Archive for 2008

Like most recent off-seasons, there’s no shortage of injury prone starting pitchers hobbling around for another gig. Over the next week I’m going to look at a few of the more intriguing options to see what teams should expect and whether a signing would be a wise investment. Since poster boy Mike Hampton is off the market, we’ll instead begin with the “new era” Hampton, former Yankees pitcher Carl Pavano.

When Pavano signed for four years and roughly 40 million in December 2004, the Yankees expected Pavano and fellow free agent signing Jaret Wright to transform their lacking rotation. Although there was no way of knowing at the time, Pavano would only make a total of 30 starts for the Yankees. Pavano was fresh off back-to-back 200+ innings seasons, a sixth-place finish in the National League Cy Young voting, an all-star appearance, and a pretty win-loss record that mystified the New York media.

A myriad of injuries would strike Pavano, beginning with shoulder tendonitis in July 2005 that effectively ended his season. Back strains, forearm tightness, elbow surgery, and just about any other injury you can name kept Pavano out in 2006 and most of 2007. Pavano would make his return from surgery in August 2008, starting seven games without much success.

Pavano has always relied heavily on his fastball, throwing it more than 50% in each of his past three seasons, including 63.5% in 2005. Unfortunately, it appears he’s lost a few ticks since then, with his average fastball coming in just shy of 88, rather than 90. A mixture of sliders, changes, and split-fingered fastballs make up the other 40% of Pavano’s pitches. While Pavano was never much of a strikeout pitcher to begin with, his per nine ratios should exceed 2008’s 3.93. It’s worth noting that Pavano’s swinging strike rates were on par with his 2005 totals, that indicates that at least some of the stuff that made him successful is still there.

Generally, the question that needs to be answered in cases like this concerns the percentage of playing time (or number of innings) makes this player a wise investment. For that, we turn to Marcels. The monkey has Pavano pitching 78 innings with a 4.60 FIP. That is an optimistic projection and one not completely based in reality, considering Pavano hasn’t thrown that many innings combined since 2006. For the sake of argument, if Pavano does reach such a point he’ll be worth roughly a win over a replacement level starter, and if he can give a team 100 innings around his career FIP (4.21), he’ll be a worthwhile pick-up out of the junkyard.

According to the always reliable New York Post, CC Sabathia has signed with the Yankees. The rumored offer of 6/140 apparently turned into 7/160.

We looked at CC’s value a month ago and determined that he was a +5.5 win pitcher for 2009. That means the Yankees are paying $4.15 million per win for Sabathia – significantly less than our projected $5 million per win, which was based on an assumption of salary inflation. It’s less than what teams were paying per win last year, when a win was going for about $4.4 million on the open market. His contract is basically the same as Johan Santana’s, but Johan wasn’t a free agent.

This deal makes the Yankees a better team, yada yada yada. You’ll hear all kinds of people talk about how this deal impacts New York. For me, the more interesting development stemming from this contract is that it cements the fact that we’re going to have an off-season of salary deflation, in terms of cost per win, for the first time in a long time. If ever there was a case where we could have expected an overpay in terms of dollars per win, it’d be with the premier free agent pitcher on the market and the Yankees in the bidding.

So, now, this offseason, we’ve seen the following signings:

Francisco Rodriguez: +2 wins, $12 million per year – $6 million per win
Edgar Renteria +2 wins, $9 million per year – $4.5 million per win
Ryan Dempster: +3 wins, $13 million per year – $4.3 million per win
CC Sabathia: +5.5 wins, $23 million per year – $4.2 million per win
Jeremy Affeldt: +1 win, $4 million per year – $4 million per win
Casey Blake: +1.7 wins, $6 million per year – $3.5 million per win
Bob Howry: +1 win, $3 million per year – $3 million per win
Mike Hampton: +1 win, $2 million per year – $2 million per win
Adam Everett: +1 win, $1 million per year – $1 million per win

Last year’s rate was $4.4 million per win. Renteria got something close to that, as did Sabathia. K-Rod got a bit more. Everyone else has signed for less.

The assumption of inflation has to be thrown out the window. This is a stagnant market at best – teams just aren’t paying $5 million per win this year. Assuming the economy rebounds somewhat in the next 12 months, I have a feeling that 2008 will be viewed much like 2003, when Vladimir Guerrero got $75 million for five years and everyone instantly asked themselves how the Angels got such a steal.

2008 looks to be the year of the buyer.

Every year, a wide array of free agents hit the open market. Some are fantastic players entering their first eligible year. Others are role players primarily relied upon to round out a roster. So far this season, we have primarily seen deals involving the latter type of player. The cream of the crop—CC Sabathia, Mark Teixeira, Derek Lowe, and A.J. Burnett—are all yet to sign. Fully aware of their status in this year’s free agent class, these four seem to be perfectly content waiting for the absolute best deal as opposed to jumping at sweet initial offers.

Sabathia has been offered an extremely lucrative deal from the Yankees, and the Brewers appear to be working on inserting an opt-out clause after three years to sweeten their own proverbial pot. Teixeira is under 30 years old and a +5 WAR player even with the positional adjustment at first base. As Dave noted in his valuation, players like this don’t hit the market that often. Lowe is the elder statesman of this group, yet still appears to be very effective and heavily pursued. According to reports, it seems Lowe’s representatives have spoken to half of the league already. Burnett opted out of his own contract this season, and is standing pat on getting a five-year deal.

While Burnett is standing pat, the other three are somewhat interlocked. Sabathia has mentioned specifically that he is not waiting to see where Teixeira signs before making his decision. Despite this contention, one has to wonder if certain teams pursuing both players could commit an average annual value of $16-22 mil or so to both. Sabathia might not be waiting on Tex, but the decision of one definitely has the potential to affect where the other one signs.

On top of that, Lowe has made it clear that he will wait until CC signs before inking his own deal. Lowe isn’t going to cost as much as Sabathia, but once CC signs, will be the most attractive starting pitcher on the market. Signing now, prior to Sabathia, could actually cost him money; even though, no matter what, he is still rather likely to sign a deal with an AAV of close to $14 mil. And if Sabathia continues to make the Yankees and their $9 gazil offer wait, the stocks of both Burnett and Lowe will rise in their eyes.

Off-season signing triangles such as this have happened before, and will happen again, but it is still fascinating to cover the goings on every day. One player begins to look better because another player is being patient, and where another signs could adversely affect the plans of the other two. Today, things got a little clearer, as Sabathia reportedly signed with the Yankees. How will his $140 mil deal over six years affect the rest? The Phillies and Yankees were previously considered Lowe’s frontrunners, but will New York back off, or at least not pony up as much now? And if the Nationals give Teixeira an 8-yr, Helton-esque deal, could he turn it down despite their poor standing as a franchise?

A continuation of the series of retrospectives looking back at the regular season and how teams fared. They will be presented, from first to last, in order of their run differential as given by the BaseRuns formula and adjusted for strength of schedule, which I feel is the best measurement of a team’s actual talent level.

Number Twenty nine: Pittsburgh Pirates

By BaseRuns, the Pirates managed just above 700 runs scored which actually wasn’t too poor for the National League, about 20 to 25 runs below average. However, it was on the the defensive side that the Pirates became the Pirates that we have known for the past fifteen or so years. At an estimated 894 runs allowed, the Pirates were 60 runs worse than any other National League team and ahead of only the Texas Rangers in all of baseball. The 191 run spread between their runs scored and allowed was the worst in all of baseball, 22 runs worst than the Nationals.

The Pirates outfield went bonkers this season as Jason Bay, Nate McLouth and Xavier Nady went from 14 runs above average to 66 in 2008 for the Pirates, which given that both Bay and Nady were traded mid-year to the Red Sox and Yankees respectively makes the improvement even more significant. Ryan Doumit helped chip in some good production out of the catcher position. Of course, that leaves the infield as the primary cause for the Pirates offense being below average.

The bullpen in 2007 benefited from good contributions from Matt Capps and Damaso Marte and while they both stuck around and were both still above average in 2008, they lost about a win and a half in value. Their supporting cast did them no favors, specifically Marino Salas, Evan Meek and Franquelis Osoria were collectively in the range of 23 to 30 runs below average.

As poor as the bullpen was, it was the rotation that torpedoed the Pirates hope for breaking the consecutive streak of below .500 seasons. Zach Duke rebounded from his disastrous 2007 campaign, but that was of little solace when Ian Snell and Tom Gorzelanny completed collapsed, leaving the Pirates with Paul Maholm and little else capable of posting even respectable lines.

The Pirates have some promise in their system, but much like the Giants, any hope of contention in the near future is going to hinge on their young group of starters fulfilling their promise. A hope that looks especially dimmer after a bleak 2008.

Francisco Rodriguez inked a three-year deal (with a fourth year option) with the Mets earlier today, but he is not the only closer that will wear a new uniform in 2009. Kerry Wood, who will likely forever be linked to the Cubs, reportedly signed a two-year deal with the Indians. The deal should be announced tomorrow, and once it is, just about everyone from the Bartman era will be gone. Wood will take over the closer’s role, which should offer some stability in the least. Last year, Joe Borowski struggled and was eventually released. Jensen Lewis then filled in for the remainder of a disappointing season for the Indians.

The exact details of the deal are not yet known, so this analysis will essentially be a work-in-progress, but we can definitely see what Wood should earn — his fair market value. In many ways, this signing is the opposite of K-Rod’s, in the sense that we have to adjust Wood’s projected FIP to be slightly higher, given the offensive superiority of the American League.

Marcel projects Wood at a 3.51 FIP over 61 innings. Moving to the junior circuit, though, a bit more should be tacked on. Let’s call him a 3.65 FIP pitcher in 61 innings. If a replacement level AL reliever is a 4.75 pitcher, than Wood is going to save a little over one run per nine innings. Extrapolated over the full 61 innings, Wood would be about eight runs above replacement level. The high leverage of his innings pitched then needs to be taken into account. Eight runs multiplied by an average LI of 1.8 comes out to +14 runs. According to these calculations, Wood would be worth a little less than one and a half wins next season.

1.4 wins * $5 mil/win equates to $7 mil. Wood’s fair market value would roughly call for a 2-yr/$14 mil deal. Last season, his base salary was $4.2 mil, though with incentives taken into account he earned just under $8 mil. We will have to wait and see what exactly Kerry signed for, but my initial inclination is that it will be more lucrative than an average annual value of $7 mil. As more details become available, we can determine just how much he was under- or over-valued, or if he was valued properly.

Then again, if he gets hurt, as has been customary for Mr. Wood, this all goes down the drain.

The prospect most impacted by the Ramon Hernandez–Ryan Freel trade was not directly involved in the transaction. By trading Hernandez to the Cincinnati Reds, the Baltimore Orioles all but signaled that top prospect Matt Wieters will be entrusted with the starting gig in 2009.

Currently, the Orioles’ 40-man roster does not even include a catcher with Hernandez traded and 2008 back-up Guillermo Quiroz recently designated for assignment. Wieters, the top catching prospect in all of Major League Baseball, does not have overly big shoes to fill. Hernandez managed a line of just .257/.308/.406 with a wOBA of .310 in 463 at-bats in 2008. Quiroz hit just .187/.259/.269 with a wOBA of .242 in 134 at-bats.

In his first professional season after signing as a first-round draft pick out of Georgia Tech in 2007, Wieters dominated the minor leagues with a .345/.451/.576 line in 229 High-A at-bats. He then carried that hot stick to Double-A where he hit .365/.463/.625 with an ISO of .260 in 208 at-bats. The 22-year-old catcher also showed excellent plate discipline with rates of 15.4 BB% and 13.9 K%. His wOBA at Double-A was .466. The switch-hitter performs well from both sides of the plate and posted lines of .382/.446/.740 against southpaws and .341/.455/.543 against right-handed pitching.

Defensively, Wieters is an excellent handler of pitchers, he is a leader on the field and he threw out 32 percent of those trying to steal against him in Double-A. Unfortunately, at 6’5” and 230 lbs he may outgrow the position. Regardless, Wieters has the potential to be the next big marquee name in Baltimore – somewhere between Nick Markakis and Cal Ripken. There are not many players – let alone catchers – with Wieters’ combination of power, ability to hit for average, understanding of the strike zone, leadership and defensive prowess.

From the Reds’ perspective, this trade provides some insurance in case over-aged rookie Ryan Hanigan is unable to handle the full-time catching role. The 28-year-old performed well in 2008, but he has just 95 career at-bats at the Major League level. The club also has Wilkin Castillo on the 40-man roster, who was acquired last season from the Diamondbacks in the Adam Dunn trade, but he is better as a jack-of-all-trades utility player and third string catcher – and he could also benefit from some more minor league seasoning.

Throughout the baseball off-season, much focus is directed towards where the big name players will go. Will CC Sabathia sign with the Yankees? Do the Angels have enough to retain Mark Teixeira? Where will Derek Lowe end up? And who will give A.J. Burnett that elusive fifth year?

Then there are the lesser discussed moves, usually involving role players like Mark Loretta and Casey Blake. These players definitely add value to a team, generally sign for a fee lower than their fair market value, and help round out a roster.

After that, we have what I like to call “wonder trades” primarily because they really make us wonder either a) what was/were the GM(s) thinking? or b) what is the point of this trade? Now, I cannot speak for Walt Jocketty’s reasoning for pulling the trigger on this trade, but the swapping of Ramon Hernandez (and $1 mil) for Ryan Freel (and two prospects) definitely feels like it fits either part of the above definition.

For starters, I can understand that the Reds have a need for a catcher. Paul Bako and Javier Valentin are both currently free agents, meaning they either needed to acquire a veteran or use a prospect. What I don’t get, however, is how they took a look at Hernandez’s projected production and salary, and determined that he was the best fit. Or, for that matter, why trading for him made more sense than re-signing Valentin to a two-year deal. Hernandez is slated to hit .259/.323/.410 in 2009, with a .320 wOBA. Based on his numbers, he would be worth -5 runs below average offensively. It is very tough to quantify catching defense, but I would tend to think he is somewhere in the -5 runs below average range. Factor in his positional adjustment and adjustment for comparison to replacement value and we are looking at a potential +2 win player.

Valentin is projected to be -4 runs below average offensively, and I cannot imagine that he is so significantly worse behind the plate than Hernandez that the difference between the two would be extremely substantial. Combine the two projections and we see that Valentin is likely to produce along the same level as Hernandez. Add in that Hernandez is owed $8 mil in 2009 while Valentin would likely cost below $5 mil and this starts to look very odd.

Then we have Ryan Freel, a sparkplug utility fielder who talks to an imaginary voice named Farney. Freel has had several off the field issues, isn’t a particularly good hitter, but has a reputation for being a great fielder from making some great plays over the years. It is very tough to quantify Freel’s fielding because of his utilityness. With such small samples at several positions, it isn’t exactly clear what his true talent level will be. I cannot imagine he will be a starter with the Orioles, but rather a defensive replacement or spot starter. Normally, he would likely project to be an average corner outfielder, but if he serves as a defensive replacement in centerfield and pinch-runner, his value may actually increase; he wouldn’t be batting much.

Regardless of what Freel brings to the table, this trade just does not make sense to me for the Reds. I mean, honestly, what was the point? Do the Reds think that with Hernandez, and not Valentin or Bako, they will suddenly skyrocket to 90 wins? And is Ryan Freel really the missing piece to the Orioles puzzle? I understand that Weiters is the Orioles catcher of the future and unloading Hernandez is key, but Freel and prospects was all they could get? I’m all for the moves involving role players, but right now we are talking about a trade involving two severely declining role players whose added contribution to their new teams will be marginal at best. Going after a guy like Gerald Laird, as the Tigers did, would have made more sense, especially if the goal is to plug someone in as a cheap and effective stopgap.

But not Hernandez, especially not in the final, and most expensive year, of his contract, with an even more expensive club option for the following season. The Reds did not give up much in Freel, but they did not get much in Hernandez, especially considering there are cheaper and similarly effective alternatives, one of whom–Valentin–has spent significant time in Cincinnati. I’m getting a headache just thinking about this trade. Reds fans, I hope I am not offending you, but honestly, can anyone out there who is a fan of either team… even if you are a bit fanboy… truly justify this trade?

UPDATE: It is now being reported that the Orioles are giving the Reds $3 mil, which drastically changes my opinion on the trade. In that case, the Reds are trading away $4 mil in salary and getting $3 mil towards Hernandez’ $8 mil. Essentially, they are only adding $1 mil in the trade, which makes Hernandez worth it, even as a backup. It might not be pointless, but it sure is boring.

Last week, we talked about how the market for relief pitchers appeared to be crashing. Today, Francisco Rodriguez and Kerry Wood became the latest to feel the contraction in bullpen spending. K-Rod is signing a contract with the Mets that will guarantee him $37 million over three years, while Wood is close to signing a two year deal with the Indians, who aren’t exactly known for spending significant portions of cash on free agents.

Rodriguez gets less money guaranteed than Francisco Cordero got last year, and I don’t think too many people believe that Cordero is the superior reliever of the two. Perhaps more teams were scared off by the decrease in velocity than K-Rod’s agent expected, but even still, this is half of his rumored 5 years/$75 million asking price heading into the winter. At this point, I don’t think there can be any question that MLB teams are valuing relievers significantly differently than they have in the past.

However, that doesn’t affect Rodriguez’s actual value, so let’s take a look at what the Mets should expect from him in 2009 to 2011.

Marcel projects Rodriguez to throw 66 IP with a 3.40 FIP, but it doesn’t know that he’s switching leagues, so we need to knock that down a bit. We’ll call it 3.25 (the adjustment for a closer is less because they never face pitchers), which of course is very good for a reliever. If we set replacement level for an NL reliever at 4.75, then Rodriguez would be 1.5 runs per nine innings above replacement, which translates into +11 runs per 66 innings.

However, we have to add in a leverage factor for late inning relievers, because the runs they allow are more valuable in terms of wins and losses than a normal reliever. 1.8 is the average leverage factor or a closer, so 11 * 1.8 = 19.8. We’d say that Rodriguez, as a closer, is worth about +2 wins more than a replacement reliever.

At an annual average salary of $12 million, that means New York is paying about $6 million per win. For most teams, that just not feasible, but as we saw, the Mets payroll allows them to have an average of nearly $3.4 million per win across the whole payroll. Considering that they have significantly underpriced players such as Jose Reyes, David Wright, and Carlos Beltran (his contract is a bargain compared to how good he really is), the Mets have the luxury of being able to overpay and still come in under budget while contending.

On it’s own, the contract isn’t great, and he’ll be hard to trade if they ever decide they don’t want him anymore. But in the specific circumstances that the Mets are in, needing a closer and having significant financial resources that most teams don’t, this deal makes sense for them. Not many teams are in the position to pay $6 million per win – the Mets are.

Jayson Stark at ESPN.com recently reported that the Dodgers and Casey Blake reached an agreement for 3 yrs and around $17.1 million. The exact details of the contracts are not known as of this juncture, though I will update when they become available. Blake, a third baseman who has dabbled at several other positions throughout his career, joined the Dodgers towards the end of July last season. In 58 games wearing Dodger blue, he posted a .251/.313/.460 line with 10 home runs. This resulted in a slightly below average .327 wOBA.

All told, his -3 runs on offense, +1.4 runs on defense, and positional adjustment for playing third base pegged him as a league average player over the final two months of the season. With injuries to Jeff Kent and Nomar Garciaparra, acquiring Blake allowed Joe Torre to shift Blake DeWitt to second base, stabilizing the defense and lineup, in a sense.

The average annual value of Blake’s supposed contract with the Dodgers is $5.7 mil, meaning that they would essentially be paying him to add about 1.15 wins above replacement per season. How does his 2009 projection look in this regard?

Marcel says Blake will hit .265/.336/.440, with 18 HR, and a .335 wOBA. His wOBA would basically represent the league average, and based on his projected playing time, he would be worth +1 run above average with the bat. He was -3.7 runs below average via UZR in 2007, and -4.7 in 2008. Let’s say, at worst, he is -5 runs at third base next season. Add in his +2.5 positional adjustment and +20 runs to represent value above replacement level, not average, and Blake is projected to be worth +18.5 runs in 2009. This easily converts to +1.85 WAR.

Assuming the going rate is around $5 mil/win this year, Blake’s fair market value for a one year deal is $9.25 mil. Factoring in a 10% discount rate for a multi-year deal, and an appropriate contract would be 3-yr/$25 mil. The Dodgers supposedly signed him for around $8 mil less than his projection calls for. Now, granted, Blake will be 36 by the end of the 2009 season, and when this contract ends, he will either become a utility bench player or retiree. Even with aging curves, though, there is little reason to think he will only be worth 3.45 WAR (the 1.15 WAR per year based don his $5.7 mil AAV) over the duration of this deal.

Having traded Andy LaRoche to acquire Manny Ramirez, it isn’t as if Blake’s signing will prevent a top-tiered prospect from earning playing time. He isn’t going to put the team over the top, or make up for Manny’s lost production if he signs elsewhere, but based on the committed money and his projected production, this looks like a very solid deal for the Dodgers.

In the comments of the posts on the Tigers acquisitions of Gerald Laird and Adam Everett yesterday, one common theme emerged among those who didn’t like the deals from Detroit’s perspective – that adding average or below average players wasn’t helpful, because good teams are built with good players, and the Tigers were filling holes with mediocre players. The feeling was that even though they didn’t cost much, Laird and Everett weren’t going to help Detroit win, so the moves were poor.

So, this post is for those folks – in it, we’ll talk about the value of role players. To do so, let’s take a look at last year’s World Series champs, the Philadelphia Phillies.

Everyone knows about Chase Utley, Ryan Howard, Pat Burrell, Cole Hamels, and Brad Lidge. Those five guys get 95% of the attention when the media discusses the 2008 Phillies, and they could easily be considered the stars of the team. Utley’s one of the three best players in the game, Hamels is a terrific young starter, Lidge is a lights our reliever, and Howard and Burrell provided muscle in the middle of the order. Between them, the Phillies got about 17 wins above replacement level last year. That’s a strong core.

However, the Phillies won 92 games – about 42 more than a team full of replacement level guys would win. That means they got about 25 wins above replacement from the guys on the roster not named Utley, Howard, Burrell, Hamels, and Lidge. Let’s look at how those guys were acquired.

Jayson Werth: .382 wOBA, +16 UZR – signed for $850,000 in 2007.

After the 2006 season, the Dodgers non-tendered Werth after he’d missed the entire 2006 season with injuries and hadn’t been very productive in 2005. The Phillies saw an opportunity to add an athletic OF with some solid hitting skills, and picked up Werth for practically nothing. They paid him a grand total of $2.5 million over the last two years, and he’s been a fantastic player for them – significantly better than the more hyped Burrell.

Shane Victorino: .355 wOBA, +3 UZR – paid $50,000 to take him in the 2004 rule 5 draft.

They took a $50,000 flyer on a guy who could cover some range and had flashed gap power at times, and for the next four years, Victorino has paid huge dividends as an above average outfielder. Think of it this way – Victorino is about as valuable as Torii Hunter, but the $17 million or so they saved by going with the low cost Hawaiian allowed them to have the financial flexibility to retain the big names and acquire Lidge.

Pedro Feliz: .306 wOBA, +7 UZR – paid $8.5 million to sign for 2008 and 2009

Feliz, like Everett, is a bad hitter and a great fielder. He’s less extreme at both ends, as his offense isn’t completely useless and his defense at third is excellent but not best-in-the-league, but it’s the same idea. The Phillies paid a marginal amount of money to fill their hole at third base by getting a defense first player and figured they’d live with the bad at-bats, and it paid off. Feliz was -8 runs with the bat and +7 runs with the glove, making him pretty close to a league average player. He only took $3 million of the Phillies payroll in 2008, however, and the upgrade they got from their hole at third base in 2007 was a big key in their success.

Greg Dobbs: .354 wOBA, -2 UZR – claimed off waivers in 2007

Dobbs is the anti-Feliz – a bad fielder who hits enough to still be useful, especially as a part time player. He gave the Phillies one of the best pinch hitters in baseball, and an offensive option at third base when they didn’t feel defense would be as necessary. They paid him the league minimum the last two years and got production equal to that of a lot of starters around the league.

Jamie Moyer: 4.32 FIP, 196 IP – acquired for two non-prospects in 2006

When the Phillies picked up Moyer at the deadline in ’06, he was considered a fringe 5th starter. His trademark command was diminishing and his stuff was high school level, and the assumption was that he could only get by on smarts for a few more months. Instead, Moyer has pitched as well as a league average starting pitcher in the NL for the last 2 1/2 years and earned a grand total of about $10 million during that time. Meanwhile, comparable innings eaters like Carlos Silva are getting $52 million in long term deals, while Moyer makes a fraction of that.

Between Werth, Victorino, Feliz, Dobbs, and Moyer, the Phillies picked up something like 9 or 10 wins compared to replacement level players, and they did so without surrendering one iota of talent to acquire any of them, and their combined payroll cost for 2008 was about $10 million. The huge impact the Phillies got from their role players is why they were able to have a parade in November, yet all of these signings would have been derided as non-impact moves, filling holes with guys who were average or worse.

Good teams need a collection of mediocre to average players. You can’t get 25 stars, and if you just focus on the top of the roster, you’re going to end up like the 2008 Seattle Mariners – a few quality players surrounded by crap, wallowing in last place, wondering why your team isn’t as good as you thought. The bottom of the roster matters, and the Tigers clearly figured that out yesterday.