Payton Tolle is the top pitching prospect in what is arguably baseball’s best farm system. Drafted 50th-overall last summer by the Boston Red Sox out of Texas Christian University, the 22-year-old left-hander features a fastball that Eric Longenhagen has assigned a 70 grade, and not just because of its high octane. Per our lead prospect analyst, the 6-foot-6, 250-pound hurler possessed “the 2024 draft’s most deceptive secondary traits,” which included seven-and-a-half feet of extension.

I asked Tolle about his four-seamer, which sat 95 mph when I saw toe the rubber for the Double-A Portland Sea Dogs versus the Hartford Yard Goats 10 days ago.

“The velo is something we’ve kind of driven hard ever since I got to the Red Sox org,” said Tolle, who was 90-92 in college and is now topping out at 98-99. “I’m buying into the system, buying into how the velo is going to change how everything looks. I also understand that more swing-and-miss is going to come at the top of the zone. At Wichita State, my first year, I felt like I was almost more sinkers, but then I switched up my grip. I brought my fingers closer together and started to have more ride on it.”

Tolle transferred from Wichita State to TCU for his junior year, where he — along with the Horned Frogs coaching staff — “really dove into how the fastball plays and what we can play off of it.” Since turning pro, that evolution has continued with a heavy emphasis on secondary offerings. Whereas his fastball usage as an amateur was often 70-75%, it has been closer to 50% in his recent outings. A work-in-progress changeup has become more prevalent — Tolle got bad swings on a few of them when I saw him in Portland — but a hard breaking ball is currently his top option behind his heater. Read the rest of this entry »

Ceddanne Rafaela’s breakout 2025 season has truly been a surprise. It wasn’t just that he ran a wRC+ of 80 in his first full big league campaign in 2024. It was how he got there. He ran the worst chase and strikeout rates of all qualified players. His contact rate and exit velocity ranked right near the bottom as well. He still looked like he could be a very good player by way of excellent defense in center field, but even though he was just 23, it raised real concerns about his potential at the plate. Beyond the fact that players haven’t historically improved their chase rates much after their rookie seasons, Rafaela’s chase rate was so extreme that it was hard to find someone to compare him to. A young player would be expected to refine his plate discipline some, but even if he had literally knocked an unheard of 10 percentage points off his chase rate, he still would’ve had the 12th-highest chase rate among all qualified players. And yet here he is now.

Rafaela has a 115 wRC+ and is on pace for 5.6 WAR this season. He has been the most valuable position player on the Red Sox. It’s probably helped that Rafaela has a year of experience under his belt and has been allowed to stick in center field all season, but this is a huge turnaround nonetheless. How did it happen? Let’s start at the beginning. Read the rest of this entry »

James Tibbs III might best be described as a hitting rat. Drafted 13th overall last year by the San Francisco Giants out of Florida State University, and subsequently shipped to the Boston Red Sox in last month’s blockbuster Rafael Devers deal, the 22-year-old outfielder lives and breathes baseball — particularly the part that entails standing in the batter’s box. From a young age, Tibbs has doggedly worked on honing his left-handed stroke.

An Atlanta native who attended high school in nearby Marietta, Tibbs excelled collegiately, slashing .338/.462/.685 over three seasons at the ACC school, with a 28-homer junior campaign further enhancing his profile. And he’s continued to hit in pro ball. He played just 26 games after inking a contract last summer, and his results were mixed; he posted a 153 wRC+ in nine games (42 plate appearances) in A-ball, earned a promotion, then went cold in High-A. Now in his first full professional season, he’s back to doing what he does best: bashing baseballs. Tibbs put up a 132 wRC+ with a dozen home runs in High-A prior to the trade, and since joining his new organization, he has logged a 107 wRC+ over 86 plate appearances while acclimating to Double-A.

Ranked 14th in what Eric Longenhagen called “the best farm system in baseball” when our Red Sox Top Prospects list was published in late June, the promising young outfielder was assigned a 45 FV, with raw power graded as his best hitting tool. Tibbs sat down to talk hitting prior to a recent Portland Sea Dogs home game.

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David Laurila: You were drafted one year ago. Are you the same hitter now, or has anything meaningfully changed?

James Tibbs III: “I’m pretty much the same. It’s what’s gotten me this far, and I’ve kind of tried to replicate that as much as possible. I’ve never been one to try to make changes unless it’s absolutely necessary, because I play off of feel. I’ll make adjustments based off of that feel, but I’m doing it trying to get back to my base. My base has been pretty consistent for the last… three years? Two years? Something like that.

“I feel like I cover the plate well. I feel like I can see the ball well from where I stand and how I load. I feel like I use my body well in order to get to the spots that I can’t necessarily cover. So yeah, it’s been pretty consistent for the most part.”

Laurila: How would you describe your approach at the plate? Read the rest of this entry »

When you think of Garrett Crochet, you probably think of a lanky lefty flinging filthy fastballs past flummoxed hitters. Nearly half the pitches Crochet threw last year were four-seamers. The pitch averaged 97.1 mph, and according to Statcast’s run values, it was worth 21 runs, making it the fifth-most valuable pitch in the game, trailing estimable offerings like Emmanuel Clase’s cutter and the sliders of Dylan Cease and Chris Sale. Crochet’s other pitches were worth a combined -2 runs. Although he ran a 3.58 ERA while pitching in front of a porous White Sox defense, the four-seamer led him to a 2.38 xFIP and 2.75 DRA. Both marks were the best among all starters. Crochet has kept right on rolling in 2025. He’s running a 2.23 ERA with a 2.40 FIP, and his 4.3 WAR ranks second among all pitchers. It would be easy to glance at the top line numbers and assume that Crochet is the same pitcher he was last year, just in front of a better defense. But there have been some subtle changes under the hood, and his relationship with his fastball now looks very different.

When a trade brought Crochet to Boston in December, the reasonable assumption was that he’d back off the four-seamer at least a little. Under Craig Breslow and Andrew Bailey, the Red Sox became the most fastball-averse team in the history of the game, throwing four-seamers and sinkers just 36.8% of the time in 2024. No one expected Crochet to ditch one of the game’s greatest weapons, but it stood to reason that the Red Sox might tweak his usage just a little bit in favor of his sweeper, his cutter, and his new sinker, all of which looked like excellent pitches. Read the rest of this entry »

Today, we have a Killers two-fer, with lists covering a couple of important defensive positions, specifically second base and catcher. While still focusing on teams that meet the loose definition of a contender (a .500 record or Playoff Odds of roughly 10%) and that have gotten about 0.6 WAR or less out of a position thus far (which prorates to 1.0 WAR over a full season), I have also incorporated our Depth Charts’ rest-of-season WAR projections into the equation for an additional perspective. That may suggest that some of these teams will clear the bar by a significant margin, but even so, I’ve included them here because their performance at that spot thus far is worth a look. All statistics are through July 12.

Padres

With Kyle Higashioka departing for the Rangers in free agency, the Padres — who ranked 24th in the majors last year in catcher WAR (1.1) — pencilled in Luis Campusano, the weaker partner of last year’s catching tandem, alongside late-season addition Elias Díaz to do the bulk of the work behind plate. The pair, augmented by 38-year-old free agent Martín Maldonado, ranked dead last in our preseason Positional Power Rankings. After optioning Campusano to Triple-A El Paso in March (he was recalled yesterday), they’ve approximated that billing, ranking 29th out of the 30 teams in catcher WAR. Read the rest of this entry »

Jose Altuve is having a Cooperstown-worthy career. Since debuting with the Houston Astros in 2011, the 35-year-old second baseman has logged 2,329 hits, including 246 home runs, while putting up a 129 wRC+ and 59.2 WAR. A nine-time All-Star who has won seven Silver Sluggers and one Gold Glove, Altuve captured MVP honors in 2017.

Turn the clock back to 2008, and the 5-foot-6 Puerto Cabello, Venezuela native was 18 years old and playing stateside for the first time. His manager with the rookie-level Greeneville Astros was Rodney Linares.

I recently asked the now-Tampa Bay Rays bench coach for his memories of the then-teenaged prospect.

“One guy that doesn’t get a lot of credit for Altuve is [current St. Louis Cardinals first base coach] Stubby Clapp, who’d been my hitting coach the year before,” Linares told me. “He always talked about Altuve, because he’d had him in extended spring. He was like, ‘You’ve got to watch this kid; this kid is going to be really good.’ I used to tell Stubby, ‘You think that because you’re small and played in the big leagues, anybody who is small can play.’”

Linares recalls the Astros organization’s wanting him to play 20-year-old Albert Cartwright at second, prompting him to tell Altuve ‘Go to short, go to third, go to left field. I’m going to make sure that you get your at-bats.” Read the rest of this entry »

In a race for a playoff spot, every edge matters. Yet all too often, for reasons that extend beyond a player’s statistics, managers and general managers fail to make the moves that could improve their teams, allowing mediocre production to fester at the risk of smothering a club’s postseason hopes. In Baseball Prospectus’ 2007 book, It Ain’t Over ‘Til It’s Over, I compiled a historical All-Star squad of ignominy, identifying players at each position whose performances had dragged their teams down in tight races: the Replacement-Level Killers. I’ve revisited the concept numerous times at multiple outlets and have adapted it at FanGraphs in an expanded format since 2018.

When it comes to defining replacement level play, we needn’t hew too closely to exactitude. Any team that’s gotten less than 0.6 WAR from a position to this point — prorating to 1.0 over a full season — is generally in the ballpark, though my final lists also incorporate our Depth Charts rest-of-season projections, which may nose them over the line. Sometimes, acceptable or even above-average defense (which may depend upon which metric one uses) coupled with total ineptitude on offense is enough to flag a team. Sometimes a club may be well ahead of replacement level but has lost a key contributor to injury; sometimes the reverse is true, but the team hasn’t yet climbed above that first-cut threshold. As with Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart’s definition of hardcore pornography, I know replacement level when I see it. Read the rest of this entry »

Starting pitchers prepare for games in three-stage fashion. A few days after taking the mound, they throw a bullpen session under the watchful eye of the pitching coach, typically with a Trackman recording each throw. At the start of every series, there is a pitchers’ meeting with all arms present, as well as the catchers and pitching coaches. On the day of a start, the pitcher will go over that day’s game plan with the catchers and coaches.

And then there are the talks pitchers have among themselves. While informal, they can likewise play a meaningful role in preparedness. Every time a hurler takes the hill, he brings with him knowledge gleaned from his peers. That was a big part of what I was interested in when I approached three starters — Lucas Giolito, Kevin Gausman, and Ryan Pepiot — to learn how they get ready for an outing from an information perspective.

Here are excerpts from my conversations with the pitchers:

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PRE-SERIES AND PRE-START MEETINGS

Giolito: “You go over a lot of things in the pre-series meeting. You go over guys who like to run — stealing bases and things like that — and you obviously go over the hitters. Considering that you have a bunch of dudes in the room that have wildly different stuff and attack plans, that’s more surface level. You’re not going down the line and saying, ‘This is how we’re going to attack this guy,’ because we’re all different. That’s for when you have your pre-start meeting.

“In the pre-start meeting — that’s with the coaching staff and the catchers — we go over each hitter, talking about strengths, weaknesses, and attack plans. The attack plans are based on the individual pitcher’s stuff.” Read the rest of this entry »

Last week, I began a series of pieces about team win-loss totals as estimated by BaseRuns, first by taking a broad look at the methodology and its limitations, then by zooming in on the offenses that deviate most notably from their BaseRuns assessment in the run scoring department. Let’s wrap up with a look at the defenses that sit furthest from their runs allowed approximation.

In the offense edition, I used a game show format to evaluate whether the perspective offered by BaseRuns has a point, or if there’s something its methodology is overlooking. We’ll keep that framework going for the defenses as well. Here’s a reminder of how it works:

To determine whether or not BaseRuns knows what it’s talking about with respect to each team, imagine yourself sitting in the audience on a game show set. The person on your left is dressed as Little Bo Peep, while the person on your right has gone to great lengths to look like Beetlejuice. That or Michael Keaton is really hard up for money. On stage there are a series of doors, each labeled with a team name. Behind each door is a flashing neon sign that reads either “Skill Issue!” or “Built Different!” Both can be either complimentary or derogatory depending on whether BaseRuns is more or less optimistic about a team relative to its actual record. For teams that BaseRuns suggests are better than the numbers indicate, the skill issue identified is a good thing — a latent ability not yet apparent in the on-field results. But if BaseRuns thinks a team is worse than the numbers currently imply, then skill issue is used more colloquially to suggest a lack thereof. The teams that are built different buck the norms laid out by BaseRuns and find a way that BaseRuns doesn’t consider to either excel or struggle.

Read the rest of this entry »

In a post yesterday, I wrote about the BaseRuns approach to estimating team winning percentages and how it attempts to strip away context that doesn’t pertain to a team’s actual ability, so as to reveal what would have happened if baseball were played in a world not governed by the whims of seemingly random variation. In this world, a win-loss record truly represents how good a team actually is. Try as it might, the BaseRuns methodology fails to actually create such a world, sometimes stripping away too much context, ignoring factors that do speak to a team’s quality, or both.

I delayed for a separate post (this one!) a deeper discussion of specific offensive and defensive units that BaseRuns represents quite differently compared to the actual numbers posted by these teams. To determine whether or not BaseRuns knows what it’s talking about with respect to each team, imagine yourself sitting in the audience on a game show set. The person on your left is dressed as Little Bo Peep, while the person on your right has gone to great lengths to look like Beetlejuice. That or Michael Keaton is really hard up for money. On stage there are a series of doors, each labeled with a team name. Behind each door is a flashing neon sign that reads either “Skill Issue!” or “Built Different!” Both can be either complimentary or derogatory depending on whether BaseRuns is more or less optimistic about a team relative to its actual record. For teams that BaseRuns suggests are better than the numbers indicate, the skill issue identified is a good thing — a latent ability not yet apparent in the on-field results. But if BaseRuns thinks a team is worse than the numbers currently imply, then skill issue is used more colloquially to suggest a lack thereof. The teams that are built different buck the norms laid out by BaseRuns and find a way that BaseRuns doesn’t consider to either excel or struggle. Read the rest of this entry »