The role of the closer is diminishing every year, but it seems like no one told the Tigers. Only five different Detroit relievers recorded a save last season, tied for the lowest total among all 30 teams. Over the past five years, only 13 Tigers have earned a save. No other team has had fewer than 17 different pitchers save a game in that time; the Rays have had 35. In the last ten years, the Tigers have had only 28 players save a game, still the lowest total in the sport. The Rays, for comparison, have had 57 different pitchers record a save since 2013.
In part, this is because Detroit hasn’t been very good. When save situations are few and far between, there is less need to spread around the closing opportunities. Yet it’s not all about the wins and losses. For the past decade, the Tigers have had a go-to closer nearly every year. From veteran relievers like Joaquín Benoit, Joe Nathan, Joakim Soria, and Francisco Rodríguez to younger arms like Shane Greene and Bryan Garcia, the Tigers have shown a tendency to name a singular closer and hand him the ball in the ninth.
It seemed like this trend might finally have come to an end when A.J. Hinch took over as manager, but Gregory Soto recorded the majority of his team’s saves in 2021 and prompted Hinch to name him the closer that October. In 2022, the Tigers had one of the deepest bullpens in baseball and easily could have opted for a closer-by-committee, but Hinch stayed true to his word. Soto earned 30 of their 38 saves and took the mound in the majority of save situations. Read the rest of this entry »
In baseball, there are two sounds that can’t quite be matched: the pop of the catcher’s glove after a sizzling fastball, and the sound of the ball being crushed by the meaty part of the barrel. No one is more familiar with the latter than Giancarlo Stanton. In the Statcast era, no hitter has consistently hit the ball as hard as he has; his otherworldly bat speed leads to some of the most impressive batted balls you’ll ever see.
Stanton’s outlier ability to hit the ball like it came out of a rocket will always raise his floor as a hitter compared to the average player. If you hit the ball like he does, even pounding it on the ground isn’t a huge concern. That doesn’t mean Stanton is impervious, however. You can’t post an exit velocity if you swing through the ball, and if he were to start making less contact, it would be a problem. In 2022, Stanton’s hit tool looked closer to that of Joey Gallo than Aaron Judge, which led to his worst full season in pinstripes by wRC+, and perhaps since his rookie year all the way back in 2010. His .211 batting average and .293 on-base percentage were both more than 50 points off his career marks. And while that decline could be partially attributed to Stanton entering his mid-30s, that’s not the only factor at play here.
Stanton’s season was marred by injury. He constantly dealt with lower leg injuries; ankle tendinitis, a calf strain, and a bruised foot all messed with the way he interacted with the ground, and it showed at the plate. As a rotational athlete, your ability to exude force into the ground is directly tied to the stability of your lower half. When a hitter’s stride foot lands, it sends energy into the ground that shoots back up for the lower half to absorb. If you stomp on the ground, there is a wave of energy that recoils through your legs and hips that you must control if you want to transfer that energy into your swing. Any hitter’s ability to do this would be disrupted by a single lower leg injury. That only worsens when you deal with injuries on both sides of your body like Stanton did, which can lead to multiple energy leakages that completely throw off your swing. For Stanton, those can be seen in the atypical movement of his feet before and during his rotation.
I’m going to show you exactly what that looked like, but first, let’s detail some of the ways Stanton struggled relative to previous seasons from a statistical perspective:
Giancarlo Stanton’s Performance in New York
Year
wRC+
AVG
Zone Contact %
wOBA v. Fastballs
PA
2018
128
.266
76.6
.415
705
2019
139
.288
77.3
.365
72
2020
143
.250
74.7
.428
94
2021
137
.273
76.5
.410
579
2022
115
.211
71.0
.320
452
Stanton’s drop in performance can be seen in his increased whiff rate in the zone and general performance against fastballs. A general rule of thumb is that great hitters crush fastballs. If a pitcher makes a mistake with a heater in the middle of the plate, they will pay the price. That becomes more difficult as velocity rises, but that’s where the great hitters set themselves apart from good hitters. Stanton has never been one to be overwhelmed by high velocity; in fact, he’s always been well above league average. But his injuries compromised his connection to the ground, and as a result, he struggled. The table below details his performance against high-velocity fastballs as a Yankee:
Stanton Against 95+ MPH Pitches
Year
Total Seen
wOBA
2018
397
0.375
2019
63
.374
2020
54
0.640
2021
393
.359
2022
403
.294
Stanton has dealt with soft tissue injuries for his entire tenure in New York, but he has still hit when he’s been on the field, including against high-velocity fastballs. But his .294 wOBA against this group of pitches was .017 points below league average and a big drop from his .359 mark in 2021, which was .049 points higher than the league average. This regression can be zoomed out on a more macro level, too. Stanton’s performance in the heart of the zone against fastballs also changed from 2021 to ’22:
Stanton Against Fastballs In Heart
Year
Overall wOBA/xwOBA
Overall K%
wOBA/xwOBA Behind in Count
K% Behind in Count
2018
.440/.460
13.5
.461/.469
28.9
2019
.261/.310
14.0
> 10 pitches
> 10 pitches
2020
.526/.547
14.7
> 10 pitches
> 10 pitches
2021
.459/.501
15.2
.493/.523
35.7
2022
.444/.382
34.1
.307/.259
56.3
SOURCE: Baseball Savant
There are a few takeaways from this. First, the drop in xwOBA in 2022 tells us Stanton’s expected stats were significantly worse than previous years on fastballs in the heart. He managed to keep his wOBA relatively high, but it seems like there was at least a little bit of luck involved. Next, when we focus in on in-zone fastballs when Stanton was behind in the count, you can see a precipitous drop from previous seasons. Like any great hitter, he would make pitchers pay for mistakes in the heart of the plate even when he was behind in the count, but that wasn’t the case last year. And while he is naturally a guess hitter, he seemed to rely too heavily on those guesses, and it resulted in many poor at-bats. A hitter of this caliber missing fastballs in the heart of the zone this much when behind in the count is a tell-tale sign that something is wrong. Those are the types of things you do when your body feels different and you can’t get to pitches you’ve always crushed.
To understand what I’m talking about, let’s run through a sequence where Stanton just looked off. This at-bat is from mid-July, after he suffered a right calf strain in late May and right around the time when he began missing time due to his left ankle. He started 2–0 on two fastballs out of the zone, then got three straight in the heart of the plate:
Pitch 3 (2–0 count)
Pitch 4 (2–1 count)
Pitch 5 (2–2 count)
This is a perfect in-game example of him letting fastball mistakes go by. One of the reasons Stanton has been such an incredible hitter for so long is that he creates his bat speed with minimal movement; his swing is shockingly quiet for somebody so large. On his two swings in advantage counts, his feet are dancing, especially in the first. He has a natural scissor kick from a closed stride, but it looks like he is losing grip on the ground before his swing gets going. Every hitter guesses or cheats at some point in an at-bat, but if they’re wrong, they can usually fight off a center-cut pitch with two strikes. Despite another fastball in the heart of the plate, Stanton couldn’t get a swing off. When your lower half isn’t properly connected to the ground, it can be difficult to rotate! As he took the pitch down the plate, you can see him enter extreme ankle eversion (ankle collapses inwards). Stand up and try to take a swing like that. Not so comfortable, right?
To illustrate that point further, here are a few swings from earlier in the season when Stanton’s feet are near neutral through the entire swing.
May 12
May 16
May 21
Each of these swings resulted in batted balls with exit velocities over 114 mph, a typical range for Stanton. But more importantly, his movements were quiet from his knees down. Relative to the swings against Cincinnati, there is no exaggeration of movement in any one part of his lower legs. In his home run swing against Dylan Cease, he uses his typical toe tap on his front foot and subtle scissor kick in the back foot to stay closed. There is no back foot slide like in July. These are fully healthy swings where Stanton maintains his connection to the ground from the beginning of rotation through contact.
Unfortunately for him, the compensations he showed in July only got worse through the end of the year.
August 29
September 24
October 1
From August on, Stanton was healthy enough to be on the field as other Yankees hitters faced injuries of their own, but he was clearly not close to 100%. These three swings can either be tied to his injured left ankle being unable to stay connected to the ground, or to his back foot not being strong enough to compensate for the energy leakage in his lead foot/ankle. In the first swing, his back leg slides way out because it’s attempting to do all the work for his body. The second swing is weeks later; he made an adjustment but still leaked into the same early ankle eversion in his back leg that we saw in July. It’s not impossible to hit like this, but when you’re struggling with stabilization, it’s not ideal.
His swing in early August is the most extreme example of how early ankle eversion can impact your lower half. It caused him to lose his back leg entirely, along with his posture. Those movements cut off his swing path, leading to his barrel being unable to cover the outer half. If you go back to Stanton’s swings from earlier in the year, you can see the best ones all come with athletic, straight posture. He’s a big dude, and to have success, he needs a stable base to control his body. This is obvious for any athlete, but as players age and lose a little bit of baseball skill, health and body control become more and more important. I’m not necessarily saying Stanton is losing skill; his first two months show that he seems to be okay. But he might be entering a stage of his career where he has less room for error and injuries like this compromise his skills and expose the biggest hole in his profile: swing and miss. I’m sure Stanton will be conscious of this heading into 2023.
Injuries have plagued Stanton for a while now, but as he heads into his mid-30s, health is more important than it’s ever been. His swing needs to stay quiet to make the most of his outlier strength. None of these injuries were major long-term concerns, but they were enough to compromise his swing and performance. Assuming he enters 2023 fully recovered from these issues, there is no question in my mind he still has the skills to deliver a 130–140 wRC+ season each year. But he will need to be conscious of how any injury impacts his swing as he enters the latter half of his career.
Since early in our history, FanGraphs has been tracking pitch type linear weights, or pitch values organized by pitch type, based on both Baseball Info Solutions and PITCHf/x pitch type data. While metrics like wRAA and wRC+ look at run generation through the outcomes of plate appearances, the idea behind pitch values is to take a more granular look. The outcome of each pitch changes the run expectancy of any plate appearance, and pitch value is a method for quantifying the overall impact of all of a player’s pitches, not just the pitches that end plate appearances, as most metrics do. In the form of pitch-type linear weights, we use these pitch values to evaluate the performance of pitchers’ specific pitch types — or hitters’ ability to hit them — either on an absolute basis with stats like wFB (runs above average on all fastballs) or on a per-pitch basis with stats like wFB/C (runs above average per 100 fastballs).
Pitch values can also be a useful way to evaluate how pitchers (or hitters, for that matter) have fared in specific counts. Executing pitches in particular situations to get ahead in counts is a crucial part of a pitcher’s approach, and at times, it feels like we narratively underestimate the impact that the outcome of an early-count pitch can have on the rest of a plate appearance. In 2022, firing a first-pitch strike was enough to drop an opposing hitters’ wRC+ from the normalized average of 100 to 68; missing on the first pitch gave hitters enough of an advantage to lead to a mark of 130, just about in line with recent years. That’s roughly the difference between Kyles Tucker and Isbel.
2022 MLB wRC+ Through Each Count
Count
0 Strikes
1 Strike
2 Strikes
0 Balls
100
68
22
1 Ball
130
90
38
2 Balls
179
130
68
3 Balls
265
212
144
My colleague Ben Clemens has written on the strange historical practice of pitchers grooving fastballs right down the middle to start plate appearances and the perhaps even stranger practice of hitters letting them get away with that. But those practices are fading away, Ben writes, and in an analytical era in which teams are looking for every advantage, the first pitch is being recognized for what it is: a frontier of pitch value opportunity, a first chance to lower the expected scoring outcome of the plate appearance.
In 2022, the strongest performer overall on first pitches was none other than Angels reliever Jaime Barría, who finished with a summed run value of -10.1 on the opening offering, nearly two runs better than any other pitcher despite facing just 316 hitters. On a per-pitch basis, Barría’s performance was even more exceptional: his -.032 runs per first pitch were nearly twice that of any other pitcher with as many as 300 batters faced. It’s worth mentioning that there are limits to what we can glean from this data; around 300 pitches is a relatively modest sample size, and Piper Slowinski warns us that pitch value is more effective as a descriptive stat than a predictive one. Barría is a true outlier here, but as we indulge in taking a look at what was new in his approach, we should do so without assuming he’ll be able to reproduce these numbers in the future. Read the rest of this entry »
Vinnie Pasquantino is fast developing a reputation as a media-friendly player who can be counted on to provide fun quips on a variety subjects, both in print and on podcasts. Entertaining and engaging, the 25-year-old first baseman is already a fan favorite in Kansas City despite having not debuted until midway through the 2022 season. And he can swing the bat, too. The 2019 11th-round pick out of Old Dominion University began his big league career by slashing a robust .295/.383/.450 with a 137 wRC+ and 10 home runs in 298 plate appearances. Our lead prospect analyst is among those who weren’t surprised. Addressing his left-handed stroke last May, Eric Longenhagen wrote that “There are missile defense systems with less precise tracking ability than Pasquantino, who… is on time with remarkable consistency.”
Pasquantino talked hitting a few months into his rookie campaign with the Royals.
———
David Laurila: What do you know about hitting now that you didn’t know when you entered pro ball?
Vinnie Pasquantino: “More of the advanced stuff. Looking at data. I was never really familiar with data on pitches before — what vert means, what horizontal spin means, what attack angle means. Things that guys would talk about, like, ‘This guy throws a heavy ball’ or ‘It’s a firm 90.’ Now I have a better understanding of what that all means. That’s probably the biggest thing, just understanding all the data we’re given and how to use it on the field.” Read the rest of this entry »
Brock Burke broke out in 2022. Working out of the Texas Rangers bullpen, the 26-year-old southpaw logged a 1.97 ERA over 52 appearances, with 90 strikeouts and just 63 hits allowed in 82-and-a-third innings. Equally effective against lefties and righties, he held the former to a .192 BA and a .635 OPS, the latter to a .218 BA and a .629 OPS. Used most often in the sixth and seventh innings, Burke was credited with wins in seven of his 12 decisions.
Burke went into last season having made just six big league appearances, all in 2019 as a starter, with a balky shoulder the culprit. That he came back strong after returning to full health is an understatement. Along with the aforementioned numbers, Burke logged a stand-up-and-take-notice 27.4% strikeout rate.
First interviewed here at FanGraphs in 2017 when he was a 20-year-old Tampa Bay Rays prospect pitching in the Midwest League, Burke will head into the 2023 with a role that has yet to be determined. The Rangers are reportedly considering using him as a starter, while some have speculated that he could be the club’s closer. Regardless of how he is utilized, one thing is certain: When healthy, Burke has proven to be a very good pitcher. Read the rest of this entry »
Let’s play some word association. I’m going to name someone, and I want you to say the first two words that come to mind. Okay, I’m ready: Richard Bleier. Did “middle reliever” jump to the fore? You’re exactly right; Bleier spent 2022 chipping in mid-quality work in the middle innings for the Marlins. One more: Matt Barnes. Did you say “middle reliever” this time? If not, maybe it was “ex-closer.” Barnes was a roller coaster ride of a closer right until he wasn’t, and he spent 2022 pitching anywhere from the sixth to ninth inning depending on need, at least when he wasn’t on the IL.
This year, I can guarantee you that those two won’t be reprising their roles. On Monday, the Red Sox and Marlins swapped their relievers in a one-for-one trade. It’s not even a contract-based swap; both players are under contract for 2023 with a team option for 2024, and the Red Sox sent $5 million to Miami to even out the payroll expenditure on the deal. It’s simpler than that: I want your reliever, and you can take mine. Read the rest of this entry »
Tink Hence has the highest ceiling among pitchers in the St. Louis Cardinals system. A top 100 prospect with a 50 FV, the 20-year-old right-hander has just 60.1 professional innings under his belt — 68.2 if you count his brief stint in the Arizona Fall League — but that has been enough to turn heads. Displaying an electric array of pitches, the lanky Pine Bluff, Arkansas native has fanned 104 batters and allowed just 44 hits and 22 walks.
Hence, whose given first name is Markevian, discussed his power repertoire and his approach to pitching during his time in the AFL.
———
David Laurila: Tell about yourself as pitcher. How do you go about your craft?
Tink Hence: “I just go out and do what I do. I know how my my fastball plays, and I know how my off-speed plays off my fastball. I really don’t try to set it all up with the analytical stuff. When I go out there, it’s easier to just play as opposed to thinking, ‘OK, if I throw it there, it does that’ or if I’m trying to make something break more. I just let it come.”
Laurila: How does your stuff play?
Hence: “I throw a four-seamer, a curveball, a changeup, and a slider. I feel like my stuff plays well when I, as they say, ’let it eat.’ My changeup works well off my fastball, and whenever I can get the curveball up… it’s like a buckle piece. I feel like my curveball is more of my strike pitch, and my slider is like my strikeout pitch. My curveball is more north-south, and when they guess fastball they take it for a strike.”
Laurila: Where is your velocity?
Hence: “My fastball probably sits 95–97 [mph]. My curve is around the 75–77 range. With my slider, you’ll see more of the 81–84 range. The changeup, during the season it kind of was slow, but I’m working on getting it around 86–87. I’m working on it a lot here [in the AFL].” Read the rest of this entry »
The modern game of baseball is defined by power and strength. You can turn on any game at any time and watch a guy swing his behind off as he launches a 100 mph fastball 450 feet. Of course, that wasn’t always so common — a lot of players used to swing for contact instead of the fences. Today, that skill set is more of a rarity, though there are still a few hitters who choke up on the handle and spray the ball from line to line. Jeff McNeil is perhaps one of the best in this category. Fresh off a batting tile, McNeil was due for a raise in arbitration. Instead, he and the Mets agreed to a four-year, $50 million extension.
The deal buys out McNeil’s two remaining arbitration years and two potential free agent years, taking him through his age-34 season. There’s also a $12.5 million club option for the 2027 season, giving the extension a chance to max out at five years and $62.5 million. On the surface, that seems like a bargain for a player coming off a 5.9 WAR, 143 wRC+ season that also saw him play the best defense of his career according to OAA. However, the free agent market doesn’t tend to be particularly generous to players who are over 30 or rely on contact as much as McNeil does. I asked Dan Szymborski if he could cook up a ZiPS estimate for a McNeil extension and as it turns out, the contract he signed isn’t as much of a bargain as I initially suspected. Including the discounts for the two cost-controlled arbitration years, ZiPS would have offered McNeil a five-year, $69 million extension. That is only $6.5 million more than the maximum the Mets offered when you include the club option. Dan also provided me with McNeil’s projected performance for the life of the contract:
This will sound ridiculous, but I have a hipster-ish choice for my favorite Los Angeles Angel. Trout and Ohtani? They’re fine, I guess, if you like generational superstars. Rendon? Ward? If we’re really reaching, Tyler Anderson? Again, I’m not against them, they’re just not exactly my taste. My favorite Angel? It’s none other than David Fletcher, a man ripped from the Deadball era and placed on the infield dirt in Anaheim.
How could you not love Fletcher? His skill set is delightful and also mind-boggling. In a power-mad era, he has none to speak of; he’s managed nearly as many triples as homers in his career. He hits nearly anything he swings at, particularly when he cuts his already short swing down with two strikes; he has a career strikeout rate in the single digits and comically low swinging strike rates. Fletcher often looks like he’s playing a different sport than the other guys on his team, but he’s so good at what he does that he was able to put together a three-year run of above-average play with first-percentile exit velocity.
Sadly, those three years are now in the past. Fletcher was ineffective in 2021 and then injured in 2022. His high-wire act worked for a long time, but in the end the numbers didn’t quite add up. Pitchers pounded the zone so much that he started swinging more to protect himself from called strikeouts, but that eventually drove his chase rate up and walk rate down, and the rest was history. Read the rest of this entry »
Back in 2020, MLB implemented a number of rule changes, both planned and forced by the pandemic-shortened season. Among them, none had the potential for dramatic change but with little actual effect on the game as the three-batter minimum rule. It was an inelegant solution to an infrequent problem: Subsequent investigation after its implementation has shown that the rule hasn’t addressed the pace-of-play issues at the heart of its intended effects.
Where the rule has had an outsized effect is in roster construction. Upon implementation, the value of a certain type of reliever — the Lefty One Out Guy (LOOGY) — was extinguished. Not that there were many LOOGYs left anyway, and the impact they had on games was fairly negligible in the grand scheme of things. This side effect of the rule was foreseen but still unfortunate nonetheless.
While the left-handed specialist has all but disappeared from major league rosters, left-handed relievers in general have felt the effects of this rule change as well. In 2022, southpaw relievers pitched around a quarter of all relief innings, which is right in line with the previous decade of usage. Unsurprisingly, more and more of those outings have come against right-handed batters. In 2013, nearly half of the batters left-handed relievers faced were left-handed as well. Last year, that rate fell to just over a third. Read the rest of this entry »