CJ Abrams Isn’t Long for Short

CJ Abrams’ ambitions as a fielder have fallen short, but the future remains bright for the Nationals star.
Washington over the weekend announced Abrams will move from shortstop to second base. That’s not a surprise. Abrams has been terrible at shortstop for his career, ranking as one of the worst fielders ever recorded by Baseball Savant’s fancy player-tracking technology. What is a surprise, however, is that a minor-career update for Abrams is newsworthy enough to justify an article, a testament to his tremendous breakout at the plate in 2026.
Abrams this year has posted -17 Outs Above Average at shortstop, which is the worst mark in the majors at any position. This isn’t an outlier for him. Since his debut in 2022, Abrams has played almost exclusively shortstop, putting up OAA marks (chronologically) of -8, -9, -18, and -11 before the -17 mark so far in 2026. His career -64 OAA makes him the sixth-worst fielder — at any position — ever recorded by the system, which dates back to 2016.
| Name | Pos | OAA | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Nick Castellanos | RF | -93 | -3% |
| Amed Rosario | SS | -86 | -2% |
| Didi Gregorius | SS | -76 | -3% |
| Kyle Schwarber | LF | -70 | -5% |
| Jorge Polanco | SS | -65 | -2% |
| CJ Abrams | SS | -64 | -3% |
| Jonathan Villar | 2B | -63 | -3% |
| Jurickson Profar | LF | -53 | -2% |
| Daniel Murphy | 2B | -52 | -3% |
| Luis Arraez | 2B | -50 | -2% |
It’s worth a brief explainer of what OAA is and how it works. Unlike other fielding metrics, which rely on the eye test or splitting the field into zones, OAA directly tracks the movement of the fielder, the trajectory of the batted ball, and the speed of the batter to estimate how likely any given play is to result in an out. FanGraphs trusts this system enough to make it the basis for the fielding component of our WAR model.
One benefit of OAA is it allows for more granular information on how fielders gain or lose value. Of the -17 OAA Abrams has posted at shortstop in 2026, -16 OAA has come on plays where he’s had to charge in. Here’s a great example of a play that’s given him trouble this year:
Abrams takes a few circuitous steps in, reaches down and snags the ball, then appears unsure whether to fire the ball on the run or set his feet to make the throw. He ultimately does a bit of both and gets the throw off late. Nick Gonzales is a fast runner, but it’s a pretty routine play for a big league shortstop.
Here’s another one:
Michael Harris II hits a squibber that forces Abrams in and way to his right. He stumbles as he works around the ball to position himself for the throw to first. He reaches down and picks it clean, but the transfer from glove to throwing position is too slow, and the throw isn’t strong enough to get Harris.
And another one:
This is nearly an impressive play. Nick Loftin smacks a hard grounder to Abrams’ right. He gets to the ball and picks the high hop with a clean backhand. But much like the first two plays, there’s a sort of hitch from glove to throw that puts him behind. The throw doesn’t have the zip needed to beat Loftin to the bag.
Abrams doesn’t have a weak arm by any means — he’s about the median among shortstops in 2026 — but it’s clearly not strong enough to make up for his inefficient footwork and transfer. It’s also worth pointing out that he’s made more throwing errors than any other fielder since he debuted in 2022:
| Name | Pos | Field | Throw | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CJ Abrams | SS | 37 | 55 | 93 |
| Elly De La Cruz | SS | 45 | 38 | 83 |
| Trea Turner | SS | 46 | 36 | 82 |
| Willy Adames | SS | 30 | 50 | 80 |
| Jeremy Peña | SS | 40 | 30 | 70 |
| Javier Báez | SS | 28 | 37 | 65 |
| Ryan McMahon | 3B | 39 | 32 | 61 |
| Bobby Witt Jr. | SS | 37 | 23 | 60 |
| Austin Riley | 3B | 35 | 21 | 56 |
| Gunnar Henderson | SS | 29 | 27 | 56 |
| Anthony Volpe | SS | 24 | 32 | 56 |
And so it’s a little bit of everything conspiring against Abrams’ future at shortstop. His footwork is awkward, his upper body is slow, and his arm is neither strong nor accurate. There isn’t really a “tool” that stands out defensively. With more than 5,000 innings over nearly five seasons, it seems unlikely he might develop one.
Abrams doesn’t agree. His agent, Mike Sanders, told The Athletic that Abrams is “not thrilled” about the change and still sees himself as a long-term shortstop. Sanders said Abrams will continue to spend the winter preparing to play short.
“He’s always viewed himself as a shortstop short-term and long-term, and would love to have the offseason under this front office to be able to work on that,” Sanders said. “I believe CJ can be a very good shortstop, and without having an offseason to specifically train at the position using the information and feedback this staff has given him, I don’t think we have a full evaluation yet of how good he can truly be there.”
Some of these hard feelings are understandable. Being told “you are not good enough” in public probably doesn’t feel very good. And “shortstop” is something of an identity for those who play it. It’s an unrequited love for Abrams, in other words.
Also, it’s plausible there is at least some merit to Sanders’ argument. The Nationals under former president of baseball operations Mike Rizzo were among the least data-driven clubs in baseball; a big reason why they fired Rizzo and replaced him with Paul Toboni was to catch up with the rest of the league analytically. If that’s the case, and the team really is using new information to provide feedback to infielders and coach them, then maybe Abrams deserves to get a fair shake at short after a full offseason of work. However, it’s more likely that the Nationals by now have a pretty good idea of what Abrams’ defensive ceiling is, and don’t think he’ll improve enough to stick at shortstop.
Moreover, both player and agent have a financial incentive for the Nationals to keep Abrams at shortstop. He is 25 years old and already into his arbitration years. He’ll reach free agency after the 2028 season at just 28. A young shortstop who hits well — very well in the case of Abrams this year — would be in for a massive payday on the open market. I don’t know how realistic that is in practice, as teams have access to the same information we do, and two more seasons of league-worst defensive play probably won’t help Abrams financially. But “shortstop” isn’t just an identity — it’s a retirement plan.
Still, for the Nationals, it’s an obvious move, albeit a tricky one. Toboni acknowledged the awkward timing of the decision in the same interview with The Athletic. He said the midseason switch gives them a chance to see how Abrams does at second heading into the offseason. Of course, it’s been obvious for years that Abrams can’t cut it at short, and the announcement after the trade deadline implies a bit of posturing on the Nationals’ part.
Regardless, moving Abrams off short makes them better pretty much regardless of who replaces him there. For 2026, that’s likely Nasim Nuñez, who’s an exceptional defensive infielder. There’s a bit of irony here, as Nuñez has -3 OAA at shortstop this year in 117 innings, but the sample is tiny and he’s posted +11 for his career in the middle infield. The switch is almost certainly an upgrade.
Short-term defensive upgrades are suddenly relevant for the Nationals, partially because of Abrams himself. Washington was assumed to be among the very worst teams in the majors in 2026, and the club made it nearly to the end of July at two games above .500. The turnaround is driven by an astonishingly good offense that still leads the majors in runs. While the Nationals have sunk out of any notion of contention the last few weeks, it’s not unrealistic to think this group could be competitive at some point in the next two seasons. Abrams’ breakout as a top-15 hitter has been crucial in changing their outlook.

Abrams was once a prospect of the highest pedigree — the type who gets to play his preferred position longer than most. He was selected sixth overall out of high school in 2019. Eric Longehagen, Kevin Goldstein, and Tess Taruskin ranked him the 15th-best prospect in 2022. And he was traded later that year in the deal that sent Juan Soto to the Padres. We’ve seen Abrams in previous years justify this pedigree for a few weeks at a time, but he could never put it all together to be more than a bad defensive shortstop with an OK bat (a second baseman, in other words).
That seems to have changed. We’re approaching the end of August, and Abrams ranks in the top 15 of qualified hitters with a 140 wRC+. He still swings a lot. He still chases a lot. And he’s actually whiffing more than ever. But where Abrams in the past couldn’t generate enough power to justify such a loose conception of the strike zone, this year he’s crushing the ball, in the air and to the pull side. He’s crushing fastballs, breaking balls, and offspeed. And he’s crushing pitches right down the middle in a way he wasn’t before. Now, there’s a pretty large discrepancy between his wOBA (.379) and xwOBA (.342). It’s also worth pointing out he has a 72 wRC+ in August following a 202 wRC+ in July. There’s clearly still some streakiness in his profile.
Nevertheless, it’s hard to see this season as anything other than a massive step forward for both player and team. Abrams might not like moving off shortstop, and the Nationals might still need to find one, but they’re each likely better for it.
Ryan Blake is a contributor for FanGraphs and Lookout Landing.
What does the % mean in the first table?
Probably the actual versus expected percent of plays made. That’s what usually accompanies OAA.
To add to our Fun-Hating Dork said, in OAA jargon it’s “success rate added.” Abrams’ cumulative success rate is 73% vs an estimated success rate of 75% for an average SS, so he makes 3% fewer plays than average.
Worth a shot to try second, but I do wonder if he’s a better fit for center. Based on OAA, it seems that he’s really bad on balls in and going left. I think balls in will be less of a problem at second since his arm would now be above average there. But I’m worried that he might still struggle laterally and especially turning two (his footwork just doesn’t look good).
I was thinking the same thing. Since the issue seems to be his footwork (which certainly will impact throwing accuracy), I’m not sure how much moving to 2B will help.
Nats have plenty of OFs, including an elite defensive CF in Jacob Young. While it might be better for CJ to play in CF, it’s better for the Nats to try him at 2B first.
It does make sense for this Nats team and probably trade value as well to see if he can stay on the dirt. I’m just skeptical based on OAA and my amateur look at his footwork that he’ll make it work.
They are absolutely right to try him at 2B first but I question whether Young’s power is for real. They might need a center fielder sooner rather than later.
Abrams came into the year with huge pre-ASB/post-ASB splits over his career. a 204 wRC+ in July suggests that problem doesn’t apply to this season, and this August coming with two of the best Nats hitters traded near/at the deadline plus Wood’s injury warrants Abrams a bit of leeway.
I wonder how the org approaches Abrams and his remaining two years of team control. If Abrams and his agent see him as an All-Star SS, he’s looking for the Trea Turner contract (11yrs/$300m) in free agency; if the Nats see him as a 2B (or possibly a corner OF) with a streaky bat, they’re offering something like the contract Altuve signed in 2018 (7yrs/$163m).
Abrams probably does see himself as an All-Star SS, but I don’t think any teams do. It’s honestly in his best interest to see if he’s at least average at another up-the-middle position. I do wonder if the Nats consider trading him if he does seem decent at second, since his value will likely never be higher.
So basically he and his agent expect me to believe that he had no idea he was a awful defender under the previous regime and now that this new regime has told him that he sucks he’ll be bothered to put in the work defensively now.
Not a PR win but he’s a good enough player it won’t matter that he portrays himself as either dumb or delusional.
Abrams is going to need the FG writers to take their game to the next level to keep his RTI up. This one boosts him to a still respectable 0.47. That’s Derek Hill territory!
Looking at the list of worst defenders it’s pretty amazing that everyone(not just the Mets), thought Amed Rosario was gonna be an elite defensive shortstop. There’s really not a position on the field that he can play. It is too bad that outs above average wasn’t around in 2015 when Wilmer Flores played SS it would be interesting to see how his defensive numbers at shortstop compared to Rosario’s.
I hope the agent’s airing of grievances is stronger than reality.
Because if not, it’s borderline amazing the Nats didn’t trade Abrams at the deadline.
And on timing, I get the Nats want to move him to his long-term position, but how come they weren’t able to adequately prep their star before moving him off?
Again, more hopeful that posturing > reality here, but concerned that what this incident might show is managerial and executive youth.
As someone who watches the Nats a fair amount, my first thought about all this was that I am going to miss watching how Nunez plays 2nd, although hopefully he is just as fun ast short. I understand that his bat is pretty light but I will miss it when the glove and steals aren’t enough to keep him in Major League job
He’ll end up being a bench player as long as he keeps a reasonable amount of speed. Unless he can consistently recreate the batting results he had in June through the All Star Break. Then he’d be a star. I’m not holding my breath.
The first clue I had that many teams didn’t care so much about infield defense was an anonymous executive quote saying something like “We could live with CJ Abrams and his defense at shortstop.” It seems awfully clear to me that either he or JP Crawford has been the worst defensive shortstop now that Bichette doesn’t play there anymore. If you’re fine with Abrams playing shortstop, it means you don’t care about infield defense.
For this reason, he could be right to resist moving off of shortstop. You and I can say that he shouldn’t play shortstop, and that the rest of his career would go more smoothly if he can show he can stick at second base. But I don’t know that every team believe that he needs to move off of shortstop. But it’s also very possible that those teams are okay with giving him shortstop, but not okay with giving him $300M to do it.
Some more evidence in favor of my pet but unsubstantiated theory that public models WAR calcs overstate defensive and/or positional value (minus CF and C perhaps?) and maybe by a lot
Obviously the defensive value of infielders continues to lower as more players and teams hunt aerial contact.
But with all things like this, I will note that the Brewers and Dodgers both appear to be teams that place some value on infield defense and I think there’s little argument to those being the best run franchises in baseball as of today.
Also I’m still just generally with the idea that we do actually know what the value of extra outs is to runscoring because we have tons of ball in play data at this point.
When OAA says that a double is worth .85 runs of runscoring and most outfield OAA take away doubles, I tend to believe thats generally true.
And if instead of making it an OAA if we just added .85 home runs to every outfielder’s total I do wonder how our opinions would change on defensive value.
But I do think that I would be way more willing to trade for CJ Abrams if I knew for a fact he could play even one position competently. Definitely sign me up to get the guy with a .342 xwOBA and who will probably give me about 30 steals, but I would be way more excited about him if I thought he could play second base defense at the level of Brendan Donovan or Bryston Stott. All the more important since apparently he doesn’t want to change positions, so I don’t know if I’m going to convince him to try something new.