The Rockies Are Wasting Their Stars
When we talk about teams not taking advantage of the best seasons of their stars, there’s no better example than Mike Trout and the Angels. You could make a 90-win team by simply building a .500 team around Trout, and yet the Angels have been able to do this only once with their center fielder. But they’re hardly the only team to fritter away the prime of top talent. Enter the Colorado Rockies.
The Rockies can hardly be called a grand failure on the field, having won 87 and 91 games in 2017 and ’18, making the playoffs in consecutive years for the first time in franchise history. But you could also argue that it’s a team that you can say underperformed those win totals, especially last year. The 2018 Rockies won 91 games, but that was with two legitimate Cy Young and MVP contenders; after successfully doing the hard part and finding legitimate stars, they’ve repeatedly failed to put a halfway competent team around those stars.
To illustrate this, here is team WAR from 2017, 2018, and 2019 (through July 29) outside of a team’s top two position players and top two hitters. As noted above, the Rockies have done as good job finding high-end talent as any team in baseball.
| Franchise | 2019 | 2019 Rank | 2018 | 2018 Rank | 2017 | 2017 Rank | Average | Total Rank |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dodgers | 22.8 | 2 | 36.9 | 2 | 35.4 | 1 | 31.7 | 1 |
| Yankees | 20.4 | 5 | 38.1 | 1 | 31.6 | 4 | 30.0 | 2 |
| Astros | 22.0 | 3 | 30.3 | 3 | 34.1 | 2 | 28.8 | 3 |
| Rays | 20.4 | 4 | 26.3 | 5 | 23.0 | 8 | 23.2 | 4 |
| Indians | 13.3 | 10 | 23.2 | 11 | 32.5 | 3 | 23.0 | 5 |
| Cubs | 13.5 | 9 | 25.5 | 7 | 27.4 | 5 | 22.1 | 6 |
| Red Sox | 17.9 | 6 | 25.5 | 6 | 22.4 | 9 | 21.9 | 7 |
| Cardinals | 11.1 | 15 | 24.8 | 10 | 26.3 | 7 | 20.7 | 8 |
| Twins | 25.2 | 1 | 15.8 | 16 | 20.6 | 11 | 20.5 | 9 |
| Athletics | 14.1 | 8 | 27.4 | 4 | 15.8 | 16 | 19.1 | 10 |
| Diamondbacks | 14.8 | 7 | 15.3 | 17 | 26.6 | 6 | 18.9 | 11 |
| Brewers | 11.4 | 14 | 25.0 | 9 | 19.6 | 12 | 18.7 | 12 |
| Nationals | 12.4 | 12 | 19.2 | 14 | 22.2 | 10 | 17.9 | 13 |
| Braves | 12.6 | 11 | 25.4 | 8 | 11.9 | 23 | 16.6 | 14 |
| Mariners | 8.2 | 20 | 19.9 | 13 | 17.4 | 15 | 15.2 | 15 |
| Mets | 9.7 | 18 | 12.6 | 23 | 18.8 | 13 | 13.7 | 16 |
| Pirates | 7.2 | 21 | 20.0 | 12 | 13.8 | 18 | 13.7 | 17 |
| Angels | 10.8 | 16 | 15.2 | 18 | 14.8 | 17 | 13.6 | 18 |
| Phillies | 8.9 | 19 | 17.8 | 15 | 11.9 | 22 | 12.9 | 19 |
| Reds | 11.6 | 13 | 12.8 | 21 | 10.0 | 25 | 11.5 | 20 |
| Rockies | 2.5 | 26 | 14.6 | 19 | 13.6 | 19 | 10.2 | 21 |
| Padres | 10.7 | 17 | 12.7 | 22 | 5.9 | 29 | 9.8 | 22 |
| Blue Jays | 3.0 | 25 | 13.9 | 20 | 12.1 | 21 | 9.7 | 23 |
| Rangers | 6.5 | 22 | 12.4 | 24 | 9.8 | 26 | 9.6 | 24 |
| Giants | 6.3 | 23 | 10.4 | 25 | 8.9 | 27 | 8.5 | 25 |
| Royals | 5.9 | 24 | 6.9 | 28 | 11.0 | 24 | 7.9 | 26 |
| Marlins | 1.9 | 27 | 1.8 | 29 | 18.7 | 14 | 7.5 | 27 |
| Tigers | -1.9 | 29 | 8.0 | 27 | 12.4 | 20 | 6.2 | 28 |
| White Sox | 1.8 | 28 | 9.6 | 26 | 4.7 | 30 | 5.4 | 29 |
| Orioles | -2.8 | 30 | -0.3 | 30 | 8.5 | 28 | 1.8 | 30 |
To make things a little easier, I’ve highlighted the playoff teams each year in orange. For 2019, I used the teams that would make the playoffs today because of, well, that whole not having a time machine thing.
Except for the Rockies, not a single team that was below-average in secondary talent using this definition made the playoffs. Relative to a league-average team, the Rockies have essentially given up 5 and 1/2 wins a year when it comes to this secondary talent, and an amazing 20 wins a year compared to the Dodgers.
In 2017 and ’18, this failing wasn’t enough to keep them out of the playoffs. But it was enough to cost the team the 2018 NL West title, forcing them into a risky Wild Card game. When the highs aren’t quite so high and lows even lower, it’s enough to push the Rockies out of the playoffs. Colorado’s secondary talent has combined for 2.5 WAR compared to the league average 10.7 WAR. With those eight wins, the team would be in the top wild card spot by a half-game right now. Instead, they’re 50-57, only closer to the playoffs than the Pirates and the Marlins in the National League.
Here’s another way to think about how the Rockies have failed to put together a complete team. For each season, I’ve added up each team’s replacement-level contributors.
| Franchise | WAR |
|---|---|
| Orioles | -17.7 |
| Rockies | -17.3 |
| Marlins | -15.2 |
| Giants | -14.4 |
| Tigers | -14.3 |
| White Sox | -14.0 |
| Rangers | -12.7 |
| Royals | -12.7 |
| Phillies | -11.5 |
| Pirates | -11.2 |
| Padres | -11.1 |
| Blue Jays | -10.6 |
| Nationals | -10.4 |
| Reds | -10.3 |
| Angels | -10.0 |
| Braves | -9.3 |
| Mets | -8.6 |
| Diamondbacks | -7.7 |
| Cardinals | -7.4 |
| Brewers | -7.4 |
| Red Sox | -6.8 |
| Yankees | -6.7 |
| Mariners | -6.6 |
| Dodgers | -6.1 |
| Indians | -5.8 |
| Athletics | -5.7 |
| Rays | -5.2 |
| Cubs | -4.7 |
| Astros | -4.5 |
| Twins | -2.6 |
Only the Orioles have gotten as much sub-replacement play as the Rockies. As you may have noticed, the Orioles are not a contender.
Coors Field provides some unique challenges for a franchise to deal with. The difficulty of playing in Coors, however, should be a reason for a front office to be more creative, bring in more people with outside-the-box ideas. Not only do the Rockies not think outside the box, they’re run like an ultra-conventional team from 1988, not like a franchise that absorbed lessons from baseball’s advances in the last 30 years. Teams care about things like getting on-base, and now have a better understanding of sunk costs, meaning that players at the bottom of the league don’t typically retain starting jobs for three years straight. Nor should it be the other teams that find the Corey Klubers and Max Muncys, and rarely the Rockies. The Rockies are failing not because they can’t develop talent, but because too often, they’re unable to find talent that’s simply below-average rather than sub-replacement.
In the end, Coors Field didn’t force the Rockies to make confusing signings of players like Gerardo Parra and Ian Desmond, nor did it force them to keep playing those players long after it was obvious they were non-contributors. Coors Field didn’t force the Rockies to only casually pick up a role player or two during two consecutive trade deadlines. Coors Field didn’t make the Rockies ignore their offensive problems offseason after offseason. And Coors Field didn’t make the team’s plan for rebuilding the bullpen “Let’s throw money at every veteran reliever we’ve heard of.”
I’m far from the only one to have noticed this; I’ve had discussions about this inside baseball on more than one occasion. And Ken Rosenthal got a pretty choice quote in his column today at The Athletic.
“The well-run teams are realistic and have a good feel for their talent and how it stacks up to their competitors,” one executive said. “The poorly-run teams do not.
“The Rockies are a great example. They thought they were building off a 91-win team (last season) without appreciating how fortunate they were and that their true talent was well below that.”
With the amount of young talent Colorado developed in the mid-2010s, there’s no reason why the Rockies couldn’t have become the mountain version of the Cubs or Astros. Instead, they’ve ridden this wave to nowhere, and are at risk of squandering the best run of player development in the team’s history. There’s still time to salvage this era, but it’s going to require a front office willing to make hard choices and ownership that’s willing to shell out cash for top free agents rather than overpay one-win players. The general manager attacking critics isn’t going to turn around this franchise.
Dan Szymborski is a senior writer for FanGraphs and the developer of the ZiPS projection system. He was a writer for ESPN.com from 2010-2018, a regular guest on a number of radio shows and podcasts, and a voting BBWAA member. He also maintains a terrible Twitter account at @DSzymborski.
You are going to really piss off Jeff Bridich and the rest of the homers at Altitude sports (Drew Goodman et al).
Keep up the good work!
Oh, this was just about 2019? I was expecting a full history of the team…
Wow. You could make an argument that the COL/LAA ownership has been differently-oriented but similarly-incompetent as BAL, MIA, etc…
The Pujols contract is often thrown around as a Reason, as well, but I wonder if, like Coors, it too is a scapegoat?
You couldn’t make that argument. There is a difference between coming up short and not trying to win at all.
The Orioles were trying to win as recently as last year
Their FA emphasis on spending money on bullpen and marginal older players is what confuses me. Coors/home DOES ultimately require that they zag while every other team zigs. And that in turn would presumably require more than a few mistakes before they get it right because even stats themselves are gonna be misleading when you are always the outlier. ‘Normal’ stats doesn’t do outliers well. But there’s plenty of ways to analyze outlier data more robustly.
At any rate, those mistakes should be of the ‘trying something different/new’ kind not your standard sort of mistake. And there don’t seem to be many of either that sort of experimental mistake or success.
In most years the Rockies rank top-3 to 5 in MLB in runs scored. I think management look at those figures and think they have a good offense.
Wouldn’t Marcus Stroman, a ground ball pitcher have been a good target for the Rockies?
IMO – there is no type of pitch/pitcher who is likely to succeed at Coors with the possible exception of Mexican League pitchers (half that league plays at mile-high or higher). More important than expecting success is finding pitchers who don’t let mistakes get to them. The other sides pitcher is gonna have the same problem so it’s more a question of outrunning the other team not outrunning the tiger. I don’t expect that’s a mental attribute that’s easy to find in any competitive pitcher who wants to dominate.
Personally I’ve long thought that they should have more of a home/road rotation schedule for their pitchers rather than some strict 4/5/6 routine schedule. Whenever they find the JDLRs who pitch well at Coors, then load up their innings there with longer time off on road trips and give them a long contract. That would save more innings on the road for the more traditional pitcher which would probably preclude all older ace types except short-term rentals in playoff type years. With the younger pitchers filling in the scheduling flexibility. It would mean doing something very different than everyone else.
The late 2000s Rockies teams didn’t have dramatic home/road splits from their pitching staff. One of the reasons they made the WS in ‘07 is because they pitched virtually identical at home as on the road (4.34 ERA at home, 4.29 away). It’s not impossible, but they have to find the right pitchers. Which usually means guys who won’t walk many batters.
Just using 2007 – the Rockies had a 4.34 ERA at Coors, the other team pitching there had a 5.64 ERA. That’s a massive home field advantage which presumably helped a lot in getting a 51-31 home record even if that mostly looks like bats did that. Same year, a 4.29 non-Coors ERA is slightly better than average but much closer to mediocre than playoff-indicator – which with the batting helps produce a 39-42 non-Coors record. IOW – it was the home record not the road record that got them in the playoffs.
I agree they can find those pitchers – Jeff Francis, Aaron Cook, JDLR. Probably one or two now but they’re still mostly young. And they only need two to cover a huge portion of Coors innings – with a bit of scheduling flexibility. But more likely than not, it’s a pitcher who’s deemed more ‘mediocre’ by other teams/saber than some ‘top of rotation’ type – and an internal developed rather than FA/trade. My point really being – when Rockies find those guys, leverage their innings towards Coors and give them the length of contract that ensures Rockies have a ‘secret sauce’ at Coors. It doesn’t solve the streakiness of road batting or the OF dimensions and fielding demands but those are easier issues too.
There is the possibility that WAR doesn’t equal wins. WAR is a very crude proxy for value. I do not think of COL as having a supremely talented roster or as a legitimate contender. There is also the reality that nobody has ever solved the pitching in COL or the home/road splits issue – this despite advances since 1988 haha. Playing half of your games in COL is probably just really bad for development. The solution to the problem may not be as simple as bringing in a bunch of people that don’t throw balls or swing bats.
You use the word “fail” a lot for a team that has consistently fielded a competitive team which speaks to your bias. Your progressive narrative is something that I find tiresome, but I am not your target audience. I get it – you think that people who don’t share your views are dumb. That is problematic thinking and best kept in moderation. The worst mistake COL has made is playing the same division as the Dodgers. I am not sure if the implication is that hiring a few more creative minds would put them consistently in the World Series – I have a feeling it wouldn’t.
Just… wow.
Honestly that comment started out ok, then just got worse and worse.
….you do realize that Fangraphs doesn’t write solely for you, I hope.
If you’re not the target audience and disagree with “progressive narrative”, there are many websites that cater to the narratives with which you might agree.
This has been the subject of much conversation on Fangraphs already, but it seems the Rockies are just really bad at spending money. They have a habit of paying guys in free agency way more than they should, and extending guys as though they were on the free agent market and receiving offers from someone else. Wade Davis was an incredibly risky deal, and Ian Desmond was widely recognized as a terrible deal from the jump. I don’t necessarily think the McGee and Parra deals were that bad based on what we knew at the time, but they really should have realized they needed to move on when the Parra deal turned out badly. Also, the issues with sunk cost.
But it’s also important to recognize that the player-development/scouting team has some real notches in its belt. Storey and Dahl have been good when they’ve been healthy, Marquez and Gray have been excellent, and as bad as Freeland has been this year he was a 4-win pitcher last year (using FIP, not using any B.S. ERA-derived value). That doesn’t mean they’re better than other teams, but I don’t think they’re that much worse in that department either. Maybe they have some problems getting position-player depth out of their system, but they’re far from the only team that has that problem.
I think it’s fair to recognize that a front office that doesn’t know what they have, makes terrible deals in free agency, and has an average-to-mediocre development/scouting squad is almost certainly one of the five worst front offices in MLB. The only one I can think of that is definitely worse are the Marlins. But we also kind of knew all this before. And this isn’t like the Dave Stewart front offices of yore, either.
You wrote before that the Rockies have a proprietary WAR metric that has them value players differently than the public does and most of the rest of MLB does. Yours and Dan’s point on “sunk cost fallacy” is perhaps most frustrating. The Rockies seem to produce plenty of good young players from their farm system but they continually give more at-bats and innings to guys they gave a lot of Free Agent money to who now stink.
Yeah, every team has their own proprietary WAR metric but my understanding is that theirs is quite a bit different than what we see here, and that is more true for this team than for any other team. Some of the negative value here is that it’s nearly impossible to put up a positive defensive WAR in that outfield, but my understanding is that they also think the park adjustment on offense is too blunt an instrument. I don’t really believe that the Coors Hangover Effect or whatever they call it is a big factor, but I do buy that maybe the park adjustment is adjusting for the wrong things in this case.
It’s still a bottom-5 front office, but I think they have figured some things out. Rockies fans can only hope that whoever is in the Rockies’ front office going forward can build off what they did.
I’m glad to hear that they are doing something very different re statistics. The first or maybe second thing I learned in Stats 101 was that outliers – and Coors is the mother of all outliers – screw up all normal distribution data and most of the common statistical techniques use normal bell curve type stats. A simple example being that median is a far more ‘robust’ (meaning resistant to outlier influence) measure of central tendency than mean. Public saber data will always be normal-based statistics – right down to the definition of ‘replacement level’ – and every other team in the league will find that good enough.
That’s true, but I think the more relevant thing here is that we’re dealing with an entirely different context. For a ballpark like Coors, which is both enormous and power-amplifying, we should expect to need to estimate things very differently than ballparks in the Great Lakes or the mid-Atlantic regions. A simple multiplier probably can’t account for a weird situation where the stadium has the dimensions of a power suppressing park but higher home run rates.
Agree. It’s a pitchers park at altitude – not a hitters park.
Super frustrating to watch Bridich continue to not get it.
I think whats become most apparent lately is that Jeff Bridich and the Rockies are one of those orginizations that other teams view as mediocre but they view themselves as a contender. They can’t keep deploying Ian Desmond on the regular and their rotation needs some proven help.
Something I think that’s legitimately worth considering: is winning a priority or maybe is intentionally not winning a goal?
For example the Desmond signing. I can’t thing of a single baseball reason that deal made sense. Was anybody else offering him anything close to that? Perhaps there was another reason (besides performance on the field) for giving him that contract?
But what are the downsides of winning or the positives of not winning that would justify this strategy?
Dan thanks for the pulling this data together and offering this insight. As a Rox fan I think the lights need to be turned on and Bridich and his FO need to be exposed for the incredibility poor job they have done. Wild card exit is as good as it will get with Bridich running the show.
Joe Harvey has walked 6.3 batters per 9 IP at the MLB level. Apparently that has some appeal for Bridich so he traded for him at the deadline.
Brilliant.