Episode 562
Jeff Sullivan is a senior editor at FanGraphs. He’s also the mostly unfeeling guest on this edition of FanGraphs Audio.
Don’t hesitate to direct pod-related correspondence to @cistulli on Twitter.
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Audio after the jump. (Approximately 1 hr 11 min play time.)
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This post is part of an ongoing arbitration research project and is coauthored by Alex Chamberlain and Sean Dolinar.
April 24: Modeling Salary Arbitration: Introduction
Feb. 25: 2015 MLB Arbitration Visualized
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A couple of weeks ago, we introduced a couple of regressions that modeled arbitration results using a basic formulae predicated on wins above replacement (WAR). Ultimately, the models estimated that an arbitration-eligible pitcher could expect his salary to increase by 14 percent, and his raise in salary to increase by 56 percent, for each additional WAR. A hitter could expect increases of 13 percent and 46 percent, respectively.
The models, however, were incomplete: they did not incorporate any other stats aside from WAR. This was by design, as we wanted to introduce simple one-variable equations for the sake of demonstration. WAR is, conveniently, a comprehensive variable that attempts to summarize a player’s worth in one easily digestible number. But what about the effects of a player’s age or arbitration year?
Moreover, the r-squared statistic — a quick-and-easy check of a model’s validity — for each specification is not especially strong, clocking in anywhere between .30 and .56. This is partly a result of specifying only one explanatory variable, so including more variables — which we have done in this post — should improve the goodness of fit of the models, assuming the variables are relevant.
With that said, we have new-and-improved models to share with you: one comprised of composite statistics and another comprised of traditional statistics. They are all vanilla, linear ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models, and it is important to remember that the values for each stat can only be used in the context of that specific model.
For each player, we specify…
We identify these particular stats not only to cover as much analytical ground as possible but also minimize the use of stats that have high correlation among themselves (multicollinearity). We want to isolate different aspects of player performance or value as best we can.
In the next round of negotiations between the players’ union (MLBPA) and the owners, the union’s aim will be to close the growing gap between player salaries and owner revenues. Player salaries a decade ago represented 50% or more of revenue, but that percentage has fallen under 40% as salaries have not kept pace with revenue. The players have several options to try and increase salaries, but the simplest and perhaps most effective route is to significantly increase the minimum salary.
The players separate themselves into classes based on service time, prioritizing the money in free agency upon reaching six years of service time above all else. A tier below the free agents are those with at least three years of service time who are eligible for salary arbitration and generally receive between 40-80% of free agency salaries on one-year contracts. A step below the arbitration eligible-players are active Major League Baseball players with under three years of service time (except for the top 22% of players with between two and three years of service time who are also eligible for arbitration). The MLB players not eligible for arbitration have their salary set by their team, usually very close to MLB minimum which is currently $507,500 and has slowly increased in the past decade. In the tiers below active players, there are players on the 40-man roster in the minor leagues who receive union protection and a minimum minor-league salary, and then there are the rest of the minor leaguers who are not in the union and had many potential protections and salary bonuses bargained away by the players’ union.
Some news-that-isn’t-really-news came out yesterday: Troy Tulowitzki will not demand a trade from the Rockies. After meeting with his agent, he decided against trying to force their hand, and will continue to play with the Rockies until they decide to trade him on their own timeline. But that is why this news isn’t really news, because Tulowitzki is headed out of Colorado at some point in the not too distant future whether he asked for a trade or not. The Rockies aren’t contenders, and it’s beyond time for them to admit this and divest themselves of expensive aging players who would offer more present value to a team that can win this year.
By not demanding a trade, Tulo takes the pressure off the Rockies to make a deal at a time when buyers aren’t really looking to buy, and allows them to let the market develop a little more naturally. With teams spending a significant portion of their time on the draft over the next three weeks, the Rockies will likely get more attentive bidders if they wait a month or so to aggressively market Tulowitzki as a trade chip. And, from their perspective, waiting another month gives Tulo a chance to stop swinging at everything and remind everyone that he is still an elite hitter; it’s probably best to trade him when he’s not running a .297 OBP.
Despite his mediocre start to the year, it’s probably fair to assume that he is still an elite player; our depth chart Projections have him producing another +3.4 WAR over 408 plate appearances through the remainder of the season, so even though we’re expecting him to miss some time — he is still Troy Tulowitzki, after all — he still forecasts to be one of the two dozen or so most valuable position players in the game. The Rockies will absorb some of that value by keeping him through the draft, but if we assume they’ll start really trying to trade him in a month, he should still have roughly a 300 PA/+2.5 WAR projection left when interested buyers start seriously trying to acquire him.
So that brings up the obvious question; at that point, what is Tulowitzki worth in trade?
Projection systems tend to look at reality a whole lot more soberly than us humans, who can fall madly in love with a player on the basis of aesthetic appeal alone. That’s why most offseason columns here at FanGraphs reviewing free-agent acquisitions tend to damper down instead of ramp up excitement.
So it is a meaningful testament to Russell Martin’s skills that, upon being signed by the Toronto Blue Jays to a five-year, $82M contract as a 31-year-old catcher — i.e. after Martin has already sustained several lifetimes of knee-shredding, cup-checking abuse in baseball’s most brutal position — the deal was graded positively in these pages by Mr. Sullivan.
Thursday afternoon, the Indians lost another close game, which is the sort of thing I have to presume they find awful maddening. Among the few bright spots was Michael Brantley, who batted four times and wound up with a homer and a walk. Said homer was all of the Indians’ offense, and it did come close to holding up. Brantley’s been outstanding on a team that’s underachieved.
Let’s stick with the same baseball game for a moment. In the game, Matt Adams struck out swinging three times. Nick Swisher struck out swinging two times, and so did Roberto Perez. I don’t bring this up to say anything about Adams, Swisher, or Perez. Rather, it just seems like an appropriate lead-in to this astonishing fact: Brantley has struck out swinging two times all season.
What’s taking place for Brantley isn’t a breakthrough. Brantley’s breakthrough happened last year, following seasons of gradual development. He wound up a participant in the All-Star Game, and he finished third in the voting for the American League MVP. What’s taking place is a continuation, a demonstration that Brantley doesn’t intend to return to what he was before as an almost impossibly average ballplayer. Brantley doesn’t have a single flashy skill. His team is threatening to drop out of the race before the season’s half over. The ingredients are there for Brantley to become a forgotten star. Consider yourself urged to not forget him.
So far this season, Brantley has been a top-15 hitter, a hair behind Mike Trout and Joc Pederson. If you expand the window to the start of last season, Brantley’s been the fifth-best hitter in the game, between Jose Abreu and Andrew McCutchen. There’s nothing about his results that seems particularly unsustainable. His improved power is almost all to the same area, but in that way, Brantley is sort of an outfield equivalent of Kyle Seager. More than anything else, Brantley’s been able to combine a quick and smooth swing with a smart approach. He hasn’t meaningfully altered his swing. It just seems like he’s always getting smarter.
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: Well let’s chat
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: Let’s just chat about baseball
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: Every so often there will probably be a question not about baseball, and then someone will complain about it
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Jeff Sullivan CorreaGraphs Chat – 5/15/15 |
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: Good player. Not a major leaguer at the moment!
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: Was interesting to hear Dan Farnsworth talk about Correa’s swing in Arizona in March, but it would also be interesting to hear an update on that
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The Houston Astros grabbed all of our attentions a couple of weeks ago, when they rattled off 10 wins in a row and vaulted to the top of the American League West. They’ve cooled off quite a bit since, going 3-6 since that streak. Yet, despite their recent struggles, they had built up enough of a cushion to maintain a .618 winning percentage and a four-game lead over the second place Angels. Not bad for a team that lost 111 games just two seasons ago.
The Astros have a very good record, and a decent shot at making the playoffs (45% by our calculator), but their roster isn’t without holes. And perhaps none of these holes is bigger than the one at shortstop. Currently, the Astros are employing Marwin Gonzalez as their primary shortstop, with a little bit of Jonathan Villar on the side. To date, these two have wRC+s of 68 and 30, respectively, and have contributed a total of -0.5 WAR.
It wasn’t supposed to be this way. The Astros signed Jed Lowrie to a three-year contract back in December to play shortstop, but he lasted all of three weeks before landing on the shelf with a thumb injury. As of this writing, Lowrie’s on the 60-day DL and isn’t expected to return until sometime after the All-Star break.
Gonzalez and Vilar are unlikely to contribute much value for the Astros going forward. And, given the nature of Lowrie’s injury, it’s anyone’s guess whether he’ll be of much use in the season’s second half. The immediate future looks pretty bleak for the Astros at short, but help is on the way. The Astros promoted top prospect Carlos Correa to Triple-A on Tuesday, putting him just a step away from the big leagues.
Devised originally in response to a challenge issued by viscount of the internet Rob Neyer, and expanded at the request of nobody, NERD scores represent an attempt to summarize in one number (and on a scale of 0-10) the likely aesthetic appeal or watchability, for the learned fan, of a player or team or game. Read more about the components of and formulae for NERD scores here.
Most Highly Rated Game
New York AL at Kansas City | 20:10 ET
Pineda (46.1 IP, 55 xFIP-) vs. Young (23.0 IP, 104 xFIP-)
Most of the observations one might reasonably make while attempting to characterize the nature of Michael Pineda’s success so far this year were made by Jeff Sullivan for the benefit of this site’s readers on Monday. Summarized briefly, however, what Pineda has done is to produce one of the league’s best strikeout rates while also recording (relatively speaking) an even better walk rate. Indeed, were Bartolo Colon never to have been born, Pineda’s walk rate would currently stand as the best in the majors. Coincidentally, Bartolo Colon having never been born is actually the premise on which noted filmmaker Charlie Kaufman has written a remake of Frank Capra’s 1946 classic It’s a Wonderful Life.
Readers’ Preferred Broadcast: Kansas City Radio?
Ever since the Diamondbacks selected Max Scherzer in the first round of the 2006 draft, his potential has been readily apparent to everyone who has watched him pitch. Anytime you have a pitcher with significant fastball velocity and movement, and at least one very strong secondary pitch, the sky is the limit. Stuff is pretty easy to identify early on, but becoming an elite pitcher requires more than raw ability.
For the first few years of his professional career, Scherzer had a classic case of “he should be better.” He was a solid contributor in Arizona and in his early years in Detroit, but if you watched his stuff on any given night, you were left wondering why he was above average rather than great. The biggest hurdle for Scherzer was repeating his rather chaotic delivery to the point where he could utilize his stuff effectively day in and day out. Adding a curveball certainly helped, but the turning point came in mid-2012 when Scherzer figured out how to find a consistent release point. He never looked back.
