Andrés Giménez Is the Latest Guardian to Sign a Long-Term Extension

Last year, Andrés Giménez enjoyed quite a breakout season, helping to lessen the sting of the Francisco Lindor trade by emerging as one of the top second basemen in the game. He made his first All-Star team, won his first Gold Glove, and helped the Guardians win the AL Central for the first time since 2018. Now, the team has guaranteed that he’ll stick around for a good long while. On Tuesday, ESPN’s Jeff Passan reported that Giménez has agreed to terms on a seven-year, $106.5 million extension that also includes an option for an eighth season.
The full details of the contract have not yet been reported, but the deal appears to cover the 2023-29 seasons, with a $4 million signing bonus and a $23 million club option for 2030 that comes with a $2.5 million buyout. Via as-yet-unspecified escalators, that option can increase to $24 million (note that Passan has reported the option year as 2031, meaning that the guaranteed portion of the deal wouldn’t begin until next season). At its maximum, the extension could pay Giménez $128 million over eight years, his ages 24-31 seasons.
The guaranteed portion of the contract is the second-largest in team history after José Ramírez’s five-year, $124 million extension signed last year. The extension is the latest manifestation of what has practically become a Cleveland tradition, one that traces back to the rebirth of the franchise. In the mid-1990s, general manager John Hart pioneered the practice of signing young stars such as Sandy Alomar Jr., Carlos Baerga, Manny Ramirez, Jim Thome, and Omar Vizquel to extensions that ran through at least some of their arbitration years and kept them in the fold when they would have hit free agency. It’s a strategy that enabled the team to save millions of dollars while maintaining a competitive nucleus, and one that has become popular with several other teams, most notably the Braves (for whom Hart served as president of baseball operations from late 2014 to late ’17). Long after Hart left Cleveland, successors Mark Shapiro and Chris Antonetti continued to sign players such as Ramírez, Michael Brantley, Travis Hafner, Jason Kipnis, Corey Kluber, Carlos Santana, and Grady Sizemore to deals along those lines.
That’s an incomplete list of players who went this route, but it never included Lindor, who went year-to-year during his arbitration years until the team decided it couldn’t afford him at a full market price. On January 7, 2021, Lindor and Carlos Carrasco were traded to the Mets in exchange for the then-22-year-old Giménez, shortstop Amed Rosario, outfielder Isaiah Greene and righty Josh Wolf.
Giménez had hit an impressive .263/.333/.398 (105 wRC+) in 49 games with the Mets during the pandemic-shortened 2020 season, but he struggled in his first year with Cleveland, batting .218/.282/.351 (74 RC+) in 68 games sandwiched around a detour to Triple-A Columbus that lasted nearly three months. He did hit much better after returning (.245/.320/.382, 94 wRC+) than before (.179/.226/.308, 43 wRC+) even if he didn’t actually make better contact. As I noted last fall, he held his own after returning despite lacking a consistent approach at the plate. “Last year [2021] he’d deviate after like a bad game,” manager Terry Francona told the Akron Beakon Journal’s Ryan Lewis in May. “You’d have different stance, you have a leg kick you didn’t have, you get a toe-tap.”
Guardians hitting coaches Chris Valaika and Victor Rodriguez helped Giménez ditch the leg kick, which they felt was hindering his pitch recognition and his timing. He fared better against every major pitch type in 2022 than ’21, and overall batted .297/.371/.466 with 17 homers and 20 steals. His 140 wRC+ finished in a virtual tie with Rafael Devers and Carlos Correa for eighth in the AL (one point ahead of Ramírez) and among second basemen of either league trailed only Jose Altuve and Jeff McNeil. On the other side of the ball, Giménez’s 16 DRS, 9 OAA and 6.5 UZR each ranked second among all second basemen, and overall, his 6.1 WAR tied Xander Bogaerts for fifth in the AL, and among second basemen trailed only Altuve. That’s some fine company.
Giménez’s performance included a few areas of concern, notably a 40.8% chase rate, 6.1% walk rate, and Statcast contact numbers (87.8 mph average exit velocity, 6.2% barrel rate, 37.6% hard-hit rate) that placed only in the 29th–36th percentiles. Thanks in part to his 94th-percentile speed, he was nonetheless one of the majors’ most productive hitters on groundballs, ranking among the top half-dozen in both batting average and wRC+:
| Player | Tm | PA | AVG | SLG | wRC+ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Harold Ramírez | TBR | 176 | .347 | .392 | 116 |
| Jeff McNeil | NYM | 195 | .338 | .400 | 114 |
| Julio Rodríguez | SEA | 169 | .343 | .367 | 108 |
| Xander Bogaerts | BOS | 207 | .343 | .386 | 103 |
| Andrew Benintendi | KCR/NYY | 167 | .335 | .353 | 94 |
| Andrés Giménez | CLE | 171 | .333 | .345 | 94 |
| Yandy Díaz | TBR | 206 | .306 | .350 | 90 |
| José Ramírez | CLE | 171 | .310 | .363 | 90 |
| Adolis García | TEX | 174 | .316 | .351 | 89 |
| Trea Turner | LAD | 226 | .319 | .350 | 89 |
As noted last fall, hitters combined for a .235 AVG and 35 wRC+ on grounders; based on that, Giménez netted an extra 17 hits, without which he’d have finished with a .263 AVG and .433 SLG, much closer to his expected numbers.
While I do wonder about the sustainability of that aspect of his game, in all, that’s a pretty impressive showing for a 23-year-old. In fact, it’s one of the best age-23 seasons of the past decade:
| Player | Team | Season | PA | HR | SB | AVG | OBP | SLG | wRC+ | BsR | Off | Def | WAR |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mike Trout | LAA | 2015 | 682 | 41 | 11 | .299 | .402 | .590 | 171 | 3.0 | 58.7 | 6.6 | 9.3 |
| Mookie Betts | BOS | 2016 | 730 | 31 | 26 | .318 | .363 | .534 | 136 | 10.6 | 41.8 | 13.0 | 8.2 |
| Cody Bellinger | LAD | 2019 | 660 | 47 | 15 | .305 | .406 | .629 | 161 | 1.4 | 54.2 | 4.5 | 7.7 |
| Manny Machado | BAL | 2016 | 696 | 37 | 0 | .294 | .343 | .533 | 131 | 0.1 | 25.7 | 11.4 | 6.2 |
| Kris Bryant | CHC | 2015 | 650 | 26 | 13 | .275 | .369 | .488 | 136 | 6.9 | 33.8 | 3.6 | 6.1 |
| Francisco Lindor | CLE | 2017 | 723 | 33 | 15 | .273 | .337 | .505 | 116 | 4.7 | 19.4 | 17.7 | 6.1 |
| Andres Giménez | CLE | 2022 | 557 | 17 | 20 | .297 | .371 | .466 | 140 | 3.4 | 28.3 | 12.0 | 6.1 |
| Yasiel Puig | LAD | 2014 | 640 | 16 | 11 | .296 | .382 | .480 | 148 | 1.6 | 36.3 | -5.5 | 5.5 |
| Corey Seager | LAD | 2017 | 613 | 22 | 4 | .295 | .375 | .479 | 127 | 3.4 | 24.9 | 8.7 | 5.4 |
| José Ramírez | CLE | 2016 | 618 | 11 | 22 | .312 | .363 | .462 | 119 | 8.6 | 22.9 | 7.4 | 5.3 |
| Bo Bichette | TOR | 2021 | 690 | 29 | 25 | .298 | .343 | .484 | 122 | 6.9 | 25.2 | 2.4 | 5.1 |
| Freddie Freeman | ATL | 2013 | 629 | 23 | 1 | .319 | .396 | .501 | 150 | 1.5 | 36.9 | -9.5 | 5.0 |
Again, fine company even given the presence of a few players who have flamed out; Bellinger and Bryant have both dealt with a series of injuries, while Puig’s decline has been an ugly mixture of on- and off-field issues. The book isn’t closed on any of the above players, but several are Cooperstown bound. It’s worth noting that the two other Cleveland players on the list have turned out quite well, and that Giménez’s 140 wRC+ is actually higher than all of the other non-first base infielders — even those who out-homered him by a significant margin.
Because Giménez spent so long in the minors in 2021, he’s accrued only two years and 106 days of major league service time, 66 short of reaching three full seasons (which would have made him eligible for free agency after the 2025 season) and 22 short of becoming an arbitration-eligible Super Two. Thus, his contract for 2023 was among the 28 the team recently renewed; most of those salaries haven’t even been published yet, but Giménez was only set to make $739,400. The $4 million signing bonus bumps him up to something closer to what a star-caliber player in his first year of arbitration eligibility might make. For example, Bichette, who’s heading into his age-25 season with 3.063 years of service time, is making $2.85 million in salary plus a $3.25 million signing bonus as part of his three-year, $33.6 million extension, while the Padres’ Jake Cronenworth, who has exactly three years of service time, is making $4.225 million coming off back-to-back 4.1-WAR seasons. Had he reached three years, Giménez might be somewhere in that ballpark.
Via Dan Szymborski, here’s Giménez’s projection through 2030, the year with the club option:
| Year | Age | BA | OBP | SLG | AB | H | HR | SO | SB | OPS+ | WAR | $ | $Arb |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | 24 | .266 | .336 | .416 | 515 | 137 | 15 | 119 | 20 | 108 | 4.4 | $36.9 | $0.7 |
| 2024 | 25 | .265 | .336 | .420 | 517 | 137 | 16 | 115 | 19 | 109 | 4.5 | $39.6 | $7.9 |
| 2025 | 26 | .264 | .338 | .419 | 515 | 136 | 16 | 112 | 18 | 110 | 4.5 | $42.1 | $14.7 |
| 2026 | 27 | .260 | .334 | .416 | 515 | 134 | 16 | 109 | 16 | 108 | 4.0 | $38.5 | $17.4 |
| 2027 | 28 | .257 | .333 | .409 | 514 | 132 | 16 | 106 | 15 | 105 | 3.6 | $35.5 | — |
| 2028 | 29 | .255 | .333 | .407 | 513 | 131 | 16 | 105 | 13 | 105 | 3.2 | $32.9 | — |
| 2029 | 30 | .255 | .333 | .407 | 513 | 131 | 16 | 106 | 12 | 105 | 2.9 | $30.4 | — |
| 2030 | 31 | .257 | .334 | .409 | 513 | 132 | 16 | 106 | 11 | 106 | 2.8 | $31.3 | — |
Even with some regression to 4.5 WAR per year at his peak, the ZiPS contract projection for Giménez if he were a free agent comes to a whopping $287.2 million, which is more than Bogaerts received from the Padres as a 30-year-old free agent (and spread out over 11 years, at that). Even with the expected discounts for his arbitration years, Giménez projects to be worth $139.5 million through 2029, and $170.8 million through ’30; through that lens, this looks like a rather club-friendly deal. It’s not an out-and-out steal the way Ramírez’s five-year, $26 million deal for 2017-21 — over which the third baseman produced 28 WAR, made three All-Star teams and finished in the top three in AL MVP voting three times — turned out to be, but it’s clear that Giménez traded some risk for financial security. If he’s still even close to being a three-win player in 2030, he’ll stand to make tens of millions more, though he’s unlikely to approach the windfall he might have reaped if he’d spent all of 2021 in the majors and hit free agency after 2025, his age-26 season.
All of which is to say that this is A Very Guardians Deal, and while we can again bemoan the salary structure that prevents players short of six years of service time from getting anything approaching their full market value, it takes two sides to tango. And we shouldn’t be surprised if at least a couple more extensions follow in short order. Via The Athletic’s Zack Meisel, the team is in “advanced negotiations” with multiple players including Rosario, Triston McKenzie, Steven Kwan, and Trevor Stephan, hoping to complete extensions by Opening Day (Stephan’s is reportedly nearing completion). Meanwhile, Emmanuel Clase (five years, $20 million) and Myles Straw (five years, $25 million) signed such deals last spring, albeit at a scale much smaller than that of Giménez. If some of those extensions come though, they’ll probably increase the team’s payroll — estimated at around $90.7 million even with several of those aforementioned extension candidates’ salaries unknown — by a few million dollars. They’re still likely to rank among the bottom third of the 30 teams, even while contending for another AL Central title or at least a playoff spot. This approach has worked for the Guardians before, and at least in terms of establishing generational wealth for Giménez, it will work for him as well.
Brooklyn-based Jay Jaffe is a senior writer for FanGraphs, the author of The Cooperstown Casebook (Thomas Dunne Books, 2017) and the creator of the JAWS (Jaffe WAR Score) metric for Hall of Fame analysis. He founded the Futility Infielder website (2001), was a columnist for Baseball Prospectus (2005-2012) and a contributing writer for Sports Illustrated (2012-2018). He has been a recurring guest on MLB Network and a member of the BBWAA since 2011, and a Hall of Fame voter since 2021. Follow him on BlueSky @jayjaffe.bsky.social.
This strikes me as such a team-friendly deal that I’m actually a bit surprised Gimenez accepted it, even with the obvious motivation to secure his first huge pile of dollars. That’s a lot of years of prime free agency to give up, especially coming off a monster season. More evidence that preemptive extensions are the way forward for smart front offices.
Considering that he has such a short track record of being good, this deal really makes perfect sense for both parties IMO.
These sorts of deals are win-win, so I would have still offered this deal. But signing a guy to a $105M deal, with incentives up to a $125M deal, when ZiPS suggests a $140M deal…that’s quite good for Giménez. He didn’t have a lot of leverage here.
Where are you seeing anything about incentives that can increase the deal to $125M? The only incentives I’ve seen mentioned are for increasing the option year amount.
Sorry. 1 great year after a horrible year? Huge chance to become Marco Scutaro lite.
That’s a pretty off-base comparison given that Scutaro was *32 years old* when he had his first season of 2.0 WAR or better, and never got to 5.0 WAR in a season, let alone 6.0.
He was 23 years old and had 340 MLB PAs going into last season. Pretty dumb post
I’m very interested to see what the years are on this, since there appears to be a dispute. If Passan is correct, this is wayyy more team friendly. This is hardly the most important aspect of a deal like this, but as someone who follows the Guardians closely, it interests me greatly.
If they’re getting the ~$171m of value for $107m, then I agree this is A Very Guardians deal, where they found a high value player willing to take a big discount, a la Ramirez.
However, if it’s $107m for $136m in value, that’s getting pretty close to simply extending a great player at close to what he would make on the open market, and getting a discount on his free agent years in exchange for a 9-figure guarantee. That’s not something the Guardians have ever done. They’ve only ever given one contract over $60m (Ramirez’s $124m) and that was one of the most team friendly deals in the history of the game.
Basically I see 3 plausible scenarios:
1-Passan was right.
2-The Guardians think Gimenez is a superstar, much more valuable than ZiPS does.
3-The Guardians’ risk tolerance has changed dramatically despite losing their RSN (Blitzer effect?)
Number 3 is quite possible given their escape from.the escrow handcuffs and the likelihood that Dolan might sell in a few years.
Also, they might have factored in a lot of the same economic factors that drove SD to splurge this offseason.
As to the RSN, if MLB ends up taking full control of local video they’d be removing a middleman (and their profits) from the supply chain, resulting in higher team revenue.
Of the suggested extensions, I’m curious about Rosario. He’s useful but hardly irreplaceable. And his open market value seems too rich for Cleveland. I would’ve expected a Bieber extension before him, and I don’t.
I tend to agree, that it’s likely 3 (with a dash of 2). If you squint, you could see some signs even back when Sherman bought in that the purse strings were ever so slightly loosening before the Covid year/loss of Sherman double whammy.
> Meanwhile, Emmanuel Clase (five years, $20 million)
Sheesh. I had forgotten the financials on this.
Pitchers get hurt.
Relievers are erratic, year to year.
Odds are if he makes it to year 4 he’ll get an extension.
Big if, though.
ZiPS doesn’t seem too incredibly bullish on Giminez’s aging curve. Granted, an age-26 peak isn’t out of the ordinary or anything, but this feels kind of steep for a really talented player.
Is there a reason why ZiPS might be less bullish?
There have been some notable sudden flameouts around 30 at second base historically, and I imagine that might be playing a factor here.
His offensive game is entirely built on speed which does not age well. He typifies Cleveland’s offensive approach of “hit the ball softly and have it work out well.”
ZiPS doesn’t buy his offensive outburst last year at all. The batted ball data suggests he got awfully lucky. But ZiPS also doesn’t predict him to decline much offensively either. What you see with his declining WAR totals is a prediction that his defense will decline.
Are you sure about that? A 35 points drop in OBP and a 30 point drop in SLG seems like a pretty substantial offensive decline.
There’s also a 7.5% decline in PAs which, by itself, would have a substantial impact.
As an aside, if you look at the chart Best Age-23 Seasons, 2013-22, Gimenez had by far the fewest PAs. On a WAR/PA basis, he had the 4th best season, behind only Trout, Betts, and Bellinger.
Sorry, scratch by second sentence/paragraph. They have ABs listed above not PAs.
A team-friendly contract based on a very conservative projection of his future. Granted he doesn’t have a track record beyond last season but it seems a bit odd that none of his projections come within 1.5 WAR of what he did last year as a 23 year old.
And sure I get that part of that was based off of an unsustainable BABIP. But we could look at Xander Bogaerts as an example. Bogaerts had a breakout season in 2015 that was backed by a BABIP of .372, which is 19 points higher than what Gimenez did last year. While Bogaerts never repeated that BABIP, he improved his offensive numbers by increasing his walk rate and his power, two things that Gimenez could do as well.
Bottom Line: This is a team-friendly contract that could turn out to be even more team-friendly than it appears.
I think you just broke down why it’s pretty fair!
Not sure how you got that from what I wrote. I’m simply pointing out that a decline in BABIP (which many people expect to happen for Gimenez) doesn’t have to lead to a decline in offense.
That being said, these predictions feel light to me. Starting this year, he’s predicted to have a triple slash line lower than his career average and less WAR than what he’s done so far per PA/AB. If he were older, I’d buy into that but it seems strange for a 24 year old. In other words, all he has to do to beat his projection for this coming year is match his career averages.
Anyway, Fangraphs seems to have some strange takes re: Gimenez. Last year, Ben Clenems wrote that he wasn’t convinced that Gimenez’ power increase was real. But in 2021-2022, he had a .134 ISO whereas last year it was .169. That hardly strikes me as a shocking increase for a 23 year old.
He has zero track record beyond a year where he ran a .353 BABIP and outperformed his xISO by 26 points.
His career xwOBA is .309, so the projections clearly think he’s made real improvements – but there’s pretty clear risk that he’s an Erick Aybar type who had a crazy year.
This deal balances that for both sides.
The floor is fair to both.
Considering he had little leverage and the MI pipeline they could have signed him to 5 years for less than half. After all, is a .255/.333/.407 MI worth $23M in FA?
BTW, another example is his teammate Jose Ramirez. Ramirez also broke out as a 23 year old, backed by a .333 BABIP. But his best offensive season was two years later when he only had a .252 BABIP, a whopping 81 points lower than his breakout season.
Obviously, there’s no guarantee that Gimenez will follow the Bogaerts/Ramirez path. But I think it’s important to understand that a drop in BABIP (even a substantial one) doesn’t guarantee a drop in offensive production.
BTW, as an aside, I vaguely remember that when Ramirez signed his first extension, Fangraphs said he would probably never have another 5 WAR season. Can’t seem to find the article so maybe I’m making it up but if they did write that then….ooops!
I do feel like the Guardians are doing something right with their hitters. They all feel “different” .
Yeah, we could add Lindor to the mix. In his rookie season, he put up a 4.0 WAR in 99 games boosted by a .348 BABIP. But his best offensive season came three years later when his BABIP was only .279.
Its called: maturing. 😁
Player development doesn’t end when they first succeed at the MLB level.
As players get older they learn the league, what pitchers want to do to them, and how to adapt to best use their abilities.
In short: they become the best version of themselves.
Doesn’t work for everybody, obviously, but some players aren’t happy until they reach or exceed their projected FV. They keep on trying to be better. Those are the keepers.
Others lose that “hunger” after “success”; some are good enough to be useful without it, while others decline. Those need careful monitoring and trading while they still have value.
Through age-23, Lindor had a .58 BB/K. It’s .55 for his career.
Ramirez had a .66 BB/K. It’s .82 for his career.
Gimenez has a .27 BB/K ratio on his career. If he improves as much as Jose managed, he’d get up to .35, going forward.
He doesn’t walk, strikes out a bunch, and has 15-HR power.
That offensive profile leaves him SIGNIFICANTLY more at the mercy of the BABIP gods than the likes of Lindor and Ramirez.
…which is why it’s worth remembering what ZiPS does.
If Gimenez’s next three seasons are 3 WAR, then 6 WAR, then 4.5 WAR, all based on BABIP fluctuations, then ZiPS will have done its job.