Archive for Daily Graphings

The Cliff Lee Trade: New York’s Perspective

It’s not official yet, but all indications point to the Yankees and the Mariners completing a deal for Cliff Lee before tonight’s game, in which Lee was scheduled to face his new team. As Dave explained, the Mariners did well to acquire a top-10 prospect and others. For the Yankees the deal is a bit more complicated.

The clear and obvious benefit is the addition of Cliff Lee to the rotation. With CC Sabathia, A.J. Burnett, Andy Pettitte, Javier Vazquez, and Phil Hughes the Yankees already have a strong starting five, but the addition to Lee represents an upgrade over every one of them except maybe Sabathia. Even then, Lee has the second lowest FIP among starters during the last three years. Sabathia ranks fifth. They represent of one the best, if not the best, one-two punches in baseball. Adding any three of the other four behind them makes for the best rotation in baseball.

A pitcher like Cliff Lee, even if just a rental, doesn’t come cheap. The Yankees had to sacrifice their No. 1 prospect, Jesus Montero, in addition to one or two more prospects, to complete the deal. Marc Hulet ranked Montero his No. 4 AL prospect this season, Keith Law ranked him No. 10 in MLB, Baseball America ranked him No.4, as did Kevin Goldstein. He’s a world-class bat that will play at any position — which is a good thing for the Mariners, because nearly every prospect pundit claims that he will not stick at catcher. Is it worth the sacrifice of a consensus top bat to acquire three-plus months of a world-beating pitcher? Or, more to the point, why do the Yankees think that the exchange works for them?

Montero likely would have debuted for the Yankees some time in 2011, whether at catcher or as a DH. With Jorge Posada entering the last year of his contract age 40, the possibility of adding another heavy hitting catcher would certainly have been attractive. But Posada is still under contract, and if healthy he will continue to play as much as possible behind the plate. Once his contract expires after 2011, another Yankees’ top catching prospect, Austin Romine, could be ready for the majors. At AA this season Romine is hitting .281/.361/.432 and is headed to the Futures Game. He is widely considered a far superior defensive catcher, and it appears his bat is starting to catch up. His presence, along with another handful of catchers in the lower minors, might make the Yankees feel a bit better about dealing Montero.

What further complicates this deal is that the Yankees not only have to be comfortable trading Montero in the first place, but have to be comfortable trading him for an upgrade to an already strong starting rotation. Last year, when the Indians traded Lee to the Phillies, the Yankees actually had a rotation problem. With Chien-Ming Wang out for the season and the team unwilling to move Phil Hughes out of the bullpen, the Yankees could have used a starter. When the second half began they used Sergio Mitre as their fifth starter. In that case Lee would have represented a significant upgrade. The scenario is a bit different this year, with Vazquez representing the rotation’s weakest cog. After a poor start he has pitched as well as the Yankees could have expected. That makes the Montero-Lee swap seem a bit worse from the Yankees’ perspective.

The real reason I think they moved is because of concerns with the bottom of the rotation. Phil Hughes has an innings limit, 170 to 180 innings, and while he’s at a decent place heading into the break, around 100 after his start tonight, adding Lee gives them more flexibility in managing those innings. The Yankees have two days off all of August and skipping him could be tough. Adding another starter would help ease that process.

Then come Burnett and Vazquez, two pitchers who have been good if not inconsistent this season. Vazquez, again, has recovered after a poor start, but that doesn’t end concerns about him. His fastball velocity is down by about 2 mph, and his slider hasn’t been as effective a weapon this season. Burnett’s career has been marked by inconsistency, and he hasn’t done anything to buck that reputation this year. He started off strong, but posted a June to forget, allowing 29 runs in 23 innings during his five starts. He has since recovered, but like Vazquez this doesn’t erase concerns. His velocity, too, is a bit down, and his curveball hasn’t been nearly as effective. While he’s using a two-seamer to induce more ground balls, he is not striking out nearly as many hitters as in the past.

Adding Lee, then, helps alleviate those concerns. He gives them another dependable arm, someone they can count on every five days without worrying whether he’ll make it out of the fourth inning. The presence of another ace also takes the pressure off Hughes, whom the Yankees can now afford to skip and eventually move to the bullpen for the playoffs.

The Yankees also realize a number of side benefits from this deal. They were, and still are, the favorites to sign Lee once he becomes a free agent this winter. The difference is that if they re-sign him as their own player they won’t sacrifice their first round pick in the strong 2011 draft. The move also prevents Lee from landing with the Twins, Rays, or Rangers, teams the Yankees might have to face in the playoffs. The swing of having Lee pitch for them and not against them is enormous. Neither of these reasons can be a primary motivator in a trade, but they’re certainly worthy consolations.

The final side benefit is that they can now trade Vazquez for a bat. This is not a necessity, and the Yankees might choose to use their pitching advantage to its fullest. But the allure of acquiring another bat is one that will be difficult to ignore. The team has already lost Nick Johnson, and a recent injury setback could mark the end of his season. While Posada has taken reps at DH, he is still more valuable to the Yankees at catcher. Adding a DH/OF type player would only benefit a lineup that already ranks second in the AL in runs per game. Plenty of contenders could use an arm like Vazquez, so the Yankees shouldn’t have much difficulty finding a match if they’re so inclined.

If the Yankees stand to benefit from this type of move, then why haven’t they done anything like this before. At the deadline last year they declined to trade for Lee, and during the off-season they didn’t get in heavily on either the Lee or the Roy Halladay deals. GM Brian Cashman has said many times that he prefers to avoid paying for a player in prospects and then again with a big-money extension. He declined to do it in 2008, when the Twins traded Johan Santana. So why now? Joel Sherman provides the insight:

Yankee officials simply feel that their farm system is in a different place today than it was back then. For example, they have the catching and second base depth organizationally to move Montero and Adams. Also, for Santana, the Yanks would have had to include Phil Hughes and Melky Cabrera. They felt they had no other prospect nearly as good as Hughes, and his loss would be devastating. And Cabrera was the starting center fielder and the Yanks felt they would have had to go outside the organization to add a center fielder through free agency or yet another trade.

Now they don’t have to touch the major league roster to get Lee.

Losing a prospect is never easy, especially now when fans can follow these players with a close eye. When that prospect is a consensus top-10 and is playing in AAA as a 20-year-old, the loss becomes even more painful. But for a team in the Yankees position that prospect sometimes becomes a necessary sacrifice. They have a number of aging players on the roster, including Posada, Pettitte, Derek Jeter, Mariano Rivera, and even Alex Rodriguez. Adding Cliff Lee brings them closer to another championship before the windows for these players close. That, I think, is the primary motivation behind this trade.

The move hurts the Yankees in the long run, in that they’re giving up one of the best prospects in baseball for three-plus months of a pitcher that they stood a good chance to sign after the season. Had they waited they could have had Montero and Lee. But there is still plenty to be won and lost in those three-plus months. The Yankees obviously think that the heightened chance to win this season is worth trading someone of Montero’s caliber. If nothing else, it shows the value they place on another World Series Championship.


The Cliff Lee Trade: Seattle’s Perspective

As originally reported by Joel Sherman, and confirmed by most others, the Mariners are on the verge of trading Cliff Lee to the Yankees for a package of prospects headlined by Jesus Montero. For the Mariners, this is the kind of deal they simply could not pass up.

Once the team fell out of the race in May, trading Lee became inevitable. His value as the best pitcher in the American League ensured that the team would get significantly more from trading him than letting him walk and taking the draft picks. The only questions were when Lee would be moved, where he would go, and what the team would get in return. The answers appear to be today, New York, and a lot.

Montero is a premium prospect whose value comes from having one of the best offensive profiles of any 20-year-old on the planet. For a team that is last in the league in scoring runs, this has obvious appeal. Given the team’s woes behind the plate the last few years, the fact that he’s ostensibly a catcher also adds to his value, though I’m one of the disbelievers who don’t think he’ll stick there.

The rest of the offer is reported to be 23-year-old infielder David Adams and a third guy. I’ll let our resident prospect gurus get into their futures, but suffice it to say that they aren’t Montero quality pieces. He’s the get in this deal.

So, how’d the Mariners do on this deal? Better than expected, I’d say. If the blueprint for a premium rental pitcher at the deadline was the CC Sabathia trade from two years ago, you have to think the M’s are getting a bit more than Cleveland did. Matt LaPorta was a fine prospect, but probably a good step behind what Jesus Montero is right now. When Lee was originally being shopped, the idea that they could get a prospect of Montero’s quality for him seemed unlikely.

And, of course, there’s the reality of what the Mariners gave up to get Cliff Lee in the first place. Going from Phillippe Aumont, Tyson Gillies, and J.C. Ramirez to Montero (and other stuff) is a substantial upgrade in terms of future value. The Mariners are getting more in this deal than they gave up, though that’s mostly a function of how bad a deal Ruben Amaro made this winter.

Over all, this has to be viewed as a win from the Mariners perspective. They rented Lee, saw his value increase, and then spun him for more than they paid originally. The rest of the season hasn’t worked out well, but this series of transactions is a net positive for the Mariners.


How Good Is Martin Prado?

Martin Prado will be starting at second base in the National League, thanks to the spot opened by Chase Utley’s injury. There’s no question that Prado deserves the appearance – he has been a fantastic hitter this season by any metric, slashing .336/.375/.500, with a .378 wOBA and 137 wRC+. Prado plays a little bit of everything and UZR doesn’t seem to think 2B is his best position – he has a -8.7 career mark at the keystone – but he has a +2.5 mark this season, easily the season in which he’s played it the most. Prado is providing a tremendous amount of value for Atlanta, with 3.4 WAR in 395 PA.

Prado is, however, the type of hitter who may seem prone to regression, particularly on balls in play. He doesn’t walk much – in any stint with at least 100 PAs at any level, he’s never posted a walk rate above 10%. His power is solid, but not fantastic – his career ISOs range from .140-.165, with about 15-20 HRs in a full season. The minimal power doesn’t sound like the profile of a hitter that’s over 35% better than league average. It sounds more like the league average profile, with a little more power and less discipline.

The key is Prado’s ability, at least so far, to reach base on balls in play. In 1139 ABs so far, Prado has racked up a .344 BABIP. Given how long it takes for BABIP to stabilize, we have to assume that it will drop in the future. The longer Prado can keep it up, however, the more we have to figure that his ability to produce high a BABIP is real, and his excellent 20.9% LD rate is certainly evidence in his favor.

So, to answer the question, Prado is quite good. The fact that his playing time is way up and the fact that he’s played at an all-star level, however, lead us to another question. Is he getting better this year, at least at the plate?

Basketball has four factors for a team’s success – shooting, turnovers, rebounding, and free throws. I think that there is an excellent analog in hitting – walks, strikeouts, power, and balls in play. I’ve been using the Custom Dashboard to visualize this since its inception, using BB%, K%, ISO, and BABIP. Ideally, I’d prefer POW (XB/H) instead of ISO, but this does the job just fine. Here’s how Martin Prado has fared in the Four Factors of Hitting in his three seasons with more than 250 plate appearances.

His walks began around average and have been steadily slipping; his strikeouts are still far below average but climbing. The power has been steadily increasing to the point where, especially given the power drop across baseball this year, it can be called “above average.” Still, the key remains balls in play, which haven’t even seen much of a jump since 2008. It doesn’t appear that, really, in any of the factors, that Prado has really shown a significant step forward, and it shows in the wOBA/wRC+ numbers. The real step forward is the playing time that has opened up for him in the Braves roster, and he has jumped into his new role and is showing that he can be a great player in the Major Leagues.


Yuniesky No Gets-ky

Over my years attempting to analyze this game I’ve come to accept that changing a player’s skill set is tedious if not bordering on the line of insanity. Players who come up through high school, college, and the minors swinging at pitches located outside the strike zone will probably continue to do so once they settle into the majors. If they’ve reached the majors with that approach and a good load of success, then it’ll probably work to varying degree.

There are, however, exceptions: if a batter is constantly bewildered by anything that isn’t a fastball then, yeah, there could be issues for him sticking in the majors. Or if a batter has a hole in swing the size of Arizona, then, yes, he’s probably not long for the bigs. But instead of wishing Carl Crawford would take on the patience of Ben Zobrist at the plate, I’ve come to accept his approach for what it is. I love watching Matt Joyce and John Jaso take close pitch after close pitch just off the plate or just highenough or just lowenough with such confidence in their recognition and discipline. But I’m also cool watching Crawford swing at a pitch half a foot above the zone and knock it through the middle on a line. My tolerance has grown, I guess you could say.

But in spite of that, I don’t get Yuniesky Betancourt at all. Betancourt is hitting .258/.282/.381 (not far off his career .273/.297/.389 line) and it’s not just the results that leave me with a blank expression, but his approach too. Tom Tango has written a few times that the great equalizer for horrible batters is to take as many pitches as possible and (presumably) draw walks or at least get a mistake pitch. Betancourt is a pretty horrible batter and he has been for years now. You couldn’t tell by his approach though, which, as best as I can tell, is to swing as much as possible at pitches that he designates as good pitches before the pitcher delivers.

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Chris B. Young Limiting the Pop Ups

Last season, Chris Young’s big league career reached its nadir. A former White Sox prospect swapped to Arizona as part of the December 2005 Javier Vazquez deal, Young was an acclaimed prospect who displayed an intriguing blend of patience, pop, and speed. The man once rated by Baseball America as the 12th-best talent in the minors didn’t distinguish himself at the plate in 2007 (94 wRC+) or 2008 (95 wRC+), but Young’s offensive game devolved to the extent that the D-Backs banished him to Triple-A Reno in August of 2009. Even after a big September, Young finished the season with an 85 wRC+. His bat was worth nearly ten runs below average.

An optimist might have pointed out that Young established a career-high walk rate (11.8 BB%) and continued to drive the ball frequently, with a .187 Isolated Power. And look — his BABIP was just .268! Young was just unlucky, right?

Well, not exactly. Over the years, Young had developed a disturbing tendency to hit the ball up the elevator shaft. His infield fly ball percentage (IFFB%) was 12.7 percent in 2007, and it climbed to 16.8 percent in 2008. Last season, Young popped the ball up a staggering 22.4 percent of the time that he hit a fly ball. For comparison, the major league average sits between seven and eight percent. Infield flies are the closest thing to a gimme out on a ball put in play, and Young hit more of them than just about anybody — over the period of 2007 to 2009, only Mark Ellis popped up more frequently among qualified batters.

As such, Young basically earned that low BABIP. His expected BABIP (xBABIP) in 2009 was just eight points higher than his actual mark, at .276. When Young was booted to Reno last August, Dave Allen offered a possible explanation for the center fielder’s pop up woes. “Part of the problem,” Allen said, “is that Young cannot lay off the high-heat.” At the time of his demotion, Young was swinging at far more high fastballs than the average MLB hitter. Here’s more from Allen:

These fastballs up in zone and above the zone are most likely to be whiffs and pop ups, and Young swings at them about 7.5% more often than average…Young is swinging at too many pitches up in the zone and, probably, there is something wrong with the path of his swing leading to the increase in pop ups and drop in HRs.

So far in 2010, Young is doing a better job of laying off the high heat. Allen was kind enough to provide a couple of updated graphs showing Young’s decreased tendency to jump at letter-high fastballs. First, here’s Young’s swing rate by pitch height from 2010, compared to 2007-2009:

And here is Young’s infield fly ball percentage by pitch height:

So, Young’s not swinging at as many high fastballs, and when he does offer at those pitches, he’s not popping up as much as in years past. That helps explain why his IFFB% is down to a much more reasonable 9.7 this season. The decrease in high fastballs swung at may also contribute to his increase in contact rate (81.6% in 2009, 86.2% in 2010) and lowered strikeout rate (30.7 K% in ’09, 24.1% this season).

Young’s BABIP is .305 this season, and his xBABIP is actually slightly higher at .311. With a wRC+ of 118, his lumber has been worth +7.6 runs to this point. It remains to be seen whether Young can keep these gains made during the first half, but Arizona’s All-Star representative is finally starting to live up to the prospect billing.


What the Anaheim Angels Should Do

OVERALL

The Angels came in to today’s games trailing the Rangers for first place in the AL West by 5.5 games. They are also fifth in the Wild Card a half game behind Minnesota, two behind Chicago, four and a half back of Boston and seven and a half behind Tampa. Given the strength of the Twins, Red Sox and Rays, the Angels should not hold strong hopes or capturing that particular title. Their best bet to qualify for the postseason is to win the West from the Rangers.

BUY/SELL

Realistically, the Angels should treat 2010 as a year to sell. They will be hard pressed to pass Texas, even if the Rangers do not make any further moves to bolster their team. Chasing that hope could cost them dearly in future wins if they deal off players that would help down the line. Of course, there is no reason to make that decision now; they can afford to wait out the month of July to see how the team holds up. In the meantime, I would hold off on making any major additions at the cost of prospects as difficult as it might be to effectively concede the division to Texas.

ON THE FARM

Mike Trout is the name on everyone’s tongues with his performance to date in 2010, an insane .448 park-adjusted wOBA that he’s put up in Cedar Rapids. It just A-ball, but Trout is only 18 as well giving him plenty of time to continue growing. Closer to the majors, Hank Conger entered the year as perhaps the Angels most touted prospect and while he has done fine at Triple-A this season, there is still a lack of power.

Trevor Reckling was projected as a pitcher with possible breakout potential if he managed to harness some control. Starting the season with a promotion to Triple-A’s rotation, Reckling walked 50 in 69.2 innings with just 46 strikeouts. Needless to say, that was a disappointment and he’s since been pushed back to Double-A. The Angels have some interesting players in their farm system now, but for the most part will need some years to see the fruits of the more recent crops.

BUDGET

Entering the season with their highest payroll of all time, it is hard to imagine the Angels having much room to add payroll for this season. With over $80 million already committed to 2011, the budget looks a bit tight for this coming winter as well. Keep in mind that the Angels have several players such as Mike Napoli, Howie Kendrick and Jered Weaver that are second or third–year arbitration players without long term deals so they are not counted in that $80 million yet.


The Manny Replacements

When Major League Baseball suspended Manny Ramirez for 50 games last season, his replacement was Juan Pierre. The slap-hitting and fleet-footed faux Frenchman with a supposed heart of gold started each of the 50 games in left field during Ramirez’s absence and performed well by his standards as he batted .318/.381/.411. Pierre’s performance became overrated in the Los Angeles media market, as some suggested he was the Dodgers’ savior. In reality he actually posted a negative WPA during that stretch; which, while not wholly indicative of his overall play, offers that he wasn’t racking up contextually important hits on a consistent basis.

Pierre is now a regular for the White Sox and — just a week after the one year anniversary of Ramirez’s return to the lineup – Ramirez is once more absent from the lineup. This time it’s a sore hamstring. Ramirez hasn’t played since last Wednesday and the Dodgers have attempted to replace Ramirez by using a triumvirate of players. Playing the role of Caesar has been Garret Anderson, who actually shared a cottage with Julius back in the day. He’s not very good anymore whatsoever. Through 138 plate appearances his OPS (.477) is almost lower than his career slugging percentage (.462).

Xavier Paul, 25, has received the second most plate appearances out of left and Reed Johnson even got a start too. Their combined performances just don’t compare to Manny and hardly encroach on Pierreian levels of competence. Anderson and Paul have reached base five times in 32 plate appearances over the stretch. For his part, Johnson has done much better; reaching base eight times in 25 plate appearances, although he’s generally entered as a substitute or switched over while playing center or right field.

Ramirez should return moderately soon – he’s due to begin a rehab assignment in a matter of days – but his suspension and injury have exposed an interesting issue. Anderson and Johnson make a combined salary just under $1.5 million (Paul makes the minimum); neither are too high quality of reserves and surely the Dodgers could’ve added someone like, say, Eric Hinske at that same price and be rewarded with better play (Hinske can’t play center, but then again, neither can Anderson). The question, though, is whether any quality reserve would want to sign with a team like the Dodgers. After all, the playing time behind Matt Kemp, Andre Ethier, and Ramirez is bound to be sparse at best and in no way were the Dodgers guaranteed the division, so joining them for a shot at a ring isn’t as promising as some other squads either.

Anderson (and maybe Johnson too) really had no choice because no rebuilding team is going to sign them to start and few contending teams would sign them to be the main reserve when playing time could be ample. The dynamic in which non-elite free agents weigh money, playing opportunity, and championship aspirations is sometimes buried. It’s certainly not as highly considered as the major free agents who mostly have free reign over their destination.

Not to say that the Dodgers were inherently handcuffed by the formula, but it’s something to think about and certain to provide more entertainment than another Anderson plate appearance ending in an out.


The Danger of Upside

Last year’s free agent market had a surplus of one thing – talented starting pitchers with health concerns. The market was flooded with guys who had previous success but were battling questions about the conditions of their arms, and were going to settle for one year deals because of it. And, pretty much without fail, they’ve all been busts.

Ben Sheets, Rich Harden, Justin Duchscherer, Chien-Ming Wang, and Erik Bedard were given a total of $25 million in guaranteed money as free agents. They have produced a grand total of +0.3 wins of value as a group, so they’re on pace to have bilked their teams out of $20 million over the course of the season. Now, things could change, and maybe Bedard or Wang will pitch well down the stretch or Sheets will have a great finish to the year, but so far, they’ve essentially been a waste of cash. It gets even worse if you include Brandon Webb’s $8 million option that the Diamondbacks exercised to keep him from hitting the market.

I think most of us thought that these deals were, by and large, good risk/reward propositions. Sheets got a bit more money than expected, but still, his contract wasn’t seen as too far out of line with what he could produce. And yet, the whole group has basically been a failure. It makes me wonder if most of us are overvaluing perceived upside in pitcher valuations.

After all, arm injuries don’t just sideline players, but they also diminish velocity and command, leading to lower levels of effectiveness. Even though Sheets has avoided the DL, he’s still not what he used to be. Harden lost enough off his fastball that he can’t really challenge hitters anymore, leading his always problematic walk rate even higher. And the rest of the group has spent nearly the entire season on the DL.

Upside is a tricky thing. It is the perception of what a guy could be, not necessarily a realistic expectation of what he will be. So far, in 2010, teams who spent on upside have been burned by doing so. I would imagine the money won’t flow so freely for guys with health concerns this winter, and perhaps that reaction is the correct one.


On Boringness: Soccer vs. Baseball

This summer, American audiences have gotten to channel-flip between the two sports that are most frequently called boring: soccer and baseball. Yet they could hardly look more different. Soccer is a timed game of nonstop movement in which players are in motion for 45 minutes at a time, and scoring is rare and highly random; baseball is an untimed game in which players are rarely in motion for more than a few seconds at a time, in which players can acquire nicknames like “The Human Rain Delay” for their facility at slowing down play. Non-soccer fans (I’m one of them) often complain that, in soccer, no one ever scores; non-baseball fans often complain that, in baseball, no one ever moves.

Of course, the World Cup has an added dimension beyond regular soccer: it’s a single-elimination tournament with excitement fueled by nationalism. It’s like March Madness, if the universities had armies and navies. It’s the only chance most of us ever get to watch a single soccer game in a packed bar surrounded by hundreds of other rabid fans. Major League Soccer has been hurt by the recession, but the U.S. men’s soccer team has probably never been as high-profile as it is now. Bill Simmons predicts that Landon Donovan’s winning goal over Algeria to send America into the Round of 16 was such a signal moment in American sports that it will, ultimately, cause soccer to take off in America.

Part of baseball’s genius is that, at its heart, it’s a game of individual matchups: each pitch is a moment frozen in time, the isolated product of mostly discrete and intelligible forces, handedness, true talent, park effect, and so forth. Each moment is a data point, each game a data set. It is the perfect playground for statistical inquiry. On the other hand, soccer is a game of flow. The clock never stops, the whistle never blows, and the action hardly ever resolves neatly, at least until the ball has hit the back of the net. FIFA keeps few statistics more advanced than pass completion percentage, and goals are so rare that — when they aren’t being waved off or ignored by the referee or mucked by the goalie — it seems mostly a matter of luck that any are ever scored at all.

The meaning of “luck” in baseball is hotly contested, of course, but over the course of a long season, controversial calls have a habit of evening out. That isn’t necessarily the case in a seven-game-series, let alone a single-elimination tournament. But while the best baseball in the world is played in America, that isn’t true of soccer. Among the major professional sports leagues in America, Major League Soccer is the only one that doesn’t possess the best players in the world who play its sport. Major League Baseball, the National Basketball League Association, the National Hockey League, and the National Football league all monopolize global talent in their respective sports; MLS mostly makes do with Americans who aren’t good enough to play elsewhere. That isn’t a problem with the rules of soccer, but a problem with the concentration of talent. If the English Premier League were moved brick by brick to America, like the London Bridge, it’s likely that Americans would watch.

I don’t expect I’ll watch much soccer after this weekend’s championship match — I’d probably rather watch Arsenal-Manchester United than Orioles-Pirates, but Comcast rarely gives me the option. I’ve spent a fun few weeks watching the best players in the world, but I’ll be happy to return my full attention to my favorite sport. After watching Spain play the Netherlands, I imagine that trying to watch DC United would just seem boring.


Who Are Creating Outs Running the Bases?

Last Tuesday night, I watched the Royals score 2 runs in the tenth inning to beat the Mariners. The Mariners were actually lucky because 2 Royals were thrown out trying to steal in the tenth inning. The Royals seem to get 1-3 runners thrown out on the base paths during each game (e.g. as I write this Billy Butler gets thrown out making a wide turn at 1st base).

Well, how does the Royals base running compare to the rest of the league. I took all the times a runner was safe at first and was then picked off, caught stealing or thrown out running the bases in a non-force out situation (e.g. trying to go from 1st to 3rd on a single). Some teams will have more chances to get thrown out because they have more base runners so I found the percentage of times a runner was thrown out on a non-force play once the runner was safe at first.

How does the Royals compare to the rest of the league? Here is a list of the worst running teams so far this season (team and percent of time thrown out by a non-force play) :

White Sox 7.9%
Angels – 7.7%
Rays – 7.6%
Rangers – 7.6%
Padres – 7.6%
Royals – 7.5%

Now that base path incompetents have had their 5 seconds of shame, here are the teams that get thrown out the least amount of times on the base paths:

Red Sox – 3.3%
Phillies – 3.6%
Blue Jays – 4.0%
Tigers – 4.2%
Braves 4.4%

Note: Here is a Google Spreadsheet of the all the teams for reference

The Royals are not the league’s worst team, but are not too far off. A few more running errors and they could quickly over take the White Sox.

Unnecessary outs on the base paths are frustrating to deal with as fans. Some of us fans though have to deal with it more than others.