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Pitch sequencing, in my opinion, is the next big thing in the field of baseball research, and despite what Samsung might like to tell you, it isn’t here yet. There has been some tremendous work done, but we’re still a long ways away from aggregating findings into one clearly defined picture of how pitch sequencing exactly works.

But we might as well continue to add to the findings. I looked at one aspect of pitch sequencing – shifts in the called strike zone – last month. Next, I’m looking at how best to set up different types of pitches. We’ll start with four-seam fastballs, and, so as to keep it simple for now, focus just on the fastball and on the pitch immediately beforehand. Not pitches before that in the same at-bat, not pitches to the same batter earlier in the game, not pitches to that batter from a different game.

Intuitively, you might expect changing speeds on the batter to be an effective way to mess with their swing and timing. A changeup, then, should be a good pitch to set up a fastball – changeups are generally 10-plus mph slower than the same pitcher’s fastball. Curveballs, too, should be decent setup pitches, as should sliders to a lesser extent. (Sliders are usually thrown harder than curves.) As it turns out, though, it doesn’t quite work that way.

Contact% = Foul balls + balls in play per swing

There’s some year-to-year variation, but, by and large, changeups are ineffective ways to get swings and misses on the fastballs which follow them. Now, bear in mind, the scale here isn’t so large – it’s a few percentage points each way. But it’s still pretty clear that changeups, as well as curveballs, don’t help the pitcher throw a better fastball the next pitch.

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Yeah, I’m writing about opt-outs again. I know, I’ve already written about them a couple of times this winter, so I’m running the risk of beating a dead horse even further, but opt-outs continue to be a source of some controversy, especially since they’ve been handed out so commonly this winter. Last week, Rob Manfred weighed in briefly, stating that he didn’t see the value in opt-outs from the team perspective.

“The logic of opt-out clauses for the club escapes me,” Manfred told FOX Sports on Thursday night. “You make an eight-year agreement with a player. He plays well, and he opts out after three. You either pay the player again or you lose him.

“Conversely, if the player performs poorly, he doesn’t opt out and gets the benefit of the eight-year agreement. That doesn’t strike me as a very good deal. Personally, I don’t see the logic of it. But clubs do what they do.”

I didn’t write about Manfred’s comments when they were published because of the fear of the dead-horse phenomenon, and because all I’d have to add to those comments is that the logic teams are seeing is a chance to save money on long-term commitments by including opt-outs in order to reduce the total amount of guaranteed money they’re including in their offers. But Manfred knows that; he just can’t say it publicly. As commissioner, he’s limited in what he can say about player compensation, especially with a CBA negotiation upcoming, and so I figured I’d just let the comment be.

But then today, Rob Neyer wrote about Manfred’s comments, and added a few of his own. And since his point about opt-outs is the one that I most stridently disagree with, I figure it’s worth bringing this issue up one more time. First, though, Rob’s take on opt-outs.

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After having typically appeared in the very hallowed pages of Baseball Think Factory, Dan Szymborski’s ZiPS projections have been released at FanGraphs the past couple years. The exercise continues this offseason. Below are the projections for the Baltimore Orioles. Szymborski can be found at ESPN and on Twitter at @DSzymborski.

Other Projections: Atlanta / Cincinnati / Kansas City / New York AL / Philadelphia / Pittsburgh / Texas / Toronto.

Batters
If there’s one thing that irks Dan Szymborski, it’s when people cast aspersions against great Polish-American war hero Casimir Pulaski. If there’s a second thing that irks him, however, it’s when people calculate the sum of the WAR figures displayed in the depth charts of these ZiPS posts, add those totals to 47.7 (i.e. the win total of a hypothetical replacement-level club), and then regard the result as Szymborski’s unambigious win projection for the team in question. Bad form, is what Szymborski has to say about that maneuver.

That caveat having been made, what one finds upon revisiting last year’s ZiPS post for Baltimore is that the club’s depth-chart projections accounted for roughly 34 WAR — which figure, added to 47.7, equals 81.7. Meanwhile, here’s the Orioles’ final record from 2015: 81-81. And their BaseRuns record, also: 79-83. What appears to have happened, at the most basic level, is that Szymborski’s computer regarded Baltimore as almost a perfectly average team and then Baltimore performed like almost a perfectly average team.

This is bad news for the current iteration of the club, which accounts for only about 27 WAR (i.e. seven fewer wins than last year) on the depth chart below. Among the position players, there’s a great deal of uncertainty after Adam Jones and Manny Machado. Indeed, right field and designated hitter actually receive negative-win projections. So, not ideal. That said, there’s some positive uncertainty, as well — particularly in left fielder Hyeon-soo Kim, whose combination of contact ability and power invite comparisons to the best version of Nick Markakis.

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At the winter meetings, I asked a small collection of managers about the evolution of the role, and all of them — save perhaps Mike Scioscia — spoke to the importance of communicating with the media and with their players.

But that story had a longer scope, and a more universal one. I also asked them about a smaller more immediate thing — I asked many of them what they had learned this year, on the job. And for those just coming to the job, what they have tried to learn before they first manage a game.

Of particular note was what former position players did to learn about pitching, and vice versa. Managers have to communicate with all sorts of different players, and yet they came from one tradition within the game. And each has spent time developing themselves in their present role.

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What happens when a team hires a new general manager or president of baseball operations? In most cases, a lot more than meets the eye. Behind the scenes, a number of structural changes take place. A smattering of them are less subtle in nature, and thus deemed newsworthy. The majority of changes go virtually unnoticed, sometimes because they’re known only within the inner workings of the organization.

In hopes of better understanding the dynamic, I queried multiple front office executives, all of whom requested anonymity. This article is comprised of their feedback, and is presented in blocks of interwoven quotes. With continuity in mind, the executive being quoted will often change from one paragraph to the next.

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“One thing we’ve seen over the years is a decrease in the number of longtime GMs. Twenty or thirty years ago a GM came on board and could count on staying in place for several years. That model no longer exists. There’s more turnover now, so any new group has to hit the ground running. Most groups try to shorten the learning curve by hiring people they know and trust to implement their philosophy. They try to put people in place to make a positive impact as quickly as possible.

“When J.P. Ricciardi became the GM in Toronto, there was a massive overhaul of the scouting staff. This past year saw the Dodgers make drastic changes in both international scouting and player development. Why were those changes made? I can’t speak for either group directly, but from a management perspective you need people you can trust to implement and execute your philosophy, whatever it might be. Read the rest of this entry »

After having typically appeared in the very hallowed pages of Baseball Think Factory, Dan Szymborski’s ZiPS projections have been released at FanGraphs the past couple years. The exercise continues this offseason. Below are the projections for the New York Yankees. Szymborski can be found at ESPN and on Twitter at @DSzymborski.

Other Projections: Atlanta / Cincinnati / Kansas City / Philadelphia / Pittsburgh / Texas / Toronto.

Batters
However one would characterize the precise opposite of a stars-and-scrub approach to roster construction, this is what the Yankees appear to have employed in collecting their present group of talent. Eight of the club’s nine likely starters are projected to record a WAR figure somewhere between 1.5 and 3.1, from Alex Rodriguez and Mark Teixeira on the low end (largely due to a less-than-full complement of plate appearances) to Brian McCann on the high. Wildly average, is perhaps the best description.

It will be interesting to see how Brian Cashman, Joe Girardi, et al. address what does appear to be the team’s one positional weakness — namely, right field. Dan Szymborski’s computer is pessimistic about the 39-year-old Carlos Beltran, projecting him not only for a roughly league-average batting line but also negative defensive-runs mark. That said, the club does have some internal options immediately available: the recently acquired Aaron Hicks and also Rob Refsnyder (who has considerable experience in right field) also receive forecasts in the league-average range.

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Yesterday, the Dodgers were involved in the three team trade that sent Todd Frazier to the White Sox, presumably because the Reds preferred a different type of prospect than what Chicago could offer. Andrew Friedman and his gang essentially acted as brokers for the other two teams, and took a commission for helping facilitate the trade, upgrading their own stock of prospects in the process.

But when a win-now team chooses to upgrade their prospect stock over simply just acquiring a guy like Frazier for themselves, it raises questions about what the overarching strategy really is. And when Andrew Friedman says stuff like this, the questions seem to be even more legitimate.

Friedman, asked if he is any more comfortable trading elite pitching prospects today than he was yesterday: "Yeah."

— Bill Shaikin (@BillShaikin) December 16, 2015

Of course, to be fair, Friedman also said this.

Friedman said he knows some teams are interested in players Dodgers acquired today but trade is not necessarily precursor to another.

— Bill Shaikin (@BillShaikin) December 16, 2015

Ken Rosenthal, the most connected guy out there, published a piece not long after suggesting that this deal might help the Dodgers pursue Jose Fernandez. Based on what the asking price was during the winter meetings, however, perhaps we should actually be looking at the other Florida team when looking for a partner in a mega-trade for the Dodgers.

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I detected a real sense of impatience as far as the Dodgers were concerned. Not impatience on the part of the Dodgers — rather, impatience on the part of people observing the Dodgers. Not that they’d been totally quiet, but they had been inactive. Now, Wednesday, the Dodgers have gotten themselves involved in a doozy. It’s a three-way trade, with the best player neither leaving the Dodgers, nor joining them. Instead, the Dodgers helped facilitate the Reds sending a quality third baseman to the White Sox. The full player breakdown:

White Sox get:

• Todd Frazier

White Sox lose:

• Francelis Montas
• Trayce Thompson
• Micah Johnson

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Reds get:

• Jose Peraza
• Scott Schebler
• Brandon Dixon

Reds lose:

• Todd Frazier

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Dodgers get:

• Francelis Montas
• Trayce Thompson
• Micah Johnson

Dodgers lose:

• Jose Peraza
• Scott Schebler
• Brandon Dixon

Frazier to Chicago, three Chicago prospects to Los Angeles, three Los Angeles prospects to Cincinnati. It stands to reason the Dodgers had to get involved because the Reds and White Sox couldn’t find an easy match straight up. Implying the Reds are higher on, say, the Peraza centerpiece than they would’ve been on a Montas centerpiece. These things can be kind of complicated to analyze, but let’s go team by team.

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It’s my belief that, right now, the Cubs are the best team in baseball. Don’t worry, you’ll have a chance to express your own belief at the end. I know that we’ve been a little heavy on Cubs posts. It’s not entirely our fault — they’ve been active. I also know it’s not super important who looks like the best team in baseball in the middle of December. There’s offseason left, and there’s spring training to go, and countless things could change. It also happens to be my belief the Cubs will remain the best team in baseball as we reach Opening Day, but this is about things as they are. Right now, literally as you read this, provided you read this somewhere close to the publishing date.

I’m going to lay out why I think the Cubs are the best. I’m also going to try to lay out why they might not be, despite all the stuff in the first part. It’s not about being contradictory — it’s about trying to cover everything. At the bottom of the post, you’ll respond to a very simple question. We’ll see which argument you find most convincing.

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After having typically appeared in the very hallowed pages of Baseball Think Factory, Dan Szymborski’s ZiPS projections have been released at FanGraphs the past couple years. The exercise continues this offseason. Below are the projections for the Texas Rangers. Szymborski can be found at ESPN and on Twitter at @DSzymborski.

Other Projections: Atlanta / Cincinnati / Kansas City / Philadelphia / Pittsburgh / Toronto.

Batters
The Texas Rangers outperformed their Base Runs record by seven wins this past season, resembling on the peripheral level more a league-average club than a division-winning one. That’s not to discredit their accomplishment, at all. It does, however, begin to explain how a team that won 88 games and returns literally all its positional starters — how such a team could look so ordinary by way of computer algorithms.

It certainly isn’t an advantage for Texas that they have a considerable portion of their payroll allocated to four merely decent players. Elvis Andrus, Shin-Soo Choo, Prince Fielder, and Josh Hamilton are expected to earn roughly $88 million collectively this year and yet to produce fewer than six wins as a group. That’s approximately $15 million per win — or nearly double the current estimated win valuation of the market.*

None of this, of course, is to impugn Adrian Beltre, who famously once played both Daedalus and Icarus in a community theater production of Ovid’s Metamorphoses.

*Note: I’ve neglected to mention here that a portion of Fielder’s and nearly all of Hamilton’s contracts are being subsidized by other clubs. Naturally, that changes the dollars-per-win calculus. What it doesn’t change is the projections themselves.

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