With all due respect to Carter Capps, it looks like we have our first major injury of spring training.

Jhonny Peralta suffered a left thumb injury on Saturday. Early indications are that he tore a ligament, could miss 2-3 months.

— Jenifer Langosch (@LangoschMLB) March 7, 2016

The Cardinals have a good team, and are looking to contend again this year, but they don’t have a lot of organization depth at shortstop, and were counting on Peralta to play everyday. Barring a future move, this injury likely pushes Jedd Gyorko from a utility role into the starting line-up, which isn’t a position the Cardinals wanted to find themselves in. Not only is Gyorko not really a shortstop, losing him off the bench would mean taking away Kolten Wong’s platoon partner, weakening the team against lefties even more than simply swapping out Peralta for Gyorko would suggest.

While the gap between Peralta and Wong at shortstop over a full season is probably only 2-3 wins, and it sounds like Peralta will only miss about half the season, this seems like the kind of injury that should encourage the Cardinals to make a move for outside help. For one, the Cardinals can’t really afford to just surrender a win, given the fight the NL Wild Card race is shaping up to be, not to mention how good the Cubs are likely to be this year. And this isn’t a team that is built to just say “let’s get them next year”, as veterans like Adam Wainwright, Matt Holliday, and Yadier Molina aren’t getting any younger. The Cardinals need to maximize their chances of winning in 2016, and running Gyorko out at shortstop for a few months is at odds with that goal.

Unfortunately for St. Louis, the injury occurred a week after Ian Desmond and Jimmy Rollins signed as free agents, so there’s no easy solution sitting around looking for a job. On the trade market, Erick Aybar would seem to be a potential fit, as the Braves don’t really need a walk-year shortstop during their rebuild, but they don’t have any internal replacements ready, so Atlanta might not be keen on giving up their only decent option. The Mets have infield depth, with Ruben Tejada and Wilmer Flores both set to serve as reserves this year, but they might not be interested in helping an NL contender stay in the race.

The Cardinals have a long history of finding hidden gems, but unless they know something about Gyorko’s defense that no one else does, this could be a pretty big blow. Talking the Braves out of Aybar seems like the best option available at the moment, at least from my perspective.

Right-handed Washington prospect Lucas Giolito recorded his spring debut this afternoon in Florida, producing a 3:0 strikeout-to-walk ratio in 2.0 innings while conceding no runs and just a single hit against the Miami ball club (box).

If certain, possibly British sources are to be trusted, the three strikeouts were facilitated, at least in some part, by means of Giolito’s breaking ball — a breaking ball described recently by former Mets GM Steve Phillips as “bowel-locking.”

Because Evil is both real and constantly among us, video footage of those particular curveballs isn’t available for public consumption. What is available, however, is the educational film above, excerpted from the right-hander’s August 14th start against Double-A Baltimore affiliate Bowie. Within that footage, one finds a specimen of Giolito’s curveball, both in real time and also provocative slow-motion.

The reader is advised to locate his or her keys before consuming said video, however, so that it might be easier to unlock his or her bowels after examining it.

Brian Reinhart is a stranger, even to himself. He’s also responsible for bringing this series of events to the author’s attention.

Position: Texas Rangers TrackMan Operators

Locations: Surprise, AZ; Adelanto, CA; Round Rock, TX; Spokane, WA

Description:
The TrackMan operator will be responsible for running TrackMan system, and one is desired for each Rangers affiliate. The position runs from April to mid-September for Adelanto, Round Rock and Surprise, and mid-June to mid-September for Spokane.

Responsibilities:

• Responsible for setting up rosters and tagging the information.
• Track/chart information for the entire game – monitoring the system and making any changes throughout the game (i.e. roster changes, defensive substitutions, etc.).
• Responsible for fixing any errors, uploading the game to the TrackMan system, and running data and reports for coaches/front office staff.

Qualifications:

• Must be able to work all home games.
• Previous experience with TrackMan System is preferred but not required.
• Must have strong attention to detail and ability to communicate well with others.
• Strong preference will be given to local applicants at each location.

Compensation:
This position is compensated.

To Apply:
Interested applicants can email their materials to abrenner@texasrangers.com. Please specify which location you are applying for.

Larry Walker is a great hitter.

He’s a great hitter at Olympic Stadium. He’s a great hitter at Coors. He’s a great hitter at Busch. He’s a great hitter at any ballpark named after a beer.

Whereas the average hitter might create 120 runs per 162 games at Coors, Walker would create 190. That’s +60%.

Whereas the average hitter might create 85 runs per 162 games in every non-Coors park, Larry Walker would create 110. That’s +30%.

When you evaluate Larry Walker, you have two choices:
1. Neutralize Larry Walker by giving him 268 plate appearances in each of the home ballparks of the 30 MLB teams. His 2501 PA at Coors? Now we only count about 11% of that. His 32 PA in Oakland? We have to figure out how he’d have done if he got 268 PA. And so on.

2. Take a league average hitter, and put him in the same playing conditions as Larry Walker. Walker had 2501 PA at Coors? Great, let’s count it all. But let’s compare him to a league average hitter who also got to bat 2501 times at Coors. He came to bat 32 times in Oakland? Then the league average hitter also came to bat 32 times.

So, what are the strengths of these two options. In Option 1, we don’t allow Larry Walker to take “unfair” advantage of a park he might be ideally suited for. Whereas most hitter would increase their runs created by 40% at Coors relative to a non-Coors park, Larry Walker increased his by 70%. Given that he got 2501 PA at Coors, Walker ends up shining more than he would otherwise. It’s like letting Mariano Rivera come in 1- and 2-run games, while letting Trevor Hoffman and Billy Wagner only enter blowouts. They are all suited to close games, but if only Mo gets to leverage that, he’ll be the one getting all the saves. Is that fair? I dunno.

In Option 2, we deal with what actually happened. We don’t have to play a game of what-if. We simply accept what the player did, and that he was able to leverage (or not leverage) his unique playing conditions. All we do is make the comparison level all those thousands of players who also played in those exact same conditions, at the same frequency as our player. Walker@Coors is compared to average player at Coors, and Mo in high leverage situations is compared to the average reliever in high leverage situations, and so on. Everyone gets to keep what they did.

So, how do you want to see it?

While much of what appears on the author’s desktop is both detestable and also capable of being detested, that’s less the case with the image above, itself recently captured and and edited and uploaded by that same author by means of his personal computer.

Depicted in that image are Toronto right-hander Drew Hutchison and Philadelphia batter J.P. Arencibia, the latter of whom one finds in the process of recording what the Phillies broadcast team has referred to optimistically as Arencibia’s “first spring-training home run.”

While such a course of events typically wouldn’t merit attention, it’s notable today on account of how the image has been made by possible by the first telecast available this spring by way of MLB.TV. Later today, it would appear, curious fans also have the opportunity to observe Cleveland and Cincinnati face off roughly 2000 miles away from the dirty, dirty shores of the Cuyahoga River. For the moment, however, Maikel Franco is batting for Philly and in the midst of a 1-1 count.

Collmenter came in relief in 32 games. Among the 210 relievers with at least 30 innings, he had the 6th lowest Leverage Index at a tiny 0.39. He also had the 23rd best performance as measured by change in Run Expectancy.

Only 4 of those 32 games did he enter the game when it really mattered. There was another 3 when it sort of mattered. The other 25 games were a smattering of complete blowouts to mostly didn’t matter.

When we’re handing out wins, especially in games that he had virtually no hand in participating because of the timing in which he came into the game, should Collmenter be like a tree in the forest with no one around?

Or do we give him credit for his performance even though it had no impact when it did happen?

On September 1, 2015, the Nationals and Cardinals played a game where the Nationals took a big lead, only to give most of it back almost immediately. The Nationals kept trying to hold on, until the end, when the Cardinals won the game on a 3-run HR.

Source: FanGraphs

Let’s look at that ninth inning. First up was Jason Heyward. He grounded out. That context-neutral run value of making an out is -0.25 runs (or -.027 wins). Making an out to start the inning with the bases empty is only worth -0.225 runs (or -.024 wins). Therefore, the base-out timing value of the out is +.025 runs (or +.003 wins). It looks like this:

-.027 wins: Heyward’s out
+.003 wins: low impact timing of out with bases empty

But we know more information. It was a 5-5 game to start the bottom of the 9th. This is a higher leverage situation than random. Heyward’s out actually reduced the chance of winning by .050 wins, not .024 wins. That is, the impact is felt twice as much as a random leadoff situation. So, there’s yet another .026 wins to account for. This is what it looks like:

-.027 wins: Heyward’s out
+.003 wins: low impact timing of out with bases empty
-.026 wins: high impact timing of out in 9th inning of tied game

The question to ask yourself (not to me, but to yourself), is how much do you want to credit Heyward for making an out in this situation: do you want to just credit him with a random out, because he was just plucked into this situation, or do you want to credit him with making an out as the leverage was lower impact (bases empty) or even high impact (9th inning of a tied game)? Is an out an out, or does the out depend on the situation?

Let’s continue. Yadier Molina also got an out. Going through the above machinations gives us this:

-.027 wins: Molina’s out
+.010 wins: low impact timing of out with bases empty
-.019 wins: high impact timing of out in 9th inning of tied game

Now the fun begins. Cody Stanley doubled.

+.081 wins: Stanley’s double
-.056 wins: low impact timing of double with two outs
+.043 wins: high impact timing of double in 9th inning of tied game

So, in a random situation, a double with two outs is not that valuable. It’s less valuable than a random walk. That’s why we have a huge -.056 win value to account for its low impact. But at the same time, this puts the winning run on base in the bottom of the 9th. This is enormously high impact. How you approach valuation will decide how you want to credit Stanley and his double.

Tommy Pham walked with first base open and winning runner already on base.

+.032 wins: Pham’s walk
-.020 wins: low impact timing of walk with 1st base open
-.009 wins: low impact timing of walk (run is useless)

Let’s pause here. The double put the winning run on base, and left 1B open. The walk is in fact practically useless. The win value changed by +.003 wins, which is pretty close to zero. The batter and pitcher know this, which is why we see a NEGATIVE impact of the walk in the 9th inning of a tied game, even though we are in a high leverage situation. This is unlike the double which had a huge POSITIVE impact. The entire sequencing of the situation matters. Given that the batter and pitcher are aware of the situations as they develop, the entire timing values noted above make perfect sense.

Finally, the HR by Brandon Moss.

+.150 wins: Moss’s HR
+.137 wins: high impact timing of HR with 2 runners on
+.114 wins: high impact timing of HR to win the game

In the end, the Cardinals went from a 61.4% chance of winning to 100%, adding +0.386 wins. Adding up the above, and we get:

+.209 wins: all the events in a random situation
+.074 wins: high/low impact timing for base-out situations
+.103 wins: high impact timing of inning/score (except walk)

So, how do you, the reader, want to evaluate each of these plays? How much do you want to assign to the batter (and pitcher) and how much do you just want to have some general “timing” buckets, not linked to any particular player?

At the end of this past week, prospect analyst Jesse Burkhart published a post at FanGraphs enumerating the virtues of draft-eligible Louisville outfielder Corey Ray. Less than an hour after that, the present author published a collection of regressed statistical leaderboards for select college conferences — atop one of which appeared draft-eligible Louisville outfielder Corey Ray, for his performance among ACC batters during the first week of the collegiate season.

For both reasons, the author observed with some interest this weekend’s series between Louisville and Ole Miss, played at the latter’s home park. While the Cardinals lost two of three games there, Ray played well, striking out just once over 14 plate appearances and recording an extra-base hit in all three contests.

The last of those extra-base hits was a home run — which is to say, basically the best kind of extra-base hit there is. With a view both to (a) celebrating that home run and also (b) attempting to reach the very narrowest possible demographic of this site’s wide readership, what the author has done is not only to capture the video footage of Corey Ray’s homer, but also to render it into slow motion and set it to an excerpt from Also Sprach Zarathustra by dead German composer Richard Strauss.

The results of this unnecessary moment in the history of film appear below.

Here are the results of the nine polls. You will see a link to each Instagraph, the results, along with my commentary.

***

http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/instagraphs/build-a-better-war-metric-part-4/
One team defense allows 8 runs, and the other a shutout. But both gave up 10 hits and 3 walks.

60% I don’t care about the timing. These defenses should count the same.
40% In the end, all that matters is runs allowed. The shutout defense should count for much better.

Commentary: This was the closest of the polls. Readers were nearly split as to whether to consider sequencing at the team-defense level or not. They prefer not to by a small margin. So given the choice between a metric based on hits, walks and outs like Baseball Prospectus, or one based on runs like Baseball Reference, readers lean toward the BPro model. I’ll get to Fangraphs in a bit.

http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/instagraphs/build-a-better-war-metric-part-7/
Solo HR or a bases-clearing double?

62% I don’t care about the context. I want the HR to count for more than the double.
38% Even if I prefer context-neutral stats, that’s true only to a point. Bases-clearing double for the win.

Commentary: The change in run expectancy is two runs for the double that clears the loaded bases, and one run for the HR with no runners on. The readers felt that even that wasn’t enough context to prefer the double over the HR. Basically, they don’t want to reward the batter for being a position to leverage a situation that he didn’t have a hand in creating. Even though he exploited it almost perfectly.

http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/instagraphs/build-a-better-war-metric-part-2/
It’s the bottom of the 9th of a tie game, bases loaded, and it’s a walk or a HR

66% Totally different. I want the HR to count for alot more than a BB
34% Same impact. I care about the preservation of wins.

Commentary: Once again, even in a scenario in which it’s do-or-die, HOW you do it matters to the reader, even if it doesn’t matter for the situation at hand.

http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/instagraphs/build-a-better-war-metric-part-6/
Ace relievers enters 9th, allow 1 run, with 2- or 1-run lead:

66% Both Billy and Trevor did an equally poor job, regardless of their lead
34% Trevor was a net negative. Billy was at least neutral, perhaps even net positive

Commentary: This is similar to the above scenario, where a player is thrust into a situation not of his making. And by an almost 2:1 margin, the readers want to evaluate the performance without respect to the situation.

http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/instagraphs/build-a-better-war-metric-part-5/
Ace reliever enters 9th with a 3 run lead, allows 2 to end the game.

77% Two runs in the 9th is an abysmal performance.
23% Two runs when given 3 runs to work with is barely passable, but still a net positive.

Commentary: There’s a limit to which Fangraphs readers will take context into account. Being given a three run lead is too much buffer to consider, and they don’t want to reward an 18.00 ERA in one inning as a net positive. But still, 23% did.

http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/instagraphs/build-a-better-war-metric-part-9-and-last/
Who pitched the better game, Strasburg or Wainwright?

78% Strasburg. His K/BB performance is so overwhelming. Maybe he didn’t get fielding support.
22% Wainwright. He didn’t dominate the hitters, but he was more effective. In the end, the runs tell the story.

Commentary: This was a referendum on FIP (heart of the Fangraphs model) v ERA (heart of the BR.com model) or Component-based ERA (heart of the BPro model). Obviously, having this poll on Fangraphs will bias the results towards those readers. But I tried to make the choice as tough as possible. Indeed, I carefully selected the numbers so they would match my version of the Bill James Game Score model.
http://tangotiger.com/index.php/site/comments/game-scores-for-2015

The two pitchers were set to have a score of “81” in both cases (50 is average, and around 100 is perfect). The 9 extra strikeouts for Strasburg were in balance against the 3 fewer singles and 1 fewer run for Wainwright. My version of Game Score is pretty much an even balance of the three models. I was really hoping that the readers, not realizing what I was doing, would end up going 50/50. They didn’t.

Given the results of the two polls, where the FIP model is much more preferred to the other two, while the BPRo model is slightly preferred to BR.com, this is what it looks like the Fangraphs readers prefer:
60% Fangraphs (FIP)
25% Baseball Prospectus (Component ERA)
15% Baseball Reference (ERA, actually RA/9)

http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/instagraphs/building-a-better-war-metric/
Comparing a bases loaded walk with a solo HR:

81% Totally different. I want the HR to count for alot more.
19% Same impact. I care about the preservation of runs.

Commentary: Once again, fans don’t care about the runs, and what the batter can leverage. They care about the events. If the batter didn’t create the situation, the fans don’t want to let them leverage it.

http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/instagraphs/build-a-better-war-metric-part-8/
Runner on third, 1 out, and the result is a K or SF:

83% This situation is so different, so obvious, that the value gap between a K and SF is huge.
17% I’m sticking that everything is context-neutral: an out is an out.

Commentary: In this case, an out is not an out. One is an out that moves the runner over, and the other is an out that doesn’t. This would be as different as a double v single. Fans are clear that if the situation is the same, but the outcome is different, then they’ll reward the outcome.

http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/instagraphs/build-a-better-war-metric-part-3/
Comparing the stranded leadoff triple to the one where he scores:

95% Same thing. A triple is a triple.
5% Totally different. One puts runs on the board, the other was useless.

Commentary: The fans are saying the sequencing of the play ends as soon as the next batter comes to the plate. The batter did his job, and he ended up at third. Whatever happens after that, they won’t hold the runner accountable, nor reward him (unless he actively did something himself).

***

Thank you to everyone who participated in the voting with 8000 total votes, and for the 180 comments in the comments section. I’m not sure where I go from here yet, but I’ll think of something soon.

This will be the 9th and final question I will ask. And I think it’s the toughest one. But, you guys keep surprising me, so, let’s get into it.

The question relates to how you see pitchers and the impact of their fielders. We have two pitchers, let’s call them Stephen Strasburg and Adam Wainwright. And they are pitching in the same game.

Strasburg pitches a complete game, striking out 13, without walking anyone, or allowing any extra base hits. But he does allow 10 singles, or at least, he and his fielders allow 10 singles, and that leads to 2 runs.

Wainwright also pitches a complete game, he also doesn’t walk anyone, but he only strikes out 4. He only allows 7 singles, or at least, he and his fielders allow 7 singles, and that leads to only 1 run.

The only thing you know is what I’ve told you. If you wish to infer more, like perhaps the Cardinals fielders helped Adam more than the Nationals fielders helped Stephen, go ahead. If you wish to infer that Wainwright allowed softer hit balls than Strasburg, you can do that if you want. You decide how to interpret the information I’ve given you.

The question: