harder to fit Pete into what is a very expensive group of players that we already have. That’s where we are. And I am being brutally honest. I don’t like the negotiations. I don’t like what’s been presented to us. Listen, maybe that changes. Certainly, I’ll always stay flexible. If it stays this way, I think we are going to have to get used to the fact that we may have to go forward with the existing players that we have.”

That quote caught my eye for a few reasons. First, the length! That’s not a no comment or even close to one. He noted a few specific points where the negotiations had gotten stuck, mentioned that the deal gets less likely as the offseason goes on, and at least nodded in the direction of how an Alonso offer affects team construction. That’s not exactly par for the course when owners give quotes; I’m looking at you, Bill DeWitt Jr., who early this winter said, “The best way to build a championship club is to have good young players.”

Second, I kept coming back to “highly asymmetric against us.” I can’t help it. I’m a contract nerd. I immediately started thinking about what that could mean. The possibilities are nearly endless. Accumulators? Collars? Conditional ownership share? Alonso gets to choose the roster every Tuesday?

Well, probably not. Agent Scott Boras threw some cold water on my ideas in a response. “Pete’s free-agent contract structure request[s] are identical to the standards and practices of other clubs who have signed similarly situated qualifying-offer/all-star level players,” he told The Athletic’s Will Sammon. “Nothing different. Just established fairness standards.”
Read the rest of this entry »

Read the rest of this entry »