One of my favorite yearly preseason pieces is also my most dreaded: the breakout list. I’ve been doing this exercise since 2014, and while I’ve had the occasional triumph (hello, Christian Yelich), the low-probability nature of trying to project who will beat expectations means that for every time you look smart, you’re also bound to look dumb for some other reason.
On the plus side, nobody really embarrassed me. Alex Kirilloff came closest, but in his defense, he was playing with a wrist injury that eventually required surgery. Read the rest of this entry »
It arrived stressfully, chaotically, and slightly late, but the 2022 season is here. And that means it’s time for one last important sabermetric ritual: the final ZiPS projected standings that will surely come back and haunt me multiple times as the season progresses.
The methodology I’m using here isn’t identical to the one we use in our Projected Standings, so there will naturally be some important differences in the results. So how does ZiPS calculate the season? Stored within ZiPS are the first through 99th percentile projections for each player. I start by making a generalized depth chart, using our Depth Charts as an initial starting point. Since these are my curated projections, I make changes based on my personal feelings about who will receive playing time, as filtered by arbitrary whimsy my logic and reasoning. ZiPS then generates a million versions of each team in Monte Carlo fashion — the computational algorithms, that is (no one is dressing up in a tuxedo and playing baccarat like James Bond).
After that is done, ZiPS applies another set of algorithms with a generalized distribution of injury risk, which change the baseline PAs/IPs selected for each player. Of note is that higher-percentile projections already have more playing time than lower-percentile projections before this step. ZiPS then automatically “fills in” playing time from the next players on the list (proportionally) to get to a full slate of plate appearances and innings.
The result is a million different rosters for each team and an associated winning percentage for each of those million teams. After applying the new strength of schedule calculations based on the other 29 teams, I end up with the standings for each of the million seasons. This is actually much less complex than it sounds. Read the rest of this entry »
It arrived stressfully, chaotically, and slightly late, but the 2022 season is here. And that means it’s time for one last important sabermetric ritual: the final ZiPS projected standings that will surely come back and haunt me multiple times as the season progresses.
The methodology I’m using here isn’t identical to the one we use in our Projected Standings, so there will naturally be some important differences in the results. So how does ZiPS calculate the season? Stored within ZiPS are the first through 99th percentile projections for each player. I start by making a generalized depth chart, using our Depth Charts as an initial starting point. Since these are my curated projections, I make changes based on my personal feelings about who will receive playing time, as filtered by arbitrary whimsy my logic and reasoning. ZiPS then generates a million versions of each team in Monte Carlo fashion — the computational algorithms, that is (no one is dressing up in a tuxedo and playing baccarat like James Bond).
After that is done, ZiPS applies another set of algorithms with a generalized distribution of injury risk, which change the baseline PAs/IPs selected for each player. Of note is that higher-percentile projections already have more playing time than lower-percentile projections before this step. ZiPS then automatically “fills in” playing time from the next players on the list (proportionally) to get to a full slate of plate appearances and innings.
The result is a million different rosters for each team and an associated winning percentage for each of those million teams. After applying the new strength of schedule calculations based on the other 29 teams, I end up with the standings for each of the million seasons. This is actually much less complex than it sounds. Read the rest of this entry »
If you thought the Padres were done tinkering with the starting rotation, you thought wrong. On Sunday morning, San Diego agreed to a deal with the Athletics, acquiring pitchers Sean Manaea and Aaron Holiday in exchange for pitcher Adrian Martinez and infielder Euribiel Angeles.
In a season in which teams continued to be conservative at stretching out their starting pitchers, the A’s were more aggressive with the injury-prone Manaea last year. Over the short-term, that proved to be successful, as he remained healthy and threw 179 1/3 innings, his most as a professional. The plaudits aren’t just quantity; he set career-highs all over the place, from WAR (3.3) to full-season FIP (3.66) to strikeout rate (25.7%).
How did Manaea do it? The likeliest reason is velocity. No, he didn’t suddenly become Aroldis Chapman or Brusdar Graterol, but every pitcher — with the possible exception of knuckleballers — requires some level of velocity to achieve effectiveness. In Manaea’s career there’s nearly a 100-point delta in batter slugging percentage between his sinkers going 91 mph or slower (.491) and those traveling 92 mph or faster (.397). On a player-to-player comparison, I get in the neighborhood of 40 points of SLG being the norm.
Similarly, Manaea also gets a lot more strikeouts when he’s throwing harder. More than three-quarters of his career strikeouts from sinkers come from the harder ones despite less than half of his sinkers being in the category. It’s not just chicken-and-egg; this pattern existed prior to this season. Sinkers aren’t traditionally used to punch out batters, but for Manaea, they’re an important weapon. Statcast credits him with 114 strikeouts on sinkers in 2021, the third-most of the Statcast era and the most since Chris Sale had 124 in 2015 (David Price has the crown with 125 in 2014).
It’s not even that Manaea’s sinker is a particularly nasty pitch, such as a splitter in fastball’s clothing; he actually gets less break on his than the average pitcher. It’s that his deceptive delivery and his excellent control basically function as a force multiplier to his velocity, effectively reducing the distance between the mound and home plate. Even a 30-mph fastball can strike out Juan Soto if you get to determine the sliver of time he has to make a decision. Read the rest of this entry »
Earlier today, Eric Longenhagen kicked off our reliever rankings. Now we’ll take a look at the bullpens projected to be baseball’s best.
If you were hoping to see the rise in bullpen innings start to really reverse itself in 2021, you were no doubt disappointed. The percentage of all innings thrown by relievers did tick below 2020’s 44.5%, dropping to 42.7% last year, but it remained higher than in previous seasons. The differences from the past are even larger when you take into account that the zombie runner rule of 2020 and ’21 (and ’22, grrrrr) lopped off some reliever innings, artificially holding down the percentages. Don’t expect the trend to meaningfully reverse itself any time soon. Teams have extensive relief corps, and short of a dramatic rule/roster change, there’s little incentive for them to revert back to an older style of bullpen usage.
That doesn’t mean that things will always stay the same, however. Just as the Ace Reliever era eventually translated into the Modern Closer era, the idea of the closer as a superhuman entity at the front of the bullpen has and will continue to erode. That’s not to say there won’t still be elite relievers who get tons of save opportunities, just that the meaning of the word “closer” will continue to shift away from describing veterans like Todd Jones or Joe Borowski, among a multitude of others, who got high-leverage opportunities their performances didn’t warrant. Baseball’s top 20 closers combined for just 570 saves in 2021, the lowest number in a full season since 1987. The elite closer peaked around 20 years ago, with the top 20 closers combining for 788 saves in 2002. Save totals aren’t dramatically down (1,191 total last season vs. 1,224 in 2002), we’ve just seen the sanctity of the role of those collecting them fade. Read the rest of this entry »
Dan Szymborski: Welcome to SzymChat! Now, we should have had baseball this week, but at least we’ll have it next Thursday instead of , say, nothing until 2023!
12:04
Fish: What’s for lunch?
12:04
Dan Szymborski: Probalby some leftover pizza.
12:04
Biscuit Barn: Daaaan !!! How worried are you about Bellinger not being able to hit ?
12:04
Dan Szymborski: Quite. There were already reasons to be worried
12:05
Dan Szymborski: And while spring training doesn’t mean a LOT, Rosenheck showed some years ago that it means a LITTLE of something
Earlier today, Meg Rowley introduced this year’s positional power rankings. As a quick refresher, all 30 teams are ranked based on the projected WAR from our Depth Charts. Our staff then endeavors to provide you with some illuminating commentary to put those rankings in context. We begin this year’s series at catcher.
In the era of modern analytics, we’ve deciphered a lot of baseball’s mysteries, but not all of them have been solved, and the catcher position remains one of the game’s most tantalizing unfinished puzzles. Shortstops all hit now and we can value relief pitchers using measures like the leverage index, but a lot of a catcher’s job is still difficult to quantify, even with the vast array of nifty data available in 2022. In some ways, that’s fine. A catcher dressed in full regalia kind of resembles an Arthurian knight, and it’s fun not to have all of our mythology replaced by science; J.R.R. Tolkien didn’t tie up all of his loose ends on purpose. Read the rest of this entry »
Over the weekend, the Rockies cemented another middle-of-the-order player’s status in Denver, signing third baseman Ryan McMahon to a six-year deal that will keep him in town until the end of the 2027 season. The contract guarantee is $70 million and covers four years of free-agent eligibility, as McMahon was still arbitration eligible for 2022 and ’23. The 2021 season was the first time his status as a regular seemed ironclad, and he responded with his best season yet, hitting .255/.331/.449 with 23 homers in 151 games and splitting time between second and third base.
Now, the thought going through your head right now may be, “Uh oh, Szymborski is writing about the Rockies, he must be planning to eviscerate them!” But while that’s frequently a good guess, in this case, this strikes me as a perfectly reasonable contract for them to sign. It’s a long deal for a player who isn’t a star, but like with Steven Matz’s four-year, $44 million deal with the Cardinals, the Rockies aren’t paying McMahon as if he were a star. If three years from now, the relationship between him and ownership has deteriorated, Colorado doesn’t seem likely to send him out of town with a $50 million bonus for his new team.
On Saturday, the Miami Marlins added a much-needed source of offense to their lineup, agreeing to terms with outfielder Jorge Soler on a three-year contract worth $36 million. Soler, now entering his age-30 season, had a rough start to the 2021 season, hitting a woeful .192/.288/.370 for the Kansas City Royals. The Braves, meanwhile, basically had to replace their entire outfield halfway through the season, leading to the trade that sent Soler to Atlanta in return for relief prospect Kasey Kalich. Better times were ahead, as Soler hit .269/.358/.524 (132 wRC+) for the Braves down the stretch. Even better was his .948 OPS in the playoffs, including three World Series home runs, which led to a World Series MVP award.
Soler’s deal with the Marlins comes with an important concession in the form of opt-outs after each of the first two years of the contract. He’ll turn 33 during his next deal and ordinary corner outfielders entering their mid-30s don’t typically end up with highly lucrative contracts. Those opt-outs are especially useful for Soler, as he’s a player whose exact level of play is hard to gauge; he spent the first half of 2021 producing like he was barely a Triple-A hitter, but in ’19, he hit .265/.354/.569 (136 wRC+) and led the American League in homers with 48. If he were to repeat his 2019 performance in his first season in Miami and opt out, ZiPS would project a five-year, $110 million contract. That’s a pretty big jump compared to the two years and $24 million the Marlins would otherwise owe him, but as I said, there’s a lot of uncertainty about what Soler’s baseline expectation should be. The contract structure actually incentivizes him to opt-out to a degree; the last year of the contract is only worth $9 million. Read the rest of this entry »
The Phillies continued to fill their outfield holes on Friday, signing Nick Castellanos to a five-year deal worth $100 million. Despite the decline in league-wide offense, the ex-Red had his best offensive season in 2021, hitting .309/.362/.576 with 34 home runs for a 140 wRC+ and 4.2 WAR. All those numbers were new career highs, and this was his first season in which he climbed over the three-WAR barrier.
It’s an enormous challenge to resist comparing the recent arcs of Phillies history to that of the Braves. Both teams saw a need to do complete rebuilds in the mid-2010s, aggressively accumulated prospects, and tried to time their big pushes into contention near particular landmarks. For the Braves, it was the new stadium, and for Philadelphia, a massive new television deal with Comcast Sportsnet worth $2.5 billion and company equity. Atlanta’s master plan unfolded just as envisioned: four consecutive division titles, culminating in the team’s first World Series championship since 1995. The Phillies, on the other hand, only just now put together their first winning season in a decade, and by the smallest possible margin.
The reasons for Philadephia’s lackluster rebuild results are myriad, but to simplify it, it comes down to two things. First: the inability, for whatever reason, to develop minor leaguers, both in-house and from trades, at the rate that the Braves were able to. Second: the willingness to make up for this gap, either with cleverness or financial resources. That’s not to say the Phillies were lackadaisical in their moves or unwilling to sign big free agents; they brought in Bryce Harper to a monster contract, landed Zack Wheeler, and regularly made trades to acquire talent like J.T. Realmuto and Jean Segura. But not all these moves worked out as well as they hoped, and there were too many holes on the roster that they tried to fill with wishful thinking. Read the rest of this entry »
Dan Szymborski
