Effectively Wild Episode 548: How Game Ones Were Won, Plus NLDS Discussion
Ben and Sam banter about MLB’s AFL experiment, then discuss what went down in the ALDS and preview the NLDS.
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Ben and Sam banter about MLB’s AFL experiment, then discuss what went down in the ALDS and preview the NLDS.
Podcast: Play in new window | Download
Subscribe: RSS
At some point people are going to come around to the fact that the Baltimore Orioles are good. They finished the regular season 96-66 and I’m sorry, you don’t do that with smoke and mirrors.
Tonight, the Orioles smoked the Tigers 12-3 in Game One of the ALDS. They did so with power, an 8-run eighth, and four innings of exemplary bullpen usage. There’s no point in recapping what you watched on TV, but here are a few perspectives from post-game interviews, as well as relevant comments from Wednesday’s media session.
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Victor Martinez struck out once every 15.26 plate appearances this year, the best mark in the league. He fanned just 42 times, making him the first player to hit at least 30 home runs with 45-or-fewer strikeouts since Barry Bonds turned the trick in 2004. V-Mart’s .409 OBP led the American League and was second to Andrew McCutchen’s .410 overall.
Finding a way to contain Martinez – and Miguel Cabrera – is a priority for the Orioles. Martinez struck out twice tonight – something he did just three times during the regular season – but he also went deep, as did Cabrera.
In the opinion of an American League pitching coach I spoke to earlier this week, there is no one way to get them out. Read the rest of this entry »
| 3:06 |
: The schedule for today’s live blogs: Wendy Thurm and August Fagerstrom have the Orioles/Tigers game, and then I’ll be joined by David Temple for the Royals/Angels game at 9:30. We’ve got ~7 hours of baseball in front of us. Let’s have a good time.
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| 5:25 |
: Welcome.
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| 5:27 |
Hi Wendy! |
| 5:27 |
Can the Royals make a this a competitive series? Can they get to a fifth game? |
| 5:28 |
: Royals’ opening is with the Angels’ starters. But Angels have same opening with Royals’ starters and have a much more potent offense. It does appear to be a mismatch, but that’s why you play the game.
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| 5:29 |
I bet the royals wish they hadn’t traded away Wil Meyers for a 2 year Shields rental. I mean their fan base must be so upset right now. |
I think we’ve known since, oh, he debuted that Jered Weaver is capable of over-performing his pure stuff. He doesn’t blow anyone away, and he’s never blown anyone away, but he’s been terrific nevertheless, in part because of his home stadium but in bigger part because of something about his delivery. At least, that’s the presumption. Weaver appears to be the deceptive sort, and deception can be part of the recipe for a top-of-the-line starting pitcher. It’s a hard thing to teach, and a hard thing to recognize, but a wonderful thing to possess.
So, Weaver’s been something of a smoke-and-mirrors kind of guy. Because of that, he’s been hard to project –what’s the aging curve for a pitcher’s deception? But Weaver’s 32 years old in a couple days, and there’s evidence that there is indeed something missing for him. Check out his in-zone and out-of-zone swing rates over the PITCHf/x era, even including the relatively unreliable 2007 set:
This year, Weaver’s in-zone swing rate was right on his career average. However, his out-of-zone swing rate was lower than his average by five percentage points, dropping a little more than five percentage points from last season. For pitchers between 2013 and 2014 who threw at least 75 innings, Weaver’s O-Swing% drop is the greatest, and overall he posted the fourth-lowest O-Swing% in baseball given a 75-inning minimum. He was less than one percentage point away from last, and, interestingly, three of the four lowest rates were posted by Angels. C.J. Wilson saw a similarly big year-to-year drop, but he’d been around this level before, and he also struggled with his command. Hitters don’t swing as much against wilder pitchers.
I don’t know what this means, exactly, in that I don’t know why this happened, but this happened. And it’s not a good thing for Weaver, because he’s been a limit-quality-contact type, and it doesn’t help those pitchers to have hitters focusing more on the strike zone. According to Baseball Savant, last year, 57% of balls in play against Weaver were in the zone. This year, that went up to 60%, and while that’s a small difference, little changes power the big changes. It’s not unlike the difference between a .300 OBP and a .330 OBP — baseball is all about seemingly marginal differences.
We know by now that Weaver is consistently going to beat his FIP, because of the fly balls and the pop-ups. But maybe this is the only trend to know:
| Year | ERA- | FIP- |
|---|---|---|
| 2010 | 76 | 76 |
| 2011 | 61 | 83 |
| 2012 | 73 | 95 |
| 2013 | 86 | 102 |
| 2014 | 99 | 116 |
Jered Weaver isn’t a big strikeout pitcher, and he’s coming off a league-average walk rate, and now he’s looking something like a league-average starting pitcher. His K% – BB% has declined four straight seasons, as his fastball has lost more than three miles per hour, and while the rest of his pitches have been less affected, something else about Weaver just isn’t the same. He’s not as deceptive as he used to be. He remains deceptive enough, and he’s blessed with a potent supporting offense, but where does Weaver go from here? Will he get even less deceptive? Will he identify something to change to gain an edge back? How many more years does Jered Weaver have, if hitters are consistently less willing to chase him out of the strike zone?
I know better than to try to predict Jered Weaver’s career death. I know, though, that I’m more worried about reduced deception than about reduced velocity. Weaver’s game was never about velocity. It was about confusing the hell out of guys, and lately guys have been considerably less confused.
On Tuesday night, during Kansas City’s improbable 9-8 wild-card defeat of Oakland (box), Royals left-hander Brandon Finnegan recorded undoubtedly the highest-leverage innings of his very brief major-league career in the highest-leverage game of his club’s season. The results were impressive: 2.1 IP, 9 TBF, 3 K, 1 BB, 1 H, 1 R, 63 xFIP-. For those unfamiliar with Finnegan previously, his performance was surely a revelation. Even for those who possessed some intimate knowledge of his college career at TCU, the outcome was likely a minor surprise, too — if for no other reason than it’s rare for any draftee to contribute meaningfully to his organization’s parent club just a few months after having become a professional.
Between his seven regular-season and (now) single postseason appearance, Finnegan is among that frustrating class of pitcher for whom (a) there exists some manner of major-league data but also (b) not so much that the fielding-independent stats which most directly inform run prevention (strikeouts, walks, ground balls) have become reliable yet.
Notably, though, there’s a collection of what one might call intermediary fielding-independent numbers — that is, metrics which (a) inform the metrics which inform run prevention but also (b) become reliable more quickly than either strikeout or walk rate (which require 70 and 170 batters faced, respectively, according to work done by Russell Carleton). Specifically, I’m thinking of these intermediary fielding-independent numbers: fastball velocity (which is useful insofar as it becomes reliable almost immediately), swinging-strike rate (which is predictive of strikeout rate), and first-pitch-strike rate (which is predictive of walk rate). Precisely how much more quickly the latter two become reliable than the stats they inform, I’m unable to say. The object of this brief exercise, however, is less about Ultimate Precision and more about attempting to extract useful information from a limited sample.
Do you guys know Jaack? That’s not a very good introduction. We’ve run live game chats during the wild-card playoffs the previous two nights, and Jaack is the screen name of at least one participating commenter. This is Wednesday’s live chat, and this is Jaack, at 11:05pm EDT:
Comment From Jaack
There needs to be an article about how much better last night’s game was. Like inning by inning breakdown.
Jaack’s the best. Thank you, Jaack! Following is such a breakdown.
Tuesday’s game, of course, set an impossible standard. It feels like it’s an all-time kind of playoff game, and while I’m fully aware of recency bias, I felt the same way after Rangers/Cardinals Game 6 in 2011, and that one’s stood up. We can debate how amazing it was to watch the A’s and the Royals, but there’s no debate that it was some kind of amazing. So there was no chance at all that the Giants and Pirates would follow that show with at least an equivalent show of their own, but Wednesday was a total dud. The saving grace was that Madison Bumgarner pitched and was awesome, but for the most part he was awesome without any danger, and when the outcome feels decided, the entertainment value plummets.
This isn’t about the quality of the baseball. This is about the quality of the show. We already know that Tuesday’s show was several times better, but now let’s put some actual data to it because what else do you have to do for the next few minutes? If you started reading this, you can finish reading this.
So, bullpens. We can all agree they’re pretty important, yeah? In the postseason, the importance of the bullpen is magnified. It’s on national television, everything is magnified. Every pitch seems more important. Every swing seems more important. Every decision made by a manager seems more important. Each of these things inches a team one step closer to a having World Series title, or one step closer to having tee times.
But also, as our own Dave Cameron has pointed out, the importance of the bullpen is magnified in the postseason because, strategically, the role of a bullpen simply becomes more important the more times you work through a batting order. Relievers are often the most effective pitchers on a team and, at this point in the season, it doesn’t make sense to save or protect your arms. You use what you’ve got when you need outs.
Read the rest of this entry »
Ben and Sam discuss the NL wild card game, Adam Dunn, and the suffering of Oakland fans, then preview the ALDS.
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So that was exciting, and then the exact opposite of exciting, but after two days of play-in games, we know who the Wild Card entries are to the postseason this year. The Royals and Giants join the six division winners in chasing the World Series title, and so before the games begin tonight, let’s take a look at what each remaining contender did well this year, as well as something they might have had problems with.
Three months ago, the Oakland A’s had Yoenis Cespedes, Addison Russell, Tommy Milone, a seemingly insurmountable lead in the American League West, and joy in their hearts. (I don’t know, probably.) Now, they’ve had a summer-long collapse, a much smaller-scale collapse within the wild card game, and have some farewells to offer to short-term employees Jon Lester, Jason Hammel, Geovany Soto, Jonny Gomes and Adam Dunn, plus slightly longer-term employees Luke Gregerson, Alberto Callaspo and Jed Lowrie, all free agents.
I’d say “it’s going to be a winter of transition” in Oakland, except that’s always the case. A full 30 members of the season-ending 43-man roster (three players were on the 60-day DL) were acquired via trade; throw in nine more via free agency or waivers, and only four Oakland players were homegrown draftees. Even that’s overstating it, though, because two of those four (eternal prospect Michael Ynoa and injured starter A.J. Griffin) didn’t appear at all for the A’s this season. That leaves Sean Doolittle, who wasn’t even drafted to do the job he’s doing, and Sonny Gray. Otherwise, this entire A’s team was built via the non-draft machinations of Billy Beane.
Right now, the A’s have financial commitments to a mere five players next year, and two of them are minimal. What’s next for the A’s? There’s no shortage of answers to that question.