One of my favorites paintings is René Magritte’s The Treachery of Images. Basically, it’s a painting of the pipe with “this is not a pipe” written on it in French. While interpretation is in the eye of the beholder, one can argue that it makes two points. First, there’s the wordplay; a painting is not a pipe. But there’s a double-meaning you can take, too: the frequent incongruity between what a word says and what a word actually is. (If you’d like to read a lot more about this painting, Michel Foucault has just what you need!)

MLB’s competitive balance tax has a lot in common with Magritte’s pipe. It says it’s about competition, but without any mechanism to ensure that the proceeds improve competition. It says it’s about balance, but it has no way to ensure that balance. It’s described widely as a luxury tax, but it’s not that either. Luxury taxes, historically, have been directed at what economist Fred Hirsch termed “positional goods,” or goods that are highly prized based on their scarcity and prestige value. Labor costs in a labor-intensive field, though, aren’t really a luxury good, and MLB’s business is mainly putting teams of baseball players on the field. Everything MLB does stems from those games; if the teams didn’t exist, there wouldn’t be as much clamor for t-shirts with cardinals sitting on a wooden stick or ice cream served in a small plastic helmet with a creatively spelled abbreviation of “stockings” on it. Players are no more luxuries for a baseball team than leather is for a shoe company.

But let’s get to the competitive balance side of things. MLB’s argument is that the CBT is needed to increase competitive balance. Yet there’s very little evidence that it actually has increased competitive balance, and if anything, teams are farther apart since the CBT was implemented, not closer together. From 1984 to 2001, leaving out shortened seasons, the standard deviation of winning percentage was about 67 points. From 2002, the first year of MLB’s modern CBT, to ’21 (excluding the shortened 2020 season), that increases to 74 points; since the start of 2016, when salaries have been static, it’s 80 points. Read the rest of this entry »

Matt Wallner has taken a circuitous route in his quest to play close to home. Geographically speaking, it might be better-described as an oblong route. The 24-year-old Minnesota Twins outfield prospect grew up thirty minutes northeast of Target Field, then circumstances sent him to Hattiesburg, 17 hours south. Since being drafted 39th overall in 2019 out of the University of Southern Mississippi, Wallner has played in Elizabethton, Tennessee and Cedar Rapids, Iowa, the latter of which sits four-and-a-half hours southeast of where he started.

Exposure-wise, the shape of Wallner’s boomerang journey changed when his intended destination out of high school dropped baseball. The left-handed-hitting slugger — No. 10 on our newly-released Twins Top Prospects list — had planned to continue his studies in Grand Forks, North Dakota, four-and-a-half hours northwest of the Twin Cities.

“[The University of] North Dakota cut baseball in April of my senior year,” explained Wallner, who battled back from a hamate injury this year to log a 131 wRC+ and wallop 15 home runs in 294 plate appearances at High-A Cedar Rapids. “I had some connections to Southern Miss through the North Dakota coach, so I went for a visit and fell in love with it. Playing college baseball when it is warmer than 30 degrees was enticing.”

Belying the fact that he considers his freshman fall at the Conference USA school “the biggest jump I’ve ever had to experience,” Wallner went on swing a hot bat in his first taste of high-profile collegiate competition, compiling numbers that included 19 dingers and a 1.118 OPS. He went on to set Southern Mississippi’s career home run record, going deep 58 times in three seasons. Read the rest of this entry »

Two weeks ago was Prospect Week here at FanGraphs. I didn’t contribute any analysis to it, because a) it was packed with really good analysis already and b) I wasn’t done compiling the thing I wanted to contribute. With some time to finish up my work — and not much else going on in our lockout-plagued sport — I’m ready to provide a bit of bonus analysis.

Last year, I used a variety of statistical techniques to come up with a list of players I thought stood a strong chance of putting together a meaningful major league career. This year, I’m … well, I’m using a variety of statistical techniques to come up with a list of players I think stand a strong chance of putting together a meaningful major league career. But this time, I’ve spent a bit more time refining my methods.

Here’s a quick overview of those methods. I used a variety of simple models based on historical minor and major league data. In each of them, I looked at a variety of key indicators in minor league hitters: statistics, age, position, level — anything I could download, essentially. I linked those minor league seasons to that player’s eventual major league career (or lack thereof).

This methodology carries many limitations, only some of which I have time to detail here. Baseball isn’t the same as it was in the past; while I think I’ve done a decent job of picking performance metrics that are stable over time, player development and the skills that are necessary to stick in the major leagues don’t look the same as they did 10 or 20 years ago.

That particular problem is inherent in everything that uses the past to predict the future, but don’t worry: my methods have way more shortcomings. For one, 2021 was a strange year to look at minor league statistics. With no 2020 season to gauge players’ skill levels, competition seemed far more variable within each league. I’m also basing much of this data on leagues that don’t exist anymore, as minor league realignment changed the makeup of the minor leagues significantly and also messed with my rudimentary park factors. I didn’t use Statcast or Trackman data, both because I don’t have a complete picture of it for 2021 and because it doesn’t exist at all in most of the years I used to train my various models. Finally, I’m using the position that each player played most in 2021 to give them a position, rather than where they’re projected to end up or what our prospect team thinks they’re best suited for.
Read the rest of this entry »

Danny Coulombe features a lot of breaking balls, and he does so with scant fanfare. In 28 relief appearances and one outing as an opener, the 32-year-old Minnesota Twins southpaw threw 41.8% sliders and 24.8% curveballs last year. He was also quietly effective. Taking the mound for a team that performed well below expectations, Coulombe logged a 3.67 ERA and a 3.75 FIP while fanning 33 batters and issuing just seven free passes in 34-and-a-third innings.

Emblematic of the lefty’s lack of fanfare is that I talked to him last August, and while I did include a few of his quotes in a September column — these on an online project management class that had him regularly visiting FanGraphs — I am just now sharing the crux of our conversation. What we delved into was the evolution of his breaker-heavy repertoire.

“I was predominantly four-seam/curveball when I got drafted,” said Coulombe, whom the Los Angeles Dodgers took in the 25th round out of Texas Tech University in 2012. “Coming up through the system I was mostly a curveball guy, and in 2014, a pitching coach I had, Scott Radinsky, told me that I needed something that looks like a fastball and moves. He said, ‘Right now, if a hitter sees a pop he knows it’s a breaking ball, and if he sees it straight he knows it’s a fastball.’ So we worked on developing a slider that year. I’ve always been able to spin a baseball, and now I’m probably about 70% breaking balls, curveballs and sliders.”

For Coulombe, maintaining a consistent differential between the two is a matter of mindset and grip. The latter required an adjustment, which was necessitated by unwanted blending. Read the rest of this entry »

For Dane Dunning, consistency will be key in 2022. A first round pick back in 2016, his professional career has been pretty turbulent for someone of his draft pedigree. He’s been the headlining return in two major trades — the Adam Eaton deal in 2016 and the Lance Lynn swap in ’20 — and also lost a season and a half to a torn UCL. To further complicate matters, the beginning of the pandemic disrupted his rehab just when he was preparing to compete for a spot on a big league roster. The delayed start to the 2020 season probably benefited him, however, as he finally made his major league debut for the White Sox in August of that year.

Dunning had just gotten his feet wet at the game’s highest level when he was shipped off to Texas during the offseason. The Rangers were extremely careful with him in his first season with the organization. You can understand why. He had missed more than two seasons worth of games between his Tommy John surgery and the lack of a minor league season in 2020. His first start in the big leagues was the first time he had pitched in an official game since June 2018. In 2021, he averaged just under five innings per start and threw more than 80 pitches in a game just four times. Still, with just over 150 total major league innings under his belt, Dunning has shown some real promise, even if there are a few kinks to work out.

Last year, Dunning managed to post a 3.94 FIP that was supported by a 3.87 xFIP. Unfortunately, his 4.51 ERA far outpaced his peripherals. He didn’t give up very many home runs — just 13 all season — but he did allow a lot of contact. Opposing batters produced a 78.1% contact rate against him, well above league average, though more than half of those balls in play were put on the ground. His strikeout-to-walk ratio was almost exactly league average, which meant he wasn’t really mitigating that contact with a gaudy strikeout rate and or a minuscule walk rate. Despite those mixed results, there are some positive signs under the hood that could bode well for Dunning’s development this year. Read the rest of this entry »

Last month, I went over some possible playoff structures in an attempt to design a format that allowed for playoff expansion while still preserving the value of adding a star to the roster. I focused on 14-team structures for a couple of reasons: it was more of a challenge to make a 14-team system that didn’t grossly alter team incentives and I suspected that the players would be willing to accept the larger field if it helped them achieve some of their other negotiation priorities.

Well, we’re a month later, and there’s a little more clarity. While there is still a lot to iron out and little idea as to when the league and the players union might reach a deal on a new collective bargaining agreement, there seems to be some kind of very preliminary sorta-agreement on a 12-team playoff system, though ownership has apparently been very resistant to allowing the more highly-seeded teams any advantage outside of the traditional home field-based ones (meaning no knockout run or “ghost wins”). Read the rest of this entry »

It’s small potatoes in the context of what’s going on (or not) in the baseball industry and the rest of the world, but so far as the Hall of Fame goes, the problem in a nutshell is this: Half of the starting pitchers who are in the Hall and were born in the 1950s are named Jack Morris. While there’s no need to relitigate the polarizing battle that forestalled his eventual election — been there, done that — the real issue, to these eyes, is that the gruff ex-Tigers workhorse is the only starter in the Hall born after 1951 and before ’63. When stacked up against other enshrined starters, his credentials are modest at best, and so his presence in the plaque room feels like an indictment of the quality of his peers.

The reality is that Morris won battles of attrition, first against the forces that reshaped the role of the starting pitcher following the introduction of the designated hitter in 1973, and then against the voting bodies that were slow to recognize the strength of those forces. He was a throwback, and in the arguments over his merits he became a symbol for a bygone era. Backed by strong offenses, he piled up innings while having less success preventing runs than his the best of his peers, but more success avoiding injuries or replacement by pinch-hitters and relievers. Plus, he won a few big games in October.

For all of that, I did not have Morris or any specific pitcher in mind when I began exploring ways to modernize JAWS to better account for the changes in starting pitcher workloads that have occurred over the past century and a half. After nearly two decades of using my Hall of Fame fitness metric, I know the contours of the position-by-position rankings reasonably well, and so I had a pretty good idea in advance which ones would be helped by whatever adjustments I settled on — that while knowing that those changes wouldn’t be so radical as to upset the entire system. That said, I suspected that shining a brighter light on some of those players would particularly resonate with fans of a certain age, particularly as I worked my way through history and reached the frame of reference of players I’m old enough to have watched. I don’t cross paths with a lot of fans of Jim McCormick or Wes Ferrell these days, but Luis Tiant is another matter. Read the rest of this entry »

The 2028-29 offseason was downright bananas. In a matter of weeks, the Dodgers shelled out $2.3 billion in guarantees, a spending spree that upended the league. What had been a good class for first basemen turned into a single team cornering the market: Yordan Alvarez, Pete Alonso, and Alec Bohm created a veritable pileup at first in Los Angeles, one that pushed the team’s best holdover player, Michael Lindauer, from first to shortstop. It also pushed Bohm to third, which meant fellow free agent signee Carter Kieboom was getting $75 million to be a backup. The rest of the league was caught flat-footed, playing catch-up or giving up on free agency entirely.

That’s just how things go in Magnus Effect Baseball, an online baseball-industry Out Of The Park league that grew out of 2020’s COVID-19 lockdowns but has turned into a freewheeling, frenetic playground that shows no signs of slowing down. Those mighty Dodgers didn’t break the league; in fact, they’re not even the best team in their division. It’s a wildly competitive league, with even the bad teams trying to trade, sign, and develop their way into contention.

Magnus Effect Baseball started the way most online activities did in early 2020: out of sheer boredom. Smith Brickner, the league’s commissioner, wasn’t the originator. At the time, he was working for the Braves as a minor league video trainee, but his job had been put on hold by COVID. “I had just driven 20-plus hours from the Braves’ spring training complex back to Long Island when my buddy Sam Denomme asked if I had an interest in joining an industry-wide OOTP league run by some guys at Driveline,” Brickner told me. “When it became clear that someone needed to step up and actually run the league, I raised my hand.” Read the rest of this entry »

Connor Joe has had a turbulent couple of years. In the spring of 2019, he made his big league debut as the Opening Day left fielder for the Giants. Just a week prior, San Francisco had acquired him in a trade with the Reds, who had selected him in the Rule 5 draft just three months before that. His time with the Giants would also prove short-lived: after 11 days and a 1-for-15 start to the season, he was designated for assignment. As a Rule 5 pick, he was returned to his original team, the Dodgers, and spent the rest of the 2019 season in Triple-A, where he posted a 132 wRC+ and a 16.1% walk rate but never got the call to return to the big leagues.

The following year, Joe was expected to compete for a roster spot with the Dodgers, but just as spring training was getting underway, team doctors found a tumor that was later diagnosed as testicular cancer. He underwent chemotherapy treatments and was declared cancer-free later in the summer, but the risks posed by the COVID-19 pandemic kept him away from baseball for the whole season. He elected free agency in November 2020 and signed a minor league deal with the Rockies later that month.

The 2021 season finally gave Joe an opportunity to shine at the big league level, but it was not without its ups and downs. He started the season in the minors thanks to his lost 2020 and ended the season on the injured list due to a hamstring injury he suffered in early September. Between those endpoints, he struggled enough to get sent down, got hot enough to become the everyday leadoff hitter, and even celebrated his anniversary of being cancer-free by smashing his first career home run. All told, he had 211 plate appearances with a .285/.379/.469 triple slash, eight homers and a 116 wRC+. Read the rest of this entry »

On the day that commissioner Rob Manfred set as a deadline for the completion of a new collective bargaining agreement that would end the owners’ self-imposed lockout and keep a March 31 Opening Day on schedule, no deal was reached. For the eighth consecutive day of negotiations, representatives for the owners and the players’ union met at Jupiter, Florida’s Roger Dean Stadium, going back and forth so many times over the course of 16 1/2 hours that the calculations of steps traveled strained FanGraphs’ servers, to say nothing of the brains of the handful of reporters staked out outside the gates. Enough progress towards a deal was made before the two sides broke for the night at 2:30 AM ET that Manfred agreed to extend the artificially-imposed deadline to 5 PM ET on Tuesday.

While nothing has been finalized, the reports of where the key components are heading do not paint a particularly pretty picture for the players’ side. After a decade in which they have largely been shut out of massive revenue growth, with new television deals falling into place, they appear to be improving the lot of their rank and file — no small matter in an industry where 47% of all service time went to players making the minimum salary — but while achieving only modest gains in areas where they initially sought more radical change.

Based upon the drips and drabs that have emerged from various reports, the battle to expand the postseason has loomed large, with MLB presenting alternative proposals based on whether it’s 14 teams (their preference) or 12 (the union’s preference).

Sources: Deal not close, but not impossible. CBT thresholds, prearb pool big issues, among others. MLB has proposed two choices:

A: 14-team expanded postseason, minimum of ~$700k, ~40m into prearb pool

B: 12-team expanded postseason, ~$675k minimum, ~$20m into prearb pool

— Evan Drellich (@EvanDrellich) March 1, 2022

The 12-team format appears to be the route this deal will take, though according to the New York Post’s Andrew Marchand, the gap between the two formats amounts to only a $15 million difference in what ESPN is offering ($100 million for a 14-team format, $85 million for a 12-team one). Whether the “ghost win” concept — giving the division-winning team that does not receive a first-round bye a one-game-to-none advantage in a best-of-five series — survives is unclear at this writing. Read the rest of this entry »