Archive for Jose Bautista

Over the winter, Jose Bautista was forced to settle on a one-year contract of about $18 million, or roughly the price of a qualifying offer. Given Bautista’s performance over the previous half-dozen years — during which he’d been one of the game’s best hitters — that deal came as a surprise. Most thought he would get three or four years guaranteed at that rate.

When a player receives so little compared to the general consensus, there’s an inclination to believe that maybe the teams know something we don’t. Bautista had just recorded one of his worst seasons, putting up a 122 wRC+, a 20-point drop from his previous three campaigns. Perhaps there was reason to believe that his poor 2016 season was going to carry over into this year. That certainly looked to be the case just a few weeks into the current season. Not so much anymore.

On April 25, Jose Bautista had played in 19 games, recorded 85 plate appearances, and produced just three extra-base hits, only one of those a homer. His walk rate was a solid 15%, but his strikeout rate was 31%. A lot of strikeouts and no power caused an early-season hitting line of .129/.271/.200 and just a 33 wRC+. As for the cause of Bautista’s poor play, age-related decline was certainly a possibility. Curious himself, Jeff Sullivan requested reader assistance, on April 25, to help better understand the underlying causes for some hitters’ struggles. Jose Bautista was one of those struggling hitters. Since that time, however, he hasn’t struggled at all. In fact, he’s been one of the game’s best, recording a 177 wRC+ in the meantime.

Regarding Bautista, the first issue raised by Sullivan raised was contact. The Jays’ right fielder had historically made contact on 81% of pitches, but he was down to 71% this season. His whiffs both in and out of the zone were up. To help gain some context, let’s separate Bautista’s last few years into a few different segments: 2013-2015, 2016, the 2017 season through April 24, and the 2017 season since April 24. Let’s start by looking at contact rate.

The good news is that Bautista has brought his contact rate back up to near-vintage Bautista levels. When the ball is pitched in the zone and Bautista swings, he’s making good contact. Before we get to the damage done on contact, that dropping O-Contact% is worth a look. From 2013 to -15, Bautista was above the league average of 63% on swings on balls outside the zone. Last season, Bautista tumbled below the 62% league average. This season, whether looking at the early or latter part of this year, Bautista is well below league average. While that is likely an indication of his declining skills, given Bautista’s batting eye, it might not hurt him as much as others. Bautista’s 21% swing rate on pitches outside the zone is among the top-10 rates in baseball.

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Back in 2008, after a half-decade of great hitting, David Ortiz slumped a bit, recording “only” a 124 wRC+. At 32, it was fair to expect some decline in performance. An offensive line 24% better than league average — as opposed to the 45-75% he’d been sustaining — seemed like a reasonable indicator of that decline. The next season, Ortiz slumped even more, posting just a 100 wRC+, essentially becoming a replacement-level player in the process. It made sense to wonder if he were finished. He wasn’t, of course. Ortiz proceeded to put up a 148 wRC+ over the next seven years, retiring after this past year following his age-40 season.

At 36, free agent Jose Bautista is a few years older than Ortiz was back in 2008, but similar questions apply. From 2010 to 2015, the former Jays outfielder put up a 156 wRC+, establishing himself as one of the best hitters in the game. He entered spring training this year thinking big in free agency, hoping for a contract well above $100 million. Following his 2016 season, that seems less likely. Bautista produced “only” a 122 wRC+ — and, for the first time during his tenure with the Blue Jays, Bautista was a below average player, putting up just a 1.4 WAR.

Despite a disappointing season at the plate, though — and questions about his arm holding up in the outfield — the projections expect a rebound for Bautista. Our Depth Chart forecast calls for a 128 wRC+ and 2.8 WAR from Baustita, which would still make him a valuable player next season.

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That didn’t take long. Just a few days into the season, we have a controversial play relating to the slide rule instituted this offseason. Last night, trailing 3-2 in the top of the ninth with the bases loaded and one out, Toronto Blue Jays batter Edwin Encarnacion hit a ground ball to Rays third baseman Evan Longoria. Longoria threw to second base to force out Jose Bautista, who had been running from first base. As second baseman Logan Forsythe attempted to throw the ball to first base for an inning-ending double play, Bautista’s arm caught Forsythe’s foot, Forsythe’s throw went awry, Encarnacion was safe, and two runs scored. Officials overturned the call, ruling that Bautista violated Rule 6.01 for interference and Encarnacion was declared out at first, ending the game in favor of Tampa Bay.

Those are the basic facts of what happened last night, and while the interpretation of the rule might be subject to criticism, there can be little dispute about what happened. There is also likely little dispute about the impetus of the new rule — player safety — and that last night’s play had little to do with player safety. That leads to a couple questions. Like, was the rule interpreted correctly? And like, should the slide rule cover plays like Bautista’s when little harm is likely to come on the play?

Before we take a look at the play, let’s consider the precise language of the new rule itself. Rule 6.01(j) is the relevant one here, titled “Sliding to Bases on Double Play Attempts”. So what does the runner have to do?

If a runner does not engage in a bona fide slide, and initiates (or attempts to make) contact with the fielder for the purpose of breaking up a double play, he should be called for interference under this Rule 6.01.

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If you somehow missed the seventh inning of Wednesday’s ALDS Game 5 and now somehow find yourself here at this website, do yourself a favor: go watch it. On the days following games like that, after we’ve been through something as grand, troubling, exultant, and trying as that seventh inning, we spend most of our time trying to make sense of it all: not only the fact that what we witnessed could only happen in this singular game of baseball, but that we’ve never seen anything like it before. Just think: there are more games like that in the future. How crazy is that knowledge? How will we possibly survive all of them?

Even though many of you, like me, are probably still dealing with the fallout of increased blood pressure, rapid heart rate, and psychological trauma, we all have a job to do, and mine is to somehow analyze a piece of what went on Wednesday. We already had Jeff breaking it down with his usual aplomb. We had Eno looking into the rules associated with the plays in question. And, perhaps most pertinent to this article, Dave weighed in on the line between emotion and sportsmanship.

There’s a part of that final subject that we’re going to key in on: emotion. We try, in many ways, to capture how players perform in different situations. We can look at dozens of splits on our player pages. Leverage is the situation that immediately comes to mind when we’re talking about intangible forces that can impact performance. The closest we get to measuring an emotional response is how players perform under pressure — how clutch they are.

But what about anger? We don’t measure that, and it’s understandable why we don’t — measuring anger is impossible or impractical with the tools we have right now. It would also be a pretty strange thing to measure, but we also measure plenty of strange things.

That brings us to what happened on Wednesday in the bottom of the seventh inning. By this point, the top half of the inning had already included the go-ahead run scoring on a deflected ball being thrown back to the pitcher, multiple instances of fans throwing objects onto the field, and the Blue Jays playing the game under protest. To say that tensions were running high would be a gross understatement, especially for the Blue Jays.

So, when Bautista stepped to the plate in the bottom of the inning during a tie game that hung in the balance, it’s not a stretch to say he was probably feeling a bit of frustration, maybe even anger. Then he did this:

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I want to put to rest the discussion about the lack of right-handed power in Major League Baseball today. There has been a lot of anecdotal commentary about how scarce right-handed power has become, but there haven’t been too many analytical articles supporting this idea. If anything, the handful of articles that have been written question if the problem even exists in the first place. There are two different arguments about this topic: the first is that right-handed power is scarce — that is to say left-hand power is bountiful — but right-hand power is not, while the second argument, which I won’t address today, is that relative to left-handed power hitters, right-handed power hitters have declined in number.

In a hypothetical choice between players of equal talent, you would almost always prefer a left-handed power hitter to a right-handed power hitter, since the lefty will have the platoon advantage more often and should be more productive as a result. There are valid arguments concerning rounding out line-ups, but right-handed batters are not scarce; good left-handed hitters are actually the scarce commodity.

For reference, the general population is estimated at having a left-handed rate of 10%, while baseball has a left-handed rate among batters is about 33%; lefties are overrepresented in baseball.

This is a box plot of the various player-seasons from 2010 until 2014. I’ve chosen this time span since it’s recent and it falls after the implementation of PITCHf/x, which improved the measurement of the strike zone. I’ve excluded switch hitters for simplicity, and set a floor at 200 plate appearances.

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Jose Bautista is once again performing at a very high level after a slow start to the season. He has produced 2.4 WAR in 72 games, and ranks 11th in the American League with a .381 wOBA. He is tied for the league lead with 23 home runs and is currently on pace to pass the 40 HR plateau for the third straight year. Despite his homer-happy ways, however, Bautista only ranks ninth in the league in slugging percentage at .533.

The major culprit is his batting average on balls in play. At a ridiculously low .201, Bautista has not had much success turning balls in play into hits. A greater percentage of his hits are home runs, which are excluded from the BABIP calculation, and his rate of singles and doubles is below the norm. In other words, while a .381 wOBA is fine for anyone to hang his head on, Bautista has actually been held back this season.

It seems strange for someone to produce so effectively with such a low BABIP, which got me thinking: has anyone ever finished a season with a wOBA as strong as Bautista’s current .381 mark with as extremely suppressed a batting average on balls in play?

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In discussing Thursday how Jose Bautista has been, without question, the best and most valuable player in the American League this year, the topic of where his first “half” ranks historically was raised. Bautista played 84 games through the break and tallied 6.6 wins above replacement. Last year, he finished with 6.9 WAR in an excellent breakout campaign. He essentially matched his production from a year ago in half of a season.

Nobody else is even close to him this season either — it would actually take the combined WAR totals of Adrian Gonzalez and Jay Bruce, an MVP candidate and an All-Star, to match his singular productivity. But where does his 6.6 WAR total through the first half of the season rank?

According to our splits data and the yeoman work of David Appelman, Bautista’s 6.6 WAR is the second-highest total since the 1974 season. That was the first year in the sample given the full availability of detailed event information on a game-by-game basis. Babe Ruth produced insane totals in 1920 (14.1), 1921 (14.4), 1923 (15.4) and 1927 (13.2) but we don’t have the capability of determining his totals through the same period.

In any event, here are the top four WAR totals through July 10 in a given year from 1974-2011:

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The baseball season still has two and a half months left of games to be played, but the bifurcation around the All Star Game often results in award discussions. The discussions tend to grow contentious when one player clearly stands out amongst the crop of candidates, but is passed over in lieu of a player with a more fitting narrative.

Right now, Jose Bautista is the most valuable player in the American League, not Adrian Gonzalez.

Bautista boasts a .334/.468/.702 line, and a gaudy .487 wOBA. He has launched 31 home runs in 84 games, and is on pace to hit right around 50 by the end of the season. He is walking in almost 20 percent of his plate appearances and has actually improved his strikeout rate. With average defense and plus-baserunning, it becomes difficult to point out any flaws in his game. Last year was clearly his breakout season, as he tallied 6.9 wins above replacement. In slightly over half of a season this year he has already produced 6.6 WAR, and very well may turn in one of the best seasons in the history of baseball.

Gonzalez is having a fantastic season, but one very clearly south of Bautista. The Red Sox first baseman has a higher batting average at .354, and a better fielding mark (albeit at an easier position), and that’s about it. His on-base percentage is 54 points lower. His .591 slugging percentage is 111 points lower. Put everything together and Gonzalez has a .429 wOBA, which would lead the league if not for the fact that Bautista’s mark is almost 60 points higher. Gonzalez is the best player in the American League outside of the Jose Bautista division, but there is a clear line of demarcation between he and Bautista.

Why are so many touting Gonzalez as the MVP of the first half? The arguments tend to boil down to the following areas: his quest for the batting title, the high RBI total, clutch performance, and the performance of the Red Sox as a team.

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As long as Jose Bautista continues to hit like this it is our duty to write articles in his honor. Earlier in the week Dave Cameron analyzed how much of a bargain Bautista’s 5 yr/$65 mil extension with the Blue Jays will represent even if he sustains just a semblance of his current performance. Dave also offered up a pu pu platter of statistical nuggets summarizing Jose’s nutty season. Today I’ll look at where Bautista’s rise to superstardom ranks historically to answer the titular question.

We all know the man can hit. In just 35 games he has 4.0 WAR to his name, slashing .360/.509/.816 and with 16 home runs in the process. His rest of season ZiPS projection is .267/.388/.567, which is better than most players are hitting right now. Seriously, his regression-riddled wOBA for the rest of the season is .419 — only six players currently boast a mark greater than that.

Everything about his turnaround defies logic. This isn’t the case of an upper echelon prospect like Brandon Wood figuring something out. Bautista was always patient at the plate and played decent defense, but he was the epitome of a player whose value was linked directly to his team-controlled status. He was a stopgap solution, a non-tender candidate, not a stud in the making. He wasn’t going to make $65 million in his entire career, and now that amount over five years is considered a massive bargain. But is his drastic improvement unprecedented? In the annals of baseball history, has anyone ever improved as much and as quickly?

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For a player sometimes referred to as “Joey Bats,” Jose Bautista hadn’t exactly been an offensive stalwart prior to 2010. A 20th-round draft-and-follow-pick of the Pittsburgh Pirates back in 2000, Bautista wasn’t placed on the Bucs’ 40-man roster after the 2003 season. His omission began a Rule V odyssey taking him through Baltimore, Tampa Bay, Kansas City, Queens, and finally back to the ‘Burgh (as part of a deadline deal for Kris Benson) within the span of six months. The Pirates shipped Bautista to Toronto in August of ’08 for catcher Robinzon Diaz, currently struggling to slug .330 for Detroit’s Triple-A affiliate. From 2004-2009, Bautista’s bat was six percent below average (94 wRC+), and his .161 Isolated Power was right around the big league norm. He racked up a combined 1.8 wins above replacement. To most fans, Joey Bats was just another Joe Shmoe trying to stick on a major league roster.

And then, 2010 happened. In 452 plate appearances, Bautista is batting .263/.376/.600. His .162 wRC+ dwarfs his modest CHONE and ZiPS pre-season projections (both called for a 94 wRC+). With 33 home runs, Bautista holds a five dinger lead over his closest competitor, Adam Dunn. Jose’s .337 ISO tops all big leaguers (Miguel Cabrera is a distant second, at .300) and more than doubles his pre-season forecasts (.162 from ZiPS, .163 from CHONE). Despite his continued defensive issues, Bautista ranks 16th among position players with four WAR. He hasn’t simply surpassed expectations. Rather, he has taken those expectations, crumpled them into a little ball, and then hammered them all the way to Quebec.

How has Bautista done it? Well, he’s hitting the ball on the ground much less often. Bautista’s ground ball rate, 41.9 percent from 2004-2009, is just 32.2% in 2010. His fly ball percentage, 42.8 percent from ’04 to ’09, is 52.2% (third-highest in the majors). His home run per fly ball rate has spiked from 10.4% from ’04 to ’09 to 21% this season (fifth in the majors).

Bautista is also pulling the ball a lot more this season:

The chart above is normally positive for most players, as the average batter shows far more power to the pull side than to the center and opposite fields. But it’s even better for Bautista. He’s an abysmal hitter when he puts the ball in play to right field:

The past couple of years, he has been Tony Pena Jr. circa 2008 when he goes the opposite way. He has never hit an opposite-field homer in his career. To center, Bautista performs quite well compared to the average hitter:

But that’s nothing compared to his exploits when pulling the ball. Bautista has long been above average when hitting to left, but check out those 2010 numbers.

Bam! Pow! Zap! A .650 wOBA. A .699 ISO, with nearly 47% of his fly balls finding the cheap seats. Twenty-nine of Bautista’s 33 home runs have been hit to the pull side. Take a look at his home run chart from Hit Tracker Online:

There’s an inverse relationship between power and fastballs seen — the more pop a player displays, the less often he gets a heater. We’ve seen that with Bautista this season, as he has gotten a fastball just 49.4%, which is the fifth-lowest FB% among MLB hitters and is well below his career 57.7% rate of fastballs seen. It hasn’t much mattered to this point, as Bautista is killing everything but changeups.

Bautista’s gargantuan season has been a happy development for the Blue Jays, and it would be a mistake to simply waive off his power display as a total fluke. That being said, there’s no way he’s going to keep an ISO approaching Babe Ruth’s career mark. ZiPS projects a .359 wOBA for Jose, with a .245 ISO that essentially splits the difference between his career figure entering 2010 and his current, jaw-dropping total.

It will be interesting to see what course of action the Jays take with Bautista this off-season. He’s arbitration-eligible in 2011 and then hits free agency. Bautista’s making $2.4 million this year, and early estimates of his arbitration award this winter are in the $6-$8 million range. Even with significant regression, Bautista is worth that sum. But would Toronto be best off shopping him this off-season, while his value is at its apex? I have a hard time believing GM Alex Anthopoulos won’t heavily consider that option. What do you think?