FanGraphs Baseball

The Tigers of the Future Aren’t Totally Screwed

The Detroit Tigers are in an unusual position. There’s nothing unusual about a team trying to win now, but there’s something unusual about the Tigers’ particular sense of urgency. We can acknowledge it has something to do with Mike Ilitch, and his age, and that’s a little weird to talk about, but it’s out there. Ilitch wants to see a winner and people don’t live forever, so this is the current line of thinking: the Tigers will do anything to try to win right away, no matter what it means for the future, because what if there isn’t a tomorrow?

It’s pretty obvious where the Tigers’ priorities are. They just gave four more expensive years to a soon-to-be 36-year-old Victor Martinez, and that contract’s been identified as one that’ll look mighty bad pretty soon. But I think people might’ve gotten too far ahead of themselves in declaring that the future will be a mess, myself included. It’s easy to observe some of the parallels between the Tigers and the Phillies, but the future Tigers aren’t sure to be screwed. There’s a way to survive, such that the window doesn’t have to slam shut.

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The Top-Five White Sox Prospects by Projected WAR

Yesterday afternoon, Kiley McDaniel published his consummately researched and demonstrably authoritative prospect list for the Chicago White Sox. What follows is a different exercise than that, one much smaller in scope and designed to identify not Chicago’s top overall prospects but rather the rookie-eligible players in the White Sox system who are most ready to produce wins at the major-league level in 2015 (regardless of whether they’re likely to receive the opportunity to do so). No attempt has been made, in other words, to account for future value.

Below are the top-five prospects in the White Sox system by projected WAR. To assemble this brief list, what I’ve done is to locate the Steamer 600 projections for all the prospects to whom McDaniel assessed a Future Value grade of 40 or greater. Hitters’ numbers are normalized to 550 plate appearances; starting pitchers’, to 150 innings — i.e. the playing-time thresholds at which a league-average player would produce a 2.0 WAR. Catcher projections are prorated to 415 plate appearances to account for their reduced playing time.

Note that, in many cases, defensive value has been calculated entirely by positional adjustment based on the relevant player’s minor-league defensive starts — which is to say, there has been no attempt to account for the runs a player is likely to save in the field. As a result, players with an impressive offensive profile relative to their position are sometimes perhaps overvalued — that is, in such cases where their actual defensive skills are sub-par.

5. Trayce Thompson, OF (Profile)

PA AVG OBP SLG wRC+ WAR
550 .215 .285 .378 84 1.1

As he had in 2013, Thompson spent all of 2014 in the Double-A Southern League. In roughly the same number of plate appearances as 2013, he recorded roughly the same walk and strikeout rates, roughly the same number of home runs, and roughly the same slash line. Despite the similarity between those two seasons — and seeming lack of development — Thompson’s projection for 2015 is about half a win greater than it was for 2014. Reason No. 1: Steamer puts more emphasis on recent performance, and an adequate season in the high minors is more valuable than a slightly better one in the lower levels. And No. 2: Thompson is still ascending towards his peak, so the any age curve adjustment is bound to help him.

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On Mark Minicozzi, or Complementing Projections with Reason

Last offseason, the Yankees signed infielder Yangervis Solarte — who’d left the Rangers by way of minor-league free agency — to a decidedly more robust minor-league deal than is the standard in the industry. The result for New York was ultimately a positive one: not only did Solarte record the highest major-league WAR figure in 2014 of any player who’d departed his club the previous offseason by way of minor-league free agency, but the Yankees were able to parlay him (along with right-handed prospect Rafael De Paula) into a trade for Chase Headley.

As noted by Kiley McDaniel earlier this month, the Solarte signing wasn’t an anomalous one for the Yankees: they’d completed similar deals with reliever Jim Miller and catcher Bobby Wilson, as well. And while neither of those players did much of anything at the major-league level, the strategy was ultimately a very profitable one for New York based on Solarte’s production alone — profitable enough, as McDaniel notes, to fund 10 seasons of such an experiment.

“Who might be the next Solarte?” one wonders. On Tuesday afternoon, the St. Louis Cardinals signed one possible candidate, infielder Dean Anna, to a major-league contract despite the fact that Anna enters his age-28 season with just 25 major-league plate appearances ever. The projections offer some logic to St. Louis’s decision: despite that limited major-league track record, Anna’s projected to produce an 89 wRC+ and slightly above-average second-base defense — a combination of skills which, when taken together, produce a nearly league-average major leauger. That’s a considerable value for a league-minimum contract.

This post was originally going to be called something like The Top-Five Minor-League Free Agents by the Projections — written with a view, that is, towards identifying those minor-league free agents most likely to receive that Solarte-type money and produce the Solarte-type production. In fact, it’s quite possible I’ll publish a post along those lines next week. But what becomes clear as one inspects the issue more closely is that, while the computer math of a projection system like Steamer is capable of translating without too much difficultly a player’s minor-league batting numbers to a major-league environment, producing a defensive projection for that same player is more difficult. And those defensive projections, if taken without any sort of healthy skepticism, can alter one’s understanding of a player’s value.

In particular, this is true of those players who’ve lingered long enough in the minors to have reached free agency. For, while an 18-year-old shortstop prospect is likely to remain a shortstop into his age-19 season, those players who began their careers a decade ago have very possibly become a different sort of player.

Consider the case of Mark Minicozzi, for example. Selected by San Francisco in the 17th round of the 2005 draft out of East Carolina University, Minicozzi made every one of his minor-league starts in the Giants system between 2005 and -07 at either second, third, or shortstop. Following a elbow injury, however, he was released by the organization and spent the entirety of the next three seasons in the independent Atlantic, Can-AM, and Northern Leagues — after which he was re-signed by the Giants in 2012.

Now, he enters his age-32 season with a decidedly different physique and set of skills than that 23-year-old version of himself originally drafted by San Francisco. And while he’s made starts at both second and third base as recently as 2013, he made the majority of his defensive appearances in 2014 at first base and left field.

With that thought in mind, let’s consider his Steamer projection for 2015, prorated to 600 plate appearances:

PA AVG OBP SLG wRC+ Off Def WAR
600 .246 .316 .351 95 -4.0 2.2 1.8

Minicozzi’s projected batting line is nearly major-league average — and this oughtn’t be too shocking. Over a span of three seasons since his return to the Giants organization, Minicozzi has produced a batting line about 30% better than average relative to the various leagues in which he’s played. This year with Fresno — his first at the Triple-A level, incidentally — the 31-year-old Minicozzi produced reasonable walk and strikeout rates (13.2% and 22.4%, respectively) while also hitting 12 home runs and exhibiting above-average batted-ball skill (.371 BABIP) in 370 plate appearances. That he would profile as a slightly below-average major-league batter is entirely reasonable.

The question of Minicozzi’s defensive value is a more difficult one to answer, however. For while, as noted, Minicozzi played mostly first base and left field in 2014, he did make those starts at second and third base in 2013, and has, at points in his career, played exclusively those more difficult infield positions. It’s possible that his starts at less demanding positions are reflective of a loss of agility and athleticism — not an unreasonable proposition given Minicozzi’s age. (Defensive skills peaks quite early in player’s career.) That said, it’s also possible that the organization has moved Minicozzi to those less demanding positions to allow younger, more promising players their due repetitions at the position (second or third, for example) they’re likely to play in the majors.

The way Steamer handles Minicozzi, specifically, is to offer no projection of fielding runs saved (which is typical for Steamer of minor-league players) and to assess the positional adjustment of a second or third baseman (+2.5 runs per season). That explains the +2.2 figure in the defensive column (Def) of Minicozzi’s projection above.

From what we know of Minicozzi, projecting him to be a major-league-average second or third baseman — or a decidedly above-average left fielder, for example — seems ambitious. In the specific case of Minicozzi, it almost certainly is. Producing 4000-plus projections, however — such as are available by means of Steamer for position players alone — necessarily requires the employment of some assumptions — chief among them, what position the player in question is likely to play adequately. And while those assumptions might work well for the majority of players, it’s also true that in specific instances — such as the case of players like Minicozzi — that one will be required to apply some reasonable alterations.

For Minicozzi, as we’ve noted, a probably reasonable assumption is that he’s more well-suited to left field now. Applying the generic positional adjustment for a left fielder (-7.5 runs per season) to Minicozzi’s projected 2015 line (again, prorated to 600 plate appearances) yields this result:

PA AVG OBP SLG wRC+ Off Def WAR
600 .246 .316 .351 95 -4.0 -6.6 0.9

Is that ultimately more accurate? I don’t know — although, it’s probably true that, in the case of an older minor leaguer, assuming that he’s closer to a replacement-level player than league-average one is probably smart. Ultimately, though, this post isn’t about Mark Minicozzi and his 2015 season. It’s about projections — and specifically it’s about how one needn’t entirely abandon a projection merely because one aspect of it (like the defensive part) appears not to fully depict the reality of the player’s situation. The projections are wildly useful as a starting point to a discussion about a player’s ability. In those cases where more major-league data is available, those starting points are decidedly accurate. In those instances where no major-league data is available, however, the projections still have their uses — so long as they’re complemented by reason on the part of the one considering them.


FG on Fox: Why $300 Million for Giancarlo Stanton Makes Sense

It was an astonishing figure that Ken Rosenthal reported. On some level the figures are always astonishing, but this one was especially so. Allow me to jog your memory:

Would Giancarlo Stanton turn down the biggest contract in professional sports history?

The Miami Marlins apparently intend to find out.

The two sides are discussing a deal that would be for at least 10 years and at least $300 million, according to major-league sources.

There used to be some talk that Clayton Kershaw would become the first $300-million man, and then he signed for about seven-tenths of that. Miguel Cabrera came close, but now it’s Stanton who’s threatening to break through the barrier. It’s astonishing, really, for multiple reasons. There’s the raw amount of money. There’s the team said to be considering the raw amount of money. There’s the player said to be considering the raw amount of money, what with Stanton’s reaction a few years back to the Marlins’ most recent fire sale. The snarky way to explain this is that it would take $300 million for the Marlins to convince anyone to trust them. Why sign with that team if you don’t have to?

But the Marlins have insisted for a long time that they’re committed to keeping Stanton around. Maybe, finally, they’re going to turn over a new leaf. We can’t predict where the Marlins are going to go. We know only that they have some talent now, and that they might soon sign their brightest star to a contract worth almost a third of a billion dollars. That seems like a lot. But, is it crazy, or is it entirely reasonable?

Read the rest on Just a Bit Outside.


Kiley McDaniel Prospects Chat – 11/14/14

11:58
Kiley McDaniel: Looking for a snappy intro? Then you’re at the wrong chat.

12:00
Comment From TK
That’s… kinda snappy, no?

12:01
Kiley McDaniel: Sounds like I need to ratchet down the snappiness. Note taken.

12:01
Comment From Graham
Seeing a number of differing opinions on Devon Travis since he was traded to the Jays. Everything from “not a big-leaguer” to “possible future batting champ.” What are your thoughts on Devon Travis?

12:03
Kiley McDaniel: He’s an okay defensive 2B with feel for the barrel and some speed that has a not so dynamic swing but makes the most of it. Could be a starter if it all comes together, more of a fringe regular or good backup for me.

12:03
Comment From Del Martin
Rumor has it that the Padres and Rangers are working on a trade that would reunite Preller with some of his discoveries. As a Padres fan, who should I be hoping for?

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Marlins Discussing Record Deal With Giancarlo Stanton

Back in September, I ruminated on when an extension for Giancarlo Stanton might look like, and a run through the numbers gave me an estimate of $300 million over 12 years. The Marlins, reportedly, are negotiating a deal with Stanton that could be worth as much as $325 million over that same time period, so it seems like the estimates in that post weren’t too far off.

Except they kind of were, because I just eyeballed the projections and decided to be a little conservative, so the calculations were based on Stanton starting out from a +5 WAR level. Stanton’s actual Steamer projection is for 2015 is up on the site now, and it has him as a +6 WAR player for 2015, suggesting I maybe underestimated his expected value by a full win each year. Here’s the same table from that post, just starting from a +6 WAR base instead of a +5 WAR platform.

Year Age WAR $/WAR Value 10% Discount
2017 27 6.0 $7.00 $42.00 $37.80
2018 28 6.0 $7.40 $44.40 $39.96
2019 29 6.0 $7.70 $46.20 $41.58
2020 30 5.5 $8.10 $44.55 $40.10
2021 31 5.0 $8.50 $42.50 $38.25
2022 32 4.5 $8.90 $40.05 $36.05
2023 33 4.0 $9.40 $37.60 $33.84
2024 34 3.5 $9.80 $34.30 $30.87
2025 35 3.0 $10.30 $30.90 $27.81
2026 36 2.5 $10.90 $27.25 $24.53

That projection values his 10 free agent years at a total of $390 million, and doesn’t include the payments he’s basically already guaranteed through arbitration. Toss in another $35 million for the two seasons before the 10 year extension kicks in, and this would suggest a value of $425 million, $100 million more than the Marlins are reportedly offering.

Yeah, I know, it sounds insane. I don’t think Stanton’s worth $425 million either. For one, the aging curve is probably not aggressive enough, especially for a guy his size with a history of knee problems. If we start his decline phase a couple of years earlier, having him drop from +6 WAR to +5.5 WAR at age-28, then the trickle-down has him end up at $313 million for the 10 free agent years, which would put him around $350 million over the life of the deal. Still a bit more than the rumored price, but definitely closer, and probably a bit more reasonable.

The other key we haven’t talked about is a potential opt-out, and how that might affect the valuation. Opt-outs are a way of giving the player non-monetary value in exchange for a lower AAV, and if the Marlins include one in an extension for Stanton, it could help them drive salaries down. Given the Marlins history of selling off players not too long after signing them, I’m guessing Stanton will demand either (or both) a no-trade and an opt-out, giving him the leverage to decide where he goes if he wants to get out of the deal.

If the opt-out is early enough in the deal, making Stanton’s commitment to the Marlins far shorter, then it could give him enough additional value to take less than the $30 million AAV he’s pretty clearly worth. We’ll do a full rundown on the deal when it’s done and the details are known, but it sounds like Stanton’s going to get a monster contract, and he deserves it.


Library Update: Pitch Type Linear Weights/Pitch Values

We’ve never conducted an official poll, but for my money, the most difficult statistics on FanGraphs for a newcomer to figure out are Pitch Type Linear Weights, also called Pitch Values. If you’re scanning through a player page and come across something that says “wFB/C” you’d be forgiven for throwing up your hands and going outside to mow the lawn.

But fear not, we’ve updated our Library entry regarding Pitch Type Linear Weights with hopes of making that alphabet soup of a statistic easier to understand. These statistics measure how each pitch thrown changes the run expectancy of the individual plate appearance through their impact on the count. Pitch values aren’t something you’re likely to chart while you watch a game, but if used appropriately, they can provide a richer understanding of which pitches have been most effective during a given season.

As always, feel free to ask questions in the comments section, on Twitter @NeilWeinberg44, or during our weekly FanGraphs Q&A chats, Wednesdays at 3pm.


General Managers on the Current Run-Scoring Environment: Thoughts from Phoenix

There is no disputing that offense is down. Teams are scoring fewer runs and hitting fewer balls over fences. Strikeouts numbers have grown precipitously. Some of the reasons behind those changes are clear. Others are more speculative. The bottom line is that the offensive environment isn’t what it was as recently as a handful of years ago.

The downturn begs two questions: 1. Is this an irreversible trend (barring rule changes), or is it simply a cyclical dip? 2. How does it impact roster-building decisions?

With the GM meetings taking place in Phoenix this week – yes, the weather was pristine – I decided to ask those very questions to a cross section of the decision makers. Not surprisingly, opinions varied.

Let’s start with the first of the two questions: Trend or Cycle?

Rick Hahn, Chicago White Sox: “There are elements like the strike zone and the velocity we’re seeing out of pitchers. Those have had a dampening effect. Defensive shifts have conceivably brought down the offensive effectiveness of some players. So, there are some tangible reasons to point to, but I do think part of it is just the cyclical nature of the game.”

Chris Antonetti, Cleveland Indians: “I’m not sure how far into it we are, but I think there are a number of different factors that have impacted the offensive environment in baseball. I don’t think it’s just a blip on the radar. I don’t necessarily see that dynamic changing if we don’t consider measures to maybe make some adjustments.”

Terry Ryan, Minnesota Twins: “No I don’t (think it is an irreversible trend). In fact, I absolutely don’t. Pitching is better, and sometimes you go through streaks where there just aren’t that many hitters coming up, or people producing on the offensive side of the game. I think that will correct itself.”

Doug Melvin, Milwaukee Brewers: “You have to be careful to make sure the cycles of offense and pitching are really that – a cyclical thing. There are probably some things affecting it a little bit, like bullpens and match-ups. The schedule is still a grind. There were also some good-quality hitters hurt over the course of this year – guys like Joey Votto – which affects offense. It could bounce back.”

Dave Dombrowski, Detroit Tigers: “That’s a great question and I’m not sure I know the answer. In my estimation, the game is probably going to look at that topic. Right now, unless some things change, I think run production will continue to be down. I don’t think it will go down much more, but the trend will stay down from an offensive perspective.”

Michael Hill, Miami Marlins: “We evaluate trends, but I would say it’s more pitcher-driven than anything. It’s pitcher driven with power arms in rotations and power arms in bullpens. Who knows what that will mean long term?”

——

The second question — does the trend/cycle impact decisions-making? — also resulted in mixed views. GMs are typically coy when it comes to anything related to player-acquisition, but a few of them offered interesting perspectives.

Farhan Zaidi, Los Angeles Dodgers: “Just when you think you’ve identified a trend, it seems like things go the other way. It’s really just about building the most-balanced team. It’s not like we’re going to think to ourselves, ‘This team had success with guys who steal a lot of bases, so let’s go that way.’ We learn every season there’s more than one way to skin a cat. I don’t think we’re going to be overly dogmatic in our approach.”

Mike Rizzo, Washington Nationals: “I think you build a team depending on a lot of factors – talent level at the big-league level, talent level on the minor-league side, who’s coming up, the type of ballpark you play in, what the division looks like. All of those ingredients go into how you build a roster. We’re going to approach this season no different than any other.”

Neal Huntington, Pittsburgh Pirates: “Players in their mid 30s are players in their mid 30s. Very rarely do they suddenly get better, as happened with some in the 1990s and 2000s. Depth is important. You look at what Kansas City and Baltimore have done, having deep and talented rosters. They can rest players and not have a huge drop off. Youth and depth are absolutely crucial to roster building as we go forward.”

John Mozeliak, St. Louis Cardinals: “Your most knee-jerk reaction is to adjust to what you need now. You look at your offensive projections and how that’s going to translate into wins. But when you start thinking more long term, guys with a 1.000 OPS are rare. Our 2004 team had three – Edmonds, Pujols and Rolen – and those days seem so foreign. One thing you might start to see is a little bit more small ball and speed back in the game, teams trying to figure out a way to manufacture runs.”

Rick Hahn, Chicago White Sox: “You’re always having conversations about staying ahead of where offense, defense, and pitching are going. You want to be on the cutting edge, whether it’s acquiring undervalued players or players you can project to play a greater role based on their ability or the environment you’re going to drop them into. The conversations haven’t changed much, but the targets have altered in recent years. I think athleticism and the ability to contribute both offensively and defensively has become more important.”

Dave Dombrowski, Detroit Tigers: “You have to be cognizant of everything that’s taking place at a particular time. You analyze, and you have to decide how you’re going to use that information when building a club. Power is diminished, but how much more are you going to pay for somebody based on that lack of power? Where does that fit in with your philosophy of making contact? There’s just so much that goes into it.”

——

Look for more from this week’s GM meetings in my upcoming Sunday Notes column.


Effectively Wild Episode 574: The Cubs’ Unparallelled Prospects

Ben and Sam talk to BP prospect staffers Nick J. Faleris and Chris Mellen about the Cubs’ top-ranked farm system.


Explaining My National League MVP Ballot

As I noted on Tuesday night, I was privileged to be selected to vote on two postseason awards this year; the National League’s Manager of the Year and the Most Valuable Player. As was just announced, the MVP award went to Clayton Kershaw, edging out Andrew McCutchen and Giancarlo Stanton for the top spot. You can see the full results of the voting at BBWAA.com. Below, I’ll explain each of my selections, and why I voted as I did.

First, a very quick overview of my philosophy. I generally think the best player and most valuable player are the same thing, and I don’t really care too much about a team’s performance when trying to determine the quality of an individual player. However, I also don’t think it’s entirely correct to focus solely on context-neutral numbers, as we generally do when trying to evaluate a player’s true talent level. Context-specific specific performance absolutely drives some of the variation in team win-loss records, and distributing your performance into the most critical situations can definitely affect your teams record one way or another.

My goal was to identify the players who added the most wins to their team in 2014, and even though “clutch performance” doesn’t really appear to be a thing a player has much control over, it still matters when tallying up wins and losses. The Royals won 89 games instead of 81 games primarily because of the distribution of their performances, and if we focused solely on the context-neutral contributions of their individual players, we’d come up eight wins shy of their actual total.

So, on my MVP ballot, the timing of performances mattered. I leaned more on RE24 rather than wRC+, and attempted to incorporate high leverage performance into the calculations as well. It might not be a repeatable skill, but I don’t think that’s what we’re trying to measure. We’re just trying to look for who added the most value in 2014, and for that question, I thinking including the timing of events is important.

Okay, now to my ballot.

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