As soon as any World Series is over, it’s fair to wonder how the most recent champion stacks up when compared to the history. And while sometimes the numbers are downright laughable, the 2018 Red Sox have been pretty extreme. In the regular season, they won five more games than anyone else. In the playoffs, they lost just once per series while eliminating the three other best teams in the game. Sometimes, you think about the history because you think you’re obligated. In this case, we look to the history because it seems like the Red Sox might’ve done something historic. It feels like this might’ve been one of the all-time greats.

I’ve run some numbers in order to see what we’ve got. I should acknowledge right here there’s no perfect, agreed-upon way to do this. There’s no ideal measure of a team overall. Does it matter how good a team is for seven months, or is it only the playoffs that matter, provided you do just enough to make it in in the first place? There are arguments to go in either direction, but for my purposes here, I’ve simply combined regular-season numbers with postseason numbers. The postseason sample, of course, is dwarfed by the regular-season sample, but that’s how I feel like it should be. You might have another opinion, and so you might trust your own analysis. Below, I’ll quickly present my own.

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Xander Bogaerts triple-slashed .288/.360/.522 in 580 regular-season plate appearances in 2018, which translated to a 133 wRC+ and 4.9 WAR. Both figures represented career highs. Like his teammate Mookie Betts, Bogaerts thrived offensively while largely maintaining a disciplined approach at the plate. This year, the 25-year-old swung at 61% of pitches he saw in the strike zone and just 43% of pitches overall. Both figures sit below league norms (just 16 of 140 qualified hitters swung at pitches in the zone less often this year) and are broadly consistent with Bogaerts’scareer figures. Bogaerts can, clearly, be a successful major-league hitter without taking a cut at every tempting fastball and slider he sees in the zone. He’s done it in each of past four years.

He did not, however, do so during this World Series. The only ball he struck really well in all five games was a second-inning double against Hyun-Jin Ryu in Game Two; his only other hits were a soft line-drive single in the ninth inning of Game Four that appeared to be almost the accidental result of a swing on which Bogaerts rolled over badly, and a single in the seventh in the clincher. Everything else he produced during this World Series was, for the most part, a weak ground ball or, in one horrible sequence of the 18-inning marathon that was Game Three, a ground out to second, a ground out to the pitcher, a ground out to the catcher, a strikeout swinging, and a ground ball into a double play. Bogaerts seemed simply unable to get his timing right for any consistent length of time in this World Series. Nor, until the final game, did Mookie Betts or J.D. Martinez.

Although all three Boston stars struggled to a greater or lesser extent during this Fall Classic — a matter examined by Jeff Sullivan earlier today — I’d like to focus on Bogaerts for much of this piece because his struggles seem, at least to me, the most pronounced — and most out of line with his performance during the regular season in 2018 (and, one presumes, his forthcoming performance in 2019). The first ground out in that horrible five-PA sequence I mentioned above, against Kenley Jansen in the ninth inning of Game Three, is instructive for its demonstration of Bogaerts’ Series-long inability to time up usually hittable pitches. (Please note: I’m not saying I could do this. I would cry if someone threw something past me at even 85.) The first pitch of the sequence was a sinker at 95 that Bogaerts took as a strike on the lower inside corner of the plate. Here it is:

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In Game Five of the World Series on Sunday night, behind a stifling seven-inning, three-hit effort from David Price — on three days of rest, even — and a pair of home runs by Steve Pearce, the Red Sox completed their dismantling of the Dodgers with a 5-1 victory and a four-games-to-one Series win. Like the other games in the series, this one was close for a while. Ultimately, though, the Red Sox pulled away late, with the Dodgers unable to produce a run beyond David Freese’s leadoff homer in the bottom of the first inning. On top of their franchise-record 108 wins, the Red Sox went 11-3 in the postseason, losing just one game in each round of the playoffs. They’ll take their place among the most dominant championship teams of recent vintage, and have a claim as the best in franchise history.

To these eyes, the World Series turned on eight factors, areas that set the Red Sox apart from the Dodgers in what was, at times, a fairly close series that will nonetheless look rather lopsided in the history books.

Two-Out Damage

Continuing what they did against the Astros in the ALCS, the Red Sox scored the majority of their runs against the Dodgers with two outs. In fact, the totals and rates in the two rounds match up almost exactly: 18 out of 29 runs scored against Houston (62.0%) and 18 of 28 against Los Angeles (64.3%). In the World Series they hit .242/.347/.484 in 72 plate appearances with two outs and put up video-game numbers — .471/.609/.882 in 23 PA — with two outs and runners in scoring position. Their OPS in that latter situation set a World Series record:

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We talk all the time about whether or not the playoffs crown the best team in baseball. Is it more important to be the best team for six months, or is it more important to be the best team for one month? What are we even celebrating, anyway? When you look at the playoffs too hard, and when the playoffs tell a different story than the regular season, it can be difficult to know what to think. You can start to think about these things more than they were ever intended to be thought about. It’s deeply unfulfilling. I can speak from experience.

This year, we get a break. We get a break from having to overthink the tournament, and having to compare it against everything we saw before. The Red Sox won the World Series in five games over the Dodgers. The Red Sox had led all of baseball with 108 wins. In the first two playoff rounds, they eliminated the two other teams that reached triple digits. My favorite standings fact: For true talent, I prefer to look at run differential, or BaseRuns. The four best teams in the regular season were the Astros, Red Sox, Dodgers, and Yankees. The Red Sox knocked out the Yankees, the Astros, and the Dodgers, in order. They lost only one game in each round. Their playoff record was 11-3. Only three champions in the wild-card era have lost fewer games. The Red Sox did that against incredible competition.

All things considered, the Red Sox were the best team of 2018. They presented a lot of the evidence from March through September, and then in October, they made a convincing closing argument. It was what happened in October that turned this from a great team into maybe the greatest Red Sox team in history. By winning the championship, the Red Sox accomplished as much as they possibly could. And there’s something about the title run that’s striking to me. In terms of execution, the playoff Red Sox played almost flawless baseball. Yet they were largely carried by their supporting cast.

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The ZiPS projection system will update these tables after every game and as the starting-pitcher probables change. They are based on the up-to-date ZiPS projections of the strengths of the teams and the projected starting pitchers. They are different than the playoff odds that appear elsewhere at this site. The FanGraphs playoff probabilities are based on 10,000 simulations using the updated projections in the depth charts. Where ZiPS differs is by guessing the game-by-game starting-pitcher matchups and using the ZiPS projections, including split projections.

First, here are the game-by-game probabilities:

And here are the overall series probabilities.

After the first two games of the World Series, the Red Sox are probably feeling pretty good. With two victories already to their credit, they need to win just two of their next five contests to win this year’s title. The odds are in their favor.

As they begin the the first of three games in Los Angeles, however, they have a decision to make regarding their lineup, owing to the absence of the designated hitter in a National League park. The issue comes up every year, but rarely does it present much difficulty to decision-makers. Most American League champions feature either feature a DH who isn’t worth playing elsewhere or an obvious weakness somewhere in the lineup.

That isn’t so much the case for J.D. Martinez and the Boston Red Sox, however.

Consider some examples from recent World Series. In 2014, Billy Butler DH’d for the Royals in Kansas City but only pinch-hit in San Francisco. Kendrys Morales played the same role for the 2015 edition of the Royals. Last year, it was the Astros’ Evan Gattis. Only Cleveland, during their series against the Cubs, was forced to take some unusual measures to include their usual DH in the lineup, placing Carlos Santana in the outfield. That said, Cleveland also lacked a surplus of great outfield options at the time.

The last legitimately good AL player forced from a lineup when the World Series headed to an NL park was probably Kevin Youkilis in 2007, when the presence of David Ortiz sent him to the bench. But the current version of the Red Sox will be forced to take similar steps in Los Angeles. Martinez was a six-win player this season, with a 170 wRC+ as Boston’s designated hitter, marking the best season by a DH since Ortiz’s 2007 campaign for the world champions. Martinez needs to go to an outfield corner, and even if he we assume that he had just bested (worsted?) the single-season low for UZR (-36 runs, set by Brad Hawpe in 2008), he still would have recorded nearly four wins this season. He needs to be in the lineup, right?

It would seem so, yes, but once Martinez goes into the outfield, one of the following scenarios needs to occur:

1. The Red Sox bench Jackie Bradley Jr.; or
2. they bench Andrew Benintendi; or
3. they play Mookie Betts at second base.

Mike Petriello made the case for the third option over at MLB.com. In that piece, he notes that the decision is easier in games Four and Five with a lefty on the mound, mentions the lack of potential opportunities for Betts at second base based on Red Sox pitching and Dodgers hitters, says the offensive numbers are a wash, and concludes thusly:

So if the lineup choices are a wash, this comes down to defense. Martinez is a sizable step down from Betts in right, but he’s got to be there if we want his bat in the lineup. Betts is likely a small step down from Bradley in center, probably a barely perceptible one, but that matters with Martinez in right. And at second, Holt is worse than Kinsler, but better than Betts. You could argue in either direction. Either way, Betts and Martinez must both play, and Bradley’s defense is more valuable than Holt’s.

Maybe putting Betts at second base is too radical for the World Series. Perhaps Cora will just keep it simple and bench Bradley, starting Holt or Kinsler at second base. It’s the easy way to go, and Red Sox fans know better than most how hard one poorly-timed defensive miscue can sting. But October is when the tough choices mean the most. Putting Betts at second is far from traditional. It just might be the right thing to do.

Petriello presents an interesting argument, but I’m not sure it is the correct one. Instead of separating offense and defense, let’s try to combine them. First, here are the player projections with a slight platoon adjustment for the lefties against a potential righty in Walker Buehler.

That’s what things look like when the players are all playing their normal positions. I’m leaving Martinez where he is, since the DH penalty is roughly equivalent to a -10 outfielder, a figure that seems about right. In the scenario where Betts goes to second base, we have to remove about a win off his value because of the change in defensive position. He’s a great outfielder, yes, but given his lack of recent play at second base, it’s probably not reasonable to expect even average defense from him, regardless of how many grounders he’s taken over the last few years. Putting that into the calculation, we see these numbers for the four outfield slots plus second base.

Maybe Betts is better at second base than we think. Maybe Martinez is worse in the outfield. What happens if we replace Bradley with Betts in center field and put Kinsler at second base.

Betts isn’t likely to lose any value in center field given his range and arm are just as good as Bradley Jr.’s, even by Statcast metrics. Whatever he would theoretically lose in terms of fielding runs from the move, he would gain back by means of the center-field positional adjustment.

Whatever the case, it appears as though the difference between the two alignments — if one exists — is just a few runs. And while that’s minuscule over the course of one game, logic dictates that, when the radical solution doesn’t come out any better in the numbers, it probably isn’t worth the downside risk. The argument holds whether Benintendi or Bradley Jr. is benched. Given that Bradley Jr. seems more likely to hit the bench against a lefty on Saturday and Sunday (if necessary), I think it raises the argument that it is Benintendi who should sit against Walker Buehler.

Given Benintendi’s spot in the batting order, it is fairly clear that Alex Cora feels it is his left fielder who hits lefties (and righties) better than Bradley Jr. The projections (with defense) put the two players as near equals. Against Buehler, that means Cora is simply choosing offense or defense in Los Angeles with the other a potential pinch hitter. Neither option is a bad choice, but since Bradley Jr. still projects competently on offense against a righty, choosing defense over offense — in light of Martinez’s presence in the field — it makes sense to go with Bradley Jr. over Benintendi. The Red Sox center fielder has been unlucky with the bat this season by xwOBA, and it is possible projections are underrating his ability.

The graph below shows all players with 500 plate appearances with their xwOBA and wOBA, per Baseball Savant. Those players above the line are underperforming their xwOBA, while those players below the line are overperforming it.

Most of the players who undershoot their wOBA based on their xWOBA are slow as seen by the table below.

It’s a bunch of really slow guys, a player who gets massively shifted in Joey Gallo, and then Marcell Ozuna and Bradley Jr. The Red Sox center fielder has hit a lot better than his batting line indicates. At least against a righty starter, he deserves to play. With the pitcher’s spot inithe lineup, Benintendi will still have an opportunity to impact the game off the bench. It certainly feels odd to advocate benching one of Boston’s best players in Andrew Benintendi, but I suppose that is one of those good problems to have.

Every plate appearance, every run, and every win is magnified in the postseason. The Red Sox came to bat more than 6,000 times, scored nearly 900 runs, and won 108 games during the regular season. In the playoffs, it’s been roughly 400 plate appearances, 68 runs, and nine wins so far. Because it is the playoffs, and because it is fun and important and special, when players and teams do something out of the ordinary, it stands out and deserves greater discussion. This postseason, the Red Sox have scored more than half their runs with two outs and, with two outs and runners in scoring position, are hitting like J.D. Martinez in the middle of a hot streak. That’s amazing, and it is great for the Red Sox, but we should be a little leery of trying to extract some sort of design or strategy from this great run.

Over at the Athletic, Jayson Stark has some of the amazing numbers the Red Sox have put up this postseason, including how they’ve scored 36 of their 68 runs with two outs. Teams usually score about 37% of their runs with two outs, so an increase by close to 50% is impressive. To try and determine how unusual of an occurrence this is, I ran a simple test, looking at the percentage of team runs scored with two outs from August 1 to August 13 of this year, roughly approximating the number of games the Red Sox play in October. During that one random stretch, no team was as high as 53% like the Red Sox arecurrently, but four teams were above 45%, with the Nationals at 48% to top the league. This is just one random stretch, but with a standard deviation of seven percentage points, what the Red Sox are doing puts them in the top 5%.

Then, for the same dates, I looked at team stats for runners in scoring position with two outs. Nobody ran numbers quite like the current Red Sox streak, with a wRC+ in the 220s, but there were two teams with at least a 190 wRC+ in the sample. One of those teams was the Braves. The other was these Boston Red Sox. So while what the Red Sox are doing is unusual, it also isn’t something that is impossible — and, indeed, the Red Sox seemed to do it earlier this season in early August.

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Wobbly Dodgers starter pitches his way into a jam. Red Sox lineup turns over to the third time through the order. Manager Dave Roberts summons reliever Ryan Madson. All runners score, Red Sox take the lead for good. You could be forgiven for feeling a sense of déjà vu regarding the basic template of the first two games of the 2018 World Series.

The Dodgers beat the Braves in the Division Series and the Brewers in the and League Championship Series in part because Madson, an August 31 acquisition from the Nationals, came up very big in a few key spots, but they’re down two games to none in this World Series because he’s failed to replicate that success. But whereas one could point to at least half-a-dozen other mistakes the Dodgers made en route to losing Game One, particularly in the field — to say nothing of Roberts’ ill-fated summoning of Alex Wood, who surrendered a game-breaking three-run homer to Eduardo Nunez — the Madson move stood out in Game Two, in part because the Dodgers played a cleaner game and in part because it cost them their only lead in this series thus far.

The Dodgers traded for Madson not only because they needed additional bullpen support due to myriad injuries but because the 13-year veteran is about as battle-tested as they come. His numbers at the time of the trade weren’t good (5.28 ERA, 4.36 FIP, 21.0% strikeout rate, 0.0 WAR in 44.1 innings), but he’d made 47 postseason appearances (fifth all-time) in six previous trips (2008-11 with the Phillies, 2015 with the Royals and 2017 with the Nationals), winning World Series rings with the Phillies and the Royals. “The numbers aren’t indicative of the stuff,” Roberts said at the time. “For us, we’re betting on the stuff and the person.”

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Neither the Red Sox’ four-run margin of victory, nor the ease with which Craig Kimbrel finished off the ninth, really do justice to the intensity of Game One of the World Series. Despite the final score, only 10 of the game’s 80 plays took place with a run differential greater than two runs. There were 11 high-leverage plays overall, and the average leverage index was 1.14, which is higher than normal. It was a game with important, exciting moments — and none were more important than certain moments of the seventh inning.

In terms purely of win expectancy, Eduardo Nunez’s three-run homer in the bottom of the seventh off Alex Wood was the game’s top play. When Nunez stepped to the plate with runners on first and second, two outs, and a one-run lead, the Red Sox’ chances of winning the game were 77% — which is to say, good but far from from certain. After his three-run homer — which came off the bat with a launch angle just under 20 degrees but managed to clear the Green Monster, anyway — Boston’s win probability increased to 96%. The game was pretty much over.

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The World Series begins later this very evening, and I don’t know who’s going to win. Nobody knows who’s going to win. It is impossible to know who’s going to win. It’s even almost impossible to know which team ought to be favored. Yeah, the Red Sox finished with baseball’s best record. But the Dodgers added Manny Machado in the middle of the year. The Dodgers finished with baseball’s second-best BaseRuns record. The Red Sox finished in third. Each team deserves to be where it is, and each team would make a deserving champion. Whatever happens over the next four to seven games will mean both everything and nothing.

Given that this is literally the World Series, though, everyone’s looking for edges. We’re all just looking for edges. Potential x-factors, if you will, that could conceivably give one team a leg up. And there’s one statistical area I’ve seen discussed in plenty of spaces — the Red Sox’s seeming vulnerability against left-handed pitching. It’s a good lineup, but it’s a lineup that had a big platoon split. Perhaps that could be enough to put the Dodgers over the top. Handedness could effectively neuter Boston’s bats.

But it seems to me there’s not anything there. The headline already gave this post away. You don’t need to keep reading in case you’re in a rush. For those of you still sticking around, I’ll take a few minutes to explain myself.

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