Two Thousand More Words About the Cole Irvin Trade

Kelley L Cox-USA TODAY Sports

There’s a simple maxim in the entertainment business, which we here at FanGraphs subscribe to: give the people what they want. You called for it (implicitly), and now you’re getting it: more discussion of the Cole Irvin trade! And hey, if that’s not what you want, you should have somehow broadcast your thoughts to me more clearly.

Here’s the overarching concept of today’s article: the total-’em-up-and-compare method of analyzing trades doesn’t really work, and in fact it hasn’t really worked for a while. I’ve got some criticisms of WAR-to-money conversions in here, too, and a general questioning of the way people apply the nebulous concept of surplus value to baseball players. Let’s get right into it.

In the comments to the Irvin piece, someone mentioned an angle that I purposefully ignored in my analysis: adding up Irvin’s projected team-controllable WAR and comparing it to the monetary prospect values Craig Edwards produced a few years ago. Subject to a few assumptions, that accounting of the trade favors the Orioles by a huge margin. Prospects in the 40+ FV tier, like Darell Hernaiz, don’t usually work out. Irvin will almost certainly be better than replacement level. If you’re intent on slapping a universal dollar figure on all players based on that, the Orioles almost can’t lose in this trade.

That’s not really how it works in real life, though. Teams don’t have a department that inputs projections, turns everything into some calculation of value measured by dollars, and then pursues trades and acquisitions based on the cold hard reality of that math and nothing else. The Irvin trade reflects this in a few ways, so let’s talk about them.

First, it’s quite clear that teams don’t value each WAR (by whatever conception of WAR you prefer) as being equivalent. Here’s just one simple example: Justin Verlander sports a 4-WAR projection in 2023 from pretty much whichever system you want to use. He got a contract worth $43.33 million annually. Rich Hill, Wade Miley, Michael Lorenzen, and Johnny Cueto combine to project for roughly 4 WAR as well. They signed deals worth a combined $29.5 million, and Verlander got a second year on his as well.

Even that is probably too kind to the all-WAR-is-equal crowd. Luke Weaver signed a $2 million deal this offseason. Ryan Yarbrough got $3 million from the Royals. If you’re a team trying to figure out what you’d need to pay Cole Irvin in free agency, some fixed exchange between dollars and WAR is a weird starting point. Use the actual market – I assume he’d get something in the Yarbrough/Weaver/Miley range, because they’re all similar pitchers.

That’s small potatoes, though. More relevant in all of this is the reason that fringe starters and their hitting equivalents have been getting squeezed all across the league. At some point in the past decade, teams have started to think about roster construction differently. It’s too simplistic to say that they’d rather play a 23-year-old over a 29-year-old even if the 23-year-old is slightly worse, but that’s the broad strokes of the issue.

More specifically, I believe that teams are taking a logical approach to the changing tides of player development. There are, simply put, a ton of capable players today. Teams are better than ever at quickly identifying which ones have the tools to succeed at the major league level, or at the very least the best chance of doing so.

A lot of this comes down to quantification. It’s a lot easier to scout your own system and figure out who your best players are if you can combine in-person looks and coaching with hard data. It’s easier to refine your evaluations than ever before, and teams are getting better and better at doing just that.

There’s more to the equation than just data, though. If you asked me what teams could take from financial markets 10 years ago, it wouldn’t have been some concept of unified value like WAR; it would have been a better understanding of volatility. Players get better or worse all the time, and not just their results: their talent level is hardly set in stone. Treating your organization like each player’s talent level is fixed isn’t the best way to get results.

If you were building a roster 15 years ago and in search of a swingman to handle, say, 10 starts a year and some medium-leverage relief work, you’d probably canvas your farm system to see if you trusted anyone to do it, then pivot to a veteran if you couldn’t find anyone. But if you had, say, four guys who weren’t quite up to snuff, the odds are pretty good that one of them would click and seize the role for you, if only you knew which one to pick.

Now that it’s easier to measure pitcher improvement quickly, it’s much easier to harness this volatility. The cost of carrying an established veteran on your roster isn’t just their salary; it’s also having fewer spaces to allocate to the pop-up players you might find in your system. It’s not so much that players didn’t improve unpredictably and sporadically before; it’s just that teams are picking up on those changes more quickly and planning around the likelihood of them proactively.

I can’t quite prove this, at least not yet, but I think there’s even more to it than that. It’s not just that a greater appreciation of volatility helps teams fill the back half of their roster. Having space for more volatile players gives you a better chance of finding something better than that. Players develop from back-end starters into mid-rotation starters all the time, and that’s the brass ring of player development.

If you can churn out average players like, say, the Cardinals and Rays systems seem to, that gives you a huge leg up on the opposition. Giving more major league playing time to those potential future solid players has value. The earlier in a player’s team control you figure that out, the better for the team (and honestly, for the player). That’s not to say that you should play a minor leaguer who posted some great measurables and might be interesting over your star shortstop, but over your fourth outfielder or fifth starter? That gets a lot more interesting.

How does this relate to Irvin? He’s squarely in that roster filler category, someone who will provide reliable innings without being a difference-maker. That limits his market in trade somewhat; he’s competing with not just each team’s fifth starter, but also the reinforcements they might call up during the season. It’s undeniably true that you can never have enough pitching, but teams are increasingly interested in hunting for upside while they do so.

That’s not to say that Irvin has no upside. More and more, teams are targeting pitchers who they want to work with, treating them as works in progress rather than just a bag full of WAR. That always should have been the case, and to some extent it always has been; for a while, though, we internet nerds just got very excited by the existence of a unifying measuring stick (WAR) and used it to equate players with similar production.

Again, though, data has helped teams streamline their operations. Now a pitching coach can target, say, a type of slider they’ve had success improving in the past, or identify pitchers who they think would benefit from a cutter formulaically. “Boy, I’m sure glad we got a pitcher projected for 2.1 WAR,” said no pitching coach ever. “His delivery makes me think he could throw a nasty sweeper” is more like it.

I’m not exactly sure what changes the O’s are hoping to work with Irvin on, or even if they have any in mind. I still think his breaking balls would benefit from more separation, particularly given the sweep-ier slider shape he debuted in 2022. But they’re an exception to the rule I was talking about above. The Orioles really do need pitching depth. The choice isn’t between Irvin and the minor leaguer that most jumps out to them; they’ll play both, and would likely be willing to play another Cole Irvin if that were an option.

In fact, the Orioles are replicating the bet-on-volatility strategy I described for minor leaguers, but at the major league level. Between Irvin, Kyle Bradish, Kyle Gibson, and Dean Kremer, the Orioles have plenty of acceptable-but-unexciting starting pitching options. They’re also more interested in competing in 2024 than 2023, which means they can weather some uninspiring performances this year in pursuit of figuring out their best possible rotation construction in a year’s time.

Maybe Gibson doesn’t fit well into that mold, but the other three do. None of Irvin, Bradish, or Kremer is a slam-dunk competent third starter, but maybe one of them will turn into one soon. The combination of a thin pitching depth chart and a team that is near contention but not quite there yet means that 2023 is a great year to try something like this.

There aren’t a lot of teams in the same situation as the Orioles. Most playoff contenders have fairly set rotations where Irvin would fit in as no more than a swingman. There are plenty of teams where he fits into the rotation, no question – but quite frankly, those teams mostly aren’t trying very hard to win games at the major league level right now. Their front offices are looking ahead, and they’re probably more interested in the Hernaiz side of the equation than the Irvin side.

The A’s, for example, are looking for the kind of volatility that Hernaiz provides. He probably won’t be a spectacular major league hitter – but he might be. It’s too soon to say; how he develops over the next few years will determine that. A 40+ Future Value is telling you more or less the same thing. That kind of profile suits the A’s purposes well. They badly need to find some new players who are both above average and young, and it doesn’t particularly matter what position they play (as long as it’s not catcher). Adding more players just means more chances to catch the right side of talent level volatility. Hernaiz isn’t a sure thing, but if you can find 10 players of a roughly commensurate talent level, one of them will surely break through.

That brings me back to the central idea I’m advancing here: using some cookie-cutter valuation metric misses the point. Teams consider their own context when they’re shaping their roster, whether via free agency or in trade. I wrote about the free agency side of it last year, but it’s worth reiterating in this context.

That’s not to say that teams don’t have quantifiable models of player value. It’s merely to say that a given player isn’t equally useful to all 30 teams, and that the simple framework of treating wins above replacement as fungible doesn’t do a good job of explaining how teams actually behave.

Models are useful, and I’m not an enemy of quantifying things. But there’s a garbage-in, garbage-out problem here. A quantitative model of player value that gets player value wrong is no better than not having a model at all. A variable formulation of dollars-per-WAR might help, but it would still be incomplete. I’m not saying that appeal to authority is the only option here – teams make bad trades all the time – but context really is everything. I’m not surprised that the Orioles were able to land Irvin for Hernaiz, and I’m not surprised that Oakland was game to make that trade given the general trajectory they’re on.

Maybe this article is overly rambling. Probably it’s overly rambling, in fact: I sure have squeezed a lot of words out of a minor trade. I think the central point is solid, though. Teams are thinking more about making the most of their prospects’ development, and they consider the context of their roster when looking for new players rather than using some universal, context-neutral valuation model.





Ben is a writer at FanGraphs. He can be found on Bluesky @benclemens.

23 Comments
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sadtromboneMember since 2020
3 years ago

“There are, simply put, a ton of capable players today.” Which is why we need a 36-team Major League Baseball! We have too many 1-win players out there, probably two hundred more than can fit on 30 teams. You expand by 6 teams, those 1-win players get to make it to the show.

bglick4
3 years ago
Reply to  sadtrombone

Absolutely. Every team now is digging up talent all over the world. This is a really good thing for us fans, but it also means the talent pool is expanding and the league needs to expand to match. Let get a team in Nashville, Charlotte, and another in Texas and New York.

Last edited 3 years ago by bglick4
sadtromboneMember since 2020
3 years ago
Reply to  bglick4

And Vancouver and Las Vegas!

Mahoney
3 years ago
Reply to  sadtrombone

Whether it’s 32 or 36, I think the next round of expansion should bring about a realignment into four divisions heavily based on geography, trying to keep teams in their current league as a secondary factor. Then play an unbalanced schedule in each league, with minimal interleague play if any, to keep travel costs and fatigue as low as possible.

With a greater geographic spread west and south than ever before, this should be an opportune time to do this.

Last edited 3 years ago by Mahoney
rosen380
3 years ago
Reply to  Mahoney

Well let’s try it:

Northeast: Red Sox, Mets, Yankees, Phillies, Blue Jays, Pirates, Guardians, Tigers

South: Marlins, Rays, Braves, Nationals, Orioles, Rangers, Astros, Charlotte (expansion)

Central: Rockies, Royals, Cardinals, White Sox, Cubs, Twins, Brewers, Reds

West: Mariners, Giants, A’s, Dodgers, Angels, Padres, D’Backs, Portland (expansion)

I could see the Rockies feeling that they are at a disadvantage due to travel (and maybe the Rangers and Astros), but there is only so much you can do with the teams that are pretty isolated.

I picked Portland specifically to close the gap between Seattle and the rest of the West and Charlotte to better tie the Orioles and Nationals to the Southeastern teams.

What if for the teams that would have significantly more travel you gave them longer series? If interdivisional would be 14 games against each other team, maybe those extreme teams would get one *seven* game series at their divisional rivals, while others would just stick with the normal 3/4 game series?

HecubotMember since 2022
3 years ago

Excellent piece! Really digs into the logic of such a trade beyond WAR exchange, with great insight into capturing volatility and betting on it.

uncasf1Member since 2022
3 years ago

Enjoyed this article. As an Oakland fan I sure hope there is a breakout or two in all the players they traded for. Right now it looks like a lot of mediocrity but then patience is a virtue for a suffering A’s fans. If only we could unload the owner in a trade…

Roger McDowell Hot Foot
3 years ago

To make an even dumber and more obvious point than the many other fine avenues for exploration discussed here, even if you stick with a completely $/WAR surplus-value-driven evaluation framework, it makes sense to consider present value and future value as separate items that it’s appropriate for two teams at different places in the cycle* to value differently. This is something a number of the comments on this trade seem to have missed — a team that is going to stink this year and a team that isn’t are going to want their $/WAR packaged very differently.

* This is another thing that probably doesn’t exist the way the online saber consensus thinks it does

sadtromboneMember since 2020
3 years ago

I think this is true, but it might be less true in this specific case because Irvin was under team control for another 4 years.

Unless we think the A’s are planning to still be bad in 4 years…oh no…

Roger McDowell Hot Foot
3 years ago
Reply to  sadtrombone

They’d obviously still prefer to take his next four years’ worth of “value,” however defined, and push more of it to future years, rather than spreading it evenly over 2023-26. Even if they plan to be a World Series contender in 2026, it’d still make a reasonable amount of sense to try to take delivery of more “value” at a future date rather than starting now, when they know for certain they don’t need it.

David GreenMember since 2021
3 years ago

“They badly need to find some new players who are both above average and young, and it doesn’t particularly matter what position they play (as long as it’s not catcher). Adding more players just means more chances to catch the right side of talent level volatility. Hernaiz isn’t a sure thing, but if you can find 10 players of a roughly commensurate talent level, one of them will surely break through.”

From the A’s point of view this is the important point. Irvin is fairly easily replaceable. So, if the team can trade him for a prospect who may pay dividends in a couple years it’s worth it.

Thank you for the article.

tung_twista
3 years ago

Another great article by Ben proving great sports writers don’t need great players as inspiration.

As you mentioned, many serious contenders don’t have room for Irvin on the rotation, but more importantly, no serious contender wants to start Irvin in a playoff game. While some back-end starters can be utilized as useful bullpen arms during the postseason, a low velo, low K pitcher like Irvin does not fit the bill. That severely limits his trade value especially with expanded playoffs.
It is the flipside of how a 4 war starting pitcher is more valuable than a 4 war position player during playoffs.
A 1 war starting pitcher is less valuable than a 1 war position player during playoffs.

Ron Flattery
3 years ago
Reply to  tung_twista

Basically every single playoff team had a player with similar numbers to Irvin in their rotation. Some teams had multiple 4.00+ era guys in rotation. LAD is the only team that didnt have a starter with 120+ innings and an era over 3.85.

fanofthemanMember since 2020
3 years ago

This is phenomenal, Ben. Probably my favorite piece I’ve read by you in a long time, though there’s some incredible completion for the top spot. This concept makes intuitive sense and your extension of the logic into the questions of how to decide who to sign was really excellent.

It’s got me wondering about quantifying this. I wonder if checking the distance between zips 20 and zips 80 would yield any interesting trends in how different franchises value volatility, or if you could do that type of analysis on puzzling recent trades to see that one team valued the volatility in a way that another didn’t. I think I remember some conversations of that in the Emmanuel Klase/Corey Kluber trade?

Anyway, this type of stuff is a reason why you’re the best baseball writer still publishing, in my opinion.

GoodEnoughForMeMember since 2018
3 years ago

This reminds me a bit of Jeff Sullivan’s old point – “every player’s ceiling is Jose Altuve.” Everyone in the majors is a freak of talent, and while there’s variation still, everyone’s 90th percentile projection is really, really good. Most don’t get there, but anyone who is a volatile unknown could be Altuve. Altuve himself looked nothing the part of an allstar; short and stocky and not super athletic. But it all worked out and he hit the top of his development curve. I think that’s why teams are more open to volatility and are constructing teams that way; run enough players out there and eventually one or two will hit their 90th percentile, and you have a much better chance of finding that by trying 8 players on the back end of your roster as opposed to 3.

Original Greaser Bob
3 years ago

There’s a simple maxim in the entertainment business, which we here at FanGraphs subscribe to: give the people what they want.

LOL

airforce21oneMember since 2026
3 years ago

“A 40+ Future Value is telling you more or less the same thing. That kind of profile suits the A’s purposes well.”

How about an article that shows us exactly how, historically, 40 FVs (and others) actually have turned out?

deaconbluerayMember since 2025
3 years ago

I think the points you make about a player like Hernaiz are inherently clear when you look at BTV’s player valuations. I don’t know the rate at which those values are updated during the season, but I bet a hot month from a young prospect can greatly alter what BTV assesses. Additionally, I’m sure every MLB team has a distribution of possible outcomes for every player in the minor leagues it finds interesting, based on their own player valuation variables.

I liked this line from your piece most of all: “A quantitative model of player value that gets player value wrong is no better than not having a model at all.” When you’re dealing with 20 year-old men from every possible background, getting that young player’s value anywhere close to right is a pretty tough feat to pull off.

Mahoney
3 years ago

Great article (as usual) Ben!

One thing about the O’s side of this deal is that Irwin fits the “low ceiling, high floor” bill in an area they need, and I think there’s a real value for teams that want to be in the postseason mix. If you’re relying too much on higher ceiling/lower floor talent for key roster spots, you can put yourself in a deep hole if the bottom falls out on too many players’ floors.

That’s why the Angels had no business banking on a Matt Duffy comeback or a breakout from Jo Adell or Andrew Velazquez while trying to contend last year. It’s also why spending the offseason loading up on high-floor veterans makes all kinds of sense for them.

On the other hand, the A’s really need to tack on as many high-ceiling guys as possible, which is why this deal made sense from their end.

DLHughey
3 years ago

Thank you.

The people who worship at the altar of that Craig Edwards piece and any universal $/WAR are the people who aren’t thinking hard enough about this. Frankly, internet nerds, including writers and commenters here, spent way too long being obsessed with $/WAR, assigning dollars to prospect valuation, and financial efficiency, to the detriment of actually understanding what teams were doing and why they’re doing it. The trade value series is the embodiment of this as well, as entertaining as it may be to read.

Plugging trades into some transaction analysis website and saying “wow, the Orioles won because of estimated $/WAR or because Craig said a 40 FV is worth x” is beyond oversimplifying the situation.

Fun-Hating DorkMember since 2019
3 years ago
Reply to  DLHughey

Those tools are interesting starting points for conversation and additional analysis — they do help to make some sense of the situation for different teams in a way that oversimplifies some details to give a generalized picture.

As per usual, the problem becomes when those models are viewed as an end unto themselves.

Roger McDowell Hot Foot
3 years ago
Reply to  DLHughey

One instance of many in recent years where a toy model, fun and interesting to play around with if you understand its limitations, gradually starts to be taken much too seriously. The Hall of Fame tests in Bill James’s Politics of Glory are a similar case, where James himself was ultra-clear that they were “toys” but eventually (largely because of their inclusion on Baseball-Reference player pages, I think) people started to act like they were much more meaningful and serious. This happens to some extent outside sports-world too, with stuff like economic statistics or a lot of what recently gets called “AI,” but it’s absolutely endemic in online saber/baseball-nerd circles.

mayntrpt
3 years ago

The A’s cynical strategy of trading deliberate current losses for bogus promises of future wins gets a little reinforcement here.

Every team in MLB has an obligation to its fanbase to put a competitive team on the field in 2023. The A’s would have such a team right now had they simply retained the good players they’ve jettisoned over the last two years.

What’s the point of even talking about whether Hernaiz will turn out to be a useful player? They’ll just dump him like they did Irvin in the unlikely case that happens.

Baseball needs a salary floor.