It’s time for another edition of postseason managerial grades. If this article series has taught me anything, it’s that in-game management is both hard and largely inconsequential. There are a million variables to consider in nearly every at-bat, but at the end of the day, the players on the field win or lose the game. Dusty Baker, the subject of today’s article, is proof of that: the Astros are an excellent team, and Baker managed well, and the Braves just beat them. The team didn’t choke, and neither did he. They simply ran into someone playing better, which is almost always more important than who moves the chess pieces around more efficiently.

One piece of feedback that I’ve gotten in previous installments of this series is that giving managers all the credit or blame for their decisions understates the role that team front offices have in preparing for the playoffs. Managers aren’t making it up as they go along, at least not always; they come into each game with a plan for many contingencies. In most cases, that’s a plan they’ve constructed in collaboration with front office personnel who do the drudge work of coming up with 50 (or 100 or 200) scenarios that mostly won’t take place, then coming up with plans for each.

So if you’d like, consider these as joint manager and front office grades. The two are operating in concert, with the front office doing research that the manager applies during games. So this is a Dusty Baker report card, but it’s also a referendum on everyone in the Astros’ front office for getting the right information in front of him. And spoiler: they all passed with flying colors.
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The last two World Series games have featured pitching best described as aspirational. The Braves used three pitchers who barely pitched in the majors to face 37 Astros, and the results were mixed. Sometimes you’re Kyle Wright, throwing 4.2 clutch innings to keep your team in the game. Sometimes you’re Tucker Davidson, coughing up a four-run lead in two-plus brutal frames. That’s the nature of pitching, but it’s not exclusive to those fringe arms, as this postseason has shown.

Consider the worst pitchers that teams brought into these playoffs. Fourteen relievers who posted a regular-season FIP of 4.50 or higher have appeared this postseason, pitching a combined 44.2 innings. They’ve been awful! They’ve combined for an ERA of 6.00 and a FIP of 5.30. That’s the kind of pitching that sends you home early.

It’s also better than you’d expect! After all, these pitchers aren’t great. That’s how I selected them — pitchers with bad numbers during the regular season. In fact, this group combined for a 5.52 FIP in the regular season, weighted by the number of postseason innings they’ve each accounted for. They’ve actually done better in the playoffs — perhaps the reason why teams selected them in the first place. Read the rest of this entry »

Sometimes, you have to let Dylan Lee pitch. Lee wasn’t supposed to be part of Atlanta’s plans for the playoffs. He wasn’t supposed to be part of Atlanta’s plans for the year, period: the Marlins released him just before the start of this season, and the Braves picked him up and stashed him in Triple-A for depth. He was added to the NLCS roster to replace Huascar Ynoa (Lee was on the NLDS roster but didn’t pitch), then tabbed to start tonight’s game as an opener.

Sometimes, you have to give Kyle Wright bulk innings. After Lee let three of the first four Astros reach base, Wright came into the game, no doubt earlier than Brian Snitker had intended. He wriggled out of the jam with only a single run in, getting Carlos Correa on a grounder before striking Kyle Tucker out to end the threat.

Like Lee, Wright wasn’t part of Atlanta’s playoff plans. He wasn’t on the NLDS or NLCS roster, and he threw only six innings in the big leagues this year. With Ynoa out, the Braves wanted someone to get them bulk innings, and Wright made 24 starts in the minors this season; he figured to be a mop-up guy who could handle bulk innings in case of emergency.

Like Lee, Wright struggled to tame a deep Houston lineup. He’s a sinker-first, sinker-second pitcher, and the Astros eat minor league sinker-ballers for lunch. The Astros swung at 17 sinkers; they missed exactly once. Of the 22 Astros he faced, eight reached base. Jose Altuve socked a home run. Houston had at least two runners on base in four of the first five innings.
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Last night, the Astros got to Max Fried early, scoring five runs in the first two innings on their way to a 7-2 rout. It was a mirror of the first game of the series — and it was also a window into how Brian Snitker plans on managing his pitching staff for the series’ remaining games. With Charlie Morton out until next year, the Braves will be stitching together innings the rest of the way. That plan started last night.

The first part of the plan: Max Fried took one for the team Wednesday night. Yanking your struggling pitcher early is common in the playoffs — Dusty Baker did it to Framber Valdez two days ago — but Snitker let Fried work through his issues and eat innings at the same time. He threw 86 pitches and completed five innings, saving wear and tear on the bullpen even though Atlanta was unlikely to win the game in any case. That makes Fried less likely to come back on short rest — though he didn’t rule it out — but it gave key bullpen arms like A.J. Minter and Tyler Matzek the night off. Matzek had appeared in 10 of the team’s first 11 playoff games; giving him a rest was a prudent decision.

The next step: use the middle and bottom of the bullpen when you can. Dylan Lee, Jesse Chavez, Drew Smyly, and Kyle Wright handled the rest of the game last night, and acquitted themselves fairly well (three innings, five strikeouts, one run). Those aren’t the top names in their relief corps, but they’ll be important during the three-game stretch in Atlanta starting this Friday. Read the rest of this entry »

The Dodgers were supposed to be a team for all seasons. A lineup comprised exclusively of All-Stars? Check. A pitching staff with Clayton Kershaw as a fourth starter? Check. A bullpen with two closers, plus a cornucopia of useful relievers to fill in the cracks? Check as well, particularly with Kenley Jansen turning back the clock.

Injuries had something to say about that, of course. By season’s end, the team lost Max Muncy to a fluke injury and Kershaw to elbow pain that shut him down for the postseason. A lineup with only seven phenomenal hitters? A rotation that stopped at three Cy Young candidates, and had to make do with the perfectly cromulent Tony Gonsolin as a fourth starter? The horror! At least the bullpen was still intact — Jansen and Blake Treinen anchored a top-five unit that kept the Dodgers rolling throughout the season even as their starters dealt with injuries.

All of these factors come into play when evaluating the decisions Dave Roberts made in the playoffs. I’ll stick to the general format of these posts — first hitting, then pitching — but in my opinion, the cascading set of questionable decisions on both sides started with the two injuries that changed the Dodgers’ plans from plug-and-play to figure-it-out. Read the rest of this entry »

For the first two installments of this feature, I graded the postseason performance of two managers per article. This time, I’m sure you were expecting the same: the losing managers for the ALCS and NLCS lined up for some random internet writer to opine on their faults. That’s still basically the idea here, but I’ll be honest: I didn’t feel like fitting a chance to enumerate Dave Roberts’ strange decision-making into only half an article. That main course is still to come; for now, you’ll just have to settle for an accounting of Alex Cora’s playoff acumen.

Lineups/Pinch Hitting

Grade: A-
The Red Sox aren’t built for versatility. By the end of the season, they mostly plugged in their best hitters and let them go to work. An injury to J.D. Martinez meant even less flexibility in several early games. Even so, I liked some of the small moves Cora made to extract a tiny bit of extra value from his lineup.

When Boston faced a lefty pitcher, Enrique Hernández led off, with Kyle Schwarber batting second. Against righties, that order was flipped. That might seem like a small thing, but I like that it always keeps a starter from having a (relatively) easy matchup when the order turns over for a third time. If you’re trying to get extra outs from your starter, you’ll be doing it at a disadvantage. And if you pull your starter, the second batter your reliever faces will have the platoon edge anyway. Read the rest of this entry »

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If the Houston Astros win tonight, they’ll go to the World Series. That’s in line with what they expected to be doing before the season — this is the fifth straight year the Astros have played in the ALCS, and they’ve been to the World Series in two of those four years. But if they make it three out of five this year, they’ll do so despite pitching injuries that have left the team rebuilding their rotation on the fly, much as they’ve been doing since the start of the year.

Yesterday, Dusty Baker intimated that Lance McCullers Jr. is out for the remainder of the postseason. Given that he was left off the ALCS roster, that’s hardly a surprise, but it does mean that the Astros need to plan for how their rotation will work without him going forward.

With their presumptive ace gone, the top of the rotation now starts with Framber Valdez. I’d argue that it might have started with him in any case, but with McCullers out, he’s clearly the best option. That lines him up to start a World Series opener if they make it that far, but does make him mostly unavailable before then. Easy enough, here’s the rotation through one spot:

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Ian Anderson had a rough go of first innings this year. In 24 games, he compiled a 6.38 ERA, and this isn’t some case of a pile of seeing-eye singles doing him in. He allowed 2.3 home runs per nine innings, walked 14.2% of the batters he faced, and generally let the offense do what they wanted. His numbers worked out to a 5.29 FIP, which hardly seems like a fair representation of his skill. In every other inning he pitched this year, he was comparatively excellent: 0.9 home runs per nine, an 8.8% walk rate, and sterling run prevention numbers (2.93 ERA, 3.71 FIP).

I hate to use the word “narrative” because it’s mostly a lazy baseball writer crutch, but it’s unavoidable here: the narrative that Anderson is vulnerable in the first inning and bulletproof afterwards has been omnipresent in his playoff starts. When he gave up a first-inning home run to Corey Seager in Game 2 of the NLCS, it was something obvious to point to. First inning? Must just be Anderson’s unique flaw, a magic spell that makes him terrible until he gets a chance to grab some sweet dugout pine.

If you can’t tell from the way I’ve described it, I’m skeptical. Splits like that feel too hand-wavy, too post hoc ergo propter hoc, if you’re into being pretentious like I am. Every pitcher has to be worst in some inning, by sheer chance alone, even if their true talent never wavers. If I had my druthers, I’d just ignore the whole thing and go back to watching dugout celebrations. But because the first inning is the first, rather than the third or the sixth or any other random number, I thought I’d do an investigation into how much we should believe it. Read the rest of this entry »

Last week, I reviewed the managerial decisions from the two teams that lost in the ALDS. With the NLDS now over, it’s time to do the same thing for the Brewers and Giants. As a reminder, I’m judging teams based on expectations, not results. Pinch hit for your MVP candidate with a pitcher? Not that it would ever happen, but you’d get an F for that. Bring in your best pitcher in a big spot, only to have him give up a three-run homer? That’s still an A, results notwithstanding.

These grades don’t cover everything that a manager does. Deploying your best players in the biggest spots and hiding their weaknesses where possible is a big part of a manager’s role, but it’s definitely not the only part. As an example, Kevin Cash and the entire Rays staff deserve a permanent A for their work in getting their pitchers and hitters ready for flexible roles all season long. Likewise, Dave Roberts and the Dodgers coaching staff benched a former MVP and seem to have kept the clubhouse roughly in order, always a tough task. None of that will be reflected in these rankings, but it’s absolutely important managerial work — it’s simply work I don’t have much insight into. Read the rest of this entry »