Pitchers and catchers are in the house, we unfortunately have our first major spring training injury, and our offseason series of contact management/quality articles rolls toward its conclusion. Earlier this week, we examined American League pitching non-qualifiers; today, our eyes turn to the senior circuit.
Two weeks have elapsed since I last wrote about the Rockies, so I hope enough time has passed to allow me to return to the subject matter.
As we know, Colorado has experimented with a number of approaches to pitching at Coors Field, from sinker-heavy staffs to expensive free agents to four-man rotations. Nothing, it seems, has worked. Back in January, I wrote about how the Rockies ought to be a center of pitching innovation when I advocated for the club to break away from the traditional five-man rotation.
While battling fatigue is one significant issue tied to pitching at altitude, another is, of course, the movement of pitches in the thin air. One kind FanGraphs reader directed my attention to a Dan Rozenson study on pitch effectiveness at Coors Field.
Wrote Rozenson:
There is strong evidence that the slider performs in absolute and comparative terms better than the curveball in Coors Field. Part of this can probably be attributed to the fact that sliders deviate from the “gyroball” trajectory of a pitch thrown in a vacuum the least of the major pitch types. Sinking fastballs also have a sharp drop-off in performance at Coors, and there is some evidence that using a cut fastball would be a good alternative.
Rockies management would be wise to learn from failed pitching experiments past. Their system ought to emphasize pitchers developing an arsenal of pitches that could be used effectively at home. This most obviously means encouraging their pitchers to throw sliders instead of curveballs as their main breaking ball, although further study might be able to illuminate what other pitches offer a comparative advantage in Denver.
Monday afternoon, I put up an InstaGraphs post titled “The Least Intimidating Hitter in Baseball.” The idea was to use a formula including fastball rate and zone rate, because, the way I figure, the more aggressively a hitter gets pitched, the less the pitchers are afraid of. I combined a couple z-scores to get a number I’ll refer to today as the Aggressiveness Index, and many of the players in the linked post are unsurprising. Turns out pitchers go after Ben Revere aggressively. Ditto Nori Aoki and Billy Burns. There’s nothing weird there.
But a certain name showed up in eighth place. Last year, pitchers didn’t show any significant fear of facing DJ LeMahieu. That makes sense if you weren’t paying attention, but LeMahieu played every day, and finished with a 128 wRC+. LeMahieu, ever so quietly, had himself a breakout, four-win season, yet it looks like pitchers just didn’t care.
Yesterday, the Colorado Rockies traded right-hander Eddie Butler to the Chicago Cubs in exchange for a modestly promising relief prospect (James Farris) and the 28th international bonus slot.
Even as recently as last year, the notion of such a move would have seemed improbable. Butler appeared twice — as recently as 2015 — on Baseball America’s top-100 prospects list. The Rockies’ rotation, meanwhile, has been quite poor, producing the second-lowest collective WAR in the majors over the last five years. They haven’t been a club, in other words, that had the luxury of giving up on a promising young pitcher.
But Colorado’s rotation has improved rapidly, while Butler’s stock has declined just as quickly. In the end, general manager Jeff Bridich concluded there wasn’t space on the roster for Eddie Butler. He made a deal.
But this isn’t just a late-January transaction that ought to be forgotten. Because Butler has shown promise. Let’s instead follow his story up to this point. He deserves it after toiling in Coors for so long, and it might provide us a glimpse of his future.
We’ve written a lot about the Rockies in the last week. David Laurila interviewed GM Jeff Bridich about how he sees the organization, we talked about their signing of Greg Holland, Jeff Sullivan covered their pitch-framing possibilities, and Travis Sawchik suggested they try something different with their pitching staff. Finally, this morning, we wrapped up unofficial Rockies week with the team’s ZIPS projections.
That’s a lot of Rockies content, but all have it has been focused on specific parts of the team, while leaving mostly untouched the question that is central to their organization and the moves they made this winter: are the Rockies legitimate contenders this year?
After having typically appeared in the very famous pages of Baseball Think Factory, Dan Szymborski’s ZiPS projections have been released at FanGraphs the past few years. The exercise continues this offseason. Below are the projections for the Colorado Rockies. Szymborski can be found at ESPN and on Twitter at @DSzymborski.
Other Projections: Arizona / Atlanta / Baltimore / Boston / Chicago AL / Chicago NL / Cleveland / Detroit / Houston / Kansas City / Los Angeles AL / Los Angeles NL / Miami / Milwaukee / Minnesota / New York AL / Oakland / Pittsburgh / St. Louis / San Diego / San Francisco / Seattle / Tampa Bay / Texas / Toronto / Washington.
Batters
Colorado field players produced slightly fewer wins than the average unit in 2016. The numbers here suggest that, given reasonable health, that same group ought to rate as something slightly better than average in 2017. Unsurprisingly, Nolan Arenado (646 PA, 4.7 zWAR) receives the club’s top wins projection. ZiPS calls for Arenado not only to produce the top batting line on the team (.374 wOBA), but also — after accounting for the third-base positional adjustment — to produce more than a win with his glove.
Of some interest here is the projection for Ian Desmond (639, 1.7). He’s forecast to record +6 runs at first base, a position he’s played zero times as a professional. Of course, one would expect a former shortstop to handle first base with some ease; however, those curious about Szymborski’ methodology should definitely, definitely, definitely contact him definitely at @DSzymborski.
Finally, a brief examination of things reveals that Colorado employs not one, but two, Gerardo Parras: Parra himself and also Raimel Tapia. Tapia’s No. 1 comp is the 23-year-old version of Parra.
I can understand why you would dream on the Rockies if you live in Denver or if you just want to see some new blood in the NL playoff field. Nolan Arenado is a MVP-caliber player. Trevor Story could settle in as a two- or three-win shortstop. Brendan Rodgers will soon arrive to help in the middle infield.
Carlos Gonzalez can still hit. Charlie Blackmon can, too, and there are other intriguing young outfield options ready to complement them. While signing Ian Desmond to play first base remains a curious decision, he could be a30-homer threat while offering positional versatility.
Tony Wolters has gone from middling shortstop prospect with the Indians to an above-average, pitch-framing catcher with the Rockies. As Jeff Sullivan noted Thursday, the Rockies could have their best framing team in history.
There are certainly questions about the fielding capabilities of the position-player group: the Rockies ranked 28th in baseball in defensive efficiency last season according to Baseball Prospectus, and have a spacious outfield to defend. But the Rockies could score enough runs — and save enough runs through framing — to be interesting.
Then, of course, there’s that whole element of pitching.
The Rockies own an MLB-worst ERA since coming into existence in 1993, a nice round 5.00 mark. The Rockies have often allowed the most runs of any team each season. It shouldn’t be a surprise, either, given how their first-ever home game ended.
Of course, Coors Field is an extreme offensive environment that inflates run production. But when adjusting for Coors Field and the league-average run environment, the Rockies’ pitching has still generally been below average. Since 2012, the Rockies’ league- and park-adjusted ERA- (103) is the second worst in the NL. Since the turn of the century, the Rockies’ ERA- (103) is tied for the fifth-worst mark in the NL. The Rockies have been league average or better according to ERA- just eight times in franchise history, including last season.
Rockies’ decision makers have tried all sorts of strategies over the years, from high-priced, proven starting pitching, to ground-ball specialists, to arms developed right in the system. Nothing has worked.
So, in an offseason in which the Rockies have done some unorthodox things, perhaps now is the time for the Rockies to be bold and unconventional with their pitching staff.
In two months or so, we’ll roll out our 2017 positional power rankings. Between now and then, not a whole lot should change, so perhaps I shouldn’t go out of my way to issue spoilers. But, what the hell, here’s our current ranking of the catchers. The Giants are in first. Buster Posey is amazing! The Rockies are in last. Their catchers are also amazing, but less amazing relative to all the other amazing catchers in the majors.
Maybe this is a good way to sum it up: Tony Wolters is expected to get the bulk of the playing time behind the plate, and 11 months ago the Rockies grabbed him off waivers from the Indians. Wolters isn’t projected to hit much, because he’s never hit much, because he’s not much of a hitter.
What he is, though, is a defender. He emerged last year as one of the better pitch-framers in the league. And now the Rockies overall project to get quite good pitch-framing in the season ahead. This is the silver lining — perhaps the Rockies catchers won’t hit so much, but it looks like they could combine to provide the best receiving skills the Rockies have ever had.
Yesterday, Greg Holland reportedly agreed to sign with the Colorado Rockies. As a guy coming off arm surgery, looking to re-establish himself as a premier reliever and rebuild his value, going to Denver seems to be an odd choice. As Travis Sawchik noted this morning, the recent history of pitchers escaping Colorado and finding significant paychecks are not great, and of course, because of how the park plays, Holland’s numbers are likely to be worse this year than if he had agreed to sign closer to sea level.
Generally, we’re used to players looking for big contracts next year signing in venues that fit their skills, and these type of one year deals are often called “pillow contracts”, but there’s nothing soft and comfortable about pitching in Coors Field. Maybe we need a new name for Holland’s choice? “A bed of nails contract” doesn’t roll off the tongue quite so easily, but more accurately portrays the situation Holland seemingly placed himself in.
But in thinking about why Holland would go to Colorado, I think we need to acknowledge that the game has evolved, and the methodologies for evaluating player performances have changed dramatically. And given those changes, maybe Holland didn’t just take a short-term cash-grab that puts him in a worse position for next year; maybe he made a choice that could actually be beneficial to his future earnings.
Coors Field is typically not the arena upon which pitchers settle to rebuild their value. They go there because they were conscripted into service, having been drafted by the Rockies. They go there because the Rockies offered them a considerable sum for their services.
For years, Coors Field has been one of baseball’s most difficult places to pitch. It remains that way in the present.
Which brings us to Greg Holland and his curious decision to sign with the Rockies. Nicolas Stellini covered all the details of the one-year deal with a vesting option already. What I’d like to consider here is the wisdom of the deal from Holland’s perspective.
Greg Holland is either a very confident man or the Rockies’ offer to him represented the best that he’d received this offseason or, perhaps, both. There was other reported interest from the Dodgers, Cubs, Nationals, Rays, and Reds.
As a free-agent pitcher recovering either from injury or a poor season works down his preference list of those places he’d like to salvage his career, Coors Field typically comes up near the end.
And there’s evidence to support that line of thinking. Consider: of the 80 most lucrative contracts in the sport’s history, most being free-agent deals, none was awarded to a pitcher who had most recently pitched for the Rockies.