Archive for Diamondbacks

Over the weekend, the Dodgers and Diamondbacks made a pair of related transactions. On Friday night, after failing to find a suitor due to the specter of a potential lost draft choice, Howie Kendrick re-signed with the Dodgers for a relative pittance; $20 million over the next two years. Given that Kendrick turned down the qualifying offer, which would have guaranteed him $15.8 million for just the 2016 season alone, Kendrick had to settle for far less than he thought he would get this off-season, and at that price, the Dodgers decided the value was too good to pass up, even though they didn’t really need another infielder.

Kendrick is better than Chase Utley and he should make the team better in both 2016 and 2017; however, they did surrender the possibility of obtaining a compensation pick if another team had eventually decided he was too good to pass up at that price as well.

For a good chunk of the winter, the assumption was that a team would make that choice, and for the last few months, the Dimaondbacks looked liked the obvious fit. General manager Dave Stewart publicly talked about his desire to add some offense at the top of the order to replace Ender Inciarte, and some combination of Chris Owings and Aaron Hill didn’t inspire a lot of confidence that second base was going to be well-handled in 2016. The D-Backs had talks with Kendrick, and had tried to trade for Brandon Phillips, so it was clear that they wanted to make a move for a more established second baseman, pushing Owings into the utility role that he’s probably better suited for.

But, after having surrendered the 13th pick to sign Zack Greinke, the Diamondbacks became fiercely protective of the 39th overall pick, a competitive-balance selection they were awarded that they would have to surrender if they signed Kendrick (or Ian Desmond, another free agent would could have helped them). Stewart even stated outright that they weren’t going to give up that pick:

“We’re not going to give up the pick,” Stewart said of the D-backs, who have the 39th selection (Competitive Balance Round A). “It’s just tough after we’ve already given up our first pick. To give up our top two picks, that would be difficult for us to do.”

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There’s been sort of a will-they/won’t-they thing going on with Arizona this offseason. They’re the team that probably makes the most sense for free agent Howie Kendrick. Kendrick is a second baseman, the Diamondbacks could arguably use a second baseman, and the front office there has made it clear they want to win in the season ahead. So, Kendrick would make them better, and I think they realize that, but there are these hurdles. There’s only so much money left to spend, and Dave Stewart has voiced a reluctance to give up another draft pick (currently slotted at No. 39).

Even now, Kendrick still fits. A strong market hasn’t developed, at least not publicly, and Arizona still has that potential infield hole. Though it’s noble to want to keep your draft picks, the 39th pick isn’t worth nearly as much as a higher one, so that shouldn’t be a major stumbling block. Kendrick might therefore end up remaining in the National League West, but he isn’t the only available possibility. In fact, you could argue Ian Desmond fits even better.

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After having typically appeared in the very hallowed pages of Baseball Think Factory, Dan Szymborski’s ZiPS projections have been released at FanGraphs the past couple years. The exercise continues this offseason. Below are the projections for the Arizona Diamondbacks. Szymborski can be found at ESPN and on Twitter at @DSzymborski.

Other Projections: Atlanta / Baltimore / Boston / Chicago NL / Cincinnati / Cleveland / Kansas City / New York AL / Philadelphia / Pittsburgh / Seattle / Texas / Toronto.

Batters
Given the moves made by general manager Dave Stewart et al. this offseason — the signing of Zack Greinke, the exchange with Atlanta of three promising and cost-controlled pieces for Shelby Miller — it’s pretty clear that the club’s ambition is to win now. Of great assistance to that particular cause are Paul Goldschmidt and A.J. Pollock, both of whom had great seasons in 2015 and are projected by ZiPS to produce just over nine wins in 2016. They form a strong nucleus for the club.

Less strong are the parts surrounding that nucleus — the club’s figurative cytoplasm, to extend the metaphor clumsily. With the exception of indy league success story David Peralta, no other position player receives a forecast from ZiPS of two wins or more. The departure of Ender Inciarte appears to have created no little difficulty. The author of consecutive three-win seasons for Arizona, his absence compels the team to rely heavily on Yasmany Tomas, the author of one negative-wins season, to rebound from his difficult rookie campaign. ZiPS is pessimistic about Tomas offering anything much better than a replacement-level performance.

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Episode 617
Nick Piecoro is a friend of the program and a beat writer for the D-backs at reputable news organ The Arizona Republic. He’s also the guest on this edition of FanGraphs Audio.

This edition of the program is sponsored by Draft, the first truly mobile fantasy sports app. Compete directly against idiot host Carson Cistulli by clicking here.

Don’t hesitate to direct pod-related correspondence to @cistulli on Twitter.

You can subscribe to the podcast via iTunes or other feeder things.

Audio after the jump. (Approximately 41 min play time.)

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Talking to Mets pitching coach Dan Warthen last year, he mentioned something about the strategy of his brand of slider that has stuck with me. We normally think of sliders as hard curveballs, maybe. Loopy but hard pitches. Try figuring out if Craig Kimbrel throws a hard curve or a slider, and you’re down that normal path.

But Warthen said something a little different about the slider: “We don’t want to make it break, we want to think about getting our fingers to the front of the ball and spinning the baseball. Then you take another breaking ball and you separate the speeds, and it doesn’t have to be a great breaking ball, it just has to be a different speed.”

So, in effect, Warthen was talking about changing speeds with the slider. Normally that’s something you talk about with the changeup, which is obvious because of the way the pitch is named. But now we can talk about it with respect to the slider.

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Given the competitive nature of the baseball industry, teams don’t go around spilling their secrets. If a team had a perfect formula for predicting injuries, it wouldn’t be in their interest to give that jewel away to the teams they are trying to beat on the field. The same is true, to a lesser extent, with player evaluations. If a team thinks the league is overrating one of its prospects because the league doesn’t have complete information, it doesn’t benefit the team to tell the league why it’s wrong.

As a result of this dynamic, we always have to take public comments from clubs with a grain of salt. Comments from team officials are designed to serve the team’s interest and that means they don’t always reveal the complete truth. We accept this as part of life, but generally expect teams to be somewhat constrained by things that sound true. For example, if the Braves had discovered some type of flaw with Shelby Miller, they wouldn’t have told everyone they were shopping him because he was due to break down. They would say they were shopping him because he’s a valuable player and they’re looking to rebuild. The latter isn’t totally untrue, it’s just not the full truth.

Teams know things they don’t want to share and we assume they only share things that serve their interest. Sometimes it’s about public relations, sometimes it’s strategy, and sometimes it’s to build good will with the media. There are lots of reasons that teams might choose to share information, but in most cases they’re not forced to say anything at all. Most of the time, teams say what we expect them to say. A lot of the time it’s largely the truth, but sometimes it isn’t.

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For the last few weeks, the Braves have been fielding calls from teams who wanted to trade for Shelby Miller. And for good reason: Miller is just 25 years old, is coming off a strong season in which he reminded everyone he was one of the game’s best pitching prospects coming up through the Cardinals organization, and he won’t be a free agent until after the 2018 season. With the price of pitching exploding in free agency, three cost-controlled years of a quality young starter is a valuable asset, and with the Braves in full rebuild mode, trading Miller to acquire players who could be core pieces of their long-term future made a lot of sense.

But when they discussed trading Miller as part of their rebuilding process, they could not have imagined the outcome that resulted tonight. After reportedly talking to the Cubs and Dodgers without securing the kind of impact young talent they were looking for in exchange, they ended up striking a remarkable deal with the Diamondbacks. The trade brings in major league outfielder Ender Inciarte along with minor league prospects Dansby Swanson and Aaron Blair.

Except, these aren’t just any minor league prospects. Dansby Swanson was the #1 overall pick in the draft just five months ago, a shortstop who shows quality offensive skills for a middle infielder. MLB.com currently rates him as the #10 prospect in baseball, and that’s after just collecting 100 plate appearances in his professional debut this summer. With a reasonable performance as he climbs the minor league ladder this summer, he’ll likely be in the mix to be considered the best prospect in baseball at this time next year.

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On Tuesday night, the Diamondbacks acquired Shelby Miller to upgrade their rotation. The cost of the acquisition, however, led most people — myself included — to conclude that not only did the team pay an exorbitant cost relative to pursuing other options on the market, but that it’s not even clear that the team improved on the field for 2016, given the loss of a quality Major League outfielder in the deal. As has been the case with several other recent moves Arizona has made of late, the reaction to the deal has been extremely negative. But has it been too one-sided and over the top?

Any time the public reaction is this slanted in one direction, it’s reasonable to ask what we we may be missing. We don’t have to ascribe to the idea of perfectly rational actors in every front office to accept the fact that teams have more and better information than we do, and when there’s a big disconnect between what we see and what they see, we should at least consider the possibility that they know more than we do. And when we look back at the recent history of unpopular transactions, there’s a decent amount of evidence that the magnitude of the criticism looks a bit silly in retrospect.

The most obvious comparison to this kind of prospect-for-pitcher trade backlash is the James Shields trade; in the aftermath of that deal, my post about the trade began “Royals Mortgage Future to Be Mediocre in 2013.” And while the Royals did indeed fail to reach the postseason in their first year with Shields, he helped them make a World Series run in 2014, and then they managed to win the whole thing this year, capping off a strong three year run that has revitalized baseball in Kansas City. With the benefit of hindsight, I certainly could have been a bit more nuanced with my opinion on that trade.

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As the reader has certainly heard, the Arizona Diamondbacks sent an impressive collection of talent to Atlanta on Tuesday night in exchange for right-hander Shelby Miller. As Jeff Sullivan has already noted here, the benefits of the deal for the D-backs aren’t particularly easy to identify. They acquire three years of Miller, yes, but at the cost not only of three promising young players, but also of relying more heavily on Yasmany Tomas. In the final analysis, the present gains appear to be minimal, while the future losses are quite possibly substantial.

Among the more notable qualities of the trade is Arizona’s decision to part with shortstop Dansby Swanson, the No. 1 overall pick from the most recent draft. In light of that draft pedigree and his current place among all prospects — MLB.com ranks him 10th currently — it’s not a stretch to suggest that Swanson is worth $50 million right now. Which is to say: a lot. There is, of course, no guarantee that Swanson will be great, but there’s also no guarantee about any of these human people. One works in probabilities, and the probability that Swanson develops into a useful player — or something more impressive than that — is pretty strong.

And here’s the most curious thing: the D-backs just acquired Swanson five months ago. Given a choice of all draft-eligible amateurs back in June, the D-backs selected him. And now they’ve surrendered him less than half a year later. Is it possible that their evaluation of Swanson has changed dramatically over that interval? Yes, but only in the same way that escaping the constant burden of one’s mortality is possible: not very.

And working under the assumption that the D-backs think roughly the same of Swanson that they did back in June, it’s difficult to perform any manner of calculus which suggests that the D-backs have employed maximum wisdom by dealing Swanson et al.

If trading a No. 1 pick a mere five months after his draft seems uncommon, that’s because it is. Indeed, up until this past April, it would have been illegal. That’s when Major League Baseball amended a rule that forbade the trading of a player during the first 12 months following his draft. Now teams must only wait until the conclusion of the World Series. That’s what made Swanson available so soon.

Beyond the rules, however, trading No. 1 picks has been rare anyway. And it follows: a club performs considerable due diligence while leading up to a first-overall selection — and likely becomes attached to the player whom they select. Whether because of their belief in the player, or the considerable investment of time and energy and money which that player represents

So it’s a rare occurrence. But how rare is it?

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With the title of this post, I have given myself an admittedly difficult task, given most comments about this trade since it went down. Arizona traded two top-100 prospects, including one player in the top 25 (at least), as well as a proven major league outfielder in exchange for a somewhat inconsistent pitcher, albeit one coming off a three-win season and with three more years of control. For the most part, everybody is beating up on the Diamondbacks — and for good reason: we don’t know the internal valuations the Diamondbacks possess on their own players and players outside their organization, but there is a general consensus that whatever those valuations are, they do not match up the rest of baseball. As a result, they have undersold their assets compared to the rest of the market. If we take out the external valuations of players like Dansby Swanson, Aaron Blair, and Ender Inciarte, can we make a case that, internally, the decision might have been sound?

What I am trying to get at is this: the trade value on the open market for Dansby Swanson, Aaron Blair, and Ender Inciarte is much greater than one Shelby Miller, but if you are the Diamondbacks and presented one choice and one choice only, how do we get to a spot where you choose Shelby Miller over Dansby Swanson, Aaron Blair, and Ender Inciarte?

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