Archive for Daily Graphings

Back in last year’s playoffs — we’re going to think for a minute about last year’s playoffs — Mike Trout hit a big home run off James Shields. The pitch was a fastball, pretty high and pretty far inside, and though there’s nothing immediately unusual about Mike Trout hitting a dinger, that particular brand of dinger was unexpected. The pitch, to that point, had been a weakness for Trout. An increasingly-exploited weakness. You remember — we wrote about it like a thousand times. The Mike Trout scouting report started going around in April or May, and from there it never really corrected itself.

You’ll recognize this image, or at least something kind of like this image. Trout’s run-value heat map for 2014, from his player page:

The best player in baseball. Seemingly the most obvious Achilles’ heel in baseball. Who wouldn’t be fascinated? And, if you were a pitcher, why not try to adjust, if for no other reason than just to see? There were adjustments, indeed.

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I want you to look at three pictures. They’re all from the same play, and it would appear to be a fairly unremarkable play. But it was a remarkable play indeed, for reasons I’ll share with you right after the pictures. If you want to make a game of it, when you look at the pictures, try to figure out the significance before I tell you what it is!

Let’s go in order. What other way is there? One:

Two:

Three:

Some of you have surely guessed why this matters. Most of you, presumably, haven’t. This is a sequence in which Howie Kendrick popped up. More specifically, this features the very last time that Howie Kendrick popped up. For timing purposes, I don’t spot useful visual clues — Jonathan Villar, Marwin Gonzalez, and David Martinez all played for the Astros in 2014. But, see, I can cheat, because I know the answers. This didn’t happen anywhere in 2014. This happened in the middle of September in 2013. Howie Kendrick hasn’t hit a pop-up since September of the year that came before last year.

So Kendrick didn’t pop-up once over a full season. Now, he wasn’t the only one. Last year, Shin-Soo Choo didn’t register a pop-up. Neither did Joe Mauer. Christian Yelich only popped up on the very last day of the season. But, Kendrick batted a lot more often than Choo or Mauer did. And, this isn’t just a 2014 phenomenon. It’s not just that Kendrick didn’t pop up — it’s that Kendrick has always only very seldom popped up. And that’s an indicator of the very thing that makes him successful at the plate.

Read the rest at Just A Bit Outside.

The St. Louis Cardinals have had pretty good starting rotations in the recent past. In 2012 and 2013, they were exceptional. The rotation finished third in FIP- in 2012, and second in 2013. They were still pretty good last season, but not quite as good — they finished 11th in FIP-. That underscores a little bit of the tumult that the rotation experienced though. They needed 12 starters to get through the season, and as such it’s not all that surprising that they’re at least thinking about making a splash in the starting rotation market. But, do they need to?

There are two ways of looking at this. The first way is through the prism of last season. They had 11 guys make at least four starts, and needed a 12th starter overall. It was the first time since 2007 that they needed 12 starters, and the first time since 1999 when they need 11 guys to make four or more starts. So, it’s easy to see why they would want to build in some stability. Especially when some of the pitchers that they’re counting on have some question marks.

Adam Wainwright was not nearly as good in the second half as he was in the first, collapsed in October, and then had minor elbow surgery following the season. It’s folly to use the second half of a season to predict the next one, but it’s also hard to look at that and not be a little concerned. Especially when the pitcher in question has the age of 30 firmly in his rearview mirror and recently had Tommy John surgery.

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Perhaps all of the wheeling and dealing is not over just yet, but seeing as it’s been a few weeks since the Oakland A’s have made a trade, perhaps Billy Beane’s manic winter has wound down to something like a conclusion. Here’s more or less what’s happened so far:

I’ve been a big fan of what Beane has been doing this offseason because, heck, it’s entertaining! Things have been so unpredictable in Oakland that no move would surprise us next. Sometimes proponents of different schools of thought are split when it comes to grading transactions, but this is a rare case of universal bewilderment.

It feels like we’ll only truly understand these moves in hindsight, once some actual games have been played. Will Oakland be positioned as a buyer or as a seller during next July’s trade deadline? Either option seems a viable possibility.

While I could be proven wrong if Oakland rolls out a 70-win season, here’s my best guess as to what it all means: Beane is trying to fill up his roster with as many players who are league average or better (2+ WAR) as he can. That is, Beane would be willing to trade away one star-level player (i.e., Jeff Samardzija) in exchange for two players who project as about league-average (i.e., Marcus Semien and Josh Phegley). As Dave has written about recently, the difference in value between a star player and an average one just might be a lot smaller than we think. Perhaps Oakland is operating under the assumption that a lineup without weak spots totally makes up that gap between star and mere starter.

Let’s look at the 2015 Steamer600 projections for all the players who ended the 2014 season with the A’s, and then all the players who are currently on the Oakland roster. I included everybody who was projected for at least 100 PAs or 30 innings pitched in the majors:

So if the A’s returned their exact same lineup for 2015, they would have 13 players who are projected to produce at least 2 WAR over the course of a full season of playoff time. With the lineup the A’s actually have, they now have 10 such players.

Obviously 13 is a larger number than 10. But consider: the A’s end-season roster from last year was the result of some very expensive trade-deadline moves. Lester, Samardzija, and Hammel were purchased at a high price, with both Lester and Hammel due to become free agents at the end of last season. For all of the big names they’ve traded away this offseason, it’s remarkable, then, that the A’s have ended up with almost the same number of average-or-better players they had before their trade deadline action. (Yoenis Cespedes, traded for Lester, was another projected average-or-better player on Oakland’s roster last year.)

This is actually a pretty unique piece of roster construction. The Seattle Mariners, which FanGraphs currently projects as having the second-best record in 2015, only have eight average-or-better players (Robinson Cano, Kyle Seager, Brad Miller, Mike Zunino, Chris Taylor, Austin Jackson, Felix Hernandez, Hisashi Iwakuma). The Angels, projected to finish two games better than the A’s, also have eight (Mike Trout, Erick Aybar, Albert Pujols, Kole Calhoun, Chris Iannetta, David Freese, Garrett Richards, Tyler Skaggs). After pushing so many chips in the middle of the table this winter, the White Sox have all of six (Jose Abreu, Alexei Ramirez, Adam Eaton, Chris Sale, Samardzija, Jose Quintana).

Projected to have the league’s best record, the Dodgers have an impressive 13 of these players (Yasiel Puig, Adrian Gonzalez, Juan Uribe, Howie Kendrick, Jimmy Rollins, Yasmani Grandal, Joc Pederson, Carl Crawford, A.J. Ellis, Clayton Kershaw, Zack Greinke, Brandon McCarthy, Hyun-Jin Ryu). The main difference being that the Dodgers will spend about four times as much on their team in 2015 as the A’s will.

By acquiring league-average players in addition to intriguing prospects, Beane just might be giving himself his best possible chance at fulfilling the intrinsically opposite goals of (1) cutting payroll and (2) remaining in contention. On Opening Day last year, the A’s had a payroll that was about 130% the size of their payroll a year previous, and about 160% the size of the payroll the year before that. If reducing payroll was the A’s top priority heading into the winter, well, Beane has definitely made lemonade out of lemons here.

Or, shoot, maybe he’s just rebuilding.

Earlier, I asked you to participate in an exercise projecting both next year’s Mookie Betts and next year’s Javier Baez. The idea is that Betts seems representative of a particularly safe prospect, while Baez represents something of a more volatile asset. I promised that I would analyze the results given a sufficient sample size of votes, and, such a sample size has already been achieved. Interestingly, as of right now, there have been three more votes in the Baez poll than in the identical Betts poll. The best possible conclusion is that three FanGraphs readers had their browsers lock up at a most unfortunate time. The worst possible conclusion is chilling indeed.

So I think it’s safe to move forward with a little analysis. Before getting there, I hope you understand that *I* understand that I didn’t conduct this exercise perfectly. Nevermind the wisdom of the exercise in the first place; all my words might’ve biased the voters to some degree. I could’ve written nothing, or I could’ve at least put the polls before the words. But, what’s done is done. Also understand that, while you’re going to see a measure of uncertainty, this is perceived uncertainty, and not actual uncertainty. We can’t know actual uncertainty. We’re just going to go ahead and pretend like what we think is a decent proxy for what actually is. Let’s see how the community feels about Mookie Betts and Javier Baez, for 2015.

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There is one pitcher out there that throws his changeup over 30% of the time and calls it a ‘heavy sinker.’ Alex Cobb aside, though, we traditionally lump the changeup in with the slider, the curve, the splitter — it’s not a fastball.

And yet, in some really important ways that go beyond movement and leak into usage, the change works like a sinker. In a league where strikeouts rule, the change actually has a strikeout problem.

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A number of people who are actually good at math have asked before why we don’t present measures of uncertainty, like error bars, when talking about WAR or projections. I’m not in charge of those things, myself, so I can’t give you the official answer, but, they’re difficult numbers to calculate, if they’re possible at all, and many people wouldn’t know how to understand them, and it’s unclear how much those measures would add to the picture anyway. Sometimes you’ll see projections presented in percentiles, like PECOTA, but generally speaking the percentiles can include almost any and all outcomes, so that doesn’t help much. There’s interest in seeing uncertainty, quantitated. It’s challenging, to do it in a meaningful way.

But I want to try something, again with your help. Last week, I ran a bunch of polls, and a few days ago I analyzed the information generated. Here I’d like to take a similar approach. Now, the post was inspired by the transcript of Dave’s Wednesday chat:

12:40
Comment From Curtis
Of all the prospects yet to debut in MLB, who has the highest bust probability in your eyes? Best chance to succeed?
12:41
Dave Cameron: Baez seems to have a very high chance of being nothing. Mookie Betts will be a solid player unless he dies.

Let’s think about Javier Baez and Mookie Betts. Let’s see what we can do to effectively crowdsource their uncertainties.

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Well, the 2015 Hall of Fame voting results rolled in Tuesday, and just about every member of the baseball media has already checked in with his or her opinion. With any luck, I’ll have the last word — at least chronologically. What are we to make of the election of Randy Johnson, Pedro Martinez, John Smoltz and Craig Biggio, and its resulting future impact upon the holdovers? Let’s take a look at some trends, and hone in on a couple of players most significantly impacted by this week’s proceedings. Read the rest of this entry »

In an appearance on FanGraphs Audio in early 2012, shortly after the latter had been traded to the Yankees in a deal that sent Jesus Montero to Seattle, managing editor Dave Cameron spoke to the possible reasons for then-rookie Michael Pineda’s success in 2011 despite the almost total absence of a changeup. The changeup, or at least some manner of pitch defined more by its vertical than its horizontal movement, is regarded generally as a prerequisite for success as a starting pitcher. By way of example, consider: of 2011’s 94 qualified pitchers, only seven (or, 7.4%) threw their curveball, changeup, and/or splitter a combined 10% or less. One of those seven was R.A. Dickey, a knuckleballer. Another was Alexi Ogando, a reliever throwing in a starter’s role. Other pitchers with other unique circumstances occupied the remainder of the list.

Michael Pineda was a member of that group, as well. Despite throwing either a fastball or slider about 94% of the time in 2011, Pineda produced an excellent rookie season, recording the 11th-best strikeout- and walk-rate differential among that same group of qualifiers, a park-adjusted xFIP 13% better than league average, and the second-best WAR figure among all rookies (including hitters).

Other pitchers had exhibited the ability to survive without some manner of downward-moving pitch, but all of them were attended by an explanation. What, I asked, was Pineda’s? Cameron’s answer: If you throw 95 mph and also feature better-than-average control, you have a larger margin for error than pitchers who don’t have or do those things.

Indeed, Pineda’s combination of velocity and control wasn’t common. In 2011, the league-average walk rate was 8.1%. Only five starting pitchers posted a walk rate lower than that league-average mark while also recording an average fastball velocity of 94.5 mph or better.

Read the rest on Just A Bit Outside.

The Yankees re-signed Stephen Drew, for one year and a few million dollars. It’s a questionable deal — nothing was available much beyond what Drew signed for, for a reason — but it at least seems like a better deal than the Royals giving Kendrys Morales two years. And the idea is simple: Drew’s a known capable defender, and he’s hit before, and if he totally busts, he can be dumped with little problem. The Yankees paid for a little insurance, and as recently as 2013 Drew was an above-average player.

But, there was the matter of 2014. The most recent year is the most significant year, and for Stephen Drew, the most recent year was an absolute nightmare. Drew was described in last year’s FanGraphs player profile as a “line-drive hitter”, so this is appropriately discouraging:

Everything cratered. In his most recent season, Stephen Drew sucked, and thanks to Joel Sherman, we were provided the following quote from some anonymous baseball executive:

There was never a time in which he looked like a major league hitter.

Pretty harsh, pretty bleak. Pretty true, or pretty hyperbolic? That much, we can try to investigate. Did 2014 Stephen Drew ever actually look like a major-league hitter?

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