Archive for Daily Graphings

Remember the Orioles for What They Were

Very soon — maybe right at this moment! — everyone’s going to be ready to turn the page. Maybe many of you are already there. The 2018 baseball season is over for every team, and for the overwhelming majority of teams, it’s been over for quite a while. What’s the sense of reflecting, when we’re supposed to move ever forward? I get it, I agree, and I’ll get there soon, myself. But, look: I’ve been spending the past month thinking exclusively about good baseball teams. Competitive baseball teams, playoff baseball teams. I wanted to take the chance to write one thing about the worst baseball team that we saw. I had a note here on a piece of paper to address the 2018 Baltimore Orioles.

The Orioles’ final record was the kind of bad that everyone remembers. In the same way it’ll take you eons to forget that the 2003 Tigers finished 43-119, it’ll take you just as long to forget that the 2018 Orioles finished 47-115. The numbers are immortalized in that iconic playoff photo of Andrew Benintendi. The Orioles won 47 games; the Orioles finished 14 more games than that out of first place. Their best month, by record, was July, in which they went 9-16. They didn’t reach ten wins in a single calendar month, and they wound up 11 wins behind the next-worst baseball team in either league. The Orioles had the 15th-worst winning percentage since 1900, and the fourth-worst winning percentage since the end of World War 2.

You know it, I know it, and there’s no sense beating around the bush. The Orioles were a total catastrophe. Buck Showalter and Dan Duquette are both out of a job. But here’s the other thing about these Orioles: They weren’t supposed to be bad. They weren’t supposed to be great, but they didn’t blow things up. Things blew up on their own.

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Ron Darling, Jack Morris, and Tyler Thornburg on Developing Their Change-of-Pace Pitches

Pitchers learn and develop different pitches, and they do so at varying stages of their lives. It might be a curveball in high school, a cutter in college, or a changeup in A-ball. Sometimes the addition or refinement is a natural progression — graduating from Pitching 101 to advanced course work — and often it’s a matter of necessity. In order to get hitters out as the quality of competition improves, a pitcher needs to optimize his repertoire.

In this installment of the series, we’ll hear from three pitchers — Ron Darling, Jack Morris, and Tyler Thornburg — on how they learned and developed their change-of-pace pitches.

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Ron Darling, Former All-Star

“When I first started throwing a split, I was one of those pitchers who could never develop a changeup. I was in the minor leagues with Al Jackson, who was a crafty left-hander in his day, and he taught me a screwball. He used to throw one. I got very adept at it, but it made my arm hurt. I had to develop a change-of-pace pitch that didn’t hurt my elbow, and that’s how the split-finger came to be.

“It was an era where the pitch was popular. Roger Craig taught it to a lot of pitchers, but it was a split-finger fastball for those guys. For me it was more of a forkball. It was something soft that I could combine with my fastball and hard curveball.

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The 2018 Red Sox in Historical Context

As soon as any World Series is over, it’s fair to wonder how the most recent champion stacks up when compared to the history. And while sometimes the numbers are downright laughable, the 2018 Red Sox have been pretty extreme. In the regular season, they won five more games than anyone else. In the playoffs, they lost just once per series while eliminating the three other best teams in the game. Sometimes, you think about the history because you think you’re obligated. In this case, we look to the history because it seems like the Red Sox might’ve done something historic. It feels like this might’ve been one of the all-time greats.

I’ve run some numbers in order to see what we’ve got. I should acknowledge right here there’s no perfect, agreed-upon way to do this. There’s no ideal measure of a team overall. Does it matter how good a team is for seven months, or is it only the playoffs that matter, provided you do just enough to make it in in the first place? There are arguments to go in either direction, but for my purposes here, I’ve simply combined regular-season numbers with postseason numbers. The postseason sample, of course, is dwarfed by the regular-season sample, but that’s how I feel like it should be. You might have another opinion, and so you might trust your own analysis. Below, I’ll quickly present my own.

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Four Questions Facing Dodgers After World Series Loss

For the second straight year, the Dodgers’ season has ended in a World Series appearance but not a World Series victory. While the Red Sox’ four-games-to-one win might show up in history as something of a blowout, the Dodgers were one key hit away from victory in Game One. If they’d also held onto a fifth-inning lead in Game Two and an eighth-inning lead in Game Four, we’d be talking about a great Dodgers team finally winning it all.

It didn’t happen that way, though — and it wasn’t because the Red Sox wanted it more or because the Dodgers’ analytics failed them. Sometimes baseball happens. It happened to the Dodgers, and in the end, the more deserving team won.

Win or lose, the Dodgers were going to face a lot of questions this offseason. Here are the four most-pressing questions in need of an answer.

Bring Back Clayton Kershaw?

Clayton Kershaw could make the decision easy for everyone by not opting out of the two years and $65 million he has left on his contract. There are plenty of concerns with Kershaw: his velocity has declined and he’s relying on his slider more than ever. The future Hall of Famer will begin next season at 31 years old, hardly an elder, but certainly past his prime. Despite those concerns, Kershaw started 31 games in 2018 and pitched 191.1 innings, including the postseason. His ERA and FIP, including the playoffs, were 2.96, and 3.31, respectively. Those are both very good numbers along with his 3.6 WAR from the regular season. Among pending free-agent pitchers, only Patrick Corbin had a better season — and Kershaw showed he could still get outs at a high rate with declining velocity.

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Boston Won Without X as a Factor

Xander Bogaerts triple-slashed .288/.360/.522 in 580 regular-season plate appearances in 2018, which translated to a 133 wRC+ and 4.9 WAR. Both figures represented career highs. Like his teammate Mookie Betts, Bogaerts thrived offensively while largely maintaining a disciplined approach at the plate. This year, the 25-year-old swung at 61% of pitches he saw in the strike zone and just 43% of pitches overall. Both figures sit below league norms (just 16 of 140 qualified hitters swung at pitches in the zone less often this year) and are broadly consistent with Bogaerts’scareer figures. Bogaerts can, clearly, be a successful major-league hitter without taking a cut at every tempting fastball and slider he sees in the zone. He’s done it in each of past four years.

He did not, however, do so during this World Series. The only ball he struck really well in all five games was a second-inning double against Hyun-Jin Ryu in Game Two; his only other hits were a soft line-drive single in the ninth inning of Game Four that appeared to be almost the accidental result of a swing on which Bogaerts rolled over badly, and a single in the seventh in the clincher. Everything else he produced during this World Series was, for the most part, a weak ground ball or, in one horrible sequence of the 18-inning marathon that was Game Three, a ground out to second, a ground out to the pitcher, a ground out to the catcher, a strikeout swinging, and a ground ball into a double play. Bogaerts seemed simply unable to get his timing right for any consistent length of time in this World Series. Nor, until the final game, did Mookie Betts or J.D. Martinez.

Although all three Boston stars struggled to a greater or lesser extent during this Fall Classic — a matter examined by Jeff Sullivan earlier today — I’d like to focus on Bogaerts for much of this piece because his struggles seem, at least to me, the most pronounced — and most out of line with his performance during the regular season in 2018 (and, one presumes, his forthcoming performance in 2019). The first ground out in that horrible five-PA sequence I mentioned above, against Kenley Jansen in the ninth inning of Game Three, is instructive for its demonstration of Bogaerts’ Series-long inability to time up usually hittable pitches. (Please note: I’m not saying I could do this. I would cry if someone threw something past me at even 85.) The first pitch of the sequence was a sinker at 95 that Bogaerts took as a strike on the lower inside corner of the plate. Here it is:

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Eight Factors That Decided the 2018 World Series

In Game Five of the World Series on Sunday night, behind a stifling seven-inning, three-hit effort from David Price — on three days of rest, even — and a pair of home runs by Steve Pearce, the Red Sox completed their dismantling of the Dodgers with a 5-1 victory and a four-games-to-one Series win. Like the other games in the series, this one was close for a while. Ultimately, though, the Red Sox pulled away late, with the Dodgers unable to produce a run beyond David Freese’s leadoff homer in the bottom of the first inning. On top of their franchise-record 108 wins, the Red Sox went 11-3 in the postseason, losing just one game in each round of the playoffs. They’ll take their place among the most dominant championship teams of recent vintage, and have a claim as the best in franchise history.

To these eyes, the World Series turned on eight factors, areas that set the Red Sox apart from the Dodgers in what was, at times, a fairly close series that will nonetheless look rather lopsided in the history books.

Two-Out Damage

Continuing what they did against the Astros in the ALCS, the Red Sox scored the majority of their runs against the Dodgers with two outs. In fact, the totals and rates in the two rounds match up almost exactly: 18 out of 29 runs scored against Houston (62.0%) and 18 of 28 against Los Angeles (64.3%). In the World Series they hit .242/.347/.484 in 72 plate appearances with two outs and put up video-game numbers — .471/.609/.882 in 23 PA — with two outs and runners in scoring position. Their OPS in that latter situation set a World Series record:

Best Two-Out, RISP Peformances in World Series History
Rk Team Season PA AVG OBP SLG OPS
1 Red Sox 2018 23 .471 .609 .882 1.491
2 Giants 2010 23 .421 .522 .895 1.416
3 Red Sox 2007 33 .391 .576 .652 1.228
4 Orioles 1970 27 .458 .519 .708 1.227
5 Yankees 1951 26 .350 .500 .700 1.200
6 Dodgers 1956 25 .316 .480 .684 1.164
7 Yankees 1956 21 .278 .381 .778 1.159
8 Reds 1975 40 .333 .450 .697 1.147
9 Dodgers 1978 20 .316 .350 .789 1.139
10 Athletics 1989 28 .350 .536 .600 1.136
SOURCE: Stats LLC

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The Mets, Brodie Van Wagenen, and When Agents Join Front Offices

According to Joel Sherman and Mark Feinsand, the next general manager of the New York Mets will be agent Brodie Van Wagenen.

Van Wagenen, who unlike most sports agents is not an attorney, is part of the sports division of Creative Artists Agency, which represents athletes, actors, and other artists. Van Wagenen, it should be noted, is co-head of CAA Sports, the agency’s athletic representation arm. But Van Wagenen is more than just an ordinary baseball agent; he negotiated Robinson Cano‘s 10-year megadeal with the Seattle Mariners, Ryan Zimmerman’s nine-figure pact with Washington, and Yoenis Cespedes‘ current deal with the Mets. In other words, Van Wagenen represents some of the sport’s biggest stars.

There’s little doubt that Van Wagenen’s experience negotiating some of the sport’s largest contracts gives him a significant amount of experience that will serve him well in his new role. Van Wagenen has also garnered a reputation as one of the most player-friendly voices in the industry, which makes this move perhaps all the more surprising. For instance, during the famously slow 2017-18 offseason, he accused MLB owners of collusion and threatened that players would boycott spring training. He also has demanded trades for players who don’t receive contract extensions.

On the surface, it seems as though the addition of a player agent to a major-league front office could represent a boon for the union.

On the other hand, it isn’t Van Wagenen’s experience about which many in the industry are concerned.

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The Red Sox Were the Best, Despite Their Best

We talk all the time about whether or not the playoffs crown the best team in baseball. Is it more important to be the best team for six months, or is it more important to be the best team for one month? What are we even celebrating, anyway? When you look at the playoffs too hard, and when the playoffs tell a different story than the regular season, it can be difficult to know what to think. You can start to think about these things more than they were ever intended to be thought about. It’s deeply unfulfilling. I can speak from experience.

This year, we get a break. We get a break from having to overthink the tournament, and having to compare it against everything we saw before. The Red Sox won the World Series in five games over the Dodgers. The Red Sox had led all of baseball with 108 wins. In the first two playoff rounds, they eliminated the two other teams that reached triple digits. My favorite standings fact: For true talent, I prefer to look at run differential, or BaseRuns. The four best teams in the regular season were the Astros, Red Sox, Dodgers, and Yankees. The Red Sox knocked out the Yankees, the Astros, and the Dodgers, in order. They lost only one game in each round. Their playoff record was 11-3. Only three champions in the wild-card era have lost fewer games. The Red Sox did that against incredible competition.

All things considered, the Red Sox were the best team of 2018. They presented a lot of the evidence from March through September, and then in October, they made a convincing closing argument. It was what happened in October that turned this from a great team into maybe the greatest Red Sox team in history. By winning the championship, the Red Sox accomplished as much as they possibly could. And there’s something about the title run that’s striking to me. In terms of execution, the playoff Red Sox played almost flawless baseball. Yet they were largely carried by their supporting cast.

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Sunday Notes: Scott Radinsky Bought In To Angels Analytics

Scott Radinsky came into coaching with an old-school approach. That was to be expected. His playing career spanned the 1986-2001 seasons, and he honed his craft under the likes of Moe Drabowsky, who came of age in the Eisenhower era. Analytics were in their infancy. Radinsky was hired by the Indians in 2005 — initially to tutor pitchers in the minors — on the strength of his nuts-and-bolts knowledge and his communication skills.

The 50-year-old went on to serve as Cleveland’s bullpen coach in 2010-2011, and then as their pitching coach in 2012. From there he moved on to the Dodgers organization, and he spent the last two years as the bullpen coach in Anaheim. Along the way, he’s learned to embrace analytics.

“The information wasn’t as eye-opening to me when I was first getting exposed to it,” admitted Radinsky, who now monitors TrackMan data throughout the season. “I wasn’t resistant; it just didn’t make complete sense to me. But over the years, because of how much better it’s being explained — and a lot of it seems more quantifiable — it makes perfect sense. I’ve completely bought in, which makes it easier for me to sell something to a player.”

Radinsky gave examples of that salesmanship — we’ll share specifics in the coming week — including convincing Blake Parker to up his breaking ball usage, and getting Justin Anderson to better utilize his fastball. In each case, the data provided by Anaheim’s analytics department was delivered to Radinsky in “an awesome” manner. Just as importantly, it didn’t arrive heavy-handed. Read the rest of this entry »


Major League Baseball Says It Isn’t in the Athletics Business

It might come as a surprise to some to learn that Major League Baseball used to be a tax-exempt non-profit. It’s true: Section 501(c)(6) of the Internal Revenue Code allows for professional sports leagues to claim tax-exempt status. That didn’t make the teams tax-exempt; the rule applied to sports’ central offices. It is an understandably controversial part of the tax code. Legislators have attempted to eliminate that tax-exempt status. MLB eventually voluntarily surrendered its non-profit status in 2007, mostly so it didn’t have to report its executive compensation.

MLB might not be a non-profit anymore, but that doesn’t mean it likes paying taxes. Its latest attempt to keep the IRS at bay concerns one of the unforeseen side effects of the new tax law, which we’ve talked about before. In this instance, MLB teams are upset about a deduction the IRS says they’re ineligible for. As the Wall Street Journal’s Richard Rubin explains,

Team owners are fighting a proposed tax regulation that would deny baseball teams and other sports franchises a lucrative deduction they say they scored in last year’s tax law.

Congress intended that teams get the “full deduction,” MLB Commissioner Rob Manfred wrote in an Oct. 1 letter to the Treasury Department and IRS, attempting to draw a “stark contrast” between baseball teams that he said should get the break and others, such as investment bankers, who can’t.

The tax break at issue is the 20% deduction for pass-through businesses such as partnerships and S corporations that pay their income taxes through their owners’ individual returns. Congress designed the break as a companion to the rate cut for corporations, but it imposed limits that the government is now directing at team owners.

For those of you who either don’t know or don’t want to know what that last paragraph means, let me explain. The tax reform bill allowed certain types of enterprises called “pass-through” businesses – where the business pays its taxes via their owners’ tax returns – to have a tax deduction. Since many MLB teams are partnerships or other kinds of pass-through entities, they want to have this deduction too.

Now here’s the problem:

Congress included “athletics” on the list of businesses that couldn’t benefit from the new 20% deduction. Such exclusions in the law were meant to prevent people from turning labor income into business income. In athletics, that was intended, at least, to prevent a player from routing his salary through a limited liability company to get the business break.

And that has led Commissioner Rob Manfred to – no joke –argue Major League Baseball is not an athletics business in a letter to the IRS. Manfred wrote that “the activities of a major league professional athlete make up a de minimis amount of the total activities of all employees of a professional sports franchise.” He goes on to argue:

A professional sports club does not merely employ professional athletes, but rather employs hundreds of additional individuals who are responsible for conducting activities related to stadium operations, marketing, team operations, broadcasting and media, retail store operations, community engagement, and general and administrative functions. In fact, the substantial majority of time spent by a club’s employees does not relate to playing in the sporting contests presented by the club.

To MLB, a baseball team is in the business of receiving athletic services, not providing them. “The services being performed in connection with a sports franchise are those performed by the players, who are employed by the club—and in that regard, the club is receiving services, not performing them.” In other words, MLB is attempting to position itself as a league of marketing companies, rather than a sporting enterprise. Says MLB: “[The IRS’ interpretation of the law] incorrectly assumes that a professional sports club is . . . in the field of athletics merely because it employs athletes.” The problem is that this proves a bit too much. As Rubin explains:

…even if the performance of athletic services is only a small part of what a baseball team does, the IRS rule says that a business that is more than 5% athletic services is a service business and can’t get the tax break.

And that’s kind of the problem. MLB is trying to say it isn’t in the principle business of athletics because it employs primarily non-athletes. But this sort of thinking strikes me as a bit absurd. In the law, we look to the plain language of words when trying to determine the intent of the legislature. One way to do that is looking at a dictionary.Merriam-Webster defines “athletics” as “exercises, sports, or games engaged in by athletes“; by the plain language of the statute, Major League Baseball qualifies. Why? Because it is a business enterprise engaged in the marketing, presentation, and production of athletic events. MLB’s argument would be a bit like saying that Metro Goldwyn Mayer isn’t a movie company because it receives acting services and merely distributes movies that contain them. As a practical matter, MLB is more than a mere intermediary; it employs the athletes, facilitates the games, and markets them. It has no other product.

The other, more notable problem with MLB’s letter is how it frames itself and its teams. Here, it cites from a press release during the passage of the tax reform law.

“The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act includes specific safeguards to prevent tax avoidance and help ensure taxpayers of all income levels play by the rules under this new fairer, simpler tax system. Our legislation will ensure this much-needed tax relief goes to the local job creators it’s designed to help by distinguishing between the individual wage income of NBA All-Star Stephen Curry and the pass-through business income of Steve’s Bike Shop.” (Ways and Means release, November 2, 2017).

The boldface and underline were placed there by MLB. Now, there is, of course, a legal distinction they’re trying to make: Steve’s Bike Shop is a pass-through entity, while Stephen Curry isn’t. And yes, there is a certain legal merit to that position – but I find that particular example to be pretty disingenuous. MLB is comparing itself and its teams to Steve’s Bike Shop and distancing itself from Stephen Curry, who is the example of someone so rich he shouldn’t receive a tax cut. But at the same time, Steve’s Bike Shop doesn’t employ Stephen Curry, while MLB teams employ professional athletes like Stephen Curry. MLB is a national enterprise and its teams are hardly a local bike shop; they are by no means a small business, nor are they a “Main Street” job creator. To use professional athletes as an example of people who do not need the deduction, whilst arguing that its billionaire owners do, smacks of bad faith, and is something the MLBPA should perhaps take notice of.

Finally, it’s worth noting that MLB isn’t alone here. Entertainment content writers are also lobbying the IRS using a similar argument. Both spend much of their submissions talking about the intent of Congress in passing the law. That makes sense: effectuating legislative intent is generally the goal of statutory interpretation. At the same time, however, it’s not clear that Congress had any intent on this issue.

Mark Prater, who was the lead Senate staff author of the provision, said he doesn’t recall explicit conversations about whether pro teams would qualify.

Oops.