Postseason Manager Report Cards: Joe Espada and Chad Tracy
Over the weekend, I graded the managerial performances of the two National League managers eliminated in the Wild Card round. Now, it’s on to the American League. Both Joe Espada’s Astros and Chad Tracy’s Red Sox lasted just two games in the playoffs and didn’t even make it to October, but each still had plenty of decisions to make in their 18 innings at the postseason helm.
I went over this in the NL rundown, but I’ll say again that like Ben Clemens, who originated this series, I care about process and not results here. It’s easy to say “that was a great move because it worked” or “that was a bad move because it failed,” but managers obviously can’t know the result of their decision as they’re making it. I’ve tried my best to transport myself back to the moment of each decision — taking into account the pitches, innings, and plate appearances that led up to it — while ignoring the outcomes.
Before we begin, I’ll also reiterate that while these are ostensibly manager report cards, there’s a much larger group of people behind the manager that helps to inform his decisions. Before the game, that includes discussions with the front office, which provides the reams of data that every manager has at his disposal during play; in-game, he’s getting feedback from his coaching staff and players on their levels of health and readiness. It really does take a village to get through a baseball game, and realistically, the praise and scorn doesn’t belong to the manager alone.
Let’s get into it.
Joe Espada
Batting: Incomplete
None of the managers who lost in the Wild Card round made fewer changes than Espada, who pinch-hit just once in two losses to the White Sox. That one substitution worked brilliantly, with righty Nelson Velázquez hitting for lefty Taylor Trammell against southpaw Sean Newcomb and promptly homering to give the Astros their first two runs of Game 1. That was a no-brainer of a decision for a team that needed runs; Velázquez had an 88 wRC+ against lefties this year to Trammell’s horrendous 12.
Espada’s ability to go to his bench was hamstrung in Game 2, as right knee soreness incurred in Game 1 limited Isaac Paredes to DH duty and forced Nick Allen into the starting lineup at third base. Letting Allen hit in the fifth inning down by a run with a runner on first and one out was understandable. Using a bat like Trammell or Joey Loperfido would have forced Raynel Delgado into the game at third, and no matter the leverage of the situation, Espada would have had to pinch-hit for him when his spot came up, with no backup infielders left at that point.
The overall lack of offensive mixing-and-matching from Espada was more of a roster construction problem than a manager issue, as was the club’s batting order. Espada’s lineup created a pocket of righties from spots three through six, with Yordan Alvarez batting second as the only hard-hitting lefty to plan around. Still, he really couldn’t have put his lineup together any better given the cards he was dealt.
Pitching: C+
When grading the Wild Card managers, I’ve tried to be sympathetic to those without much to work with, and that was absolutely the case for Espada and his pitching staff. I wouldn’t wish a Game 1 bullpen game on a manager even if he was my worst enemy, and especially not one with Houston’s pitching staff. And given that the Astros clinched on the last day of the season, they couldn’t have lined the pitching up any differently, either. But while a bullpen game was necessary, starting the game with AJ Blubaugh on the mound wasn’t.
Blubaugh, who led all relievers in innings pitched this year with 96, was an unsung hero for the Astros during the regular season. But his 2026 was marked more by quantity than quality; his 3.66 ERA outpaced his 4.25 xERA and 4.31 FIP, and he limped to the finish line with 10 runs allowed in his last 10 appearances. Fellow righty Miguel Ullola finished his season stronger and could have provided length similar to the best version of Blubaugh (as he showed later in the game). Or, given the White Sox’s penchant for aggressive in-game platooning, going with a lefty like Josh Hendrickson, Bennett Sousa, or Bryan King may well have forced White Sox manager Will Venable into aggressively substituting once a lefty was out of the game. That might have led to Randal Grichuk starting the game with the platoon advantage and then being pinch-hit for as soon as Espada brought in a righty. Once that happened, Espada would have had a clearer lane of lefty bats to manage against, allowing him to use a second lefty pitcher like Hendrickson, Sousa, or King. Venable may well have countered with someone like Tommy Pham, but getting Grichuk’s lefty-mashing bat out of the game after a single plate appearance would’ve been a big win.
Espada managed from behind for the rest of the game, and once Blubaugh exited, all of his decisions were logical but came too late for the offense to recover. King ended up with a logical pocket of four lefties in six batters before turning the ball over to Ullola, who was a godsend, providing length without Espada having to worry about left-right matchups. Once Ullola was done, it was the standard manager playbook of alternating lefties and righties to play matchups, before giving the ball to his highest-leverage arms in Bryan Abreu and Josh Hader in the eighth and ninth. Houston was down by four runs when Abreu entered and by three runs when Hader came in, but in a best-of-three series, chasing a Game 1 win by using your best arms is what I would have done, too.
Game 2 could not have started more disastrously, with the Astros’ best starter, Hunter Brown, unable to make it out of the first inning. While he was let down by his defense and didn’t pitch quite as badly as his line would suggest, I understand Espada’s urgency in pulling the plug and making it a second straight bullpen game. But Blubaugh again being the first reliever out of the ‘pen was puzzling, and my evaluation doesn’t care that it happened to work out. This was another chance for Espada to bring in a southpaw against a lineup with five lefties in its first six spots, and yet Blubaugh was called upon to face Sam Antonacci and the top of the White Sox lineup for the second time in two days. Doubling down by sending Blubaugh back out for the second was equally perplexing, especially with Peter Lambert available for length.
After the second inning, however, I thought Espada redeemed himself with a near-perfect set of moves given his personnel. Lambert was the best arm available for the middle frames, and with very few trusted arms on staff, I’m giving his manager a pass for allowing him to face more than nine hitters. Batters 10 and 11 drawing walks made it Bryan Abreu time in the sixth with nobody out, again the appropriate move given that the Astros were down by one at the time and it was a must-win game. Abreu is no stranger to coming in and cleaning up messes, and while Chase Meidroth took him deep, he carved through eight outs thereafter before turning the ball over to Hader for four outs.
After Meidroth homered, the Astros trailed by four for the remainder of the game, and knowing that the Astros would need Hader for a third straight game if they miraculously pulled off a Game 2 comeback, I think Espada struck the right balance between getting Hader into the game and being cognizant that he’d need his closer the next day. With the benefit of hindsight, that exposes the danger of chasing a comeback by using Hader in Game 1 — and I certainly wouldn’t have liked using him in that game if the Astros were down four or five — but as I’ve mentioned repeatedly during these report cards, the manager can’t know the future. The best chance of pulling out win in a Game 1 that was still within striking distance comes by using Hader in the ninth, and the same is true for a Game 2 comeback.
Chad Tracy
Batting: Incomplete
Tracy entered the Wild Card Series with his healthiest and most complete offense of the season, and he lined things up about as well as you can against a tough customer like Cam Schlittler in Game 1. The Yankees used two righties in relief of Schlittler, and the only move Tracy made was to pinch-hit Andruw Monasterio for the injured Roman Anthony in the sixth, with Schlittler still in the game.
Anthony was removed from the roster prior to Game 2 due to his hand injury, and the combination of that and a tough opposing lefty in Max Fried led to a very different lineup for Boston, though one that I also didn’t have any problems with. Tracy’s one pinch-hit move of the night was playing the platoon game by swapping Nate Eaton out for Jarren Duran against Will Warren in the eighth. There weren’t many moves, hence the incomplete, but the ones he made were good.
Pitching: C
Out of the eight grades I’ve given to the managers eliminated in the Wild Card round, this was the toughest one to sort out. In a nutshell, I loved what Tracy did with his starting pitchers and strongly disliked which relievers he chose to deploy when.
Payton Tolle faced 19 batters in his Game 1 start, and was presumably allowed to face Paul Goldschmidt for a third time because Tracy would’ve rather had that matchup than likely pinch-hitter Luis García Jr. against a righty pitcher. That allowed Tracy to deploy lefty Erik Miller against Ben Rice… which immediately backfired, as Rice homered. Still, I have no problem with that choice. Rice was worse against lefties this year, and while Miller struggled in September, I understand going with the big stuff against Rice’s big swing. The bullpen arms used after Miller, though, represented baffling choice after baffling choice.
Still down just two runs, Tracy used lower-leverage arms Greg Weissert and Alec Gamboa, with Gamboa, Wyatt Olds and Brayan Bello allowing the Yankees to blow the game wide open on their way to a 9-0 drubbing. In a postgame exchange with the Boston Globe’s Tim Healey, Tracy defended using the pitchers he did — thereby lowering his win probability for that game compared to using better arms like Garrett Whitlock or Aroldis Chapman — as being a consequence of an offense that was, in his estimation, unlikely to come back no matter who pitched.
While I understand taking the long view of potentially needing to play three games in three days, if you aren’t going to chase a win down two runs with Schlittler soon to come out of the game, when are you going to chase a win? A manager can only manage the game in front of him, and for all Tracy knew, the Red Sox could end up winning Game 2 without needing Whitlock or Chapman anyway.
Game 2 ended up having a similar inflection point, with starter Sonny Gray pulled after just 70 pitches and 19 batters. That led to quite the anti-analytics firestorm on social media, but here in my corner of the internet, removing Gray was a clear-cut decision. I don’t care about Gray’s third-time-through-the-order performance being really good this season; he was bad in that scenario last year, and the third-time-through penalty is always going to exist to at least some extent. Gray had also allowed four of the last eight batters to reach and was clearly losing effectiveness. But giving Cody Bellinger another look at Miller a day after the lefty’s own ineffectiveness wasn’t ideal; unless Garrett Crochet was completely uncomfortable coming in with runners on base, I’d have preferred him in that scenario.
Instead, Crochet came in to start the following inning and the game went sideways from there. Spencer Jones reached on a strikeout-wild pitch and the inning spiraled thereafter, and while it wasn’t all Crochet’s fault, his performance all but assured a loss. Tracy then proved my earlier point about not knowing what the next day’s game will hold by using Whitlock down two runs with the bases loaded in the sixth and Chapman down seven runs in the eighth. Using Whitlock there was a coherent attempt to keep the game close, while Chapman was a “well, we need a miracle” pitching change. Had the Red Sox used Chapman and Whitlock to chase a win in Game 1 and ultimately won, Chapman never would’ve pitched down seven runs in Game 2, since Game 3 would be on the horizon. In sum: Yes, it matters when there’s a game tomorrow, but tomorrow’s game can go any which way. If you’re only down a couple runs and have a rested leverage arm, use him.
