Maybe it’s because of the right-hander’s lack of a pedigree, or his status as a non-roster invitee during spring training. After all, Hamilton is a 27-year-old reliever who struggled through injuries and ineffectiveness over the past four years. At the same time, he looked like a find as recently as 2018, when he pitched to a 1.74 ERA and 2.44 FIP across 51.2 innings between Double- and Triple-A; he even averaged 96.7 mph on his heater in a brief eight-inning callup. The next season, he seemed poised to play an integral part in the White Sox bullpen, but he was struck by a foul ball while rehabbing separate shoulder and head issues stemming from a car accident. His poor luck nearly brought his career to an end, but he finally began to feel back to normal this offseason.
If you didn’t know about Hamilton before, I’ll be the first to tell you that he has been a joy to watch this season, not only because of his unique offering but also his comeback story, parlaying his rediscovered health into a spot in the Yankees’ pen, where he’s found early-season success with a resurgent fastball (averaging 95.4) and the slambio. The latter pitch has been nothing short of excellent thus far: a ludicrous 29.9% swinging-strike rate and worth 3.8 runs, which rank third and tied for fourth, respectively, among the 85 sliders thrown at least 50 times this year (as of Saturday night). The pitch’s unusually high rate of called strikes, 15.6%, given its whiffiness, also places it second among the 85 sliders in CSW%. Read the rest of this entry »
After a decade of hand-wringing and tedious arguments on both sides, MLB restricted defensive shifts this past offseason. Much has already been written about the pros and cons of this decision, and I’m not going to take the time to recapitulate all of those arguments here. One debate in particular really caught my eye, though: Would teams still play an overshift-esque alignment by moving an outfielder to the shallow right field position occupied by shifted second basemen in pre-restriction shifts?
I expected it to be a rare tactic, but still one that came up from time to time. Five-man infields already existed; in fact, I ran the math on when they might make sense in 2019 when the Dodgers tried one. The exact conclusion of that piece isn’t important; the point is that teams sometimes thought a five-man infield was the best defensive alignment when any defense was allowed, so they would surely prefer it with restrictions on other alignments in place. Read the rest of this entry »
You probably don’t think of baseball as a contact sport, though catchers might beg to differ. Whether it’s blocking a baseball or taking a foul ball to the mask, catchers are constantly at war with a five-ounce ball of leather. That’s why catchers have to commit to blocking through and through. You can’t cheat your way to being a good blocker; you have to learn your pitchers to understand what pitches they tend to spike and how those pitches spin off a bounce. The stakes will always depend on the situation, but as a catcher, you try to gain the confidence in your pitcher to throw a pitch in the dirt by committing to the grind in the bullpen, during warmup pitches, and in game.
I’ve been anticipating Statcast adding blocking metrics for a while now. As a former college catcher, it doesn’t take much to make me appreciate the league’s great blockers, but our culture in baseball gives more attention and value to the things we can measure. With the introduction of the new blocking leaderboard, we no longer need to guess at just how impactful or skilled some catchers are relative to their peers.
In a similar fashion to how I reviewed Statcast’s arm strength leaderboards, I am going to highlight some of the best blocking catchers in the game. The criteria for this exercise is straightforward: I took the catchers ranked first through fifth on the default leaderboard and chose what I deemed to be an impressive pair of blocks from each from the 2022 season. The mechanics of blocking can vary from player to player, but what matters most is killing the speed of the bounce with the lower half of your chest protector. These five catchers can do that on a variety of pitches going in any direction.
I’ll start with this: the debate between catching with one knee down versus in a traditional stance has no absolute answer; it’s entirely dependent on the individual catcher. In the case of Adley Rutschman, he is capable of being both a top-tier framer and blocker primarily in the traditional stance. But the combination of his mobility, flexibility, and hip anatomy allows him to shift his knees down from his traditional stance without needing to get into a pronounced traditional squat.
On this 90-mph splitter from Félix Bautista, Rutschman anticipated the pitch in the dirt and blocked up with what looked like an effortless movement. Bautista is without question one of the most difficult pitchers in the game to catch: triple digits from a straight over-the-top arm slot high off the ground, paired with a blistering splitter that hitters swing through over half the time. Because of that, Rutschman must always be ready to get his knees on the ground and stuff the splitter, especially when runners are on. He put on a clinic all year, and this pitch was no exception.
The second block was just as impressive. On a 92-mph changeup, Rutschman read the arm-side spin and opened up his left hip to create space for a side shuffle to get in front of the baseball. Blocking pitches over 90 mph is a doozy, but it’s all in day’s work for one of the best in the game.
Jose Trevino (no. 2 overall, 15 Blocks Above Average)
Every time I watch Jose Trevino catch, it’s clear to me that he is a former infielder. The way he can shift and rotate his hips while in such a deep position is truly impressive. He is one of the catchers who can have one knee down and be even better at blocking. Since he has such a great feel for his pitcher’s tendencies, he can sink into his one knee stance and block a Gerrit Cole knuckle curve in the dirt if he needs to, or get under the pitch and frame it if it’s in the shadow zone.
The sweeper he blocked from Lucas Luetge with the bases loaded was what I like to call a confidence block. Luetge’s strength is using his sweeper for soft contact and chases on his glove side; that he throws it on an 0–1 count with the bases loaded says a lot about his trust in his catcher. And Trevino stuffed the sweeper right in front of him, showing me that he was relaxed as can be. When a pitch is about to hit your chest protector, you’re taught to exhale so you can soften your body and accept the pitch into your stomach rather than stiffening up. Few catchers do that as well as the Yankees’ backstop.
J.T. Realmuto is an iron man behind the plate: He has caught over 130 games in back-to-back years, including a deep playoff run last year where he did not miss a single game. This is a perfect example of an everyday catcher who relies on the one knee down stance to take some wear and tear off his body. Like Trevino, he uses it to his advantage when blocking. Because he is so flexible, he can extend his right leg outwards as far as he can, which lets him get ahead of the movement; in a traditional stance, you have to recognize the pitch, then shoot your leg out for a block.
A spiked changeup is no challenge for Realmuto. His body is already in a perfect position to be a wall for a long or short hop. All he has to do is move his glove to cover his five hole like he did in the first clip. The reason I included the blocked curveball was so that I could highlight how he uses his legs to recover from the block in a one knee down stance. Focus on how his left knee slides inward as the pitch hits his chest protector. That lets him tighten his five hole and put his body in a better position to shoot up quickly. He then pulls in his extended right leg under the center of his body so he can push off both legs to chase the pitch to ensure the runner doesn’t advance. This is not a simple movement; it requires next-level mobility and strength to pop up this quickly. It’s just one of the many strengths of Realmuto’s catching game.
Sean Murphy (no. 4 overall, 12 Blocks Above Average)
As a baseball fan on the east coast, I didn’t always get a chance to watch Sean Murphy display his catching prowess in Oakland. But in doing the research for this piece, I was impressed to see how athletic he is back there. Blocking splitters that hit the plate is a painful job; when any pitch hits the plate, it hardly loses any speed. But Murphy grew up in the bigs catching and blocking this pitch from Frankie Montas, and he is a better defensive catcher for it.
Murphy’s stance — with his behind high up in the air — is reminiscent of an old school catcher preparing to stuff a pitch in the dirt. You’ll notice that in the second GIF, he also uses the one knee down stance to block. Some catchers will vary their stance depending on the pitcher. As I said earlier, blocking splitters is extremely difficult; in fact, I’d bet it’s the toughest pitch for catchers to get in front of when it’s spiked because of how it can bounce off dirt. That’s why Murphy opted for the traditional stance with Montas but went with one knee on a curveball from Jared Koenig. When you know your pitchers, you can be savvy with how you set yourself up for success.
This wouldn’t be an article about great catching without including a Puerto Rican backstop. Tomás Nido is your classic backup defense-first catcher who has made his carer off being an elite framer and blocker. His placement on this list is incredible given that he is only a part-time player. Similar to some of the catchers already highlighted, he is dealing with some electric pitchers with air-bending offerings. I didn’t include traditional chest protector blocks in either clip because I wanted to use Nido as an opportunity to talk about a crucial part of catching/blocking that isn’t always realized: the art of picking.
Picking is a flashy, beautiful move that can only be executed by players with the softest of hands. The retired Yadier Molina always had a knack for picking balls that looked destined for the backstop, and his fellow Puerto Rican Nido is no different. On an overthrown changeup from Max Scherzer, Nido smoothly moves his glove across the zone and effortlessly stops the pitch from getting by him. He did almost the same thing on the spiked changeup from Joely Rodríguez, but in the opposite direction. Picking is something that you do when you know you have no shot at blocking a pitch. It’s a necessary skill that isn’t always rigorously trained, but it should be for that exact reason. Depending on how you were set up, there are times when there is no shot to contort your body in front of the ball. When that time comes, all you have is your glove and your instincts. Nido has proven time and time again he can do this on a pinch.
I hope you’ve come away from this piece learning a thing or two about blocking. There are the obvious things you cannot miss when it comes to blocking, but aspects such as recovery, picking, and exhaling upon impact are all minute details that don’t always get attention. This list of catchers displays those abilities on a routine basis, and that is why they have found themselves atop this new leaderboard.
Opening Day is tomorrow, but not everyone has their legs under them just yet. Take Miguel Vargas, whom I wrote about a couple of weeks ago — he wasn’t even allowed to swing for a quarter of his spring training plate appearances. While he’s swatted three doubles and a homer since taking the bat off his shoulder, he probably wouldn’t have minded at least a handful of extra reps.
And it seems like he isn’t alone. Teams have dealt with the usual rash of injuries this spring, and a sizable portion of Opening Day bats will take the field without the benefit of a full slate of spring training plate appearances. For his part, when Vargas broke his finger, the Dodgers were able to get him some semblance of in-game experience by having him track pitches without swinging. Read the rest of this entry »
This is Kiri’s first piece as a FanGraphs contributor. She lives in the Pacific Northwest while contributing part-time to FanGraphs and working full-time as a data scientist. She spent five years working as an analyst for multiple MLB organizations.
By this point, you’ve undoubtedly consumed considerable content regarding the rule changes arriving in the majors for the upcoming season. You know all about the pitch clock dictating when hitters must ready themselves in the box and when pitchers must start their deliveries, as well as the wrinkle this introduces to pickoff attempts. You’ve also heard about the bigger bases and the limits on defensive shifting. Analysts have projected which players stand to be impacted most by the changes, while players who feel the changes make their jobs more difficult have voiced their concerns, and early spring training action has showcased the growing pains of adoption. With much of the existing commentary zooming in on the micro effects for particular players and game situations, let’s take some time to zoom out and ponder the macro effect on the game as a whole. More specifically, let’s ruminate on what makes a game or sport objectively appealing and how the rules — and subsequent changes to them — influence the appeal of a game.
At the most basic level, games are defined by rules dictating play. For those of us who struggle with authority, rules often feel restrictive. It’s no wonder, since rules come across as real haters, with all their “Don’t do this,” and “Don’t do that,” and “You can do this, but no, no, not like that.” That said, we needn’t have such an adversarial relationship with rules. In his book exploring the game of basketball, Nick Greene notes, “Games are peculiar. They are the only pursuit in which rules are used to facilitate fun.” To better understand the dynamic between rules and fun, Greene interviews a game design professor, Eric Zimmerman, who explains, “One of the paradoxes of game design is that the creativity of play is made possible by play’s opposite, which are rules. Rules are in essence constraints, but games don’t feel that way. […] When the rules are activated, what follows is fluid, unpredictable magic.” The rules of any game are finite, but the universe is infinite, implying that infinitely many possibilities exist in the space not covered by the defined rules. The fun in any game lies in the creativity used to explore the infinite space outside the boundaries set forth by the rules. Read the rest of this entry »
Every time a young star signs a contract extension, we all breathlessly mention the total guarantee. Did you hear Corbin Carroll is getting one hundred and ten million dollars? You could buy a pretty nice house with that, or several nice houses, or live comfortably for the rest of your life and set your kids up to succeed in the bargain. It’s natural to focus on something like that. It is, after all, the main part of the deal.
In almost every one of these extensions, there’s an additional feature: one or more years of team options tacked on to the end of the contract. Our collective analytical view of those tends to be more or less a shrug. “Oh, yeah, and two team options, so that’s nice,” we say, or “well, that makes sense.” I wouldn’t call our evaluations of these options particularly nuanced.
I don’t think that’s going to change on the whole, but the Carroll extension spurred me to at least delve a little deeper into the dollars and cents side of those team options. I’ve already done some work on opt outs from the player perspective, and conveniently enough, I can lift a lot of the mathematical methods from that treatment and use them to evaluate things from the team side. Read the rest of this entry »
Before Miguel Vargas doubled in his first plate appearance of the day last Thursday, he hadn’t lifted the bat off his shoulder his first 12 times up. Nursing a pinky fracture, he was just there to track pitches. Yet initially, this “strategy” paid unanticipated dividends: through seven looks, he walked four times and struck out three times, good for a .571 OBP (albeit with a 42.9% K-rate). However, pitchers ultimately adjusted, sending Vargas back to the dugout the next five times.
Apparently, opposing managers were made privy to his no-swing approach before each game. But even if Dave Roberts didn’t tell them about it, it was in the press as early as the morning of February 27, after which three of Vargas’ walks came. My colleague Davy Andrews, recounting this misadventure, posited that some of the pitchers treated Vargas like any other foe because they were just trying to get into regular-season shape.
But Davy also suggested pitchers may have been a bit incredulous that Vargas wouldn’t swing, up there with his batting gloves on and in his crouch. The incredulity slipped away, though, in those last five looks. Zack Greinke even toyed with Vargas, tossing him a pair of eephuses (eephi?) sandwiched by two full-strength heaters (thanks to Davy for doing the GIF work so I didn’t have to):
Earlier this month, I wrote about the improvements that umpires have made in calling balls and strikes according to the rulebook strike zone. Today, I’d like to focus on the other side of that equation: pitch framing. The consensus around baseball is that pitch framing’s story has followed a very familiar arc. Call it the Competitive Advantage Life Cycle:
Teams realize the immense value of a skill.
An arms race ensues as they scramble to cultivate it.
The skill becomes widespread across the league.
Since the skill is more evenly distributed, it loses much of its value.
Once everybody got good at pitch framing, nobody was great at it. As Rob Arthur has put it, “Catcher framing felt like it was disappearing almost as soon as it was discovered.” I even have fun graphs to drive the point home. There are definitely more useful ways of presenting the data, but I like how these ones let you watch the entropy dissipate over time in open defiance of the second law of thermodynamics:
Since joining MLB as an expansion team in 1993, the Rockies have won 46.9% of their games. Among active franchises, that mark stands as the third worst. Granted, most other teams have had a lot more time to establish themselves, and the Rockies have bested their 1993 expansion counterparts in the Marlins (though given the option, they’d probably take the Marlins’ two World Series championships). But they have also been handily outpaced by the 1998 expansion teams, the Diamondbacks and the Rays, who have each posted winning percentages of 48.5%. Further, the Rockies still have the fifth-worst winning percentage even if we limit our scope to 2000 onwards. These results don’t line up with the Rockies’ spending, especially as of late, which has placed them in the middle of the pack in terms of payroll — that is, until we consider the Coors effect.
The Rockies’ pitching has long dragged down the fortunes of the team as a whole. Since 2000, they’ve easily been the worst staff in the majors with a 4.93 ERA. But it isn’t entirely their fault: pitches move sub-optimally and balls fly further in Colorado. The front office has tried various remedies, in particular opting for more groundball-heavy or low-BABIP pitchers. Neither of those strategies has worked all that well, but some proposals carry promise, like the idea of relying more on gyro spin and/or using the lesser impacts of Magnus force in Colorado in an advantageous way.
But the innovation in Denver appears to be at a bit of a standstill, possibly due to unrealistic expectations about the Rockies’ current level of competitiveness. Self-evaluation issues aside, on a recent episode of Effectively Wild, Ben Lindbergh and Meg Rowley described the Rockies as a team that could theoretically be more consistent if they truly figured out how to navigate playing half of their games at Coors. That got me thinking, and while I certainly don’t purport to provide the final answer, I do hope to supply a different perspective on the problem. Read the rest of this entry »
Last week, we published our playoff odds for the 2023 season. Those odds contain a ton of interesting bells and whistles, from win distributions to chances of receiving a playoff bye. At their core, however, they’re based on one number: win totals. Win totals determine who makes the playoffs, so our projections, at their core, are a machine for spitting out win totals and then assigning playoff spots from there.
We’ve been making these projections since 2014, so I thought it would be interesting to see how our win total projections have matched up with reality. After all, win total projections are only useful if they do an acceptable job of anticipating what happens during the season. If we simply projected 113 wins for the Royals every year, to pick a random example, the model wouldn’t be very useful. The Royals have won anywhere from 58 to 95 games in that span.
I’m not exactly sure what data is most useful about our projections, so I decided to run a bunch of different tests. That way, whatever description of them best helps you understand their volatility, you can simply listen to that one and ignore everything else I presented. Or, you know, consider a bunch of them. It’s your brain, after all.
Before I get started on these, I’d like to point out that I’ve already given our playoff odds estimates a similar test in these twoarticles. If you’re looking for a tl;dr summary of it, I’d go with this: our odds are pretty good, largely because they converge on which teams are either very likely or very unlikely to make the playoffs quickly. The odds are probably a touch too pessimistic on teams at the 5–10% playoff odds part of the distribution, though that’s more observational than provable through data. For the most part, what you see is what you get: projections do a good job of separating the wheat from the chaff.
With that out of the way, let’s get back to projected win totals. Here’s the base level: the average error of our win total projections is 7.5 wins, and the median error is 6.5 wins. In other words, if we say that we think your team is going to win 85.5 games, that means that half the time, they’ll win between 79 and 92 games. Past performance is not a guarantee of future results, but for what it’s worth, that error has been consistent over time. In standard deviation terms, that’s around 9.5 wins. Read the rest of this entry »
