The Yankees have been pursuing a left-handed corner outfielder all winter. They’ve telegraphed their willingness to trade, and trade multiple pitchers at that, to get their target. Last night, they did what they set out to do – at least, as long as you’re willing to take my words exactly literally. Sure, he’s not Juan Soto, but Alex Verdugo is now a Yankee, after the team traded Richard Fitts, Greg Weissert, and Nicholas Judice to the Red Sox.
For Yankees fans who have been following the sound and fury around a Soto trade in the last week, acquiring Verdugo almost feels like a joke played by Brian Cashman. “Oh, you wanted to improve our offense and get us some more left-handed hitting? Here you go! I did exactly what you asked for!” It’s not so different than your parents telling you that you don’t need to buy Lucky Charms at the grocery store because you have some at home, only to see a box of Generically Fortunate Oat-Shapes in the pantry when you run inside to check. Read the rest of this entry »
The following article is part of Jay Jaffe’s ongoing look at the candidates on the BBWAA 2024 Hall of Fame ballot. Originally written for the 2020 election, it has been updated to reflect recent voting results as well as additional research. For a detailed introduction to this year’s ballot, and other candidates in the series, use the tool above; an introduction to JAWS can be found here. For a tentative schedule and a chance to fill out a Hall of Fame ballot for our crowdsourcing project, see here. All WAR figures refer to the Baseball-Reference version unless otherwise indicated.
Bobby Abreu could do just about everything. A five-tool player with dazzling speed, a sweet left-handed stroke, and enough power to win a Home Run Derby, he was also one of the game’s most patient, disciplined hitters, able to wear down a pitcher and unafraid to hit with two strikes. While routinely reaching the traditional seasonal plateaus that tend to get noticed — a .300 batting average (six times), 20 homers (nine times), 30 steals (six times), 100 runs scored and batted in (eight times apiece) — he was nonetheless a stathead favorite for his ability to take a walk (100 or more eight years in a row) and his high on-base percentages (.400 or better eight times). And he was durable, playing 151 games or more in 13 straight seasons. “To me, Bobby’s Tony Gwynn with power,” said Phillies hitting coach Hal McRae in 1999.
“Bobby was way ahead of his time [with] regards to working pitchers,” said his former manager Larry Bowa when presenting him for induction into the Phillies Wall of Fame in 2019. “In an era when guys were swinging for the fences, Bobby never strayed from his game. Because of his speed, a walk would turn into a double. He was cool under pressure, and always in control of his at-bats. He was the best combination of power, speed, and patience at the plate.” Read the rest of this entry »
As the leading lights of the baseball world sit around Nashville, Tennessee, waiting for Shohei Ohtani to choose his forever home, the reliever market finally sputtered to life on Day 2 of the Winter Meetings, with two veteran right-handers signing contracts for 2024. Kirby Yates, late of the Braves, is bound for Texas on a one-year, $4.5 million deal. Chris Devenski, meanwhile, re-signed with the Rays on a one-year deal with a team option; the first year will pay him $1 million, after which the team holds a $2 million option with a $100,000 buyout.
As much as a balky bullpen can derail an otherwise championship-caliber team, the 2023 Rangers were the kind of club that makes you think the whole thing just isn’t worth worrying about. Texas won the World Series with a relief corps that did not fit its implacable offense, posting the worst strikeout rate of any playoff bullpen. The only team whose relievers fared worse on an ERA basis was Miami, and the Marlins lasted all of two games against a Phillies lineup that thrashed them around like a hungry cat tormenting a lizard. Read the rest of this entry »
The Los Angeles Dodgers and right-hander Joe Kelly did a whole bunch of paperwork just to end up back in business together. In November, the Dodgers declined a one-year, $9.5 million option on Kelly, buying the right-hander out for $1 million and sending him into free agency. This week, the two parties agreed to terms on another contract, reportedly for one year and $8 million. Nobody likes to take a pay cut, but for Kelly, who was born in Anaheim, that’s $9 million in his pocket to stay put instead of $9.5 million – ultimately a pretty friendly outcome after the option decision didn’t go his way.
If you’ve tuned in to the postseason in the last decade, you’re probably familiar with the work of Kelly, who started a World Series game for the Cardinals in 2013, earned his first ring with the Red Sox with a dominant October in 2018, and pitched for the Dodgers in four of the last five postseasons, winning his second World Series in 2020. He helped set up a pair of future Hall of Fame closers in their only World Series seasons (so far) two years apart in Craig Kimbrel and Kenley Jansen. Since the start of his career, the only pitchers with more postseason appearances than Kelly’s 41 are Jansen, Ryan Pressly, and Aroldis Chapman:
Hampson defines what it means to be a utility player — the 26th man on the roster who contributes not through offensive prowess but via baserunning and defensive versatility. Despite once being a 50 FV prospect, he never became an everyday regular with the Rockies, hovering around replacement level thanks to his consistently poor hitting (he posted a wRC+ of 64 in each of his first three full seasons in a Khris Davis-esque streak). Concerns about his power potential in the minors were validated by his pedestrian exit velocities in the majors, maxing out at 11 homers even in the favorable conditions of Coors Field.
After being non-tendered by Colorado, Hampson signed a one-year deal with the Marlins, where he was roughly a league-average hitter over 250 plate appearances. This sudden uptick in offense was largely a mirage of batted ball luck; he posted a .379 BABIP compared to a .320 career baseline (in the ballpark with the highest BABIP), the lowest barrel rate of his career, and no improvements in walk or strikeout rates.
You certainly shouldn’t be expecting anything resembling a league-average hitting line from Hampson, but his baserunning and defense are still enviable. He has averaged +4.2 BaseRuns per 150 games played, and while he’s not a volume stealer, he has an 81% career success rate. His skills on the basepaths have translated to defensive range at every single position besides first base and catcher. It’s extremely difficult to maintain a high quality of fielding despite being constantly ping-ponged between the infield and outfield, especially from the beginning of a big league career, yet Hampson has performed admirably wherever he’s been stationed.
Garrett Hampson, True Utilityman
Position
Innings
RAA + UZR Arm Runs
2B
1014
-4
3B
97
1
SS
621
1
LF
94
0.2
CF
1300
2.9
RF
86
-1.1
Hampson has been above average with the glove spending the considerable majority of his time at up-the-middle positions, an asset to teams who can spend a roster spot on a defense-first player and/or rebuilding clubs looking to boost their inexperienced pitching staffs with solid gloves. The Royals certainly fit the latter criteria, with eight members of their current projected pitching staff, including three members of the starting rotation, entering 2024 with fewer than three years of service time. A most likely use case for Hampson will be as a platoon partner with the left-handed Kyle Isbel and Michael Massey, though he could get time almost anywhere given the lack of proven talents on the roster.
Wendle is best known for his four-year tenure with the Rays, where he thrice eclipsed 500 plate appearances and 3 WAR (or a pro-rated 2020 equivalent) despite never locking down a single position. Instead, he rotated between second, third, and shortstop, primarily manning the keystone early on, then seamlessly shifting the bulk of his starts to third base when Brandon Lowe had a fully healthy season at second. When he hit at an above-average clip, he did so without much pop or plate discipline, putting bat on ball and consistently placing line drives into the outfield. He maximized his productivity given his lack of raw power or lift in his swing, but it relied on his plus speed and bat control, which couldn’t last forever.
Wendle broke into the majors late, playing his first full season for the Rays at age 28. Despite entering free agency for the first time, 2024 will represent his age-34 season. As a result, he’s lost a step over the years, evident in his declining defensive and baserunning value. He took extra bases on hits less frequently than before, and last season was his first as a below-average defender by RAA. His line-drive rate went from great with the Rays to below-average with the Marlins, and hitting the ball on the ground over half the time isn’t effective for someone who doesn’t have the foot speed to leg out infield hits. The warning signs were there in his age-31 season in 2021, so it’s unsurprising Tampa traded him that offseason, (correctly) anticipating a future decline. Wendle was never great with the Marlins, but his production completely fell apart during the last couple months of his tenure there, with a -6 wRC+ over the last two months of the year.
Joey Wendle Speed Metrics
Year
Sprint Speed Percentile
BsR/150
Def/150
2018
81
3.2
5.4
2019
86
3.2
8.6
2020
83
4.2
5.4
2021
71
-0.2
10.4
2022
50
0
7.3
2023
61
0.3
2.1
SOURCE: Baseball Savant
Def incorporates RAA and positional adjustment
Wendle will slide into the role previously held by fellow left-handed multi-positional infielder Luis Guillorme, who was non-tendered following a down year truncated by a calf injury. It’s somewhat surprising that Guillorme was let go given his arbitration estimate of $1.7 million and track record of success in a bench role, especially with his disciplined approach at the plate and high walk rates. Should both Wendle and Guillorme return to form next season, the Mets will be trading a points of OBP for a few more extra-base hits, though the former’s decline in athleticism make it difficult to see him as an impact player, even in his limited role.
Only one position player contributed more negative WAR to his team than Wendle in last season’s second half, and it just so happened to be DeJong. In the first half with the Cardinals, he hit below league average and put up the best defensive numbers of his career, putting him on a three-win pace for the season. With St. Louis well out of contention, they flipped him to the Blue Jays, where he fell into a historic slump. In 13 games north of the border, he went 3-for-44, striking out 41% of the time without drawing a walk or clubbing an extra-base hit. His .068/.068/.068 slash line was good for a -76 wRC+, prompting the Blue Jays to release him after just three weeks.
DeJong then signed on with the Giants, themselves in the middle of a horrific offensive implosion. While he was acquired to take playing time from the aging Brandon Crawford, his struggles in Toronto followed him west, where he hit even worse than Crawford. He wasn’t as historically awful as he was with the Jays, but he still hit just .184 without a walk before the Giants cut him loose as well.
The question going forward remains whether or not DeJong’s abysmal second half was a 31-game anomaly or a true change in his talent level. There are certainly red flags in his under-the-hood numbers; zero walks in 94 plate appearances is concerning, but his chase rate shooting over 54% after leaving St. Louis (compared to a 32% career rate) may be even worse. His power almost completely evaporated as well. A combination of lowered exit velocity with more ground balls than fly balls for the first time in his career led to just one barrel in 60 batted ball events. Steamer’s projections certainly put a good deal of weight into his disastrous run, forecasting a .276 OBP and 76 wRC+, with a strikeout rate a few points above his career norm.
DeJong’s signing won’t drag the White Sox, who scored the second-fewest runs in the majors last year, out of the cellar, but it will at least stabilize their infield situation in the short term. With the arrows pointing down on 40-man infielders José Rodríguez and Lenyn Sosa, the Sox lack immediate plug-and-play options at the six beyond Nicky Lopez. Their clearest option for the future is top prospect Colson Montgomery, our 12th-ranked prospect atop the 55 FV tier. But while Montgomery has looked great in pro ball, he’s far from a perfect prospect, and his poor defense at shortstop may necessitate a future position change, though he’s never played an inning anywhere else in the minors. He also suffered a back injury that limited him to just 84 games in 2023, including a relatively unimpressive showing in the Arizona Fall League. It’s possible that DeJong could hold down the fort for the early season, making way for a midseason debut from Montgomery.
The following article is part of Jay Jaffe’s ongoing look at the candidates on the BBWAA 2024 Hall of Fame ballot. For a detailed introduction to this year’s ballot, and other candidates in the series, use the tool above; an introduction to JAWS can be found here. For a tentative schedule, and a chance to fill out a Hall of Fame ballot for our crowdsourcing project, see here. All WAR figures refer to the Baseball-Reference version unless otherwise indicated.
Carlos Beltrán was the quintessential five-tool player, a switch-hitting center fielder who harnessed his physical talents and became a superstar. Aided by a high baseball IQ that was essentially his sixth tool, he spent 20 seasons in the majors, making nine All-Star teams, winning three Gold Gloves, helping five different franchises reach the playoffs, and putting together some of the most dominant stretches in postseason history once he got there. At the end of his career, he helped the Astros win a championship.
Drafted out of Puerto Rico by the Royals, Beltrán didn’t truly thrive until he was traded away. He spent the heart of his career in New York, first with the Mets — on what was at the time the largest free-agent contract in team history — and later the Yankees. He endured his ups and downs in the Big Apple and elsewhere, including his share of injuries. Had he not missed substantial portions of three seasons, he might well have reached 3,000 hits, but even as it is, he put up impressive, Cooperstown-caliber career numbers. Not only is he one of just eight players with 300 homers and 300 stolen bases, but he also owns the highest stolen base success rate (86.4%) of any player with at least 200 attempts.
Alas, two years after Beltrán’s career ended, he was identified as the player at the center of the biggest baseball scandal in a generation: the Astros’ illegal use of video replay to steal opponents’ signs in 2017 and ’18. He was “the godfather of the whole program” in the words of Tom Koch-Weser, the team’s director of advance information, and the only player identified in commissioner Rob Manfred’s January 2020 report. But between that report and additional reporting by the Wall Street Journal, it seems apparent that the whole team, including manager A.J. Hinch and general manager Jeff Luhnow, was well aware of the system and didn’t stop him or his co-conspirators. In that light, it’s worth wondering about the easy narrative that has left Beltrán holding the bag; Hinch hardly had to break stride in getting another managerial job once his suspension ended. While Beltrán was not disciplined by the league, the fallout cost him his job as manager of the Mets before he could even oversee a game, and he has yet to get another opportunity.
Will Beltrán’s involvement in sign stealing cost him a berth in Cooperstown, the way allegations concerning performance-enhancing drugs have for a handful of players with otherwise Hallworthy numbers? At the very least it kept him from first-ballot election, as he received 46.5% on the 2023 ballot — a share that has typically portended eventual election for less complicated candidates. What remains to be seen is whether voters treat him like Rafael Palmeiro and banish him for a big mistake (a positive PED test) in the final season of an otherwise impressive career, or like Roberto Alomar and come around quickly after withholding the honor of first-ballot induction for an out-of-character incident (spitting at an umpire) before giving him his due. Read the rest of this entry »
For the 20th consecutive season, the ZiPS projection system is unleashing a full set of prognostications. For more information on the ZiPS projections, please consult this year’s introduction and MLB’s glossary entry. The team order is selected by lot, and the next team up is the San Diego Padres.
Batters
The Padres have an elite set of offensive talent in Juan Soto, Fernando Tatis Jr., Manny Machado, and the rest of the assorted cast. Then again, they need to be, because as the team is currently designed, the pitching is a massive sinkhole. Soto leads this group, and after an underwhelming Padres debut in 2022, he hit about as expected in 2023. Tatis Jr. turned out to be an excellent corner outfielder and stayed healthy, and while Machado had some ups and downs and will play some DH in 2024 due to his elbow injury, he’s unlikely to be a problem for the Friars.
The next tier of hitters is as good as the best players on some teams. Ha-Seong Kim made a great case for 2021 being his outlier season, not 2022. Xander Bogaerts still ended up with a season right about where reasonable expectations where, and Trent Grisham is at least average in center field, though he should be banned from bunting on his own volition. If the catcher pairing and Jake Cronenworth are the weakest parts of your lineup, you’re doing a pretty good job.
That being said, there are serious concerns on the horizon. Soto is a free agent at the end of the year, which is why he’s coming up a lot in trade talks. That free agency is quite short on offensive talent just increases the incentives for the Padres to trade him for pitching help and/or farm system restocking. A lot of the organization’s depth has been whittled away over recent years, so the team is susceptible to injuries, and while the farm system has bounced back a bit — it was pretty depleted from myriad trades — many of the best prospects aren’t likely to be options over the next few years. One exception is Jackson Merrill, though with Bogaerts and Machado signed to the end of time, it’s uncertain where he will break into the majors.
Pitchers
Here’s where there should be many furrowed brows. At one point a few years ago, the Padres were entering the season with seven or eight viable starting pitchers, but it’s hard to envision that being even close to the case this upcoming spring. Joe Musgrove is their best pitcher now, but that comes with a pretty significant “but” in the form of a shoulder injury that ended his season prematurely and kept him from participating in the team’s doomed last-gasp run to sneak into the playoffs. Yu Darvish, meanwhile, is showing signs of decline, which is unsurprising for a pitcher who will be 38 by the end of the next season.
It gets cloudier from here, to be kind. ZiPS projects only six Padres with an ERA+ above 100, and the two best of them, Blake Snell and Josh Hader, are no longer actually employed by the team. The rest of the rotation is a bevy of sixth starters, better suited to be Plan Bs and not the guys you actually want to start the season in the rotation. ZiPS is quite intrigued by Robby Snelling, but he’s realistically a year or so away, with Dylan Lesko a little farther.
It’s not hard to see why the Padres have been interested in trading Soto if it gets them pitching help. Unlike the vast majority of franchises in history, their collapsed cable deal likely means that there’s a lot of truth to the Padres being at their limits on how much they can invest in the team. With revenues uncertain and some ownership changes coming given the recent passing of Peter Seidler, it doesn’t strike me as likely that they’ll spike a $300 million payroll. And to sign the pitchers in free agency that they need, that’s probably what they would have to do with Soto on the roster.
ZiPS wants nothing to do with the bullpen. Enyel De Los Santos and Tom Cosgrove project as the best of the lot, but neither bring to the table what Hader did. The computer was always “in” on Robert Suarez, going back to the moment he was signed, but it’s a bit worried now, as an elbow injury and losing a third of your strikeout rate are inauspicious signs. Even if Suarez isn’t a problem, the rest of the bullpen looks to be, and it’s not just ZiPS being mean; Steamer is only slightly gentler on the Pads.
Right now, the Padres look like a high-80s win team with a decently high ceiling if they get some uncharacteristically good fortune in 2024. The future of this team remains complicated. Those answers will not be known when this article goes live.
Ballpark graphic courtesy Eephus League. Depth charts constructed by way of those listed here. Size of player names is very roughly proportional to Depth Chart playing time.
Players are listed with their most recent teams wherever possible. This includes players who are unsigned or have retired, players who will miss 2024 due to injury, and players who were released in 2023. So yes, if you see Joe Schmoe, who quit baseball back in August to form a Belgian Death Metal Skiffle Band that only plays songs by Franz Schubert, he’s still listed here intentionally. ZiPS is assuming a league with an ERA of 4.33.
Hitters are ranked by zWAR, which is to say, WAR values as calculated by me, Dan Szymborski, whose surname is spelled with a z. WAR values might differ slightly from those that appear in the full release of ZiPS. Finally, I will advise anyone against — and might karate chop anyone guilty of — merely adding up WAR totals on a depth chart to produce projected team WAR.
Rule no. 1 of MLB’s Winter Meetings: Beware of water features. Nashville’s Gaylord Opryland Resort & Convention Center, which for the next three days will serve as Vatican City for dudes in quarter zips and running shoes, contains within its expansive halls an artificial river. I’m in the process of putting together a bounty pool to see if we can get a writer to fall in the drink by the end of the week, but so far everyone’s stayed dry.
Nobody has suffered the fate of this legendary unfortunate, who absentmindedly stumbled into a Dallas hotel fountain in 2011, live on MLB Network. I’d like to propose — with the understanding that this might be controversial — that face-planting into a water feature would’ve been a more productive use of Jerry Dipoto’s Sunday evening than what he actually got up to.
Jim Leyland is headed to Cooperstown. The 78-year-old former manager of the Pirates, Marlins, Rockies, and Tigers was the only candidate elected by the 2024 Contemporary Baseball Era Committee for Managers/Executives/Umpires, which met on Sunday at the Winter Meetings in Nashville to consider eight figures who made their greatest impact from 1980 to the present. In his first appearance on an Era Committee ballot, the 78-year-old former skipper received 15 of 16 votes (93.8%) from a panel of Hall of Famers, executives and media members/historians.
In a 22-year managerial career with Pittsburgh (1986–96), Florida (197–98), Colorado (1999) and Detroit (2006–13), Leyland led his teams to the playoffs eight times, winning a World Series with the Marlins in 1997, a pair of pennants with the Tigers in 2006 and ’12, and six division titles. He ranks 18th in career regular season wins (1,769) but was only 41 games above .500 for his career, with a .506 winning percentage; his record included some lean years with teams that had been torn down and weren’t likely to compete. When given the resources to do so by ownership, he was quite successful, guiding seven teams to at least 90 wins. He was a three-time Manager of the Year, winning the NL award with the Pirates in 1990 and ’92 and with the Tigers in 2006. He’s one of 10 managers to win pennants in both leagues and just the second to lead two teams to a World Series in his first year on the job; Bucky Harris was first, with the 1924 Senators and ’47 Yankees (h/t @AlmostCoop).
Leyland was his era’s archetype of an old-school manager. Prematurely gray, he went from looking ancient at the start of his career to actually being ancient, at least in baseball terms. Known for sneaking cigarettes between innings, he cut an indelible image in the dugout and in front of a microphone, where his dry wit made him a media favorite. Despite a gruff exterior and a knack for getting his money’s worth from umpires when the situation merited it, he earned a reputation as a players’ manager rather than an old-school hard-ass. Read the rest of this entry »
The St. Louis Cardinals were one of baseball’s most disappointing teams in 2023. Favored to win the NL Central, they instead finished with just 71 wins and missed the playoffs for the first time since 2018. Moreover, the losing record was wholly unfamiliar territory. Since John Mozeliak was appointed GM prior to the 2008 season (his title is now President of Baseball Operations), the Cardinals had had nothing but winning records under his watch. They reached the postseason in 10 of those seasons and twice advanced to the World Series, capturing the franchise’s 11th modern-era title in 2011.
To say that St. Louis has had sustained success under Mozeliak would be stating the obvious. Ditto that “The Cardinals Way” — the catchphrase champions the club’s adherence to fundamentals and its player development acumen — has paid dividends on a consistent basis.
What does it mean when sustained success suddenly hits a roadblock? In the Cardinals’ current case, does it represent an anomaly? Was 2023 simply a blip, or is there a need for Mozeliak’s team to change its processes in any way? I asked that question of the executive during last month’s GM meetings.
“I think it would be somewhat foolish to just approach this past year as, ‘Oh, odds have it that you’re going to lose, so it happened,’” replied Mozeliak. “You can learn from some things that happened last year. I hope everybody who is involved in this is having that reflection moment and trying to understand what we could have done differently, what we should have done differently, and what we will do differently going forward.”
Asked if he could share specifics, Mozeliak said that while some have been identified, he preferred not to call any of them out, lest he “make anybody feel bad.” He did say that he was willing to call himself out. “Adding more pitching prior going into camp, would have, in hindsight, made more sense” was the mea culpa he chose to share. Read the rest of this entry »