Archive for relievers

David Robertson and the Dangers of Reliever Volatility

Right-handed reliever David Robertson is earning $12 million per year on a rebuilding Chicago White Sox team that has little need for a high-priced closer. The Washington Nationals, meanwhile, might need a closer if they aren’t comfortable with internal options who, whatever their qualifications, lack proven closer experience. As a result, it isn’t surprising to find that the two teams have been discussing a trade. Robertson is owed $25 million over the next two years, a relatively reasonable fee given the cost of closers on the free-agent market. If the White Sox are looking to dump salary, Robertson might make sense for multiple teams, but if the Sox want prospects back, both Chicago and Robertson’s suitors might be better off waiting until July, even if the price for relievers is higher at that time.

From 2011 to -15, Robertson was one of the very best relievers in baseball. During that time, he averaged nearly two wins above replacement per season. The only relievers with a higher total WAR during that time frame were Aroldis Chapman, Greg Holland, Kenley Jansen, and Craig Kimbrel. That 2015 campaign, Robertson’s first with the White Sox, was also arguably the best of his career. He struck out 34% of batters while walking just 5%. A very low 66% left-on-base percentage gave him just a 3.41 ERA (compared to his 2.52 FIP), but the results were fine nonetheless. Entering the 2016 season, Robertson was again set to be one of the very best relievers in the game, earning a 1.9-WAR projection on our Depth Charts projection. The season didn’t go as well as expected.

Robertson put together a solid season, recording a good 3.58 FIP (82 FIP-) and a similar 3.47 ERA (82 ERA-). The result: a 1.0-WAR season, making him one of just a dozen full-time closers to hit the one-win mark last year. The results were good, but they represented a decline from his elite numbers the five years prior to 2016. His strikeout rate dropped from 34% to 28%; his walk rate more than doubled, up to 12%, after having remained below 9% since the 2011 season. Last season might be an outlier. It’s possible that Robertson return to form this year. It could be a new normal for Robertson going forward, though — or, worse, it could represent a decline that could continue into this season. The problem is that nobody really knows.

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Finding A New Market

When you are the 726th player drafted in a draft, your odds of making it to the major leagues are incredibly slim. Only two players drafted in that spot (and signed) in the history of the draft have donned a major league uniform: Milt Hill and Dane De La Rosa.  It took De La Rosa five seasons of pitching, in any league, to throw his first pitch above A-ball. That time frame included stints in places such as Yuma, Helena, Long Beach, and Victoria with stops in between. It also included a stop in the real estate market in 2006 trying to close deals on houses.

The Rays gave him another chance in 2010, and he finally reached the major leagues on July 20th, 2011. He went on to pitch 11 more games in Tampa Bay before being traded to the Angels late in the 2013 Spring Training season. De La Rosa went to the Angels as a pitcher that struggled to command his fastball.  Yet another new location for De La Rosa, but with it came a new approach to his craft.

In looking at video of De La Rosa from the past two seasons, he has made some minor tweaks to his delivery. The first changes come in his setup for his delivery (click all images to enlarge).

start2012 start2013

The first image is from 8/27/12 when De La Rosa mopped up a 13-3 blowout against Boston while the second one came in his second save of his career against his former team. The 2013 image shows that De La Rosa has changed where he starts on the rubber while also starting his hands a bit higher, and closing off his front side more than he did in 2012.

At the max lift portion of his delivery, he now resembles the man he was called up to replace on the roster in 2013, Jered Weaver.

2_2012 2_2013

De La Rosa has more bend in his back leg, has brought his hands closer to his body, and has more twist in his upper body as he shows his back to the opposing hitter. These adjustments allowed him to stay closed easier in order for him to open his hips up to come to the plate in rhythm with his delivery.

3_2012 3_2013

One of the thing that stands out in reviewing De La Rosa from 2013 is his increased velocity.

ddlrvelo

 

The data from BrooksBaseball shows that shows that the average velocity on De La Rosa’s four-seam fastball rose nearly each month of the season in 2013, continuing the trend that started in 2012.

Month Avg Velo
April 2012 92.2 mph
Sept 2012 93.2 mph
April 2013 93.7 mph
May 2013 94.8 mph
June 2013 95.7 mph
July 2013 95.6 mph
Aug 2013 95.6 mph
Sept 2013 96.4 mph

The data also shows that De La Rosa was throwing from a bit of a higher release point, which pitchers can use to add velocity while sacrificing horizontal movement. The increased velocity led to increased results. Opponents slugged just .277 against him last season, which was in the top tenth percentile of all relief pitchers that faced at least 200 batters in 2013. His Contact% as well as his opponents wOBA were both in the top-third of the same sample size. The improvements led to more success against right-handed batters as his swing and miss rate against those batters (35.5%) was higher than the likes of Koji Uehara (35.1%) and Craig Kimbrel (34.0%).

The Angels have had their issues in recent years harvesting pitching talent from their farm system, but they appear to have done quite well thus far here. They’ve turned an undrafted organizational middle reliever into an opportunity for a home town kid to go good. So far, so good.


Posnanski’s Radical Idea

Pretty much everyone loves Joe Posnanski, including me. But while “Poz” has been perhaps the most prominent advocate of objective analysis among “mainstream” sportswriters, few would call him a “radical.” His blog post today, in the aftermath of a series of Tweets and counter-Tweets regarding Matt Thornton’s appearance in last night’s All-Star Game, however, paints a different picture. While he doesn’t explicitly say so, Posnanski implicitly has a pretty radical idea about what sort of pitcher belongs (and does not belong) in the All-Star Game.

While acknowledging that Matt Thornton is a good middle reliever, Posnanski does

not want to see a middle reliever, no matter how good, pitch with the game on the line in the All-Star Game. I just don’t. I’m not necessarily overjoyed by the way managers use their staffs, but I know the realities of the game — managers put their best pitchers in the rotation, and they put their best reliever in the closer role, and they take the best of the rest (or the young pitchers they are trying to break in) and put them in middle relief. Some thrive in that role. And their value tends to be undervalued by everyone … including me.* But that doesn’t make it interesting in any way.

This is set up by this perfectly reasonable point:

Middle relief is a specialty position. It’s extremely important in day-to-day baseball, but, to me at least, the All-Star Game is not day-to-day baseball. It’s a game for the best. And in a league that has Lee, Liriano, Lester, King Felix, Verlander, Price, Greinke, Weaver, Sabathia, Pettitte and many other great, great starting pitchers, I’m sorry, I don’t want Matt Thornton pitching in the most important moment of the game. I don’t buy that having that “experience” of pitching the seventh inning with runners on is of great value, not in this kind of game. Give me the best pitcher.

Poz is right: we want to see the best pitcher out there, and we know that relief pitchers are generally relievers because they aren’t good enough to start. Yes, most fans would rather see Zack Greinke or Jon Lester than Matt Thornton — they are better pitchers than Thornton.

The “experience” point is also excellent, and pushes this idea over into the “radical” category. After all, if the “‘experience’ of pitching the seventh inning with runners on” isn’t important in the All-Star Game, then really, why would “experience of pitching in the ninth” be any different? The “experience” issue is a major part of the basis for modern closer “position,” one of the myths that sabermetric analysis has been debunking for a while. Closers do what they do because, just like every other reliever, most of them couldn’t handle starting for some reason or another. This gets at the heart of Posnanski’s implicit radicality: if we want to see the best pitchers, why should any relief pitchers make the All-Star Game?

If we agree with Posnanski that Matt Thornton isn’t good enough to pitch in the All-Star Game, which relievers are left? Among qualified relievers 2008-present, only two had a better FIP than All-Star Scourge Matt Thornton (2.50): Jonathan Broxton (2.13) and Mariano Rivera (2.36). Has Thornton been lucky on home runs? Here is an exhaustive list of qualified relievers with a better xFIP than Thornton (2.84) 2008-present: Broxton (2.32) and Rivera (2.57).

Of course, Rivera and Broxton are both “proven closers,” but even if you buy that load of “clutch” nonsense (you shouldn’t), as Posnanski pointed out, that kind of “experience” shouldn’t matter in the All-Star Game. In any case, leverage accounts for just how important the situations in which the pitcher has been placed in have been. Wins Above Replacement (WAR) helps us properly value “mere specialists” by incorporating leverage into their valuation as well as how much they’ve pitched. Since 2008, Matt Thornton has accumulated 5.9 WAR. Which relievers are ahead of him? You guessed it: Jonathan Broxton (6.9) and Mariano Rivera (6.4).

Maybe guys like Rivera and Broxton could make an appearance in the All-Star Game, if all the starters were used up or something, but hey, if we don’t want to see Matt Thornton, one of the most valuable relievers (middle or otherwise) in the game over the last few seasons, what’s the point of having relievers on the roster at all? Heck yeah, I’d rather see King Felix pitch than Matt Thornton. I hope Posnanski uses his prominent position to advocate for the position logically implied by his arguments.

However, I suppose in one way Posnanski should probably be happy that Matt Thornton was the reliever inserted into the game. Can you imagine the backlash Posnanski would have endured from Royals fans in his hometown of Kansas City if he’d tweeted about the silliness of Joe Girardi putting in Joakim Soria, someone Thornton has clearly outpitched the last several years?