Hosmer and Yelich Do Not Need to Change
Eric Hosmer signed with the Padres…wow, was it only last weekend? Eric Hosmer signed with the Padres last weekend. I wrote up the whole post, and then sat back, eager to look at the comments, given how Hosmer is so famously polarizing. And, yeah, those expected comments rolled in, just as you’d think, but there was also another comment that stuck in my head. Here is most of it:
Maybe it’s kind of obvious, when you think about it, but we probably haven’t given it enough consideration. With all the tools we have, it’s been easy to dream on Hosmer’s power upside. Similarly, it’s been easy to dream on Christian Yelich’s power upside. This is supposed to be the era of data-driven player adjustments, so you can imagine a version of Hosmer and a version of Yelich who are able to generate consistent loft. But this isn’t as easy as it seems. It’s not even necessary, and there’s always the chance a change could backfire. See, the thing about Hosmer and the thing about Yelich is that both of these hitters are already good.
Let’s quickly explore some familiar territory, using information from Baseball Savant. Why have people keyed on Hosmer and Yelich in particular? Here are 2017 average launch angles and exit velocities, for everyone with at least 100 batted balls tracked.
The two players in question are in yellow, and Yelich is the yellow point further to the right. Yelich just ranked in the 94th percentile in exit velocity, but he ranked in the 8th percentile in launch angle. Hosmer, meanwhile, just ranked in the 87th percentile in exit velocity, but he ranked in the 4th percentile in launch angle. The data is encouraging and discouraging at the same time. The contact quality is good! But these guys seem to hit grounder after grounder. What if they could put more balls in the air? It’s like talking about Yandy Diaz, except with two established big-league regulars. (Diaz is the point on the baseline, furthest to the right.)
This brings to mind the phenomenon of swing-changers. Or, if not always swing-changers, then approach-changers. So much attention has been focused on the success stories. But, try to rattle those successes off, off the top of your head. Of course, there’s J.D. Martinez, and there’s Justin Turner. There’s Josh Donaldson, and there’s Jose Bautista. Daniel Murphy made a change. Marlon Byrd made a change. Logan Morrison made a change. Yonder Alonso made a change. Elvis Andrus made a change. There are others — this list isn’t exhaustive — and each case is inspiring, but each case also seems to have something in common. Before changing, the hitters weren’t very good. Some of them were fighting to just extend their careers. There are two things to surmise: These players were incentivized to try to adjust, and they also had some room to grow. Their old swings must not have been optimal.
At 28, Eric Hosmer is a veteran. He’s an above-average hitter, and his wRC+ last season was 135. The Padres paid a fortune to land him. At 26, Christian Yelich is also now a veteran. He’s an above-average hitter, and his wRC+ last season was 115. He was hurt by his home ballpark, and the Brewers paid a fortune to land him. Hosmer knows he’s good, and he knows he was wanted. Yelich knows he’s good, and he also knows he was wanted. There’s less incentive for these players to change. There’s also less incentive for their teams to try to change them.
The Padres and the Brewers know all about Statcast. And I’m certain the players know all about launch angles. They’re probably tired of hearing about launch angles. It’s not that they couldn’t imagine a better performance. But there would be some resistance and hesitation here, on both sides. Swings and approaches are fundamental to what a player is, so why risk messing with a good thing? How aggressively should you chase after upside? And how much upside is even really in there?
It’s funny — there are plenty of cases of mediocre players who made approach changes and improved significantly. There are far fewer cases of good players doing the same thing. Now, part of the explanation there is obvious. But, take Francisco Lindor. He just hit a ton more fly balls, and his wRC+ hardly budged. The same thing has been true of Matt Carpenter, after his mid-career approach overhaul. Joey Votto and Mike Trout have had some fluctuations in approach over time, but they keep putting up basically the same numbers. And you can even look at Yelich himself. The past two years, he’s hit fewer grounders than he used to. As more of a ground-ball hitter, his wRC+ was 119. As less of a ground-ball hitter, his wRC+ has been 123. How much does that mean?
And sometimes good players can get in trouble. Gregory Polanco has suggested that trying to hit more fly balls messed him up. Jason Heyward chopped his ground-ball rate in 2016, and he was awful. This past year, Wil Myers hit more balls in the air, and he was less productive. It’s not as if it’s impossible for players who are already good to get better. It does happen. But it’s not a simple process. In order to be a quality hitter in the major leagues, you need to be almost unbelievably good. Players who are good hitters probably already have swings that are more or less what they need to be. Maybe that’s not always the case, but there’s real risk in attempting a major adjustment. You never know when a hitter might become terribly uncomfortable, having succeeded in one way for multiple years.
When you have someone on the fringe of the bigs, you might get more buy-in for an adjustment, and you might be more likely to uncover something positive. J.D. Martinez’s original swing clearly wasn’t working for him, but the talent must’ve always been in there. When you take someone like Hosmer, his swing has been working for him. So the player is less incentivized to make a change, and the team is less incentivized to suggest one. Hosmer might’ve already found the approach that works best for himself, because being as good as he is is already impossibly hard. The same goes for Yelich. There are ways for these players to get better still, but there would be enormous risk in trying to rebuild how they bat.
Doesn’t mean something won’t change. Doesn’t mean something won’t change for the better. It’s just nothing to expect. Based on some numbers, it seems like Hosmer and Yelich could improve by aiming up. I’m sure their new teams have thought about it. There’s just not much in the way of precedent here. It’s not the good players who’ve had to save their careers.
Jeff made Lookout Landing a thing, but he does not still write there about the Mariners. He does write here, sometimes about the Mariners, but usually not.
Amen!
I strongly agree with the revered Saint Votto, who said here: https://www.cincinnati.com/story/sports/mlb/reds/2017/04/27/joey-votto-want-unpitchable/100991956/
“Where I get concerned is the guys that make this attempt and burn out too much of their time and don’t get a chance to be their best selves, and either don’t make it to the big leagues or don’t perform their best in the big leagues because they’re always attempting this new style of hitting,” Votto said. “I see it with a lot of guys. Everyone tells the good stories, but there’s a lot of s—ty stories of guys who are wasting their time trying things.”
Hitting is really complicated, and what works for one player and his body may work worse for another.
I don’t know whether it is right or wrong for Hosmer to change his swing, but all I have thought throughout the Padres pursuit of him is “Logan White clearly loves Hosmer- like he loved Seager and Bellinger- and there is no one in baseball whose opinion I trust more.” Also- I have always thought that Hosmer’s swing is the most violent swing I have ever seen, it takes a seemingly straight path to the ball, and it is difficult for me to imagine him taking a different path to the ball without losing some of that swing “eruption” ( for lack of a better word).
On another note, Yandy Diaz is really out there
The problem is that there are many trade offs in hitting:
-lower gb rate usually means lower babip on average
-pulling the ball and elevating are generally inversely correlated
– sometimes ( but not always) more means more Ks
The successful swing changers always beat one or more of those general rules:
– bautista had the babip penalty but he beat the other two “rules” (Ks and pulling without more rolled over grounders)
-murphy beat the K raise and the babip penalty by hitting in a very tight launch angle band (super low grounders, but only slightly slightly above average Fb and tons of liners)
-JDM has the Ks and elevates but avoids the babip penalty by hitting for power without pulling a lot ( which takes huge raw power)
So for the general population there are trade offs, there is no magic pill to beat the system. The ex exceptionally successful swing changers managed to avoid some of that.
That doesn’t mean hosmer can’t improve, under perfect conditions he could probably improve , but for that a lot of things need to break right. It is not one simple adjustment and you are done, there is a complex interplay of swing , approach and how you are pitched and there is a lot that can go wrong, this is not golf and a ball on a tee but balls hit but balls hit that move at 90 to different locations and sometimes also spins and speed changes.
A swing change is not just one adjustment but a whole cascade of adjustments in different areas (mechanics , timing, approach…). It can be done but it is hard dann work and a lot can go wrong.
Maybe they will try a mild adjustment with just pitch selection without a new swing to reduce the risk but that is not guaranteed to work either.
Btw I do have an article about hosmers swing in the pipeline because I have seen two things that I think make it harder for him to lift but that doesn’t mean those changes are easy to make.
when the fact that the padres overpaid hosmer if he doesn’t change his swing is firm enough, the “padres surely know about statcast and expects no change” stance gets weaker.
it’s possible that they prefer to get less returns on their investment, particularly when they can afford to let him tinker with the swing because they are not winning anything anytime soon. but that would be pretty dumb of them.
I think the teams at least hope for a mild change. They probably don’t think he goes full bautista and hits 35% grounders but they probably hope he can go from 56% grounders and 23 hr to 48% and 32 homers.
Whether he can do it is another question. Wouldn’t rule it out but wouldn’t bet on it either.
Hosmer tried the swing change early last season. Wonder how that worked? Hosmer’s normal swing is based on waiting on the ball and hitting it up the middle. Maybe he could get pull happy and go for loft like last April with a .573 OPS?
I don’t think he did anything to his swing last April. He hit more grounders than in any other month of the year. His K rate was slightly below his season average (unlikely if you’re going for loft), yet he ended up with the lowest wOBA of the season by a mile (also unlikely if you’re getting loft without strikeouts). The only thing I saw him say about that month was that he was swinging at inside pitches more than he should (problematic with his traditional big swing and big reach). He took his lowest walk rate of the year, which is consistent with swinging too much rather than swinging differently.
His BABIP that month was about 100 points below his season average. Maybe he was swinging at the wrong pitches; maybe he was just getting unlucky over 96 plate appearances. But I’d need to see something else to suggest it was a swing change.
Hosmer is not a good hitter. One year he is and the next he will be terrible. For someone who plays first that just doesn’t cut it. There is a reason teams pay for 4.50 ERA, 160 inning pitchers, consistency has value.
Hosmer isn’t really a bad hitter, actually he is not much worse than yelich. The difference is that one is a defensively not really good 1b while the other one is an ok centerfielder
“X isn’t a bad hitter,” somebody wrote on a baseball analytics website about a guy who, like clockwork, has a horrible season every other year
Who are the other points on the baseline? I’m hoping one is Billy Hamilton, but I have no idea who the other might be.
Hamilton has an extremely low exit velo but his batted ball profile and launch angle is pretty average and not really standing out. Just a combination of super low exit velo and ok but not really good contact rate.
Dee Gordon 79.7 EV 0.0 LA & Ian Desmond 87.2 EV 0.0 LA
(Billy Hamilton 79.1 EV 8.4 LA)
Ahh that 87 EV 0.0 LA is just what I want playing left field at Coors.
That Tony Gwynn SoloHitter sure rewards the crap out of tomahawking a direct path to the ball.
Is it possible that ‘swing changers’ are simply PED users? Or to be less accusative- are PED users likely to increase FBs and launch angle?
If a player gains 10 MPH of EV and can all the sudden launch fly balls 40 feet longer- they would have an incentive to start hitting a lot more fly balls. Theoretically, increased strength would help a swing bring a low fastball up. Given the same EV, it requires more strength at the point of contact to take a low ball moving at a downward angle and re-orient it to a launch angle at (say) 90 mph, compared to the lesser strength needed to simply barrel a ball on a Ted Williams type-swing plane generating a 90 EV.
The name that got me wondering about this is Marlon Byrd.
https://www.fangraphs.com/statss.aspx?playerid=950&position=OF
Byrd’s first 3 seasons saw his hot-prospect status flame out, as he career ISO was .110. His career FB rate at that time was 25% and his GB rate was ~2.00. Byrd then got traded and ‘changed his swing’ – his FB rate jumped up to ~40% where it would stay for the rest of his career. His ISO jump took a year longer to materialize, but he became a ~.170 ISO player going forward. Surely increased strength helped him have the power to torque those low sinkers upwards.
Others like Jose Guillen had FB rates below 30 and low ISO for a while- and then moved up to the 40%/.200 area a few years before getting caught for PEDs. Johnny Peralta similarly broke into the majors with a FB rate in the 20s and an ISO under .100: but by his third year he was at 35% (on his way to 40s) and a .200 ISO. Yasmany Grandal is a similar story- first two years FB rates around 30 with low ISO, last 4 have been ~40% with big ISO (although his breakout came after getting caught). Francisco Cervelli broke into the bigs with a 0.90 ISO and 32% FB rate over his first 550 PA- his FB rate spiked to 40% and his ISO jumped to .231 in 2013- the year he was caught using. His FB/ISO have plummeted back to pre-13 levels ever since. Michael Morse had an ISO round .100 and a FB rate in the 20s through his first 4 seasons, but from 2010-14 his FB and ISO spiked up to around 38% and .200.
Ryan Braun posted 44% FB rates in his first two seasons, then dipped to 34% by 2009 & 2010. In 2011, a year in which he admitted using PEDs, his fly ball rate went back up to 37%. Was this regression? Braun’s FB rate stayed elevated at 38% in 2012, and has been about 32% ever since.
The vast majority of caught PED users I’ve come across (Arod, Sosa, Giambi, Ortiz, Palmiero, Ramirez, Cameron, Cruz, etc) had FB rates around 40%+, but that is simply true of sluggers generally. Tejada, for what it’s worth, stands out as a slugger/PED user who kept his FB rates in the 30s (although generally had lower ISOs when his FB numbers dipped).
Other notable counter examples include Dee Gordon, Melky Cabrera & Starlin Marte, who have regularly been around 25-30% without any big changes in their careers.
Without point any fingers at anyone who hasn’t been caught, I’d pose a few questions:
(1) Did I write correctly above that it takes more strength to hit a ball upwards at 90 mph than to hit it with a lower trajectory at that same speed?
(2) Do PED users add strength and bat speed?
(Physicist Roger Tobin has published work saying yes, http://baseball.physics.illinois.edu/BRJ-Steroids-v3.pdf )
(3) Consequently, would most players adding strength and batspeed be better equipped to start hitting more flyballs and therefore enjoy a higher correlated ISO?
If so, I suspect that some of these turnarounds are more about untestable PED programs and less about simply deciding to launch faster-than-ever pitches 400+ feet. Without substantially increased strength, players might not be able to simply decide to knock 93 mph two-seamers sky high deep into the outfield. I have no doubt that adding an optimal launch angle is hard work and a good idea regardless of strength-enhancement, but it also seems clear that most ‘ped-for-strength’ programs would greatly increase the ability to add well hit FBs.
JD Martinez, Daniel Murphy, Jose Bautista, Justin Turner, Yonder Alonso & Logan Morrison were all struggling in their careers a bit like Marlon Byrd was, so undoubtedly they needed to make a change and -apart from Byrd- there isn’t any reason to suspect that those changes included PEDs.
One thing for sure: the media and MLB attempt to label today’s game as the ‘post PED era’ when there is zero evidence PED/steroid use has declined.
I’m hesitant to dignify comment this with a response, but if you think there’s no evidence that PED use has declined you should check out the current aging curves compared to the steroid era curves as a good place to start
Age curve change could result from players having to change their usage, cycling, treatments, etc. There is no competent statistical showing that usage has declined or that the younger age curves prove decline in PED use.
The last explosion in HRs was PED-driven: but alternative explanations existed at the time. It is not unprecidented, so there is at least a fair question whether this HR explosion is caused, in part, by the PEDs that caused the last one.
I wonder if anyone is willing to answer the questions I listed above:
(1) is more strength needed, all else equal, to hit a ball 90 EV with a higher launch angle as compared to a lower
(2) do PED users add strength and bat speed, and
(3) would most players adding strength and batspeed be better equipped to start hitting more flyballs and therefore enjoy a higher correlated ISO
If so, likely Marlon Byrd’s PED usage give him greater ability to optimize EV and launch angle.
I don’t think it’s appropriate to acuse anyone but I also think it’s highly naive to assume PED use has disappeared. Chemists didn’t stop working and players didn’t stop having incentives to use and being highly competitive people.
Please take your conspiracy theories and go away.
It’s not a conspiracy to say Marlon Byrd was caught with PEDs, and PED use would seem to give him greater ability to optimize EV and launch angle.
No need for uncivil responses.
tl;dr
The 2013 numbers you cite for Cervelli came from a grand total of 52 AB.
Hosmer has that big contract to live up to, but do they boo people in San Diego ?
“The Padres paid a fortune to land him.” Well, no. The Padres payed some percentage of their revenue stream to acquire a resource that they expect will help them make _more_ money.
Can we avoid language that implicitly plays the “players are greedy and overpaid” game?
Do we have to avoid calling Chris Davis overpaid?
Hosmer is overpaid.
*taps mic*
“Webster’s Dictionary defines fortune as ‘a large amount of money or assets’.”
*gives monotone 5-minute speech*
*wins school speech award*
*sadly continues to have exponentially less money than Eric Hosmer*
I wouldn’t say Murphy really fits with the rest of the list. He was doing perfectly fine before he made his change, and I don’t remember anyone saying that he was on the verge of being washed up before he gained that extra level.
Murphy was a bit like hosmer. He was a solid hitter but due to terrible defense he still was only about an average player (more positional value than hosmer but really quite bad there).
With the change his hitting became so good that he more than compensated his bad defense.
I’d say there’s two different cases here. I wouldn’t say an approach change should be something for Yelich to try out. He has been consistently putting up strong offensive numbers for a few years now. and as you said, a change likely isn’t going to improve his numbers significantly. Also as you mentioned, he had been hurt by Marlins Park. However, I think a swing change is something which may be more beneficial for Hosmer and the Padres. He’s struggled with consistency throughout his career basically alternating well above average and average to below average offensive seasons. Perhaps the Padres attempt to see if altering his swing could result in a more consistently quality player at the plate, albeit perhaps a different type of one. But then again, perhaps Hosmer begins playing more consistently from year to year during his prime, and his current approach will not be messed with.
It will be interesting to watch play out. Yelich could have resisted changing his swing, because of the park he played in. Now that he is in a more hitter friendly park, he may have more incentive. Hosmer is going to a park more equal to the one he played in. But, as ‘awy’ suggested, The Padres are in at least in a one year rebuilding phase and Hosmer may use it is as a window to try something different.
This is the crux of the matter in a nutshell. I speak from experience in another game. I have been a PGA member for 55 years and the question of what is “good enough” always hangs over every player. During this period I was a Club Professional and had the opportunity to coach a lot of young developing players. It is rare to get the chance to coach anyone with great ability but I had that chance and his story is relevant to this situation. As a junior golfer this young man won everything locally and regionally and at age 18 reached the finals of a USGA national championship. He got his free ride at a Major Conference school after being recruited by many of the big schools in golf. His career started off beautifully but it wasn’t long before he began to make swing changes under pressure from the college coach. He was forced to get instruction from others and soon went into a tail spin that lasted throughout the rest of his collegiate career. He has returned to his roots and has spent the years since graduation trying to find what was lost. There have been some bright spots. He won the State Open and has qualified to play on the lower rungs of the PGA Tour ladder in Latin America and China but it isn’t the same “Yet”. We have hope.
What happened? He was driven away from the natural gifts that he was given and forced into a template by some “My way or the Highway” person. Those gifts he had as a junior are gone forever and the best that can be hoped for is some type of hybrid technique. Why can’t he regain his youthful swing? That is sadly easy to explain. No one can hit hundreds of golf balls, or swing at thousands of pitches with a different technique, any technique, and not have it become part of their swing permanently.
This brings us back to this great article. Why should Hosmer or Yelich risk becoming Heyward? That is foolish or even worse. As Mr. Sullivan says, these fine players are not failed prospects like so many of the swing changers, they are both superb major league baseball players and have little reason to try to change except if they grow rabbit ears and start listening to some wannabees and never weres who claim that these two star players are not maximizing their talent. “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” is the correct course of action.
I think Martinez, Murphy, et. al. would laugh at your “If it ain’t broke don’t fix it” mantra.
What separates the best players from the league average ones is the desire to be the best. To find seemingly minor flaws, fix them, and improve.
As has been pointed out ad nauseam, Hosmer has a very clear flaw in his batting approach. Yes, he could sit on that pile of cash, and be content to just be an above average player. Or he could try something new and possibly become one of the best in the game. Maybe it doesn’t work out, but he’s guaranteed $144m either way, so what’s the risk to him?
What’s the risk with him? Well like you said the best players always try to be the best. If he changes his swing and it does seemingly irreparable damage, he will no longer be the best version of himself.
I think it is incredibly hard to take someone that has been extremely successful their entire lives doing something the same way then try to make wholesale changes in someone’s approach. Now has he been “extremely successful” relative to the rest of MLB every year? Of course not, but to say he hasn’t been extremely successful with that swing is not correct. He was a 1st round draft pick, has played 7 seasons in the MLB, and just sign a 9 figure contract.
There are certainly instances where it has happened, but in most of those (not all) instances someone was on the verge of no longer being in the Show or weren’t in the Show when they made the massive overhauls.
I would much prefer small changes to approach that over a multiseason period grows into the significant change everyone would prefer to see. Instead of hitting 2.5 GB/FB, maybe the goal should 2-2.25. If he has a little bit more success, it would probably make him a bit more receptive to further changes.
Wasn’t Martinez dfa’d or some equivalent before fixing his swing? I think he was broke.
Quick question about launch angles. Why is the minimum y-axis points of the EV/LA graph set at 0? Surely, an extreme ground ball hitter like Hosmer has an average launch angle that tips into the negatives (or if not him than someone would, right?) There are 3 guys sitting on the x-axis of the above graph and no one below it. Is that a coincidence or some kind of truncation of the stats or what?
Hosmers average launch angle was like plus 3 last year. Negative launch angle are basically non existent in pro ball, I think there might have been one guy last year.
Here’s how Hosmer and Yelich are VERY different.
Hosmer’s exit velocity on balls hit at HR launch angles (between 16 and 32 degrees) is 92/94/91mph to pull/center/oppo last year. Hosmer hit 16/27/37 of these air balls to each field. So he hits most of them oppo and center.
In contrast, Yelich hits the ball 98/96/94mph to pull/center/oppo. It literally doesn’t matter what field he hits the ball to at these launch angles because he has HR chances to all fields. Hosmer’s balls would mostly be fly outs.
Hosmer’s average launch angle has been 5 degrees, 4 degrees and 4 degrees the last three years and he should stay there because of his warning track power on most of the flies.
Similarly Yelich has been 4 degrees, 3 degrees and 4 degrees, but he absolutely should be lifting the ball more because his wOBA outcomes are ~ .750 at those launch angles. His wOBAs at the launch angles below are ~.350
I get that the point of the article is they are successful with their current batted ball profiles, but there’s no reason now to try to optimize.