Bob Melvin feels that the San Francisco Giants could use more star power. Hearing the team’s new manager say as much when he met with the media in Nashville earlier this week prompted a question from yours truly. Prefacing it by pointing out that the San Diego Padres team he led last year had no shortage of it, I asked the veteran skipper if it is possible to have too much “star power.”
“Not necessarily,” replied Melvin, whose 2023 Padres underachieved to the tune of an 82-80 record. “It just depends on the makeup. Look, the year before we went to the NLCS in my first year there. Last year was a disappointing season, but I don’t think there’s anything to make of it being a poor year because there was too much star power. They have some really good players there, it just didn’t work out as well.
“I am big on incorporating,” Melvin added. “I think everybody needs a role and everybody needs to feel they’re a part of it. That makes for a much better clubhouse. Everybody feels they’re important. There’s an enthusiasm to that. I think there’s a place for both.”
Scott Harris largely agrees with Melvin. When the subject of impact free agents such as Shohei Ohtani came up, I asked Detroit’s President of Baseball Operations the same question that I’d asked his San Francisco contemporary. Read the rest of this entry »
Last year, I took a long look at the predictive power of rookie exit velocity. One of the things I learned was that for rookies with at least 200 balls in play, wRC+ was less predictive of their future performance than max exit velocity. That blew my mind. Knowing just one measurement, the velocity of a player’s hardest-hit ball, was more useful than knowing about their overall performance through their entire rookie season. Exit velocity matters a lot, as does how you interpret the data.
Since the rollout of Statcast in 2015, we’ve been introduced to three general ways of thinking about exit velocity, along with half a dozen individual variations. Depending on the context, we might read about a player’s average exit velocity, their maximum exit velocity, their hard-hit rate, or any number of exit velocity percentiles. For a while now, I’ve been wondering which one of these methods is most useful. Could there be one exit velocity metric to rule them all?
I have to imagine that at some point in the last several years, the R&D department of each major league team has asked itself that exact same question. In each big league city, someone much smarter than I am did the math and wrote up the results in a report that now rests comfortably in a proprietary database with a catchy name. The rest of us just have to make do with rumors and innuendo suggesting that teams most often value something akin to 90th-percentile exit velocity. To my knowledge, no one in the public sphere has made a comprehensive survey, and I wanted to look into the matter for myself. Read the rest of this entry »
Back in July, I dove into the pulled fly ball successes of Cody Bellinger and Isaac Paredes that led to them outperforming their Statcast expected statistics. Since then, I’ve paid particular attention to Bellinger. Much of that is due to his interesting free-agency case. His unique profile relative to previous free agents with this level of performance is fascinating. On the surface, 4.1 WAR and 134 wRC+ at age 27 from an athletic multi-positional player is typically deserving of a $150 million-plus contract. But Bellinger isn’t a typical player; the question of sustainability looms due to the nature of his performance, most notably highlighted by a 10th-percentile hard hit rate.
Doubting the stickiness of his performance is completely fair. Hitting the ball hard gives you more room for error; the further you are down the hard-hit-rate spectrum, the more reliant you are on other skills that are perhaps not as sticky. Spending nine figures on that kind of profile is scary! But the more I think about Bellinger’s profile, this question keeps popping back up in my head: if we hopped in a time machine and went to the year 2008, would we question for a second whether he deserves a big long-term deal? I know that’s a flawed thought, but it’s lurking in my brain because of the years of traditional coaching focused on the importance of putting the ball in play with two strikes and not worrying about what type of contact is made, or how hitting to contact and letting home runs happen by accident is the purest form of hitting.
But after thinking more, I reminded myself of how the data the public has access to now is useful for these exact reasons. We know better than we did 15 years ago about what variables have strong causal effects on performance and/or fluctuation — this can’t be ignored! We should want a hitter to make flush contact consistently, regardless of count. We should question and consider what makes Bellinger different or not.
Recently, MLB.com’s Mike Petriello investigated some of the questions around Bellinger, most notably his hard-hit rate and two-strike approach. Two months before that, Baseball Prospectus’ Craig Goldstein highlighted the concerns around Bellinger’s 90th-percentile exit velocity and how DRC+ hadn’t bought into his performance, particularly the home run output, because of the lack of hard hit. By DRC+, he ended the season at 112, a far cry from his 134 wRC+. In short, there has been plenty of pondering about Bellinger’s 2023 profile and whether it can be repeated. This piece will do largely the same thing, just from a different angle. Read the rest of this entry »
The Los Angeles Dodgers and right-hander Joe Kelly did a whole bunch of paperwork just to end up back in business together. In November, the Dodgers declined a one-year, $9.5 million option on Kelly, buying the right-hander out for $1 million and sending him into free agency. This week, the two parties agreed to terms on another contract, reportedly for one year and $8 million. Nobody likes to take a pay cut, but for Kelly, who was born in Anaheim, that’s $9 million in his pocket to stay put instead of $9.5 million – ultimately a pretty friendly outcome after the option decision didn’t go his way.
If you’ve tuned in to the postseason in the last decade, you’re probably familiar with the work of Kelly, who started a World Series game for the Cardinals in 2013, earned his first ring with the Red Sox with a dominant October in 2018, and pitched for the Dodgers in four of the last five postseasons, winning his second World Series in 2020. He helped set up a pair of future Hall of Fame closers in their only World Series seasons (so far) two years apart in Craig Kimbrel and Kenley Jansen. Since the start of his career, the only pitchers with more postseason appearances than Kelly’s 41 are Jansen, Ryan Pressly, and Aroldis Chapman:
Hampson defines what it means to be a utility player — the 26th man on the roster who contributes not through offensive prowess but via baserunning and defensive versatility. Despite once being a 50 FV prospect, he never became an everyday regular with the Rockies, hovering around replacement level thanks to his consistently poor hitting (he posted a wRC+ of 64 in each of his first three full seasons in a Khris Davis-esque streak). Concerns about his power potential in the minors were validated by his pedestrian exit velocities in the majors, maxing out at 11 homers even in the favorable conditions of Coors Field.
After being non-tendered by Colorado, Hampson signed a one-year deal with the Marlins, where he was roughly a league-average hitter over 250 plate appearances. This sudden uptick in offense was largely a mirage of batted ball luck; he posted a .379 BABIP compared to a .320 career baseline (in the ballpark with the highest BABIP), the lowest barrel rate of his career, and no improvements in walk or strikeout rates.
You certainly shouldn’t be expecting anything resembling a league-average hitting line from Hampson, but his baserunning and defense are still enviable. He has averaged +4.2 BaseRuns per 150 games played, and while he’s not a volume stealer, he has an 81% career success rate. His skills on the basepaths have translated to defensive range at every single position besides first base and catcher. It’s extremely difficult to maintain a high quality of fielding despite being constantly ping-ponged between the infield and outfield, especially from the beginning of a big league career, yet Hampson has performed admirably wherever he’s been stationed.
Garrett Hampson, True Utilityman
Position
Innings
RAA + UZR Arm Runs
2B
1014
-4
3B
97
1
SS
621
1
LF
94
0.2
CF
1300
2.9
RF
86
-1.1
Hampson has been above average with the glove spending the considerable majority of his time at up-the-middle positions, an asset to teams who can spend a roster spot on a defense-first player and/or rebuilding clubs looking to boost their inexperienced pitching staffs with solid gloves. The Royals certainly fit the latter criteria, with eight members of their current projected pitching staff, including three members of the starting rotation, entering 2024 with fewer than three years of service time. A most likely use case for Hampson will be as a platoon partner with the left-handed Kyle Isbel and Michael Massey, though he could get time almost anywhere given the lack of proven talents on the roster.
Wendle is best known for his four-year tenure with the Rays, where he thrice eclipsed 500 plate appearances and 3 WAR (or a pro-rated 2020 equivalent) despite never locking down a single position. Instead, he rotated between second, third, and shortstop, primarily manning the keystone early on, then seamlessly shifting the bulk of his starts to third base when Brandon Lowe had a fully healthy season at second. When he hit at an above-average clip, he did so without much pop or plate discipline, putting bat on ball and consistently placing line drives into the outfield. He maximized his productivity given his lack of raw power or lift in his swing, but it relied on his plus speed and bat control, which couldn’t last forever.
Wendle broke into the majors late, playing his first full season for the Rays at age 28. Despite entering free agency for the first time, 2024 will represent his age-34 season. As a result, he’s lost a step over the years, evident in his declining defensive and baserunning value. He took extra bases on hits less frequently than before, and last season was his first as a below-average defender by RAA. His line-drive rate went from great with the Rays to below-average with the Marlins, and hitting the ball on the ground over half the time isn’t effective for someone who doesn’t have the foot speed to leg out infield hits. The warning signs were there in his age-31 season in 2021, so it’s unsurprising Tampa traded him that offseason, (correctly) anticipating a future decline. Wendle was never great with the Marlins, but his production completely fell apart during the last couple months of his tenure there, with a -6 wRC+ over the last two months of the year.
Joey Wendle Speed Metrics
Year
Sprint Speed Percentile
BsR/150
Def/150
2018
81
3.2
5.4
2019
86
3.2
8.6
2020
83
4.2
5.4
2021
71
-0.2
10.4
2022
50
0
7.3
2023
61
0.3
2.1
SOURCE: Baseball Savant
Def incorporates RAA and positional adjustment
Wendle will slide into the role previously held by fellow left-handed multi-positional infielder Luis Guillorme, who was non-tendered following a down year truncated by a calf injury. It’s somewhat surprising that Guillorme was let go given his arbitration estimate of $1.7 million and track record of success in a bench role, especially with his disciplined approach at the plate and high walk rates. Should both Wendle and Guillorme return to form next season, the Mets will be trading a points of OBP for a few more extra-base hits, though the former’s decline in athleticism make it difficult to see him as an impact player, even in his limited role.
Only one position player contributed more negative WAR to his team than Wendle in last season’s second half, and it just so happened to be DeJong. In the first half with the Cardinals, he hit below league average and put up the best defensive numbers of his career, putting him on a three-win pace for the season. With St. Louis well out of contention, they flipped him to the Blue Jays, where he fell into a historic slump. In 13 games north of the border, he went 3-for-44, striking out 41% of the time without drawing a walk or clubbing an extra-base hit. His .068/.068/.068 slash line was good for a -76 wRC+, prompting the Blue Jays to release him after just three weeks.
DeJong then signed on with the Giants, themselves in the middle of a horrific offensive implosion. While he was acquired to take playing time from the aging Brandon Crawford, his struggles in Toronto followed him west, where he hit even worse than Crawford. He wasn’t as historically awful as he was with the Jays, but he still hit just .184 without a walk before the Giants cut him loose as well.
The question going forward remains whether or not DeJong’s abysmal second half was a 31-game anomaly or a true change in his talent level. There are certainly red flags in his under-the-hood numbers; zero walks in 94 plate appearances is concerning, but his chase rate shooting over 54% after leaving St. Louis (compared to a 32% career rate) may be even worse. His power almost completely evaporated as well. A combination of lowered exit velocity with more ground balls than fly balls for the first time in his career led to just one barrel in 60 batted ball events. Steamer’s projections certainly put a good deal of weight into his disastrous run, forecasting a .276 OBP and 76 wRC+, with a strikeout rate a few points above his career norm.
DeJong’s signing won’t drag the White Sox, who scored the second-fewest runs in the majors last year, out of the cellar, but it will at least stabilize their infield situation in the short term. With the arrows pointing down on 40-man infielders José Rodríguez and Lenyn Sosa, the Sox lack immediate plug-and-play options at the six beyond Nicky Lopez. Their clearest option for the future is top prospect Colson Montgomery, our 12th-ranked prospect atop the 55 FV tier. But while Montgomery has looked great in pro ball, he’s far from a perfect prospect, and his poor defense at shortstop may necessitate a future position change, though he’s never played an inning anywhere else in the minors. He also suffered a back injury that limited him to just 84 games in 2023, including a relatively unimpressive showing in the Arizona Fall League. It’s possible that DeJong could hold down the fort for the early season, making way for a midseason debut from Montgomery.
Come on, you knew Wade Miley was going to sign with the Brewers, right? He’s not exactly a lifer there. In fact, he’s spent most of his major league career elsewhere — Arizona, Boston, Seattle, Baltimore, Houston, Cincinnati, and Chicago, to be exact. He’s not from Milwaukee. But he just makes sense as a Brewer, and he knows it. He reportedly let his son make the final decision on whether he’d come back this year, and the verdict is in: one year and $8.5 million, with a mutual option for the 2025 season.
That’s not the only move Milwaukee made on Monday; the headline-grabber was making Jackson Chourio’s record-setting contract official. But even that wasn’t all. They also signed Joe Ross to a major league deal, as Robert Murray reported. Ross hasn’t pitched in the major leagues since 2021, but after missing most of 2022 rehabbing from Tommy John surgery, he averaged 96 mph on his fastball in 14 innings across three minor league levels for the Giants in 2023. Now, he’s back in the majors, though it’s unclear whether he’ll end up in the rotation or the bullpen.
Deals like these — moderately priced contracts for solid veterans with upside — have long been a Brewers specialty. They’ve benefited from a cornucopia of top pitching talent for the past half-decade, but they’ve supplemented it wisely as well. Miley’s 2023 season was a great example of that. He signed for $4.5 million last winter and threw 120 league-average innings, give or take some anomalous batted ball luck (his .234 BABIP was the lowest he’s allowed in his career). That was a huge coup for Milwaukee, which dealt with its fair share of pitcher injuries. Even on a tight budget, he was brought back for more of the same at roughly double the rate. Read the rest of this entry »
Lucas Giolito is one of the more intriguing free-agent pitchers currently on the market. Still just 29 years old, the veteran right-hander is coming off of a sub-par season — a 4.88 ERA and a 5.27 FIP for three different clubs — but his overall resume is that of a solid big league starter who reliably takes the mound every five days. His 947 innings pitched over the last six seasons are eighth-most in MLB, and his 167 starts are tied for fifth-most. All told, he has a 4.43 ERA, a 4.44 FIP, and a 25.3% strikeout rate since debuting with the Nationals in 2016. His best season was 2019, when he went 14–9 with a 3.41 ERA, a 3.43 FIP, a 32.3% strikeout rate, and 5.2 WAR with the White Sox.
With his pending free agency in mind, I approached Giolito in early September — a day after he’d made his first of six appearances with the Guardians — to talk about where he’s at in his career.
———
David Laurila: I first interviewed you in 2017. How would you describe your evolution as a pitcher since that time?
Lucas Giolito: “Unfortunately, it hasn’t been going in a good direction recently. As for how I’ve evolved, I definitely use the slider more. The longer you’ve been in the league, the more guys get used to you, and sometimes the changeup is working great and sometimes it isn’t. Up until 2021, I was pretty much a two-pitch guy. I had a slider for show, but it was mainly fastball-changeup. That was effective for me, whereas now guys will sometimes sit on the changeup. Having that slider to go in the other direction, I can show a different look, especially to righties.”
Laurila: Do you feel that your changeup is as good now as it was in your best seasons? I’m thinking primarily about movement profile and speed differential.
Giolito: “That’s interesting. I think it’s pretty much the same. The thing is, in ’19 and ’20, when I used it a lot and it was really effective, I didn’t actually pay much attention to the metrics on it. So it’s really hard to say. I do know that the velocity is pretty much the same.” Read the rest of this entry »
The other night, I had pie for dinner and watched a Hallmark Christmas movie (HCM). It was a solid hang, and I thoroughly enjoyed myself. On a night when my brain felt like mashed potatoes and my body refused to accept that it was 7:00 p.m. and not 11:00, I warmly welcomed the sugar rush, in both the literal (pie) and figurative (HCM) sense.
Despite the pleasantness of the evening, I do not intend to adopt an all-dessert diet and swear off the movie theater. I might make it three days before becoming so starved for substance that my mind and body start acting out a horror movie in rebellion. While sugary sweets and romcoms provide enjoyment, they lack staying power.
Which naturally brings me to Adley Rutschman and the Orioles. Rutschman currently stars in an HCM, written and produced by the Orioles’ front office and ownership group, in which he attempts to woo O’s fans and save Christmas (aka their postseason aspirations). Adley receives support from a promising ensemble cast, but their inexperience shows in their performance, particularly when asked to stretch their ability for an intense scene during the movie’s climax. Meanwhile, the story’s B-plot (starting pitching) felt a little thin, like they might need to resort to a cringy musical number to fill time, and the C-plot (bullpen) started out as a bright spot to relieve tension but threw a surprise twist in the mix that went unresolved. Read the rest of this entry »
The St. Louis Cardinals were one of baseball’s most disappointing teams in 2023. Favored to win the NL Central, they instead finished with just 71 wins and missed the playoffs for the first time since 2018. Moreover, the losing record was wholly unfamiliar territory. Since John Mozeliak was appointed GM prior to the 2008 season (his title is now President of Baseball Operations), the Cardinals had had nothing but winning records under his watch. They reached the postseason in 10 of those seasons and twice advanced to the World Series, capturing the franchise’s 11th modern-era title in 2011.
To say that St. Louis has had sustained success under Mozeliak would be stating the obvious. Ditto that “The Cardinals Way” — the catchphrase champions the club’s adherence to fundamentals and its player development acumen — has paid dividends on a consistent basis.
What does it mean when sustained success suddenly hits a roadblock? In the Cardinals’ current case, does it represent an anomaly? Was 2023 simply a blip, or is there a need for Mozeliak’s team to change its processes in any way? I asked that question of the executive during last month’s GM meetings.
“I think it would be somewhat foolish to just approach this past year as, ‘Oh, odds have it that you’re going to lose, so it happened,’” replied Mozeliak. “You can learn from some things that happened last year. I hope everybody who is involved in this is having that reflection moment and trying to understand what we could have done differently, what we should have done differently, and what we will do differently going forward.”
Asked if he could share specifics, Mozeliak said that while some have been identified, he preferred not to call any of them out, lest he “make anybody feel bad.” He did say that he was willing to call himself out. “Adding more pitching prior going into camp, would have, in hindsight, made more sense” was the mea culpa he chose to share. Read the rest of this entry »
Justice Bigbie has gone from a 19th-round draft pick to one of the most promising prospects in the Detroit Tigers system in just two years time. Taken 555th overall in 2021 out of Western Carolina University, the 6-foot-3, 215-pound corner outfielder is coming off his second full professional season, during which he slashed .343/.405/.537 with 19 home runs in 485 plate appearances across High-A West Michigan, Double-A Erie, and Triple-A Toledo. The 24-year-old’s 157 wRC+ was tied for seventh highest among all minor leaguers with at least 400 PA.
Bigbie talked hitting, with a primary focus on high-velocity training, at the conclusion of the Arizona Fall League season, which saw him log a .749 OPS with the Salt River Rafters.
———
David Laurila: In some respects, you came out of nowhere in putting up big numbers this year. On the other hand, your overall track record (which includes a .350/.426/.539 slash line in four collegiate seasons) is that of someone who has always hit. In your mind, did you actually take a huge step forward, or did you mostly just do what you’ve always done?
Justice Bigbie: “I mean, I don’t want to say that I continued to do what I always do. I try to continue to improve, continue to get better each day, and I feel like I’ve done that since getting my first taste of pro ball in 2021. I’m continuously making tweaks to my swing and improving what I can improve on. I think that’s contributed to the success I had this past year.” Read the rest of this entry »