The Pirates are having a relatively successful 2023, as the team has defied expectations and is currently in second place in the NL Central, just a half-game behind the first-place Brewers. The record on the field isn’t the only thing coming up Pirate this year: the team successfully signed Bryan Reynolds to an eight-year, $106.75 million contract extension, ending the eternal and well-founded speculation about which team the Bucs would trade him to and when. With Ke’Bryan Hayes already signed to a $70 million extension — then the largest dollar figure for a contract in franchise history — Pittsburgh has discussed locking up two other foundational talents, Mitch Keller and Oneil Cruz.

Despite the Pirates signing a nine-figure deal with Reynolds, it would be a mistake to assume that it foreshadows a new era in team spending that gets them into the next tier up in the spending ranks. The last time they finished even 20th in baseball in payroll was 20 years ago, in 2003, and they’re usually in the bottom five. There they will stay, but if they spend a good proportion of that self-limited budget on their best young talent, they get their best shots at the NL Central and don’t explicitly look like a stop for young players between Triple-A and the majors. To manage this, Pittsburgh has to sign its young players sooner rather than later, and absorb additional risk.

Of these two players, Keller’s extension is probably the more urgent matter to attend to. The least expensive time to sign him would have been a few years ago, when he was struggling to adjust to the majors and the Pirates could, as noted above, defray some of the cost by taking on that additional risk that he’d never develop. Keller is eligible to hit free agency after the 2025 season, so there’s a real ticking clock here; the longer the Pirates take to come to an agreement, the less financial reason their ace has to take one and the less talent would come to Pittsburgh in the event of a trade. Now that Keller’s breakout appears to be a reality and not a fluke or merely speculation about the future, he has a lot more financial leverage than he did a year ago.

While Keller worked out most of his remaining command issues last season, he still suffered a bit from having strikeout stuff but not being great at actually collecting those Ks. The full version of ZiPS still sees his improved swinging-strike rate not supporting the impressive 50% bump in his overall strikeout rate, but it does agree that his performance in 2023 in this department represents real and significant improvement. As such, Keller has one of the biggest bumps among pitchers from his preseason long-term projection. Even the simpler in-season projection version of ZiPS still has him finishing in the top five in the NL in WAR, behind just Zac Gallen, Zack Wheeler, Spencer Strider, and Logan Webb.

Perhaps the most striking example of Keller’s continued breakout is just how improved his cohort of most similar past pitchers is. Here are the top 50 pitchers in ZiPS similarity (with the specific year at which their baseline is similar) for Keller both before 2023 and now:

You will note that I didn’t label which column was which, because I’m just that confident that you’ll know in about a half-second of glancing which list is the better one!

In sum, ZiPS suggests a fair six-year deal right now would be six years, $116 million:

This reflects the fact that he has two more years of arbitration; a projected offer as a free agent would be six years, $153 million, or seven years, $171 million.

Despite being a shortstop — for now at least — rather than a pitcher, Cruz is the riskier of the pair. He’s less established in the majors than Keller and is currently on the IL with a fractured ankle, making a projection that much trickier. But when agreeing to a mutually beneficial contract, you basically have to pay either in currency or risk, and if the Pirates don’t want to give up a ton of the former, they’ll have to be willing to pay by taking on a bunch of the latter. Even if the current injury makes the atmosphere a little too much like gambling for either side of the negotiations, a healthy Cruz — which is expected to be a thing sometime around August — should be enough to kickstart talks.

Cruz was one of my breakout picks this year, and while the ankle means that’s one that I’m unlikely to get right, he still has a great deal of upside with his game-changing power. And his contact issues, while concerning, are at least a problem that you can pinpoint; it only take a few percentage points of a bump in contact rate for ZiPS to start projecting him with Javier Báez’s prime. Cruz had already shown an uptick in his nine games this year, walking seven times as his contact rate hit 70%. Nine games is a pitifully small sample size, even for less volatile numbers, but it’s certainly better than those numbers going in the opposite direction!

Cruz has more upside than Hayes does, but the latter is healthy and closer to his potential than the former is to his higher potential, and the contract projection comes out similarly to the extension that Hayes signed: a seven-year, $67 million extension that delays Cruz’s free agency by two years.

Will contracts like these single-handedly make the Pirates a perennial contender? No, but signing young players to long-term deals at least gives them the path to long-term relevance in the NL Central and gives a fanbase that’s been beaten up for 30 years some hope that it’ll get to see PNC Park be the long-term home for the team’s core rather than a set of turnstiles.

One of the strange things about projecting baseball players is that even results themselves are small sample sizes. Full seasons result in specific numbers that have minimal predictive value, such as BABIP for pitchers. The predictive value isn’t literally zero — individual seasons form much of the basis of projections, whether math-y ones in something like ZiPS or simply personal opinions on how good a player is — but we have to develop tools that improve our ability to explain some of these stats. It’s not enough to know that the number of homers allowed by a pitcher is volatile; we need to know how and why pitchers allow homers beyond a general sense of pitching poorly or being Jordan Lyles.

Data like that what StatCast provides gives us the ability to get what is more elemental, such as exit velocities and launch angles and the like — things that are in themselves more predictive than their end products (the number of homers). StatCast has its own implementation of this kind of exercise in the various “x” stats. ZiPS uses slightly different models with a similar purpose, which I’ve dubbed zStats. (I’m going to make you guess what the z stands for!) The differences in the models can be significant. For example: when talking about grounders, balls hit directly toward the second base bag became singles 48.7% of the time from 2012 to ’19, with 51.0% outs and 0.2% doubles. But grounders hit 16 degrees to the “left” of the bag, over the same time period, only became hits 10.6% of the time and toward the second base side, 9.8%. ZiPS uses data like sprint speed when calculating hitter BABIP, because how fast a player is has an effect on BABIP and extra-base hits.

ZiPS doesn’t discard actual stats; the actual models all improve from knowing the actual numbers in addition to the zStats. For data on how zStats relate to actual stats, I’ve talked more about this here and here.

But you’re here to see the numbers themselves, not the exposition, so let’s star wipe to the main storyline. Read the rest of this entry »

12:00

Dan Szymborski: Greetings! I have a 1 PM appointment, so pretty strict on time today

12:00

Dan Szymborski: I made one?

12:01

Dan Szymborski: I’m not sure, I’m not expert enough on the human body to know why this effect, if it exists, might exist

12:01

Dan Szymborski: but it might be itneresting to study actual hamstring injuries by position

Read the rest of this entry »

May was a successful month for the Tigers, a franchise which in recent years has been lacking in happily remembered calendar pages. Detroit’s .577 winning percentage in May (15–11) is its best full month since a .615 mark (16–10) all the way back in July 2016. And while it would be a stretch to say that everything has been coming up bengal, given that the team’s run differential is still slightly in the negative for the month, the bleakness of the AL Central has allowed the Tigers to come within a game of the division lead. Even Spencer Torkelson, whose bat disappeared in 2022, has been playing better baseball, putting up a 119 wRC+ in May. Unfortunately, fate wasn’t even kind enough to give Detroit the whole month; a couple of days before the calendar flip, injuries to Eduardo Rodriguez and Riley Greene have ended May on a decidedly sour note.

These Tigers certainly aren’t strangers to injury. Every team faces injuries sooner or later, but Detroit managed to win in May despite an entire rotation’s worth of promising pitchers — Tarik Skubal, Matt Manning, Spencer Turnbull, Casey Mize, and Beau Brieske — out with injuries. The contributions of Rodriguez and Greene had a lot to do with that. The former’s hot April start continued in May with a 2.03 ERA/2.61 FIP over five outings; the latter hit a star-level .365/.435/.573 for the month. That came crashing down on Tuesday with two bits of very unwelcome news. Read the rest of this entry »

11:59

Dan Szymborski: It is chat time!

12:00

Dan Szymborski: I liked the Soriano-Wilkerson trade. The Wilkerson part.

12:00

Dan Szymborski: To an extent.

Read the rest of this entry »

The 2022 Blue Jays won 92 games and finished second in the American League in runs scored, and Alejandro Kirk had a lot to do with that. Hitting .285/.372/.415 and playing better defense behind the plate than most expected when he was a prospect, he formed a dynamite catching chimera with Danny Jansen and Gabriel Moreno, who was sent to Arizona this offseason. The resultant pairing of Kirk and Jansen projected to give the Blue Jays the best catching situation in baseball in 2023. But while the rest of the top catchers in the majors have worked out about as expected, Toronto’s have not, combining to hit a respectable but disappointing .232/.311/.384. As the younger and much less experienced of the two, with more time to grow as an offensive player, Kirk’s struggles concern me more.

It’s easy to forget how quickly Kirk rocketed through the minors in recent years. After playing mostly in High-A Dunedin in 2019, the Blue Jays were interested enough in his talent to put him on the taxi squad at the start of September 2020, even getting him into nine games, seven as a catcher. The following season, he only played a couple of weeks at Triple-A Buffalo before becoming a permanent major leaguer. While a promotion that aggressive does happen once in a while, there’s no situation that I can remember in which a team promoted a catcher who wasn’t an extremely polished defender that quickly. He hit .242/.328/.436 — a solid triple-slash for any catcher, but exciting for a player with such little high-level experience. Perhaps as importantly, while Kirk didn’t fool anyone into thinking he was the next Yadier Molina with the glove, he played far better defensively than the DH-pretending-to-be-a-catcher archetype that players like Zack Collins fall into. But Kirk’s .234/.353/.324 line so far is not what people expected in the follow-up season, and while the resulting wRC+ of 96 is far better than trainwreck status, it’s also far from the stardom he displayed last year.

When you see a dropoff like that, especially in a fairly short stretch of games, you frequently see a BABIP blip along with it. But while Kirk has dropped about 40 points of BABIP since last year, his hit profile supports a fairly low BABIP. In fact, ZiPS thinks that he’s “earned” a .249 BABIP based on how he’s hit this year, lower than his actual BABIP of .261. The plate discipline stats also show no red flags; he still makes good contact and isn’t suddenly offering more often at worse pitches.

The icky part of Kirk’s seasonal line involves the loss of power, and unfortunately, the drop in both his exit velocity and loft is real; four miles per hour and seven degrees of launch angle are not small deviations. For the Statcast era, I took every player who put 75 pitches into play in consecutive years, ranked their dips in exit velocity and launch angle (out of 2,389 players), and found those with the biggest dropoffs, using the average of their ranks (we’re trying to get a general idea, so a very simple method is fine). Here are the results:

Kirk ranks highly in terms of dropoff in these stats, so it’s not surprising to see his power evaporate. It’s also not something that bodes well. ZiPS and other projection systems deal with these issues in a more scientifically sound fashion than this, but there are a lot of fading players on this list. The ones that did improve overall in seasons after the two-year window, such as Díaz and Acuña Jr., managed to reverse this process. I went down the top 50 players on this list and found that this held true as well. And Kirk actually showed some dropoff from 2021 to ’22 despite his excellent performance, suggesting that the seeds of a future issue had already been sown.

One culprit here is that he is simply topping hard pitches down in the zone, whereas last year he was getting just enough loft to squeeze a bunch of hits out of them; he hit .452 on low fastballs and lifted the majority of them with a positive launch angle. This season, only three of 13 low fastballs haven’t been driven into the ground, and Kirk has lost about eight degrees of launch angle on average compared to last year. It’s not just luck either: he’s hitting them with less velocity, resulting in an xBA of .231 compared to .336 last year.

The exit velocity issue is important for Kirk because he’s not a fast player and hits a lot of grounders; he’s not going to be legging out many soft infield hits, so he needs to hit the ball hard. Groundball BABIP is very sensitive to exit velocity, as unlike fly balls, there’s no sweet spot where a soft hit becomes an impossible-to-field bloop.

And if you check the Statcast leaderboard in terms of year-to-year change, Kirk is near the top of the list in terms of most increased topped contact rate.

The good news is that the full model of ZiPS is aware of these hit tendencies and still thinks Kirk is going to be alright over the long haul, though his problems right now have increased the downside risk, pushing his projections down from the 3.5–4.0 WAR range they were in before the season:

These types of changes aren’t good, but they’re also not death sentences for careers and can be reversed. Kirk, even while struggling, still retains a lot of the characteristics that made him such a good hitter last year. The key to improving his baseball game right now may be working on his golf game and re-embracing the modern trend of turning low pitches into long drives rather than worm-burners.

From entertainment to finance to sports, every category of human endeavor has its own benchmark for incompetence. There are a lot of candidates to this title in MLB, but one of the most common invocations for ineptitude is the 1962 Mets. Sure, you can find better examples of hilarious failure in the 19th century, such as the Wilmington Quicksteps, who folded while warming up for a game in 1884 when attendance was zero, with the players having to find their own way home from Delaware. You can find teams that won fewer games, like the Cleveland Spiders. But 19th-century baseball was essentially one step above a traveling medicine show, and by the time the 1962 Mets came into existence, MLB was a thoroughly professional league which would be recognizable by today’s fans.

An expansion team that year, the Mets started off losing their first nine games. Things only got slightly better from there: they finished with 120 losses, the most in modern MLB history. Over 60 years later, the A’s, after a 10–38 start, seem poised to become the new true north of failure. Through the first 48 games (as of Sunday’s games), this year’s Oakland squad is actually two games behind (or ahead of, depending on your point of view) the ’62 Mets, who won 12 of their first 48 games.

In some ways, the A’s are already a sadder case than the Mets are. The Mets were an expansion team, hampered by very miserly rules for the expansion draft which left them (and the Houston Colt .45s) with long roads to putting talented players on the field. By all accounts, the team was trying to win, and fan interest was high relative to the performance, with a million fans putting New York in the middle of the pack, attendance-wise. The A’s, on the other hand, are desperately trying to move to Las Vegas or whatever other city without baseball is willing to throw a billion dollars their way and are averaging under 9,000 paying fans — not attending fans — per game. The Mets may have had one of the worst first basemen in the league in “Marvelous” Marv Throneberry, but at least media didn’t have to evacuate an area because of possum urine. Combine the possums with a few dozen cats and whatever else is lurking, and the WhateverItsCalledThisYear Coliseum may be best described as an open-air wildlife refuge that sometimes has baseball games.

But what are the odds that the A’s lose 120 games or even more by the end of the 2023 season? To get an idea, I fired up the ZiPS projection system to get the latest tales of woe from the AL West. Read the rest of this entry »

12:02

Dan Szymborski: ITS A CHAT!

12:04

Dan Szymborski: It’s a bit tricky – I don’t generally like skipping catchers too aggressively, but they can’t play both him and Endy Rodriguez.

12:05

Dan Szymborski: And it’s a little awkward to stick him in a non-catcher position in the majors

12:05

Dan Szymborski: Unless the Pirates have the guts to bench Santana

Read the rest of this entry »

Players the caliber of Juan Soto are rarely available via trade, so when the Padres acquired him via trade last summer from the drowning Nationals, it made a huge splash on the level of dropping a Sherman tank into your neighborhood swimming hole. But rather than continue his previous level of superstardom, he struggled to meet expectations in San Diego. His .236/.388/.390 line was still enough for a solid wRC+ of 130, but relative to his normal level of excellence, it’s hard to call that line anything but a disappointment.

Soto’s start in 2023, though, pales even next to his post-trade performance last year. April 17 may be the nadir of his career in San Diego: the Padres were shut out for the second game in a row, and he put up his fifth consecutive hitless game, leaving him with a triple-slash of .164/.346/.361. For the calendar year ending on that day, he was hitting .230/.391/.435 and had compiled 3.5 WAR — good enough for mere mortals, but not entities made of sterner stuff.

Around this time, Harold Reynolds talked a bit on MLB Network about Soto’s swing and the changes he was making. While I’ve criticized Reynolds plenty for his general analysis when it crosses into the jurisdiction of analytics, I bookmarked this video at the time, as the analysis rang true to me. He believed that Soto’s tinkering would pay dividends, and whether it’s a coincidence or not, he’s looked a lot more like the Soto we love over the last month. In 23 games since then and through Sunday’s action, he hit .321/.447/.571 and amassed 1.2 WAR, the kind of MVP-level production we’ve expected to see from him in mustard and brown and largely have not. Read the rest of this entry »

In the sea of prospects, Casey Schmitt barely caused a ripple. The only Top 100 list the infielder made before this season was Baseball Prospectus’ Top 101; he just squeezed in near the end at no. 94. The computer projections were no kinder, with ZiPS only projecting him as the fourth-best prospect in a rather weak San Francisco Giants system, just barely in its Top 200. Yet these limited expectations didn’t stop Schmitt from engulfing opposing pitchers in his first three big league games, as he went 8-for-12 with two home runs and two doubles.

Obviously, having three big games isn’t a guarantee of stardom — or even viability — in the majors. For example, Vaughn Eshelman started his major league career by throwing 13 shutout innings over his first two starts. He only had eight quality starts left in him (out of 28) and was out of the majors two years later. He might be best known for going on what was then the DL as a result of burning himself with a candle. Read the rest of this entry »