It’s not that I advise always taking teams at their word. Teams have an interest in pushing obvious agendas, and much of what they put out there is essentially some kind of propaganda. Teams always have to be selling themselves, which means emphasizing optimism while downplaying any negatives. But I trust the Rays on what they say they’re doing. Over the weekend, the Rays added C.J. Cron while losing Corey Dickerson and Jake Odorizzi. They said they slashed payroll without getting meaningfully worse, and I agreed. That post was promptly followed by news of the Rays trading Steven Souza Jr. for prospects, but the Rays said that was a baseball trade, not a money move, and that it would be the end of the selling. I believed the Rays; it just didn’t feel like an actual tank-job. There was also the room to make an addition.
An addition has already been made. The Rays have plugged the Souza void by signing Carlos Gomez for a year and $4 million. Gomez is signing from out of the bargain bin, so this isn’t a franchise-altering transaction. And there’s always the chance that, tomorrow or next week, Kevin Kiermaier or Chris Archer is swapped for younger players. The Rays still could tank, if they wanted to. But Gomez will actually earn more in 2018 than Souza will. And I think this is just more evidence of how the Rays are forever attempting to thread the needle. What is Carlos Gomez, as a ballplayer? He’s just an older and more fragile Steven Souza. It’s not the worst exchange, given the four new prospects from the trade.
The Yankees entered the offseason determined to stay under the luxury-tax threshold. The Rays, meanwhile, have appeared intent recently on cutting payroll. As for the Diamondbacks, their moves this winter seem to indicate a club looking to quietly build on its first postseason appearance in six years.
On Tuesday night, the aforementioned organizations came together to accomplish their individual objectives in a three-team trade. Nick Piecoro reported on the most notable players involved in the deal.
Source: Dbacks have acquired Steven Souza from Rays in three-team deal. Brandon Drury is headed to the Yankees.
Steven Souza Jr. should immediately assume Arizona’s starting right-field job, while Brandon Drury represents an option at second and third base for a club that lacks experience at both positions. With regard to Tampa Bay, they both shed Souza’s $3.6 million salary and land a small collection of prospects, including Nick Solak from the Yankees and Anthony Banda and two PTBNL from Arizona. Another prospect, Taylor Widener, goes from New York to Arizona. Our own Eric Longenhagen evaluates the merits of the prospects involved here. It’s not a franchise-altering return for Tampa.
Below are scouting reports on the prospects who changed hands in the three-team trade on Tuesday night that sent OF Steven Souza, Jr. from Tampa Bay to Arizona and INF Brandon Drury from Arizona to the Yankees.
Prospects Acquired by Rays
Name
Position
Future Value
ETA
Anthony Banda
LHP
50
2018
Nick Solak
2B
45
2019
PTBNL
—
—
—
PTBNL
—
—
—
Anthony Banda, LHP
In 2017, Banda struggled at notoriously unforgiving Triple-A Reno, where he posted a 5.39 ERA. He made a spot start in Arizona in July and then was up again in August for a three-start look before he finished the year in the D-backs bullpen. Despite his poor on-paper production in 2017, his stuff remains intact and he profiles as a No. 4 starter. Banda sits 92-95 and will touch 96 with his fastball. He has an above-average changeup that he should probably throw more often and an average curveball in the 77-82 mph range. In light of what’s going on with Tampa Bay right now, he’ll probably exceed rookie limitations in 2017. He’s a 50 FV prospect who appeared within the honorable-mention section of our top-100 list.
It got kind of lost on Saturday, because Eric Hosmer signed with the Padres on Saturday, and that became baseball’s big news. But the Padres weren’t the only team active over the weekend, as the Rays pulled off a trio of transactions. Jake Odorizzi was traded to the Twins for a low-level infielder. Additionally, C.J. Cron was acquired for a player to be named later, and, to make roster room, Corey Dickerson was designated for assignment. The moves all happened so fast it got confusing, but the sequence made an unpleasant impression. Dickerson was a 2017 AL All-Star, and Odorizzi had been a regular starter for four years. It looked as if the Rays were partially tearing down.
Indeed, in a sense, that’s true — ownership was looking for the front office to cut payroll. Even though the Rays’ payrolls have always been modest, money is a factor in everything, and the 2017 club apparently got a little pricey. The owners asked for a payroll reduction, and an ownership ask is an ownership demand. This is how the Rays have long operated. Ideally, it wouldn’t be the case, but it is what it is. I can’t compel the owners to spend more than they do.
But while many have been upset by the departures of Odorizzi and Dickerson — including Kevin Kiermaier — it should also be understood just where the Rays are. The Rays now aren’t really worse off compared to where they were. The team isn’t tanking, as far as I can tell, and they’re not planning to lose 95 games. Two big contributors from the past are now gone, yet the roster is still okay. That’s not a bad outcome after shedding $10 million.
Late Saturday, the Tampa Bay Rays acquired SS prospect Jermaine Palacios from Minnesota in exchange for RHP Jake Odorizzi. Palacios has a fairly long track record of offensive performance — he’s a career .290/.345/.426 hitter over four pro seasons — and is a viable defensive shortstop, but his game has some blemishes that may be exploited at the upper levels of the minors.
Chief among those is Palacios’s approach. He is not a selective hitter. Palacios has a quick bat, is loose-wristed, and has terrific hand-eye coordination, but his propensity to swing at just about everything is likely to be exploited as he reaches the upper levels of the minors. The physical tools to hit are here and, after flopping at Low-A in 2016, Palacios seemed to adjust to full-season pitching last year. (Nothing obvious changed mechanically, he just looked more comfortable than he did the year before.) This might be something he’s slow to do at each level. It’s tough to project Palacios’s hit tool because his barrel quickness and bat control are both excellent, but his on-paper production is going to play down unless he starts hunting driveable pitches.
Defensively, Palacios has a 55 arm, enough to play the left side of the infield, and average range, hands, and actions. He makes the occasional acrobatic play but he’s also a bit prone to mental mistakes. He’s a shortstop prospect but isn’t such a good defender that he’ll profile without providing dome offensive value, too. Whether or not that happens will depend on how his approach and general baseball acumen matures. If it doesn’t, he looks more like a utility guy, and he might be that anyway with Willy Adames in the farm system. Look for Palacios to start playing positions other than shortstop, which he hasn’t done since 2015.
Last March, I approached Jake Odorizzi in the Tampa Bay Rays’ spring-training clubhouse to learn more about the cult of the high fastball he was leading among the club’s pitchers.
The Rays led baseball in 2016 by the volume of four-seamers thrown up in the zone. The reason: to negate the effect of swing planes more and more designed to damage pitches lower in the zone. The Rays were again one of the dominant high-fastball teams last season, ranking second in the sport by volume and percentage of fastballs located in the upper third and above the zone according to Statcast data via Baseball Savant. (They ranked 14th in spin rate.)
The Mets reportedly continue to look for infield help this winter with a view to improving their team for the 2018 campaign. According to Ken Rosenthal, three of the targets for New York are free agents — specifically, Todd Frazier, Eduardo Nunez, and Neil Walker. Pirates infielder Josh Harrison is a fourth. The cost of acquiring any of the first three is pretty straightforward: about $30-40 million, according to our crowdsourced estimates. As for Harrison, the issue of “cost” is more complicated.
According to Rosenthal, the Pirates want Brandon Nimmo in return for their versatile infielder. Superficially, that seems to make sense for the Mets. Nimmo is probably a fifth outfielder after Michael Conforto gets healthy. As for Harrison, he’d probably start. That’s a good trade-off for New York, right?
In one way, yes. But then there’s also that agonizing question every club is compelled to face when pondering the trade of a young player: what could he become? What’s his upside?
One way of answering that question with regard to Nimmo, specifically, is to focus on his process and look at other players who have a similar one. Nimmo is a player with a good eye, a nearly even batted-ball mix, and a certain degree of power. Also, his outfield defense looks decent. Let’s get exact about those facets of his game and look at other players with similar games.
Between 2008 and 2013, the only team to win more games than the Rays was the Yankees. Think about what that means. Over the span of six years, only the richest franchise in baseball could out-perform one of the poorest. The Rays ranked in second, with 550 wins, 14 fewer than the Yankees, but 12 more than the Phillies. The Rays made the playoffs on four occasions, once, of course, getting as far as the World Series. The Rays were a model organization. At least, the Rays were a model, provided you had an organization with comparatively limited resources. It was a minor miracle how much they were able to accomplish.
The recent years haven’t been so rosy. Which, in some ways, is hardly surprising — not only are success cycles cyclical by definition, but the Rays are also at a massive financial disadvantage, at a time when more and more front offices are beginning to think like they do. There’s a popular theory out there that it used to be way easier to build good baseball teams on the cheap. It’s probably true! So one could use the recent Rays as evidence that parity is beginning to slip away. Small-market teams might be increasingly screwed. It wasn’t long ago we saw the Rays trade away the face of the franchise. It’s possible Chris Archer could be next.
There’s no question the Rays aren’t what they were. There’s no question they’ve been on the outside of the playoff picture looking in. And yet, with the benefit of hindsight, it’s interesting to look at what the Rays have been, and at what they’ve almost been. By one measure, the Rays haven’t had that much of a dip.
I noticed an underlying theme in both pieces I’ve written since coming back, along with many others written this offseason at FanGraphs. If you are a fan of a small- or medium-market team that will never spend to the luxury-tax line and thus always be at a disadvantage, do you want your team to try to always be .500 or better, or do you want them push all the chips in the middle for a smaller competitive window? In my stats vs. scouting article I referenced a progressive vs. traditional divide, which was broadly defined by design, but there are often noticeable differences in team-building strategies from the two overarching philosophies, which I will again illustrate broadly to show the two contrasting viewpoints.
The traditional clubs tend favor prospects with pedigree (bonus or draft position, mostly), with big tools/upside and the process of team-building is often to not push the chips into the middle (spending in free agency, trading prospects) until the core talents (best prospects and young MLB assets) have arrived in the big leagues and have established themselves. When that window opens, you do whatever you can afford to do within reason to make those 3-5 years the best you can and, in practice, it’s usually 2-3 years of a peak, often followed directly by a tear-down rebuild. The Royals appear to have just passed the peak stage of this plan, the Braves hope their core is established in 2019 and the Padres may be just behind the Braves (you could also argue the old-school Marlins have done this multiple times and are about to try again now).
On the progressive side, you have a more conservative, corporate approach where the club’s goal is to almost always have a 78-92 win team entering Spring Training, with a chance to make the playoffs every year, never with a bottom-ten ranked farm system, so they are flexible and can go where the breaks lead them. The valuation techniques emphasize the analytic more often, which can sometimes seem superior and sometimes seem foolish, depending on the execution. When a rare group of talent and a potential World Series contender emerges, the progressive team will push some chips in depending on how big the payroll is. The Rays have a bottom-five payroll and can only cash in some chips without mortgaging multiple future years, whereas the Indians and Astros are higher up the food chain and can do a little more when the time comes, and have done just that.
What we just saw in Pittsburgh (and may see soon in Tampa Bay) is what happens when a very low-payroll team sees a dip coming (controllable talent becoming uncontrolled soon) and doesn’t think there’s a World Series contender core, so they slide down toward the bottom end of that win range so that in a couple years they can have a sustainable core with a chance to slide near the top of it, rather than just tread water. Ideally, you can slash payroll in the down years, then reinvest it in the competing years (the Rays has done this in the past) to match the competitive cycle and not waste free-agent money on veterans in years when they are less needed. You could argue many teams are in this bucket, with varying payroll/margin for error: the D’Backs, Brewers, Phillies, A’s and Twins, along with the aforementioned Rays, Pirates, Indians and Astros.
Eleven clubs were over $175 million in payroll for the 2017 season (Dodgers, Yankees, Red Sox, Blue Jays, Tigers, Giants, Nationals, Rangers, Orioles, Cubs, Angels), so let’s toss those teams out and ask fans of the other 19 clubs: if forced to pick one or the other, which of these overarching philosophies would you prefer to root for?
After having typically appeared in the hallowed pages of Baseball Think Factory, Dan Szymborski’s ZiPS projections have now been released at FanGraphs for half a decade. The exercise continues this offseason. Below are the projections for the Tampa Bay Rays. Szymborski can be found at ESPN and on Twitter at @DSzymborski.
Batters
Most major-league clubs probably feature multiple players whom one could reasonably designate as the Face of the Franchise. Until recently, that was not the case with the Tampa Bay Rays. Basically ever since his debut in 2008, Evan Longoria has been synonymous with the club — due in no small part, one assumes, to the concurrence of his best years with the best years of the team. Traded to the Giants on December 20, he’s expected to produce roughly three wins for San Francisco.
How the club will attempt to replace those wins remains uncertain at the moment. Christian Arroyo (409 PA, 0.6 zWAR), Matt Duffy (444, 1.3), Daniel Robertson (406, 1.0), Ryan Schimpf (459, 0.5), and Joey Wendle (563, 1.0) are all candidates for the second- and third-base nexus in Tampa Bay, each flawed in his way. I’ve included Duffy, Robertson, and Wendle on the depth-chart image below simply because they receive the top projections from Dan Szymborski’s computer.
The author noted elsewhere recently that Byron Buxton recorded the highest WAR (3.5) of any player in 2017 who also produced a below-average batting line. By virtue of his 2015 season, however, Kevin Kiermaier (474, 3.3) has the top mark by that same criteria of any player since 1997. He’s projected to produce a precisely league-average batting line in 2018 while also saving 14 runs in center field.
