The doldrums of the offseason induce fascinating research. Look no further than Ben Clemens’ post “They Don’t Make Barrels Like They Used To,” or Davy Andrews’ follow-up, “They Don’t Make Pitch Models Like They Used To.” When the free agent signings dry up, baseball writers must get real creative. And so they write about stuff like the Competitive Advantage Life Cycle.

In his pitch models piece, Davy outlined in four bullet points what happens when one team gains an edge over the others:

• Teams realize the immense value of a skill.
• An arms race ensues as they scramble to cultivate it.
• The skill becomes widespread across the league.
• Since the skill is more evenly distributed, it loses much of its value.

“The second we gained the ability to calculate the value of catcher framing, everybody started working on it,” he wrote. No longer was Ryan Doumit allowed to work behind the plate once it became clear he was capable of leaking 60 runs of value in a single season. Davy produced this helpful plot to demonstrate this convergence of catcher framing value, the Competitive Advantage Life Cycle in action:

All the teams are smart now. Even the Rockies might be smart! Even in areas that ostensibly look like pockets of inefficiency — reliever contracts, for example — there is likely some sort of internal justification for the behavior. Once something can be quantified, the serious outliers disappear. Right?

Maybe not quite. Three years ago, catcher blocking statistics surfaced on Baseball Savant, though teams surely were measuring this skill internally for years prior to its public introduction. Has there been a general convergence in the years since? To some degree, yes. Here is the blocking equivalent of Davy’s plot, with Savant’s “blocks above average” metric on the y-axis. There isn’t a clear clustering trend like in the framing case, but the middle of the pack appears a touch tighter.

Measured as the standard deviation between teams, the trend is a little clearer. Slowly but surely, teams are beginning to converge.

But the catcher blocking revolution is a tentative one. While it’s moving in the right direction, it’s too soon to say the arms race is fully on. To wit: Last year was the worst catcher blocking season in recorded history.

Though Savant introduced the metric publicly in 2023, they have in the years since provided data going back to 2018. Between 2018 and 2025, there were 538 qualifying catcher seasons. Agustín Ramírez’s -28 blocks below average last year ranked 538th among that cohort. It should noted that blocks above average is not a rate stat; he did all that in just 73 games behind the dish.

The slower convergence on blocking is, I think, understandable. Of all the things a catcher does, it’s among the least sexy. Framing, naturally, has received most of the attention from analysts over the last decade or so; it tends to comprise the plurality of catcher defensive value, even in this phase of the Competitive Advantage Life Cycle. Throwing runners out, meanwhile, gets the most love on broadcasts, and it’s the easiest to spot.

Blocking sort of falls between those two catcher activities. It’s somewhat visible, but the difficult blocks happen relatively infrequently. And the value is muted: Savant estimates each block above (or below) average grades out to a quarter of a run. Even Ramírez’s record-breaking season, then, only resulted in -7 runs of blocking value. By comparison, it isn’t all that remarkable to lose seven or more framing runs; eight catchers bested (worsted?) that mark in 2025 alone.

Additionally, there is not much blocking discourse. What distinguishes a good block from a great block? How much is a block worth? Who is the best at this skill? I don’t think there is a common consensus on these questions.

Defined as it is by Savant, blocking is, in some sense, the fundamental task of catching. Only a subset of all pitches are potentially “framable.” Catching a runner stealing is even less common. But on nearly every single pitch, the catcher must catch the ball. It’s right there in the name! Catcher!

For a full-time catcher, that comes out to tens of thousands of pitches in a single season. Perhaps you are saying, ‘OK, how many of those are actually hard to catch?’ I submit that they all are; professional catchers just make it look easy. Imagine a moderately athletic young person was thrown into a game to catch for nine innings. They’d miss hundreds of pitches. To catch in the major leagues, you cannot miss hundreds of pitches. You need to catch them all.

Compared to the general population, Ramírez is an amazing catcher. He saw thousands of pitches with crazy velocity and mind-bending spin and caught nearly every one. But he did not catch them all. In fact, he made a mess of many catchable pitches in the 2025 season. On Savant, the “blocks above average” statistic is described thusly:

Every pitch is assigned a probability of being a passed ball or wild pitch based upon several inputs, most notably: pitch location, pitch speed, pitch movement, catcher location, and batter/pitcher handedness. Based on that knowledge, each pitch a catcher receives (or fails to) is credited or debited with the appropriate amount of difficulty. For example, if a catcher blocks a pitch that is a PB + WP 10% of the time, he will receive +0.10. If he blocks a pitch that is a PB + WP 90% of the time, he will receive +0.90.

I wanted to better understand what this looked like in practice, so I tried to recreate the Statcast model from scratch and apply it to all the pitches in the 2025 season. I was not privy to some of the inputs of the Statcast model, such as the positioning of the catcher, and my physics knowledge was not robust enough to calculate where a spiked pitch intercepted the ground, as Tom Tango did in this explainer post.

What I do have access to, however, is Python, and a just-good-enough knowledge of machine learning techniques. I started with pitch location, release position, pitch movement, and velocity as my predictor variables. At first, it was terrible. But after some trial and error, I landed on a CatBoost framework, and the resulting model came surprisingly close to reproducing Tango’s model. While it slightly underrated the likelihood of wild pitches, it nonetheless correlated nearly identically with the Savant leaderboard at the individual catcher level (0.9 r-squared).

Once I had a good-enough approximation, I set out to better understand the spectrum of wild pitch/passed ball probabilities. Out of nearly 200,000 pitches with runners on base in the sample, just 198 graded out as both a) having a less than 1% chance of being a wild pitch or passed ball, and b) ultimately becoming a wild pitch or passed ball. Here is the general distribution:

Of those 198 extremely unlikely passed balls/wild pitches, 12 can be attributed to Ramírez himself. Funnily enough, he actually graded out as a roughly average framer. But his framing focus, I believe, may have led to some of these inexcusable passed balls. Apologies to the man, but I compiled a reel of his lowlights that can be seen below:

(There is hope yet for Ramírez. Shea Langeliers finished with -26 BAA in 2024; his framing declined in 2025, but his blocking graded out as bang-on average.)

One way to lose lots of blocking value is to whiff on these sorts of catchable offerings, but catchers can make up ground by smothering difficult pitches. Here’s the best block of the year, according to my model, which gave Austin Wells just a 14% chance of corralling this splitter. Leverage isn’t considered here, but it must be noted that this block literally saved the game; the Yankees went on to win in 11 innings:

Wells is a decent blocker, but he is far from the best. That honor goes to Alejandro Kirk, who excels not just at limiting mistakes, but also wrangling unruly breaking balls in the dirt. As this plot shows, the highest probability wild pitches/passed balls live down there:

Kirk is able to smother these types of pitches better than anyone in the league. Watch him make easy work of this 89-mph knuckle-curve in the dirt:

One thing to know about Kirk: He’s short (for a baseball player, anyway.) He’s got a low center of gravity, and he gets down to block those pitches. Does being short help you succeed at blocking? It seems like there’s at least some evidence that’s the case:

For now, Kirk is the reigning king of blocking, and Ramírez its court jester. Give it a few years — say, by 2030 — and blocking will likely find itself in the same place as framing, eliminating itself of Doumit-y characters, anything that reeks of serious lost value. All the mess gets filtered out eventually. As of now, we find ourselves in a purgatorial phase of the Competitive Advantage Life Cycle. Enjoy the imperfections while they last.

Thanks to Stephen Sutton-Brown for technical assistance.

Davy Andrews recently wrote about Steven Kwan’s defense, which, as my colleague chronicled, has been demonstrably stellar. Not only has the 28-year-old Cleveland Guardians left fielder been awarded a Gold Glove in each of his four MLB seasons, the metrics back up the accolades. There hasn’t been a better defender at his position, and that goes for the senior circuit as well as the American League.

And then there is Kwan’s bat. The 2018 fifth-round pick out of Oregon State University isn’t a basher, but he is a solid contributor to the Guardians offense. Since debuting in 2022, the erstwhile Beaver has slashed .281/.351/.390 with a 112 wRC+. Moreover — this is no secret for most FanGraphs readers — he seldom goes down by way of the K. Kwan’s 9.5% strikeout rate over the past four campaigns is the lowest among qualified hitters not named Luis Arraez.

Grant Fink knows his left-handed stroke as well as anyone. Cleveland’s hitting coach tutored Kwan in the minors before moving into his current role, and they work together in the offseason. I asked Fink about two-time All-Star when the Guardians visited Fenway Park last September.

“If you look at his profile as a hitter in the major leagues, it is based on accuracy and ball flight,” Fink told me. “His key is making sure that his body is moving in a way where he can get his barrel to the ball in multiple places in the zone, and that he is making contact in the right windows to produce that consistent ball flight. Read the rest of this entry »

How much WAR does FanGraphs project Ronald Acuña Jr. for in 2026? It’s a really straightforward question. It should be especially straightforward now that all of our projections are out. But as it turns out, it’s less clear cut than it sounds at first, and clarifying it has two benefits. First, it’ll help you better understand our projections. Second, it’s fun to play with math. So buckle up: We’re doing arithmetic.

First, let’s settle on what the “FanGraphs projection” even is. Here’s the relevant section of Acuña player page:

Eight projections, each with tons of numbers. That’s a lot! But when I say the “FanGraphs projection,” I’m referring to the first green row, the FanGraphs Depth Charts projection or FGDC. That’s the top-line projection we use anywhere on the website that pulls in projections to make predictions. When you see “2026 (Proj),” it’s using that number unless otherwise stated.

That’s settled then, right? We’re projecting Acuña for 5.4 WAR. Why did I have to waste your time with an article about it? It has to do with how we make that projection, a process you’re about to learn about, probably in more detail than you wanted. Read the rest of this entry »

One of the fun parts of writing about baseball is the image services. We use Imagn Images, which is owned by USA Today. Like all image services, it licenses pictures taken by professional photographers all over the world to news organizations without their own photographers. That very much includes FanGraphs. We’re not photographers. I’m definitely not a photographer. Here’s the most recent picture I took. It’s a bunch of dusty foam acoustic panels, and I think you’ll agree that the composition is garbage.

Luckily, the image service allows us to use pictures from actual talented photographers. These people take superlative action shots, and then we grab a convenient one for the top of each article. The system works, but it leaves so, so many cool pictures unused. Today, I’d like to highlight one category of pictures that is a particular favorite of mine: Outfielders smushing themselves into the wall as they try to make a leaping catch. As subgenres go, it’s a delight, and so we’re going to honor the best it has to offer. Read the rest of this entry »

When Eric Longenhagen put together our 2018 Philadelphia Phillies top prospects list, he described southpaw Ranger Suárez as “small but athletic and mechanically efficient, unfurling a sinker/slider combination that has a chance to play at the back of a rotation.” Having yet to pitch above High-A, the 22-year-old Suárez was assigned a 40 FV and a 2020 ETA.

He has gone on to exceed expectations. Not only did Suárez reach the majors earlier than anticipated — July of that same season — he has evolved into a frontline starter. After first establishing himself as a reliever, the Pie de Cuesta, Venezuela native moved into the Phillies rotation in August 2021, and since then, he boasts a 3.39 ERA and a 3.45 FIP over 654 frames. Moreover, he has gone 4-1 with a 1.48 ERA in the postseason, a contributing factor to his desirability in the free agent market. As chronicled by my colleague Davy Andrews, the Red Sox inked Suárez to a five-year, $130-million deal earlier this month.

When Sonny Gray met with the Boston media after being acquired via trade from the St. Louis Cardinals in late November, I asked the veteran right-hander if he feels settled in to who he’ll be going forward, or if he foresees making any changes to his repertoire or pitch usage. I haven’t had an opportunity to ask that question to Suárez, but I did present a version of it to Red Sox chief baseball officer Craig Breslow. Does the organization’s pitching brain trust anticipate suggesting any tweaks, or do they view the 30-year-old lefty as someone who already optimizes his talents? Read the rest of this entry »

I was thinking about Rob Refsnyder recently for two reasons. First, I think about Rob Refsnyder a lot. I try to be professional in this forum, but everyone has their own sports fan nemeses, and Refsnyder is one of mine.

Back in 2012, Refsnyder — then a University of Arizona Wildcat — was the Most Outstanding Player of the College World Series, in part because he went berserk in the two-game final against South Carolina: 4-for-6 with two walks and a home run. He drove in the winning run in Game 1 and scored the winning run in Game 2. My beloved Gamecocks were denied a third straight national championship and haven’t been back to Omaha since. I’ll die mad about this series, and I’ll never forgive Refsnyder in particular.

I did not, however, expect to still be writing about Refsnyder — then a punchy, athletically unremarkable second baseman — in 2026. The previous year’s College World Series MOP, Scott Wingo, was an 11th-round pick; he never came close to making the majors and has spent the past decade as a college assistant coach. (He was most recently in the news in 2024 as the Home Run Derby pitcher for Alec Bohm.) Read the rest of this entry »

Let’s start with a thought experiment, then we’ll get to the guy in the picture up there. Say you’ve got an unhittable fastball. Every time an opposing batter swings at it, they miss. With such a pitch, you’d want to hit the strike zone every time. Only good things can happen in the strike zone. Either the batter takes and you earn a called strike, or they swing and you earn a swinging strike. Outside the zone, you’d run the risk of throwing a ball because the batter lays off it.

Now, say you’ve got an extremely hittable fastball. Not only does it never generate a whiff, but every time the batter swings at it, they also hit a home run. You’d never want to throw that pitch in the zone. You wouldn’t want to throw it much at all. Maybe you’d use it as a waste pitch to change the batter’s eye level, just every once in a while, and so far outside the zone that they wouldn’t even think about swinging at it. But that’s it.

Those are extreme examples, but my point is to introduce the concept of an ideal zone rate. Every pitcher (and every pitch) in baseball lives somewhere between those two extremes. Some pitchers should live in the zone and some should avoid it. All sorts of factors inform that ideal zone rate: how likely the pitch is to earn a whiff, how likely it is to earn a chase, how hard it tends to gets hit, whether it tends to gets hit in the air or on the ground, how it interacts with the rest of your repertoire, how it performs in different locations, how well you’re able to locate it, how confident you feel in it, the count, batter, situation, and so on, and so on.

Lately, the calculus has shifted somewhat. The zone rate has been rising because pitchers have been instructed to aim down the middle and trust in their stuff. In 2024, 49.6% of all pitches were in the strike zone and 26.5% were specifically in the heart zone (the area at least one baseball’s width from the edge of the zone). Both of those numbers were the highest rates we’d seen since the start of the pitch tracking era in 2008, and both of those numbers were surpassed in 2025, when for the first time ever, more pitches hit the strike zone than missed it. Across baseball, the ideal zone rate has increased.

Read the rest of this entry »

The San Francisco Giants, with their unique front office leadership and unconventional manager, have gone the traditional route. “Acquire Harrison Bader” is a tried-and-true team-building strategy for a would-be contender; the former Florida Gator is on his way to his seventh organization in the past four-and-a-half years.

The Giants, unlike Bader’s previous employers, seem interested in keeping him around long enough to unpack all his furniture: Bader’s new contract is for two years and $20.5 million.

Regardless of any analysis to follow, this move makes the Giants stronger in 2026. Bader is a legitimate center fielder who’ll relieve the defensive pressure on the freshly emancipated Jung Hoo Lee (who’s stretched in center) and Heliot Ramos (who’s stretched at any position that requires him to wield a glove). Guys who can play center field comfortably and have a clue at the plate are harder to find than you’d think — especially in free agency — and the Giants got one. Read the rest of this entry »

One day, José Ramírez will get old. One day, he’ll dodder out to the grass in front of the pitcher’s mound on the arm of an adorable grandchild and lollipop the ball into the dirt in front of home plate to the warm cheers of the Cleveland faithful. That’s sure to happen at some indeterminate point in the future. This weekend, however, the Guardians expressed their belief that Ramírez’s inevitable decline is a long way off, inking the 33-year-old future Hall of Famer to a seven-year contract extension that will keep him in the fold through the 2032 season. When the extension expires, Ramírez will be 40.

We’ll break down all the numbers and the dollars, but the biggest story here is the most obvious one. This is great news for anybody who loves Ramírez, the Guardians, or baseball. Ramírez has full no-trade rights, and there’s every reason to expect him to stay for the rest of his career. It’s time to talk about statues and plaques and how nice it is that we’ll never have to know just how wrong it would feel to see him in a jersey that doesn’t say Cleveland on it. This is the third extension Ramírez has signed. The first came in 2016, and it bought out his arbitration years plus two option years. The second came in 2022, and, like this one, it bought out the final three years of the previous extension. Ramírez wanted to stay in Cleveland, and with those first two extensions, he forfeited tens of millions of dollars on the open market to do so.

This extension is slightly more complicated, and the details matter quite a bit. Ramírez was already signed though the 2028 season as part of the previous seven-year extension, so it’s not as if there was a pressing need to get this done. He was owed $69 million over the next three years. This deal reworks his compensation over that period and adds four more years. Over the next seven seasons, Ramírez will earn $25 million per year, with $10 million per year deferred. (Each of those deferrals lasts 10 years, and then pays out $1 million per year for 10 years. So he’ll get $1 million in 2036, $2 million in 2037, and so on until he gets his final $1 million payment in 2051.) The deal also came with perks like increased bonuses for awards and high finishes in the MVP voting, an extra hotel room on road trips, and use of a private jet to and from the All-Star Game plus one extra time per year. Read the rest of this entry »

Joe Boyle is emerging as a late-bloomer success story. Now 26 years old, the Tampa Bay Rays right-hander is coming off a campaign during which he not only continued to display a power arsenal, but began to rein in his command as well. Over 86 innings with Triple-A Durham, Boyle paired a 32.9% strikeout rate with an 11.8% walk rate; across 52 innings with the big league club, those numbers were 25.7% and 12.4%. While admittedly far from George Kirby-esque, those free-pass percentages were nonetheless a meaningful step in the right direction.

Boyle’s relationship with the strike zone has long been tenuous. In May 2024, Eric Longenhagen wrote that while “Boyle has had huge stuff for his entire life as a prospect, [he has] also been very wild.” Fast forward to December of that same year, and our lead prospect analyst again cited the nastiness of the 6-foot-8, 250-pound hurler’s offerings, adding a caveat that he has “zero feel for location.”

Something else that Longenhagen wrote 13 months ago bears noting:

“It’s possible that the Rays will attempt to do with Boyle what they successfully accomplished with Tyler Glasnow: Simplify his delivery to make it more consistent and hope it’s enough for him to be a five-inning starter.”

Currently projected as the Rays’ fifth starter by RosterResource, Boyle is now with his third organization. Selected in the fifth round of the 2020 draft by the Cincinnati Reds out of the University of Notre Dame, he was subsequently swapped to the Oakland Athletics in 2023, and then to Tampa Bay the following winter. It is understandable that the pitching-savvy Rays were, and remain, enamored with his potential. While Boyle’s success at the major league level has been spotty — his ERA last season was 4.67 — his comps stick out like a sore thumb. Baseball Savant’s list of the pitchers most similar to Boyle based on velocity and movement comprises Chase Burns, Jacob deGrom, Dylan Cease, Hunter Greene, and Bubba Chandler. Read the rest of this entry »