Archive for Yankees

Moving right along on our look at the ten best offensive plays of the season, we find ourselves ensconced in a summer affair between the Yankees and Blue Jays, when Jason Giambi and his memorable moustache loomed large. On June 5th, Chien-Ming Wang squared off against Dustin McGowan in what turned out to be a huge come from behind win at Yankee Stadium. Though the Yanks got out to an early 2-0 lead, a Melky Cabrera error, a two-run single by Matt Stairs, and a two-run double from Lyle Overbay combined to give the Jays a 7-2 lead when the top of the fifth finally came to its close. From there, the game graph below beautifully illustrates what transpired:

The Yankees slowly inched their way back, scoring two in the bottom of the fifth on a Bobby Abreu groundout and Alex Rodriguez sacrifice fly. Now trailing 7-4, they held the Blue Jays in check in the top of the sixth, before a two-run homer off the bat of Wilson Betemit brought them within one run. The game remained 7-6 in favor of the Jays until the top of the ninth inning. Entering the frame, the Yankees had just a 17.1% probability of winning the game.

Alex Rios singled. Scott Rolen singled as well. Matt Stairs then uncorked a ground rule double, scoring Rios, and extending the lead to 8-6. At this juncture, the Yankees were reduced to a 3.4% probability of winning! Farnsworth went onto escape what had become a bases loaded jam without further damage, increasing the Yankees expectancy to a mere 10% on the nose.

BJ Ryan entered the game, looking for the save, and immediately retired Derek Jeter on a groundout. After Bobby Abreu lined out to centerfield, the Yankees had a 1.6% probability of winning this game. 1.6%! Alex Rodriguez then singled, and advanced to second base on a defensive indifference. Just 5.1% now. Hideki Matsui singled A-Rod home, cutting the score to 8-7, and doubling their expectancy to 10.4%. In stepped Jason Giambi.

This should have been Jorge Posada’s spot in the order, but he had been lifted earlier for pinch-runner Shelley Duncan. Giambi was coming off the bench to deliver in a crucial spot. With Matsui on first base, Giambi did just that, by launching a walkoff two-run homer into the stands. The Yankees would win the game, having just a 10.4% likelihood of doing so as Giambi entered the batters box. While the sixth biggest play of the season resulted in an expectancy swing of 83.0%, Giambi’s home run vastly exceeded Velez’s triple, with a WPA of .896; in other words, his home run increased their chances of winning by 89.6%.

Yankee Stadium may be no more, and this may have been the first year in forever that the Yankees missed the playoffs, but they had at least one extremely memorable moment this past season, and it happened to be the fifth biggest offensive play of the season.

Mike Mussina did not have too great of a season last year. He barely surmounted the 150 innings plateau even with 27 starts and a relief appearance. He fanned just 91 hitters, a 5.39 K/9, his lowest rate since 1994. Coupled with a 2.07 BB/9, Mussina’s 2.60 K/BB was his lowest since 1993. Surrendering 188 hits in those 152 innings helped produce a career worst 1.47 WHIP. Stranding just 66% of those baserunners resulted in all time high ERA of 5.15. With numbers like that and a fastball that struggled to touch 86-87 miles per hour, the end appeared to be rapidly approaching this potential and oft-debated hall of fame candidate.

There were some good signs, however, as the hits surrendered hinged upon an unusually high .340 BABIP. Additionally, despite 5.15 ERA, his FIP was a solid 4.01, which might not be the caliber of a #1 pitcher, but definitely what a team should be looking for in a #3-#4 guy. Entering this season, the Marcel projection system saw Mussina as a 4.53 ERA/3.95 FIP pitcher with a 2.83 K/BB and a 1.38 WHIP. His numbers were projected to regress a bit, but not all the way back to the Moose from the late 90’s/early 2000’s.

With a week left in the season, Mussina has made many forget about last season’s numbers as he has been a rock for the Yankees staff. In 32 starts, he has pitched in 189.1 innings, and while he has gotten hit around a bit to the tune of 207 hits surrendered and a .326 BABIP, his WHIP has dropped to 1.25. The major reason for this is his 1.38 BB/9, which happens to be the lowest of his entire career. Coupled with a nice 6.70 K/9, Mussina’s K/BB now rests at 4.86, one of the highest in his career. The strand rate has regressed to the league average 72%, and with the reduced amount of baserunners, period, this has helped him to a 3.57 ERA. His FIP of 3.38 suggests it should be even lower.

His fastball has gotten even slower this year, as he averages around 84-86 mph on his “heater” but something noteworthy is his change of rates on balls in play. His career rate of grounders is 43%, and from 2002-2007, it ranged from 40-43%. This year, however, he is at 48%. It is very tough to discuss Mussina right now without mentioning his hall of fame candidacy, so I will leave that for the comments section below, but if he were to retire following this season, going out on top so to speak, what do you consider his chances to be? Or does he need one more season like this to cement his place in Cooperstown?

Much of the talk this week surrounding the Yankees has centered on the final game at Yankee Stadium. It is natural for nostalgic love to kick in when something widely considered an historical monument reaches its last legs, but what many have not discussed thus far is how one of the players who calls the stadium home is in the midst of his best season to date. Yes, Mariano Rivera, the 39-yr old closer for the Yankees, the best postseason closer of all time and likely the best overall closer as well, is putting the finishing touches on a masterpiece of a season.

Someone his age, who throws virtually one pitch, will not usually improve as the years pile on, but what he has done this year is nothing short of remarkable. And, for the record, I will be able to show just how great this year is without ever mentioning his saves total. In 68.1 innings, Rivera has given up a measly 41 hits, just 4 of which are home runs. Get ready for his other controllable skills. He has struck out 74 hitters and issued just 6 free passes! 6! That is a 12.33 K/BB ratio. His WHIP is 0.69, and when you add in his two hit batsmen it does not get much higher.

With an 87.6% LOB, which could very well be sustainable for a closer of his ilk, Mo has an ERA of just 1.45 this year. His FIP suggests it should be around 2.06, but still, 2.06 is not too shabby either. His 1996 season was quite dominant as well, but he was still setting up John Wetteland at that juncture. Since 1997, when Rivera became the full-time closer, he has never been better than right now, as he is posting highs/lows in ERA, FIP, WHIP, BAA, K/9, BB/9, K/BB, and LOB.

Looking at his win based metrics, his 4.36 WPA ranks second in baseball amongst relievers to Brad Lidge, who by all accounts is also having a fantastic season. Rivera leads all relievers in WPA/LI, however. WPA is a better stat to look at for closers primarily because they are pitching in high leverage situations, and they are going to be judged by how well they perform in like situations. It would still depend on how often the closer gets to appear and in what situations, but suffice it to say, Rivera has been the best closer in the AL this year (sorry K-Rod), and only Brad Lidge is going to give him a run for his money in the entire sport. This may be the last year of Yankee Stadium, but its beloved closer is going out in style, producing the best closed season of his career… oddly enough, it will be the first time his team misses the playoffs since he took over the reigns.

Every now and again when I get a few free moments to myself it has become customary to check sites like Baseball Think Factory and see what is going on across the blogosphere. In the last month or two it has dawned on me that I end up reading about one article every other day discussing Mike Mussina and his chances of being inducted into the Hall of Fame. Writers present stats, discuss why they are good enough, play devil’s advocate to show why he might not get in, and then make some comparison to a pitcher either in/not in to prove their point.

He is currently in the midst of a very good season but, unless I’m mistaken, he mentioned in John Feinstein’s book (along with Tom Glavine) that this would be his final season. Perhaps his great pitching has changed his mind but I had thought this year would be his last.

Regardless, when I look at the Hall of Fame, one question surfaces: Can the story of baseball during the era in which this guy played be truly, accurately told, if we remove him? If the answer is yes, he doesn’t really belong in Cooperstown. That qualifying question discusses the impact a player had on the game on a very simple level; if someone was that important to the game then you would need to include him in some type of historical document or pamphlet when explaining the era to future generations. To me, that is what the Hall of Fame is and should be.

For Mussina, I’m not so sure the answer to that question is positive. And, even if it is, doesn’t the hesitance pointed in his direction say more than the numerous articles written about him?

Anyways, supposing he does find himself enshrined, on whom do you think he made the most impact? Orioles or Yankees? Here are his overall numbers and average seasons with each team. Be sure to note that his numbers with the Yankees are including his overall 2008 numbers using the in-season Marcel projection system.

Orioles: 10 yrs, 288 GS, 2009.2 IP, 3.53 ERA, 131 ERA+, 3.29 K/BB, .249/.293/.394
Yankees: 8 yrs, 247 GS, 1547.0 IP, 3.89 ERA, 113 ERA+, 3.99 K/BB, .261/.301/.406

Orioles: 29 GS, 6.98 IP/GS, 3.53 ERA, 1.18 WHIP, 47 BB, 154 K
Yankees: 31 GS, 6.26 IP/GS, 3.89 ERA, 1.21 WHIP, 40 BB, 158 K

The numbers on the Orioles tend to look a little bit better but on whom did he have the bigger impact? As in, if he gets inducted into the Hall of Fame, would it make more sense to see him wearing an Orioles or Yankees cap? When answering, try to think along the lines of the future and the question posed towards the beginning. For us, it’s very hard to break free from the current, and since we have seen him in pinstripes this entire decade they might be an easy choice… but if someone, fifty years from now, who had little knowledge of this era, were to learn about it and Mike Mussina came up, which team would it make more sense for him to represent?

Back on June 24th, Yankees second-baseman Robinson Cano had the Rafael Belliard-esque slash line of .227/.270/.325. He had been a huge disappointment and seemed to be in the midst of a big step in the wrong direction. After all, by the time his third season in the big leagues ended last year, it appeared that Cano might give Chase Utley a run for his money as the premier offensive keystone cornerman in the game. If we know anything about a player’s true talent level, though, it is that a player performing much, much worse than his pre-season projection through the first half is very likely to post much better numbers from that point on.

It should come as no surprise then that, since June 24th, Cano has produced a .359/.377/.573 slash line. He has never been one to walk much, finishing both 2006 and 2007 in the AL’s bottom ten in BB%, while currently ranking fourth lowest this year. His strikeouts, however, are occurring less frequently this year. After finishing out of the top ten lowest strikeout rates in 2006 and 2007 he currently has the fourth lowest rate.

Due to this he is putting balls in play at a higher rate this year and, whether a direct result or not, his BABIP has taken a serious hit. After coming in between .320 and .361 in his first three years, his current mark of .273 pales in comparison. It may not be significantly different from a statistics standpoint but the fact remains it is a big cause of his lower numbers. I initially thought this drop may be due to a lower rate of line drives, but he has actually hit them at a higher frequency this year; his groundball rate has dropped, though. Additionally, his flyballs have increased while his HR/FB has dropped; after ranging between 10.4% and 12.3% it is currently just 7.8%.

Plugging him into both of the in-season projection systems produces the following:

Marcel: 65-211, 6 HR, .310/.352/.486, .838 OPS
Total: 170-605, 15 HR, .282/.319/.429, .748 OPS

ZiPS: 62-213, 6 HR, .291/.332/.451, .783 OPS
Total: 167-607, 15 HR, .275/.314/.417, .731 OPS

While both project the same amount of home runs over the next 50-55 games, ZiPS has him posting a slugging percentage 35 points lower than the Marcel. Both seem to agree, though, or come relatively close to each other in the slash line and OPS departments when looking at his total seasonal line. Unless Cano absolutely destroys his in-season projection this is going to be a down-year for him, but he is not as bad as his current numbers would lead us to believe. Next year will be the test to see if he can bounce back or if this season is the beginning of an early downward trend.

Yesterday we looked at Mike Hampton and his many injuries, and so it only made sense to today take a look at another member of the FIP—Fraternity for the Injury Prone—Carl Pavano. Prior to the 2005 season Yankees GM Brian Cashman inked Pavano to a four-year deal worth around 39.95 million dollars. The signing came on the heels of two very solid seasons from the righty once traded for Pedro Martinez. Aside from W-L and ERA, Pavano had decreased his BB/9, WHIP, HR/9, BAA, BABIP, and FIP each year from 2001-2004, leading to a rise in his K/BB and LOB%.

Unfortunately, his K/9 also took hits in each of these years. All told, the Yankees looked like they might have been getting a good #4 starter albeit at a steep price. Now, at the end of that contract, the deal looks like one of the worst ever handed out, not just because Pavano’s pinstripes performance lacked quality for the most part, but because those performances were so few and far between.

Since signing with the Yankees, Pavano has made 19 starts, pitched in 111.1 innings, with an FIP upwards of 4.70. He missed the 2006 season completely, made just two of those nineteen starts in 2007, and Cashman seems to believe that he won’t recover from his latest surgery in time to pitch this year, meaning the Yankees would have paid 40 million dollars for 17 starts of below average pitching in 2005, and two relatively meaningless starts in 2007.

Pavano’s contract bothered the players, as well, never the more evident than in the book Living On the Black in which Mike Mussina scoffed at a contract offer from the Yankees that there was no way he would accept less money than Carl Pavano.

He also took criticism for withholding injury information from the Yankees, after breaking his ribs in a car crash. He didn’t tell the team until he was scheduled to come off the disabled list for a different injury. I cannot imagine how that conversation went down.

Cashman: Well, Carl, we’re activating you and will schedule you in the rotation.
Pavano: Oh wait, I forgot to tell you…
Cashman: (sighs) What now?
Pavano: I actually have broken ribs.
Cashman: How long have you forgotten to tell us?
Pavano: A few weeks.
Cashman: Were you planning on telling us?
Pavano: Well… not really… but now that they hurt alot…

What the future holds for this once promising prospect is yet to be seen, but just like Mike Hampton will likely forever be remembered for his injuries, Carl Pavano will likely go down in baseball lore as one of the worst retrospective contract signings in the history of the game. Since Pavano signed, he has made 19 starts… in that same span, Roy Halladay has 23 complete games.

This offseason there was much speculation that the Yankees were going to lose Alex Rodriguez, Jorge Posada, and Mariano Rivera to free agency. All three returned with shiny new contracts. Rivera, widely considered the greatest closer of all time, may be getting up there in age but his current stats would surely disagree.

Last year he experienced what was determined to be his “worst” season as a closer. In 67 games he posted a 3.15 ERA. Oh god that’s terrible! His ERA was the highest it had ever been as a closer and that, combined with his 4 blown saves and age resulted in many wondering what he had left in the tank. Well, he is off to a tremendous start this year and, by all statistical accounts, last year wasn’t as bad as the media made it out to be.

His 2007 FIP came in at 2.65, suggesting his ERA leaned on the unlucky side. He struck out 74 batters in 71.1 IP, walking only 12, which greatly aided his 1.12 WHIP. Additionally, he wasn’t throwing any slower—93.6 mph compared to 93.8 the year before. Take ERA out of the equation and what exactly did Rivera do wrong last year?

Anyways, back to this year. In 23 games Rivera currently has a 0.36 ERA, 1.32 FIP, and 0.52 WHIP. The FIP and WHIP are just about one-half of his 2007 totals. In 25 innings he has given up 11 hits and two walks while striking out 24. His BB/9 of 0.72 is the lowest it has ever been and he has stranded 92.3% of the runners that reach base; his career LOB% is 79.3%.

Batters are hitting just .135 against him with a .191 BABIP. Pizza Cutter discussed Troy Percival’s knack for posting low opponent BABIPs and Dave Studeman commented that it isn’t that unlikely for elite relievers to follow suit. Rivera’s career BABIP is .278 and, since 1997 (when he became the full time closer) he has held it under .280 in seven different seasons.

Rivera’s career rates of balls in play are 16.4% LD/54.2% GB/29.4% FB. This year, he is posting the same 16.4% LD but has traded in seven percent of his grounders for flyballs; flyballs that stay in the park as evidenced by his no home runs allowed.

Interestingly enough, Rivera’s gmLI, which measures the leverage index at the time of his entrance is 1.88, the highest it’s been since 2002. The difficulty level clearly has not phased him yet as his 2.49 WPA dictates a contribution of 2.5 wins in just 23 games.

Last year the Yankees struggled in the first half of the season and fought their way back into playoff contention. This year, it is no secret they are underachieving, prompting many analysts to question whether this will be the season in which the Yanks miss the postseason. In an attempt to determine what is going wrong with the team I turned to their team page and became fascinated with the numbers of Jason Giambi.

Believe it or not, Giambi is one of just three Yankees hitters with a WPA of at least 0.15; his 0.17 comes in behind just Hideki Matsui and Bobby Abreu. Additionally, he has a WPA/LI of 0.73, much higher than his WPA.

What will turn many fans off is his lowly .236 batting average. When put into perspective with the rest of his slash line—.236/.384/.516—it becomes clear that the batting average truly does not do his production justice. He has just 29 hits but 8 are doubles and 9 are home runs. Those 9 HR lead the Yankees and his 24 RBIs ranks second to Abreu.

Giambi has increased his BB% from a year ago and decreased his K% from 26 to 15. His LD/GB/FB rates were virtually identical in both 2006 and 2007, coming in at 16.4/30.2/53.4; this year he has BIP rates of 19.4/28.7/51.9. He is hitting more line drives and yet has just a .208 BABIP. We have talked here a lot about expected BABIP and how it works for hitters, so we would expect Giambi to be closer to the .314 range with this percentage of line drives. Now, this isn’t to say he will sustain 19.4% LD all season but that frequency should roughly correlate to the aforementioned BABIP.

Looking at Giambi’s numbers from 2002-2007, the only year in which his BABIP and xBABIP differed significantly was 2003; generally speaking, his BABIPs have been close to what his percentage of line drives would suggest.

What really interested me about Giambi is his shift in swing and contact percentages. He currently leads the league with the lowest percentage of swings at pitches outside the zone. Giambi has swung at just 9.9% of outside pitches, making contact on 51.7% of those swings. Last year he swung at 18.2% of the pitches outside the zone, likely contributing to his higher K%.

He has swung at 67.9% of pitches in the zone, making contact on 88.5% of them; the 88.5% puts him right in the 50th percentile. Overall, these swing and contact shifts have resulted in Giambi making contact four percent more often than a year ago. Giambi might not be the player he was five years ago, steroids or not, but his numbers seemingly absolve him from blame for the Yankees early struggles.

Without a doubt, Alex Rodriguez is one of the greatest baseball players of all time. He’s a hall of fame talent with a tremendous career behind him despite only being 32 years old. He’s got a shot at the all time home run record, is the highest paid player in the game, and plays on the biggest stage in baseball every night. However, despite all his ability and his impressive career performances, he’s also become the mainstream poster boy for an “unclutch” player. His disastrous performances in the 2005 and 2006 playoffs have been well documented, and he’s heard about his failures in the clutch for years, even if they weren’t always justified.

Well, if you take a look at the Win Probability leaderboard and sort by clutch performance, you’ll notice a familiar name currently posting the worst performance in high leverage situations of any hitter in baseball. Yep, there he is, again sitting atop a list that he’d rather never hear mentioned again. And, while it’s early, the ten plate appearances he’s had in situations where the LI has been greater than 1.50 show that he’s lived up to the reputation during the first two weeks of the season.

From his play log:

April 12th, Top 8, 2 out, 1st and 2nd, up 4-3: Alex Rodriguez struck out swinging
April 2nd, Bottom 9, 2 out, 1st and 2nd, down 5-2: Alex Rodriguez struck out swinging
April 3rd, Bottom 6, 0 out, 2nd and 3rd, down 2-1: Alex Rodriguez struck out swinging
April 14th, Top 8, 2 out, 1st and 3rd, down 8-7: Alex Rodriguez reached on an FC
April 3rd, Bottom 4, 0 out, 1st, down 1-0: Alex Rodriguez flew out to second base
April 13th, Top 1, 1 out, 1st and 2nd, 0-0: Alex Rodriguez grounded into a double play
April 1st, Bottom 4, 1 out, 1st, 1-1: Alex Rodriguez grounded into a double play
April 7th, Bottom 3, 2 out, 1st and 3rd, up 2-1: Alex Rodriguez reached on an FC
April 8th, Top 3, 0 out, 1st, 2-2: Alex Rodriguez struck out looking
April 1st, Bottom 7, 0 out, no one, 2-2: Alex Rodriguez singled to right field

It’s only ten plate appearances, but it’s ten fairly miserable plate appearances. Four strikeouts, two double plays, a couple of fielders choices, and a lone single. He made 11 outs in these 10 trips to the plate and lowered his team’s chance of winning by a combined 58.4%. So far, this season, Alex Rodriguez has been a problem when he had a chance to help his team the most. This fits right into the narrative that has been told about him for years.

However, I absolutely have to note that this is not a continuation of any real trend. Thanks to the addition of leverage splits on his Baseball Reference player card, we can see that A-Rod has actually performed better in high leverage situations over his career than he has in low or medium leverage situations. Over 1508 plate appearances with an LI of 1.50 or greater, Rodriguez has hit .307/.393/.590, marginally better than his career line of .306/.389/.578. That includes being a monster in high leverage situations last year, posting a .349/.439/.706 mark over 132 plate appearances.

No one should draw any conclusions from the first 10 high leverage at-bats of Alex’s Rodriguez 2008 season, especially in light of his career performances. I had to chuckle, however, when I checked out the clutch ratings this morning and saw a familiar name sitting at the bottom. I’m guessing this will be a moniker he’s going to have to fight his entire career.