Archive for Teams

No, we aren’t just going to do a leaderboard sort for best movement in each direction and call it a day. It’s a little bit more complicated to figure out the best changeups by shape and speed, mostly because it’s all relative. The changeup, as the name implies, functions off of the fastball, as a change of pace and movement. So we need to define anything the changeup does relative to the pitcher’s fastball.

Then we can do a sort and call it a day.

In order to define fastball movement, let’s just group together all of the fastballs thrown by a pitcher. It’s probably more nuanced than that; the concept of tunneling or sequencing shows that pitchers can pair their changeup with one fastball or the other for different results. But some of this comes out in the wash: by averaging movement across fastballs, their selection of different fastballs will weight the movement in the direction of the pitcher’s usage.

So then our x and y movement, and velocity, are defined against this average fastball for each pitcher. Using a minimum of 50 changeups thrown, and z-scores to sum up the values, we can get a list of best changeups quickly.

First, the relievers.

Best Reliever Changeups by Movement, Velocity

Pitcher	FB (pfx_x)	FB (pfx_z)	FB (velo)	CH (pfx_x)	CH (pfx_y)	CH (velo)	Sum Z	CH swSTR%
Brad Boxberger	-3.3	10.6	92.6	-7.8	2.0	79.8	6.7	14%
Shawn Tolleson	-2.6	11.0	92.9	-4.8	4.0	79.8	4.9	15%
Josh Fields	0.1	11.5	94.1	-0.6	3.7	81.4	4.5	8%
Roberto Osuna	-4.2	10.7	95.5	-8.0	6.9	82.3	4.0	16%
Josh Smith	-4.1	7.6	89.9	-8.4	1.9	79.4	4.0	8%
Chasen Shreve	7.3	10.6	91.4	6.3	1.5	82.6	3.5	18%
A.J. Ramos	-3.0	8.6	92.4	-7.5	1.0	85.5	3.5	35%
Jeff Ferrell	-4.1	10.2	93.0	-7.4	4.9	82.4	3.5	20%
Danny Farquhar	-5.0	8.5	92.7	-7.5	1.0	84.5	3.2	24%
Fernando Rodney	-6.7	7.1	94.7	-9.6	3.3	82.7	3.1	17%
Andrew Schugel	-7.9	7.8	91.6	-9.6	2.3	80.5	3.1	23%
Joaquin Benoit	-6.5	8.9	94.2	-7.5	1.9	84.1	3.1	24%
Tyler Thornburg	-0.8	11.1	92.2	-5.8	6.3	83.8	3.0	19%
Arnold Leon	-5.1	9.8	91.6	-4.6	2.8	80.2	2.9	22%
Pat Neshek	-8.5	4.9	89.9	-4.6	3.7	68.4	2.9	9%
Tommy Kahnle	-1.9	7.4	94.8	-7.6	2.8	87.2	2.8	23%
Mike Morin	-4.7	8.9	92.3	-0.5	6.8	71.7	2.8	25%
Deolis Guerra	-5.1	10.0	90.8	-6.7	4.0	80.7	2.8	15%
Daniel Hudson	-6.6	8.3	96.0	-9.9	4.9	84.8	2.7	18%
Erik Goeddel	-3.9	9.2	93.0	-4.7	2.0	84.3	2.5	32%

SOURCE: PITCHf/x

pfx_x = horizontal movement
pfx_z = vertical movement
Sum Z = sum of the z-scores for the differentials between fastball and changeups in x, y movement and velocity
swSTR% = swinging strikes over pitches for the changeup
Minumum 50 changeups thrown in 2015

If you listen to The Sleeper and The Bust, you know I talk about this all the time and do the math in my head. Now the math is there for us on the sheet of paper.

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There are few who doubt that, after finishing up his sixth season in Major League Baseball, Jason Heyward is a good player. Up for debate is precisely how good Jason Heyward has been during his career, and more importantly for whichever teams signs him this winter, how good Heyward will be moving forward. Attempting to measure defense with advanced statistics like UZR and DRS has its critics, and attempting to place a value on it can be difficult. Heyward has been an above average offensive player, incredible on defense, and heading into free agency a few months after turning 26 years old, provides few realistic players for comparison. Heyward will get paid. How much will he be worth?

Heyward’s main drawback, perhaps only drawback, as a player seeking more than $100 million is his lack of power. He hit 27 home runs in 2012, but recorded just 13 of them this year along with an isolated slugging percentage of .146, essentially league average. Combining average power with a low strikeout rate (14.8% in 2015) and a solid walk rate (9.2%), Heyward’s wRC+ of 121 puts him in the upper third in terms of the league’s hitters. Adding in 23 steals on 26 attempts and the rest of his baserunning, Heyward’s 22 runs above average on offense placed him within the top quarter of qualified hitters. Lacking in top shelf power, Heyward still provided solid numbers on offense, and after a disappointing start with he Cardinals, he hit .306/.375/.455 with a wRC+ of 130 from the beginning of May to the end of the season.

The lack of power does prevent easy comparison to most free agent mega-deals. The names brought up most recently with regard to Heyward are Jacoby Ellsbury, who got seven years and $153 million from the New York Yankees two years ago, and Carl Crawford, who received seven years and $142 million from the Boston Red Sox five years ago. While those deals might no look great now, age is a major factor. When Ellsbury was Heyward’s age, he had just completed his second full season. Crawford debuted young, but due to a team-friendly contract, he did not become a free agent until after his age-28 season, three years older than Heyward. Ellsbury, now 32, has been worth 21 wins since turning 26 while Crawford, 34, has been worth 22 wins over the last eight seasons. Solid production, that, despite some disappointing seasons mixed in.

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In a pair of recent posts at this site, Matthew Kory has examined — first before the Royals’ great success and then also after it — has examined what sort of effect the World Series champions might have on the roster-construction philosphies of baseball’s other 29 teams. Both pieces are founded on a reasonable assumption — namely, that it’s common for franchises to imitate the process utilized by the league’s great victor, with a view to also imitating the product. The Copycat Effect, is how one might characterize this. Why felines specifically have been singled out for their mimetic inclinations, I can’t say. That the phenomenon exists seems like a reasonable possibility.

The current post resembles Kory’s own efforts in that the objective is to isolate and explore the most pronounced traits of baseball’s championship club — those traits which, were an organization tempted to emulate the champion, they would themselves identify as most important. Where it differs from Kory’s work, however, is that the intent here is to look towards the future. Instead of examing which current major-league players or teams most embody the Royals’ strengths, what I’d like to ask is which prospects do that. In other words, I’d like to ask this: which rookie-eligible players would a general manager, attempting to best imitate the Royals, set about acquiring (or keeping, as the case may be)?

That’s the guiding inquiry of the current post. How to answer it, though?

First, this way: by identifying those traits endemic to the Royals. Again, Kory’s work is helpful here. In the latter of his two posts, he identifies the traits which most distinguished Kansas City from the rest of the league: a low strikeout rate among the club’s hitters, strong baserunning, elite defensive ability, and a talented bullpen. For the purposes of this post, I’ll be ignoring pitchers. I’ll do it for a number of reasons, but largely because betting on even the near-term success of relievers is a fool’s errand. So the focus will be on hitters.

That’s the first step towards answering the question. The second: to utilize the recently published Steamer 600 projections for 2016. Here’s how I began: for all 4043 players for whom a forecast has been produced, I calculated the z-scores in each of three categories: strikeout rate (where lower is better), baserunning runs relative to average, and defensive runs (which accounts both for fielding runs and positional adjustment). I then averaged together the z-scores for each of those three categories. Reason dictates that the resulting figure should represent to what degree the relevant player might offer the skills possessed by Royals players.

Below are the top-10 rookie-eligible players by that methodology. Note that Age represents 2016 baseball age and all heading titles preceded by -z- represent z-scores.

Royals Prospects Who Aren’t Royals: Attempt No. 1

Name	Team	Pos	Age	PA	K%	BsR	Def	zK%	zBsR	zDef	Total
Willians Astudillo	PHI	C/1B	24	450	7.1%	0.1	7.5	3.1	0.2	1.2	1.5
Jose Peraza	LAN	2B	22	600	11.2%	0.9	1.9	2.3	1.5	0.3	1.4
Rossmel Perez	BAL	C	26	450	10.0%	0.1	7.5	2.5	0.2	1.2	1.3
Tomas Telis	MIA	C	25	450	12.2%	0.2	8.2	2.1	0.4	1.3	1.3
Hanser Alberto	TEX	2B	23	600	11.7%	0.4	4.7	2.2	0.7	0.8	1.2
Tyler Heineman	HOU	C	25	450	12.2%	0.1	7.5	2.1	0.2	1.2	1.2
Raywilly Gomez	LAA	C	26	450	13.3%	0.2	7.5	1.9	0.4	1.2	1.2
Benjamin Turner	SFN	C/1B	26	450	13.3%	0.2	7.5	1.9	0.4	1.2	1.2
Ramon Cabrera	CIN	C	26	450	14.2%	0.0	10.2	1.8	0.1	1.7	1.2
Alex Swim	MIN	C/OF	25	450	12.9%	0.1	7.5	2.0	0.2	1.2	1.2

So, an immediate observation: this is a list full of catchers plus also Jose Peraza and Hanser Alberto. Because catchers receive such a large positional adjustment (+7.5 runs per every 450 plate appearances), they’re inclined to gravitate towards the top of lists like this. Where projections are concerned, positional adjustments aren’t subject to regression and translation like other metrics. Strikeout rate, baserunning, fielding runs: where only minor-league data is available, Steamer is conservative — particularly so regarding the latter two variables. As such, the large catcher’s positional adjustment unduly rewards catchers. Catchers are important, but merely presenting a list of doesn’t seem entirely in keeping with our objective here. We’ll have to refine our methodology.

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The season is over. The games have been played, the asses have been crowned. That’s the end. All done.

Except of course, no, not at all. Baseball season is like outer space, or an order of breadsticks at WTF Thursday’s Neighborhoodish Restaurant. It never ends. But before we move on to the business of baseball’s business, our topic for the next [checks watch] five months, let’s look back just a tad. You’ll recall, in a bit of foreshadowing, that I graded the Royals’ division-winning celebration in September. It has been suggested by some that, now that Kansas City are champions, I should grade their World Series-winning celebration, and see how it stacks up. See if they’ve learned anything over the last month. So, rather than think too hard about a different, more original topic idea, I thought, “Yeah. Sure.” So here we are! Exciting!

We’ll start where we started last time: the beginning. Which is really the end. It’s here:

With two strikes, Wade Davis threw a fastball inside that may or may not have caught the corner. Didn’t matter. The game was already over. Wilmer Flores, already focused on his off season of deep disappointment akin to learning that WTF Thursday’s Neighborhoodish Restaurant closes at 9pm — meaning endless breadsticks are a myth — took the pitch. I’ve watched the play over and over and despite solid video evidence to the contrary I’m not convinced Flores didn’t wander back to the dugout three pitches earlier.

In any case, let’s get to the grading. You may (not) recall that the Royals’ division-winning celebration garnered 58 out of 70 possible points, or 83%. Not bad. But let’s see if the Royals can improve on that effort, or if I even remember what the categories are.

*****

Appropriate Excitement Level

Heh. Remembered that one.

Look, I really want to talk about the appropriate excitement level. I mean, heck, it’s the heading and everything. And sure, fine, the Royals were super excited. Ten points out of 10, boys. Well done. But the thing I keep noticing after Davis’ strikeout of Flores is Flores. Just watch this.

Davis throws the game’s final pitch.

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Four days. It took MLB all of four days to bring us the first transaction of the off-season, as the Mariners and Rays got together on a six player trade that ships some interesting players in both directions. The full trade, as announced on Thursday evening.

Tampa Bay receives:

SS Brad Miller
1B Logan Morrison
RHP Danny Farquhar

Seattle receives:

RHP Nate Karns
OF Boog Powell
LHP C.J. Riefenhauser

While this is a six player deal, for simplicity, we can mostly break this down into three one-for-ones.

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The worst called ball of the season was literally a fastball in the middle of the strike zone. That makes it genuinely the worst called ball imaginable, with the consolation being that it at least didn’t matter very much. When I’ve written these posts in the past, I’ve noted that the bad called balls look worse than the bad called strikes. There is no called-strike equivalent of a ball on a pitch down the middle. You’ll never see a called strike on a pitch at the eyes. You’ll never see a called strike on a pitch in the dirt. I think the default is to call a ball, unless the pitch does enough convincing, and there are limits to that. Still, one post has to be followed by the other. Writing about the worst called ball means I have to write about the worst called strike. That’s below, and I’m sorry it isn’t more visually hilarious, but this is still the worst of something, over seven months of baseball, and the devil is in the details. The devil loves details.

The second-worst called strike of the season? I’ve already written that up, because it was the worst called strike of the season’s first half. It was a lefty strike, thrown by Max Scherzer to Odubel Herrera to open a ballgame. The pitch measured 11 inches away from the nearest part of the strike zone.

Unsurprisingly, the worst called strike of the whole season is similar, in that it’s a lefty strike away off the plate. Over time, we’ve grown kind of used to the lefty strikes getting called, but the thing about this is lefty strikes are balls. The zone shouldn’t extend off the plate in either direction, for anyone, but it has and it does, and hitters have to live with that. The second-worst called strike was 11 inches away from the zone. The worst called strike was 12 inches away from the zone. That’s 9% worse. Pretty big gap when you’re at an extreme.

The good news is nobody cared.

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The 2015 season will forever go down as (literally) a banner year for the New York Metropolitans. A National League championship pennant will forever fly above Citi Field, and with youthful pitching studs Jacob deGrom, Matt Harvey, Noah Syndergaard and Zack Wheeler in place for the foreseeable future, a competitive future appears assured. As someone who has spent many years in a major league front office, I can assure you, however, that the page is turned from the present to the future at record speed in the game of baseball. The Mets, and all 29 other clubs, must quickly take stock of who they are and put the wheels in motion toward the club they which to become moving forward.

There is no such thing as a perfect ball club in this day and age. The champion Royals themselves lack offensive power, and their starting rotation was far from fearsome. One can easily make the argument that the Mets owned the starting pitching advantage in each and every World Series contest. Obviously, the Royals’ superior team defense, bullpen, position player durability and ability to make contact more than offset their shortcomings.

The Mets are a very curious case. On the last day of July, they stood 30th and last in the major leagues in runs scored. It’s pretty unique to travel from that low point to playing meaningful games in November. Their other chief weakness, which just happened to be the one that reared its ugly head when the stakes were the highest, was the Mets’ subpar team defense.

While no one would have placed the Mets’ overall defensive ability on par with that of their World Series opponents, both old-fashioned and new-age metrics agree that the National League champions profiled (at worst) as an average defensive club. You want old school? The Mets ranked fifth in the NL in fielding percentage, and made the fifth-fewest errors. You want a little more new-school? They ranked second in the NL in defensive efficiency, i.e., turning batted balls into outs. So far, they look positively above average.

Let’s get a little more cutting-edge, and move on to FanGraphs’ team defense page. Here we find the Mets 17th in overall defense, 13th in UZR/150, 19th in error runs, and 10th in range runs. Now we’re talking straight up major league average.

What if we were to take a look at the issue from a somewhat different perspective, both incorporating batted ball data into the equation, and evaluating team defense from a head-to-head perspective; how did clubs perform defensively as compared to their opponents over 162 games, in the same ball parks, with the same weather conditions?

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This is an oversimplification, but to be a successful starting pitcher in the current era, you have to maintain some reasonable level of effectiveness for something like 25 batters per start. If you can’t pitch into the sixth and seventh innings with regularity, you aren’t going to remain a starting pitcher for very long. In the past that number was higher and in the future it might be lower, but if you don’t have the tools to remain effective for two or three turns through the order, you’re destined for the bullpen.

Pitching is multidimensional, which means that in order to pitch well enough to remain a starter, you need some combination of skills which push you across that threshold. Command, endurance, and stuff all play into the equation. Command is the ability to throw your pitches where you want them and endurance is the ability to maintain your command and stuff over multiple repetitions. Stuff is more complicated because it is partially a measure of individual pitch quality (defined in many ways) and the number of pitches you have at your disposal.

In other words, if you have average command, decent endurance, and the world’s greatest fastball, you can probably get by if your other pitches are only okay. But you can also get by without a great fastball if your command is elite and you have three solid pitches. There’s no single path to success.

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For the last three years, the Baltimore Orioles and Washington Nationals have been engaged in a feud over television rights fees. As both Wendy Thurm and I have previously discussed, the origins of the dispute date back to 2005, and Major League Baseball’s resolution of Baltimore’s objections to the Montreal Expos being relocated to Washington, D.C. (territory belonging at the time to the Orioles).

In order to alleviate the Orioles’ concerns, MLB structured a deal in which Baltimore would initially own 87 percent of the newly created Mid-Atlantic Sports Network (MASN), the regional sports network that would air both the Orioles’ and Nationals’ games. In exchange, the Nationals were scheduled to receive an initial broadcast rights fee of $20 million per year from MASN, an amount that would be recalculated every five years.

Jump forward to 2012, when Washington requested that its rights fee be increased to $120 million per year. MASN and the Orioles refused, and as a result the dispute ended up in arbitration, with a panel of MLB team executives – the Mets’ Jeff Wilpon, the Rays’ Stuart Sternberg, and the Pirates’ Frank Coonelly – ultimately awarding the Nationals roughly $60 million per year in broadcast fees.

Still not satisfied, the Orioles and MASN then went to court in 2014, asking a New York judge to overturn the arbitration award on the grounds that the panel was biased. After initially blocking MLB from enforcing the arbitration decision that August, presiding Judge Lawrence Marks gave MASN and the Orioles a more lasting victory on Wednesday, officially vacating the arbitrators’ award.

As a result, the Orioles and Nationals are back to square one in their dispute, potentially impacting both teams’ 2016 offseason plans.

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Alex Gordon is going to be a hot commodity on the free-agent market. Little thought will be given to exercising his current 2016 option, and then he’ll be available to anyone and everyone. The FanGraphs crowd expects him to sign for something in the neighborhood of five years and $90 million, and the crowd can end up low when predicting the higher tier. Relative to other free agents, the crowd puts Gordon’s contract between Chris Davis‘ contract and Jeff Samardzija’s contract in total cost.

Maybe Dayton Moore will be the guy who gives the contract. The Royals love Gordon, as anyone would, and he’s been with the Royals his whole career, and you might’ve noticed those Royals recently winning a championship. On their side, then, there’s new extra revenue, and there’s a natural desire to keep the same core. On Gordon’s side, he could be willing to entertain a bit of a discount, to remain where he’s been. He likes the organization, and now the organization’s successful. Good reason to stay.

There’s a lot of money out there, though. This is business, and perhaps Gordon will elect to leave Kansas City on top. People are driven to pursue new, fresh opportunities. There’s a strong chance Gordon doesn’t return, is the point. Maybe it’s 40%, or maybe it’s 90%. Gordon has been an absolutely phenomenal defensive left fielder. So because this era might be about to change, I’d like to quickly review what’s been a period of team-level defensive dominance.

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