As I’ve done for the past few years, I’m going to be grading each eliminated postseason manager on their decision-making. We spend the year mostly ignoring managers’ on-field contributions, because to be honest, they’re pretty small. Using the wrong reliever in the eighth inning just doesn’t feel that bad on June 22; there are so many more games still coming, and the regular season is more about managing the grind than getting every possible edge every day. The playoffs aren’t like that; with so few games to separate wheat from chaff, every last ounce of win probability matters, and managers make personnel decisions accordingly. What better time to grade them?

My goal is to evaluate each manager in terms of process, not results. If you bring in your best pitcher to face their best hitter in a huge spot, that’s a good decision regardless of outcome. Try a triple steal with the bases loaded only to have the other team make four throwing errors to score three runs? I’m probably going to call that a blunder even though it worked out. Managers do plenty of other things — getting team buy-in for new strategies and unconventional bullpen usage behind closed doors is a skill I find particularly valuable — but as I have no insight into how that’s accomplished or how each manager differs, I can’t exactly assign grades for it.

I’m also purposefully avoiding vague qualitative concerns like “trusting your veterans because they’ve been there before.” Playoff coverage lovingly focuses on clutch plays by proven performers, but Adolis García and Alek Thomas have been great, too. Forget trusting your veterans; the playoffs are about trusting your best players. Corey Seager is important because he’s great, not because of the number of playoff series he’s appeared in. There’s nothing inherently good about having been around a long time; when I’m evaluating decisions, “but he’s a veteran” just doesn’t enter my thought process.

One note: In the pitching section, I’m taking a more specific look at reliever matchups. This 2022 Cameron Grove study, which I’ve mentioned in a few prior report cards, measures a repeat-matchup reliever penalty. A forthcoming article, which I’ve reviewed, examines the issue without focusing on specific matchups, but rather looking at relievers pitching on back-to-back days or on short rest after heavy workloads. Both of these things are, unsurprisingly, bad for reliever performance. Managing the balance between starter and reliever over-work is really hard. I probably haven’t given enough credit to the necessity of balancing bullpen workloads against particular opposing batters in the past, but I’ll make a note of it going forward.

I’ve already covered the losing managers of the Wild Card round and the various division series eliminations. Today, it’s Dusty Baker’s turn. Read the rest of this entry »

Baseball games don’t have a single protagonist. Baseball series don’t have a single protagonist either. The vagaries of a nine-man lineup, four-man rotation, and eight-man bullpen mean that the most important moments of a series feature semi-random matchups. Bryce Harper doesn’t get to bring the ball up, call for an isolation, and try to hit a game-tying home run. You can’t game plan a high-leverage at-bat for your star. It’s just probability; the big moments can’t possibly find the same guy every time, which is what makes baseball such a team sport.

Okay, now that I’ve said that: This game was Adolis García’s game, and this series was his series. He’s been at the center of everything ever since the start of the ALCS, but particularly for the past three games. First, Bryan Abreu hit him with a pitch that emptied the benches in Game 5 and eventually led to a memorable Astros comeback from García’s own three-run homer. He came back on Sunday determined to extract vengeance, and eventually succeeded. He took 16 swings at 22 pitches, first racking up four strikeouts but then hitting a majestic, game-breaking grand slam. On Monday, he was right in the middle of things again.

In the first inning, García stepped into Cristian Javier’s nightmare: Corey Seager demolished a high fastball for a 1-0 lead, Evan Carter walked and stole second, and García was at the plate threatening to break the game open before the Astros even batted. Javier threw him a fastball roughly six inches above the top of the strike zone. But García was up there to swing, not take, and he smashed a single off the face of the left field wall to score Carter. It was more of a double and a running error if I’m being honest; García, intent on celebrating his success against the Astros to the fullest, took a leisurely look at the rapidly receding baseball before he realized it wouldn’t leave the park. He scurried to first at half speed, chagrined, before stealing second immediately. Read the rest of this entry »

In the first game of the ALCS, Yordan Alvarez struck out three times; Jordan Montgomery got him on each of those. He had a plan to contain Alvarez, you see, a glorious plan. Jeff Passan profiled it over at ESPN. Pitching Twitter, a group I mostly count myself as a part of, was in rapture. Throw to the perfect locations! Yordan can’t stand this one simple trick! Could even the fiercest batters be tamed if pitchers could only come up with a good plan?

This plan, by the way, was a great one. Alvarez isn’t bad at any part of hitting, but his eye at the plate is his least-outstanding tool. And while he’s a fearsome power hitter, he’s not equally fearsome regardless of where the ball is pitched. Here’s a chart of his career ISO (on balls in play) based on where he makes contact:

On high-and-tight pitches, he doesn’t fare well, at least compared to the rest of his work. The deep blue section low and away is less important — he usually comes up empty when he swings at those — but either high and tight or low and away look like safe harbor for opposing pitchers. Montgomery pitched to maximize these two weaknesses. He worked his batting eye with curveballs below the zone and used his sinker almost exclusively on the inner edge of the plate:

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This is going to sound harsh right at the start, but here’s the deal. Craig Kimbrel is an objectively good major league pitcher. Alek Thomas is an objectively mediocre major league hitter. I’m not trying to say anything bad about Thomas, to be clear. I think he’s an awesome player, the kind of guy I’d like to have on my team for his impressive defensive ability. But Thomas started the day on the bench, and Kimbrel started the day as the Phillies closer. Neither of them look likely to head back to that role any time soon.

Why? Because after three hours and 14 pitchers, Game 4 of the NLCS came down to a simple matchup. Kimbrel stood on the mound. Lourdes Gurriel Jr. lounged on second base after a double to start the eighth. With a two-run lead, Kimbrel had a simple mission: keep the ball in the ballpark. His opponent? Thomas, who came in to pinch hit for Emmanuel Rivera. Thomas isn’t anyone’s idea of an ace pinch hitter. He compiled a 71 wRC+ this season, which brought his career mark to 72. He came into the game with a 56 wRC+ in the playoffs. The Phillies started a lefty, and it looked like Thomas might spend Friday’s game like he did Thursday’s, hanging out on the bench and then pinch running.

There was just one problem for Philadelphia: Kimbrel didn’t have his curveball. He’s built a Hall of Fame career on two pitches, but the standout is a knuckle curve that seems to tear the fabric of spacetime on its way home. It’s one of those pitches that, when it’s working, can’t be countered. It starts right in the middle of the plate, and then poof, it’s in the dirt while you flail helplessly. But on Friday, none of that was true. The first three curves Kimbrel threw missed badly. The fourth spun invitingly in the zone, and Evan Longoria barely missed it, socking a 96 mph line drive to deep left that landed in Brandon Marsh’s glove. Then Kimbrel missed with two curves to spot Thomas a 2-0 count. Read the rest of this entry »

As I’ve done for the past few years, I’m going to be grading each eliminated postseason manager on their decision-making. We spend the year mostly ignoring managers’ on-field contributions, because to be honest, they’re pretty small. Using the wrong reliever in the eighth inning just doesn’t feel that bad on June 22; there are so many more games still coming, and the regular season is more about managing the grind than getting every possible edge every day. The playoffs aren’t like that; with so few games to separate wheat from chaff, every last ounce of win probability matters, and managers make personnel decisions accordingly. What better time to grade them?

My goal is to evaluate each manager in terms of process, not results. If you bring in your best pitcher to face their best hitter in a huge spot, that’s a good decision regardless of outcome. Try a triple steal with the bases loaded only to have the other team make four throwing errors to score three runs? I’m probably going to call that a blunder even though it worked out. Managers do plenty of other things — getting team buy-in for new strategies and unconventional bullpen usage behind closed doors is a skill I find particularly valuable — but as I have no insight into how that’s accomplished or how each manager differs, I can’t exactly assign grades for it.

I’m also purposefully avoiding vague qualitative concerns like “trusting your veterans because they’ve been there before.” Playoff coverage lovingly focuses on clutch plays by proven performers, but Josh Jung and Geraldo Perdomo have been great, too. Forget trusting your veterans; the playoffs are about trusting your best players. Zack Wheeler is important because he’s a great player, not because of the number of playoff series he’s appeared in. There’s nothing inherently good about having been around a long time; when I’m evaluating decisions, “but he’s a veteran” just doesn’t enter my thought process.

I’ve already covered the losing managers of the Wild Card round and the other division series eliminations. Today, it’s Brian Snitker’s turn. Read the rest of this entry »

As I’ve done for the past few years, I’m going to be grading each eliminated postseason manager on their decision-making. We spend the year mostly ignoring managers’ on-field contributions, because to be honest, they’re pretty small. Using the wrong reliever in the eighth inning just doesn’t feel that bad on June 22; there are so many more games still coming, and the regular season is more about managing the grind than getting every possible edge every day. The playoffs aren’t like that; with so few games to separate wheat from chaff, every last ounce of win probability matters, and managers make personnel decisions accordingly. What better time to grade them?

My goal is to evaluate each manager in terms of process, not results. If you bring in your best pitcher to face their best hitter in a huge spot, that’s a good decision regardless of outcome. Try a triple steal with the bases loaded only to have the other team make four throwing errors to score three runs? I’m probably going to call that a blunder even though it worked out. Managers do plenty of other things – getting team buy-in for new strategies and unconventional bullpen usage behind closed doors is a skill I find particularly valuable – but as I have no insight into how that’s accomplished or how each manager differs, I can’t exactly assign grades for it.

I’m also purposefully avoiding vague qualitative concerns like “trusting your veterans because they’ve been there before.” Playoff coverage lovingly focuses on clutch plays by proven performers, but Evan Carter and Corbin Carroll have been great too. Forget trusting your veterans – the playoffs are about trusting your best players. Bryce Harper is important because he’s a great player, not because of the number of playoff series he’s appeared in. There’s nothing inherently good about having been around a long time; when I’m evaluating decisions, “but he’s a veteran” just doesn’t enter my thought process. I’ve already covered the losing managers of the Wild Card round and the ALDS. Dave Roberts is up next.
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Have you ever seen one of those horror movies with an unstoppable villain? They might get knocked down. A truck might run them over. They might fall out of a plane, or off a bridge, or into a bottomless pit. But then the camera cuts just so, and there’s that silhouette, lurching back into view, pursuing our protagonist despite the fact that they should have been down for the count.

I’m not making any fandom or value judgments here, but if you’re rooting against the Astros, they can feel like a movie monster. The Rangers did the baseball equivalent of knocking them over the head with a club in ALCS Game 2. They came out swinging against Justin Verlander last night to some success, but they really hit the accelerator against Framber Valdez in the first inning on Monday.

Marcus Semien smacked a first-pitch sinker past Jeremy Peña. Corey Seager blooped a first-pitch sinker into left. A batter later, Adolis García lined a first-pitch sinker into right for an RBI single. Mitch Garver never saw a sinker, but he did muscle the first in-zone pitch he saw to left, a sinking liner that brought home another run. Sprinkle in a bit of bad Houston luck — Valdez fumbled a comebacker for an error, Nathaniel Lowe hit a seeing-eye single on the kind of weak grounder that Valdez usually feasts on — and suddenly it was 4–0 Rangers. Read the rest of this entry »

As I’ve done for the past few years, I’m going to be grading each eliminated postseason manager on their decision-making. We spend the year mostly ignoring managers’ on-field contributions, because to be honest, they’re pretty small. Using the wrong reliever in the eighth inning just doesn’t feel that bad on June 22; there are so many more games still coming, and the regular season is more about managing the grind than getting every possible edge every day. The playoffs aren’t like that; with so few games to separate wheat from chaff, every last ounce of win probability matters, and managers make personnel decisions accordingly. What better time to grade them?

My goal is to evaluate each manager in terms of process, not results. If you bring in your best pitcher to face their best hitter in a huge spot, that’s a good decision regardless of outcome. Try a triple steal with the bases loaded only to have the other team make four throwing errors to score three runs? I’m probably going to call that a blunder even though it worked out. Managers do plenty of other things – getting team buy-in for new strategies and unconventional bullpen usage behind closed doors is a skill I find particularly valuable – but as I have no insight into how that’s accomplished or how each manager differs, I can’t exactly assign grades for it.

I’m also purposefully avoiding vague qualitative concerns like “trusting your veterans because they’ve been there before.” Playoff coverage lovingly focuses on clutch plays by proven performers, but Evan Carter and the entire Diamondbacks roster have been great too. Forget trusting your veterans – the playoffs are about trusting your best players. Carlos Correa is important because he’s a great player, not because of the number of playoff series he’s appeared in. There’s nothing inherently good about having been around a long time; when I’m evaluating decisions, “but he’s a veteran” just doesn’t enter my thought process. I’ve already covered the losing managers of the Wild Card round, as well as Brandon Hyde’s efforts. Today, it’s Rocco Baldelli’s turn. Read the rest of this entry »

As I’ve done for the past few years, I’m going to be grading each eliminated postseason manager on their decision-making. We spend the year mostly ignoring managers’ on-field contributions, because to be honest, they’re pretty small. Using the wrong reliever in the eighth inning just doesn’t feel that bad on June 22; there are so many more games still coming, and the regular season is more about managing the grind than getting every possible edge every day. The playoffs aren’t like that; with so few games to separate wheat from chaff, every last ounce of win probability matters, and managers make personnel decisions accordingly. What better time to grade them?

My goal is to evaluate each manager in terms of process, not results. If you bring in your best pitcher to face their best hitter in a huge spot, that’s a good decision regardless of outcome. Try a triple steal with the bases loaded only to have the other team make four throwing errors to score three runs? I’m probably going to call that a blunder even though it worked out. Managers do plenty of other things – getting team buy-in for new strategies and unconventional bullpen usage behind closed doors is a skill I find particularly valuable – but as I have no insight into how that’s accomplished or how each manager differs, I can’t exactly assign grades for it.

I’m also purposefully avoiding vague qualitative concerns like “trusting your veterans because they’ve been there before.” Playoff coverage lovingly focuses on clutch plays by proven performers, but Evan Carter and the entire Diamondbacks roster have been great too. Forget trusting your veterans – the playoffs are about trusting your best players. Bryce Harper is important because he’s a great player, not because of the number of playoff series he’s appeared in. There’s nothing inherently good about having been around a long time; when I’m evaluating decisions, “but he’s a veteran” just doesn’t enter my thought process. I’ve already covered the losing managers of the Wild Card round. Today, it’s Brandon Hyde’s turn. Read the rest of this entry »

You all know how playoff relief pitchers work these days. A starter comes out, perhaps earlier than he would in the regular season, and then the parade starts. A 23-year-old who throws 99 with a mind-bending slider. A former starter who pops 100 with ease. A crafty lefty is next, an embarrassment to his peers thanks to a mere 97-mph radar gun reading. Then it’s time for the big cheese, the bullpen anchor; he throws 100 as well, only with a secondary pitch that would get him convicted of witchcraft in an earlier era.

That’s just the way baseball has gone in recent years. Pitcher training is better than ever and velocity misses bats, so the trend is inexorable. In 2014, the average fastball thrown by a reliever in the playoffs checked in at 94.1 mph. In 2022, it hit 95.9 mph. In the not-so-distant future, it will surely top 96. If you can build the entire bullpen out of fireballers, why not do it?

It feels strange to call Ryan Pressly a junkballer. He sits 94-95 mph with a backspinning four-seamer. He threw a pitch 98 mph this season. He’s lived up near 100 at various points in his 11-year major league career. But in modern baseball, he’s downright quaint, a four-pitch reliever who doesn’t rely on gamebreaking velocity. Read the rest of this entry »