The 2020 Cubs won the NL Central, but they did it in a fairly unusual way, getting minimal contributions from Anthony Rizzo, Kris Bryant, and Javier Báez. In 151 combined games, their trio of stars combined for a mere 1.6 WAR, mostly coming from Rizzo (1.0); back when the Cubs won the World Series in 2016, Bryant alone racked up nearly eight wins. Last season, players like Ian Happ and Willson Contreras were the ones who propelled the team to October baseball, not the old core.

With Báez, Bryant, and Rizzo all set to enter free agency this offseason, the Cubs, as in many a heist movie, hoped to bring back the old crew for one last big score in 2021. But unlike many good yarns about high-stakes thievery, the Cubs largely ignored the supporting cast. The studio had cut the budget, an obvious necessity what with the Cubs playing in a tiny, small-market city, boasting merely the fourth-best attendance in baseball in 2019, and the reality that no owner in baseball history has ever made money. Yu Darvish was off to film a high-budget action movie in San Diego; the only primary member of the 2019 rotation still on the roster in ’21 is Kyle Hendricks.

Without much in the way of new blood, they needed their old core to shine one last time. And luckily for the Cubs, this is largely what has happened. In a similar number of games as the 2020 season, our troika of protagonists has combined for 4.8 WAR, tripling their contribution from the prior season. With the addition of Nolan Arenado, the Cardinals got most of the preseason NL Central ink but the Cubs have been more impressive at the box office. Read the rest of this entry »

No one thought that the Arizona Diamondbacks were going to contend for their division this year. It’s been nearly a decade since any team other than the Dodgers took that title; the buzz factor, the splashy acquisitions, newly belonged to the Padres; and it didn’t take too long before the Giants proved themselves formidable contenders, too. The Rockies were, as expected, back in the rearview mirror, another star bitterly departed, their GM resigned, reports of organizational dysfunction hovering around them. What, then, of the Diamondbacks? To linger — to play spoiler, maybe. To continue onward, even if only because they have to. “#RattleOn” — that’s their hashtag. One imagines the heat, a bone-deep drought, a sound — low to the ground and strange — carrying out into the unfurling darkness until you can hear it no longer. The sound is a warning, or an object of childish entertainment, or a sigh whose meaning remains frustratingly unclear. It persists even after it’s gone.

Last week, the Diamondbacks lost seven games in a row. Six of those games were on the road. The Diamondbacks have, in fact, lost 19 consecutive road games. The record for most consecutive road losses is 22 — a mark achieved once by the Philadelphia Athletics in 1943, and later by none other than the New York Mets in 1963. No team has ever lost exactly 21 road games in a row — an entirely different Philadelphia Athletics team lost 20 straight in 1916. And there, the next name down the list: the 2021 Arizona Diamondbacks, winners of just under a third of the games they’ve played.

The Diamondbacks lost in Oakland. Ketel Marte crashed into the Coliseum, making an incredible catch — and then the ball disappeared from his glove when his back was turned. The final score was 4-0, anyway. They were unable to scratch a run across against Sean Manaea, just as they’d only managed two in seven innings off Chris Bassitt the day before. Before that, they lost in Milwaukee — a tie carried into the eighth lost and never recovered; mostly, deficits whose heights couldn’t be scaled, no matter how slight. They were swept in LA by the Dodgers; in Denver, by the lowly Rockies; in Queens by the Mets and in Miami by the Marlins. Their last road win was on April 25. They swept the doubleheader in Atlanta, 5-0 and 7-0. They were, at that point, exactly .500. Read the rest of this entry »

Shohei Ohtani produced another tour de force on Friday night against the Diamondbacks, throwing five strong innings and collecting a pair of doubles — lighting up Statcast along the way — and even making a defensive cameo in the Angels’ 6–5 win, though he departed before the matter was settled in extra innings. None of what the 26-year-old phenom did on Friday was anything we haven’t seen from him before, but that’s part of the point. He’s making this double duty stuff seem routine, combining pitching and hitting responsibilities in a way that hasn’t been pulled off in over a century, performing at a very high level in both roles with specific elements that are elite, and positioning himself as a legitimate MVP candidate.

Othani was facing a downtrodden club that had lost 21 of their previous 23 games, but the Diamondbacks were at least playing at Chase Field rather than threatening to extend their 19-game road losing streak. On the mound, he allowed just two runs over five innings, striking out eight. Both runs came in a messy fifth inning that included hitting Tim Locastro with a pitch, back-to-back balks (the second of which scored Josh Rojas), and a wild pitch on which Eduardo Escobar struck out but reached first safely as Ketel Marte scored from third. Surprisingly, nobody had that particular combination on their Bad Inning Bingo cards.

Shohei Ohtani did not agree with this balk call pic.twitter.com/fRmOS0La5K

— Talkin’ Baseball (@TalkinBaseball_) June 12, 2021

That inning aside, Ohtani was impressive, generating 14 whiffs, just one shy of his season high (which he’s reached three times); seven of those were via his four-seamer and another five with his splitter. The latter has a claim as the most unhittable pitch in baseball. Among offerings that have concluded at least 50 plate appearances, Ohtani’s splitter has held batters to the majors’ lowest wOBA:

Meanwhile, Ohtani’s splitter has also produced the majors’ highest whiffs per swing rate:

I’ve included Ohtani’s majors-leading putaway percentage on the offering (per two-strike pitch ending with a strikeout) and his second-ranked strikeout percentage (per plate appearance ending with the pitch). Glasnow’s curveball is the only pitch that has a higher rate in the latter category.

As for Ohtani’s fastball, which averaged 95.2 mph on Friday — and 95.5 for the season, 1.2 mph lower than his 2018 rookie campaign — he threw one to Asdrúbal Cabrera in the third inning that was clocked at 99.6 mph. That’s his fastest since a 98.8 mph heater on May 5; he hasn’t topped 100.0 since April 4, but both of those round up to 100 if you’re counting that way. Velocity aside, the most distinctive thing about his heater — which batters have hit for a .270 AVG, .444 SLG, and .400 wOBA — is his 30.2% PutAway%, which ranks eighth in the majors.

In 47.1 innings (4.1 shy of his rookie total), Ohtani has posted a 2.85 ERA, 3.41 FIP, and 3.61 xERA. Those numbers won’t thrust him into the AL Cy Young race, particularly give his workload constraints; he’s on pace to throw 118 innings after two years of almost nothing. Still, they’re significantly better than average — his ERA- is 69, his FIP- is 82 — and they testify to a convincing recovery after so much time lost to blisters, a UCL sprain that resulted in Tommy John surgery, and a flexor pronator sprain that shut him down after two brutal appearances last year.

Among AL pitchers with at least 40 innings, Ohtani’s 34% strikeout rate ranks fifth and his 0.76 homers per nine 11th. While his 14% walk rate is the league’s second-highest, he’s gotten the situation under control; after walking 19 batters in his first four starts (18.2 IP), he’s walked just nine over his last five (28.2 IP), with just one start with more than two. On a per-plate appearance basis, his walk rate has dropped from 22.6% over those first four starts to 7.6% over the last five. That’ll do.

As for Ohtani’s hitting, he went 2-for-4 with a pair of doubles. The first one, off Merrill Kelly, came in the third inning after he fouled an 0–2 cutter off his right knee, producing a scary moment (think Christian Yelich suffering a season-ending kneecap fracture in 2019). Uncomfortable but undaunted, Ohtani arose and, four pitches later, ripped a sinker into the right-center field gap, driving in Justin Upton; the drive’s 114.9-mph exit velocity was the game’s highest.

Moments later, Ohtani came around to score on an Anthony Rendon single. That hit was sandwiched around a pair of groundouts, but in the seventh inning, after moving from the mound to right field, he doubled off Taylor Clarke to send Upton to third, who later scored on a wild pitch to break a 4–4 tie, though Ohtani was stranded at third. He departed the game after the inning, with Taylor Ward moving from center to right and Juan Lagares taking over in center.

This was the third time this season that Ohtani has moved from the mound to the outfield in the same game, and the first in a contest the Angels won; they lost 5–1 to Houston on May 11 despite his season-high seven-inning, one-run effort, and 3–2 to Cleveland on May 19, when he pitched just 4.2 innings and allowed two runs. He’s played the outfield on two other occasions — once after shifting from designated hitter, once after pinch-hitting — and while he’s yet to record a putout or assist in 6.1 total innings in the pasture, he’s now gone 2-for-4 in those extra plate appearances.

Including his pinch-hitting appearances on Saturday and Sunday, Ohtani is hitting .269/.353/.608 and ranks second in the AL in slugging percentage and homers (17) behind only Vladimir Guerrero Jr. (.688 SLG, 21 HR). Ohtani’s 159 wRC+, meanwhile, is third behind Guerrero (204) and Matt Olson (169). Again, it’s a convincing turnaround given last year’s dismal .190/.291/.366 (82 wRC+) line. The offseason work he did to strengthen his lower body and rebuild his swing is paying off; he’s absolutely crushing the ball. Through Saturday, his 23.8% barrel rate leads the majors; his .418 xwOBA places him in the 97th percentile; and his 55.2% barrel rate and 93.5 mph average exit velocity are both in the 96th percentile. All of those are career highs, and his 34 barrels are just three short of his career high, set in 2018, albeit on 72 fewer batted ball events (143 to 225).

Owning the major’s top barrel rate as well as its most unhittable pitch (or one of them, at least) is incredibly cool, but one of Ohtani’s most impressive stats is perhaps his most basic one: He’s played in 60 of the team’s 65 games, starting 55 times and pinch-hitting in five. He’s made his two-way play routine to an extent that he wasn’t allowed to do in 2018, when the Angels generally kept him out of the lineup both the day before and the day after his starts and didn’t let him hit on the days he pitched, lest they lose the DH upon his departure. Even given the caveat that he’s not playing the field, this is a huge deal — the closest analogue we’ve seen to Babe Ruth’s 1918 and ’19 seasons. In ’18, Ruth, still a member of the Red Sox, made 19 starts plus one relief appearance, totaling 166.1 innings, and added another 57 starts in the outfield (including 11 in center!) and 13 at first base, plus five pinch-hitting appearances. His 11 homers and .555 slugging percentage led the AL and his 2.22 ERA ranked ninth, and his 6.7 combined WAR ranked second in the majors. In ’19, Ruth made 15 starts plus two relief appearances, tossing 133.1 innings, and 106 starts in the outfield plus another five at first base, as well as one pinch-hitting appearance. He set a single-season home run record that year with 29 and ran away with the major league leads in OBP (.456), SLG (657) and combined WAR (9.8).

While I’m not suggesting that Ohtani is revolutionizing the game the way Ruth did, his 2.1 WAR as a hitter (tied for ninth in the league entering Sunday) and 1.1 WAR as a pitcher combined rank second only to Guerrero’s 3.9, and it projects to 8.0 WAR over the course of the season, about halfway between Ruth’s 1918 and ’19 seasons. With Vladito currently leading all three Triple Crown categories (he has 55 RBI and a .344 batting average to go with his 21 homers), this could be a very interesting MVP race, and any fears that it will boil down to a repeat of the 2012 AL battle between Miguel Cabrera and Mike Trout, with its old school/new school fault lines, ought to be at least somewhat assuaged by Guerrero’s high WAR.

Then again, these days one can’t get much more old school than invoking the Bambino himself. That Ohtani’s performance is inviting that comparison is a wonder to behold.

Joe Smith has quietly been a good pitcher for a long time. Now 37 years old and playing for his sixth team, the Houston Astros reliever has a 3.06 ERA over 14 big-league seasons. Moreover, his 804 appearances are the most of any active hurler — and that’s not even the eye-catching part. Smith recently moved ahead of Walter Johnson into 49th place on the all-time list, with another legend in his sights. Next up is Nolan Ryan, who logged 807 career outings.

I asked Smith about his ascent in the pitching-appearances category. Could he have imagined this when he debuted with the New York Mets in 2007?

“When I first got called up, I was just trying to figure out what the heck pitching in the big leagues was, “said Smith, who’d been drafted out of Wright State University the previous year. “That offseason, I wrote out some goals and things I needed to get better at, and I was able to accomplish them. At that point I felt like I could do it for a long time. But there’s so much luck in this game. Your health, right? Pedro Martinez was on the team, and everybody would wish him good luck. He’d be, ‘No, wish me good health. If I’m healthy, I’ll be good.’ That really resonated with me. Being able to answer the call is what it’s about, especially when you’re a reliever. You want to be able to post as many days as you can.”

Right now he’s on the shelf. Smith went on the 10-day IL earlier this week, his return date uncertain. The sidearmer told me that everything is structurally sound, yet his forearm had been “grabbing” him (Astros manager Dusty Baker has reportedly referred to it as “elbow soreness”). Read the rest of this entry »

This past offseason, the Toronto Blue Jays spent a ton of money to upgrade their lineup, bringing in George Springer and Marcus Semien for a combined total of $168 million. Of course, $150 million of that total is owed to Springer over the next six seasons; Semien signed a one-year deal after finding the market for his services to be rather slow and cold. Two months into the season, it’s been Semien who has been the more valuable acquisition for the Jays, however. Springer has been sidelined for all but four games with a nagging quad issue that has yet to be resolved. Meanwhile, Semien leads all qualified second basemen with 2.6 WAR, a mark that places him seventh overall among all qualified batters.

For Semien, his success this year has been a huge payoff on the risk he took by signing that one-year offer. After a breakout 2019, he struggled to maintain that new level of production the year after. With real questions about his true talent level at the plate lingering over him, he decided to take a one-year offer to rebuild his value in 2021.

As Mike Petriello recently notes, the offensive downturn Semien suffered through in 2020 may be a bit misleading. Through the first 14 games of the 2020 season, he posted a 45 wRC+, but because of the truncated season, those 14 games represented around a quarter of the total games played last year, giving them an outsized effect on his overall line. Read the rest of this entry »

This past Tuesday’s slate of games provided us with a cluster of enjoyable home runs. Among them were Shohei Ohtani’s longest career home run (an estimated 470-foot blast); Ke’Bryan Hayes inadvertently missing first base and having his third bomb of the year overturned; and a fly ball off the bat of Carlos Correa that just (and I mean just) cleared the Green Monster.

Correa’s home run, the shortest of the season so far, was struck at a launch angle of 49 degrees and traveled an estimated 310 feet; it’s one of only four (over-the-fence) home runs hit since 2015 with a launch angle that high or higher. There have been several homers hit 310 feet or less, but the lion’s share of them have been the inside-the-park variety. Here’s the list of impressively short out-of-the-park home runs:

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In our preseason positional power rankings of the league’s third basemen, the Braves came in at No. 25, projecting for just 1.4 WAR at the position, with Jason Martinez writing not only about Austin Riley’s potential contributions, but also possible production from Jake Lamb. Roughly two-and-a-half months later, the picture looks entirely different: Lamb never took an at-bat in Atlanta (though he’s playing well for the White Sox), while Riley has put together a very solid offensive season. In 59 games and 231 plate appearances through June 9, he’s slashing .300/.381/.515 with 11 home runs and a 142 wRC+ and has accumulated nearly as much WAR by himself (1.3) as the team’s total positional projection. As a result, the Braves have gotten some of the best value in the majors at third base relative to those projections. (The Rangers mess with the table a touch, since they were projected for and have achieved negative value so far, but I digress.)

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On Wednesday night, Nick Madrigal hit a groundball to third base. That’s a normal state of affairs; he’s fourth in the majors in total grounders so far this year. While hustling down the line, however, he tweaked something in his leg and pulled up slightly. It looked like it might be a nagging injury, but the truth turned out to be far worse: Madrigal was diagnosed with a complete tear of one hamstring tendon and a partial tear of another, and the Sox have placed him on the 60-day IL.

Madrigal and the club have a decision to make. A surgery to fix the tears would end his season. The earliest timeline for rehabilitation, though, would place him back on the roster around the end of August, and there’s no guarantee that rehab would go smoothly. The final decision on whether to opt for surgery won’t come this week, but in the meantime, it’s not too early to consider what it means for the AL Central-leading White Sox.

Whether batting at the top or bottom of the lineup, Madrigal had been a spark for Chicago this year. His contact-focused, all-fields grounder game doesn’t resemble the way that baseball is played in the major leagues today, but that doesn’t make it any less effective. Hitting everything you swing at and running like mad afterwards is an effective strategy, particularly when you don’t have power to rely on as a backup. It’s worked to the tune of a .305/.349/.425 line so far this year, good for a 118 wRC+.

Some of the component stats are downright hilarious. Madrigal’s 7.9% strikeout rate is absurd; his 5.1% walk rate is comparatively normal but still much lower than league average; his 3.03 GB/FB ratio ranks fourth in baseball. His 3.7% swinging-strike rate is second only to David Fletcher, and his 91.8% contact rate is the best mark in the majors. If you’re not going to hit the ball hard or at least in the air, you need to make up for it by putting a ton of balls in play, and Madrigal unquestionably does that.

Of greater concern to the White Sox than how he arrives at his offense, however, is how much offense he provides. That’s mostly covered by the 118 wRC+, and that’s a big chunk of offense to replace. Only eight players we list as second basemen have bested that mark, and that includes Max Muncy, Chris Taylor, and Jazz Chisholm Jr., who all get a decent amount of playing time elsewhere on the diamond.

That doesn’t take into account defense, and while defensive metrics don’t agree on Madrigal (UZR and OAA like him, DRS doesn’t), his speed and smooth work with the glove are universally praised by scouts and team executives, not to mention teammates. He looks to be a plus defender at the position, another tough thing to replace midseason.
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With the continual increases in league-wide fastball velocity each year, we’re beginning to understand that pitcher aging curves are going to change dramatically. As Jeff Zimmerman’s work makes clear, older pitchers are holding onto more of their fastball velocity and shedding usage at the same time. There’s a survivor’s bias in studying the pitchers who have accrued the most innings, but there’s something to be learned about the limits of maintaining velocity from pitchers who exemplify the modern game.

Max Scherzer is an archetype of the modern pitcher: someone who has been all gas and punchouts. But as he ages, he appears to be entering into a slow decline. He’s boosted his K-BB% rate from 23.4% last season to 30.9%, but his fastball has lost 0.6 mph (94.9 to 94.3 mph) off its average and 0.8 mph (97.9 to 97.1 mph) off its max. And while we can argue about averages, what might be most important for measuring arm health is max velocity.

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About a month ago, I wrote about Jack Flaherty and looked at his increased reliance on both his fastball and his slider. I posited that through his first seven starts, Flaherty had effectively been a two-pitch pitcher, with the aforementioned combination of pitches making up about 80% of his total pitches. (His curveball was his third-most used pitch, thrown sparingly at about a 13% clip.)

To investigate if this constituted a negative development and could account for Flaherty’s reduction in strikeouts relative to his career norms, I conducted a series of analyses. I grouped pitcher seasons from 2010-20 and looked at the number of pitches each pitcher had with a usage over 15%. This was somewhat arbitrary; I chose the 15% cutoff so pitchers with mixes like Flaherty’s in 2021 would appear in the bucket with two pitches. I then took each bucket and looked at the group’s strikeout rate, walk rate, FIP-, and WAR per 180 innings pitched. I found that between two, three, and four pitches, there was virtually no difference in any of the measures; the strikeout and walk rates were within a percentage point, as were the FIP- figures, while the prorated WAR numbers were within hundredths of a win. Next, I calculated the third time through the order (TTO) effect for pitchers in each bucket. To my surprise, there again was little difference between the pitcher buckets. My hypothesis was that two-pitch pitchers would struggle to get through the order as effectively as their peers who utilized more pitches. But based on my cutoffs for a relevant pitch (15% usage), this did not seem to be the case.

From there I concluded that Flaherty leaning on his fastball and slider more was not inherently bad; there seemed to be no evidence that being a two-pitch starter was inherently detrimental to striking out batters, preventing runs, and turning over a lineup on more than one, two, or three occasions.

But upon further reflection, I was dissatisfied with my process in arriving at this conclusion. The basis for my dissatisfaction was that my criteria for determining whether a pitcher was a two-pitch pitcher or a pitcher with three to four credible offerings. I chose the criteria, as I explained above, based on the tendencies of a single player I was interested in and in a way that would fit the narrative I was trying to tell. I also felt (anecdotally) there had been an influx of pitchers in the majors who have found success by primarily relying on two pitches; some of those pitchers happened to represent clubs the public deems “smart.” Thus, two-pitch starters were not actually more flawed than their peers with more diverse repertoires.

I will address the latter part of this line of thinking later (spoiler: it is extremely flawed) but this is just how I was trying to rationalize my findings. I have seen the performances of Luis Patiño and Shane McClanahan in 2021 and Tyler Glasnow last year (he added a slider this season) in Tampa with two pitches and thought the Rays may be on to something. Same for the Astros and Framber Valdez, Cristian Javier, and Lance McCullers Jr. (until this year, when he also added a slider). Two of the most surprising break-through pitchers of the past two-plus seasons have been Kevin Gausman and Lucas Giolito, both of whom rely primarily on a fastball/offspeed combination (for Gausman, the pitch is a splitter; for Giolito, it is a changeup). Dinelson Lamet is another pitcher with exceptional results (when healthy) relying only on a four-seamer and slider. As I mentioned above, this is all anecdotal evidence backing up a potentially faulty conclusion. There is no empirical support here. This is not the most rigorous approach to research.

That led me to redo my analysis, this time with more rigor in classifying the “two-pitchedness” of a player. Before I get into my methodology for this determination, I would be remiss if I did not at least introduce the main concept I am trying to measure: the third time through the order effect (which I will denote as TTO for the remainder of this piece). This is a phenomenon that has played a massive part in determining pitching roles and deployment in this era of major league baseball. It consists of the degradation of pitcher performance as he moves through the opposing lineup. No matter how you measure it — wOBA allowed, RA9, ERA — the pitcher population pitches worse the second time through the order compared to the first and the third time through the order versus the second. Generally, the effect is measured relative to the first time through the order. Since I will be using wOBA allowed in this piece, that means the second time through the order effect is the difference in wOBA allowed for the second and first time through the order and the third time through the order effect is the difference in wOBA allowed between the third and first time through the order. For some more background on the subject, I would recommend this piece at Baseball Prospectus by Mitchell Lichtman, which was my introduction to the phenomenon. More recently, Rob Mains did a multi-part series on the TTO penalty for BP. I would also recommend these two articles from Chris Teeter at Beyond the Boxscore; the first link measures the TTO for groundball versus fly ball pitchers and the second gauges the TTO by the type of secondaries a pitcher employs.

Now, onto to my analysis. First, let’s walk through how I grouped pitcher seasons this time around. For every pitcher season from 2010-19 (I threw out the shortened 2020 season) where the pitcher in question threw at least 100 innings, I looked at the percentage of pitches he threw for each pitch type. All the pitches were ranked in descending order based on their usage. I pulled the top two most used pitches for each pitcher and added their usage together. The sum of the usage of the top two pitches was my gauge of the “two-pitchedness” of that pitcher season. To give an example, Walker Buehler’s two most used pitches in 2019 were his fastball and slider. The former he threw 53.2% of the time and the latter he threw 14.2% of the time. Add those two figures together and you get 67.4%. That combined number was the figure I was concerned with for each pitcher season. A pitcher who only has two credible offerings will have a value close to 90%. Pitchers with the most egalitarian mixes will be down towards 50%. So instead of using an arbitrary cutoff to gauge whether a pitcher was a two-pitch pitcher, I used a continuous number that gives us a spectrum that’s not biased in any way (unlike my analysis in the Flaherty piece).

I bucketed the combined usage of the top two pitches in increments of 10 percentage points. All players with a combined usage of their top two pitches greater than 50% and at most 60% were grouped together, then greater than 60% and at most 70%, etc. Note that we are dealing with pitchers who threw at least 100 innings in a season. This means we are considering starters and, in recent seasons, “bulk” guys or pitchers who appear after openers and are tasked with starter-level workloads without the designation of pitching as a starter.

With the pitchers bucketed I went to pitch-by-pitch data from Baseball Savant. Each plate appearance in each regular season game was given the designation of how many times that pitcher faced that spot in the batting order. I appended the information about the pitch usage bucket the pitcher fell into and then collected the data for each bucket.

Before I get to the TTO figures, let me show you the information I described towards the beginning of this article about the performance of pitchers in each bucket, now with the refined pitcher designations:

For the rest of the piece, I am going to neglect the bins with so few players because the generalized results in those bins lack any signal given the size of the sample of pitchers in those buckets. Interestingly, it seems pitchers up to 90% combined usage of their top two pitchers performed best. They tied for the highest strikeout rates and posted the lowest walk rates, lowest park and league adjusted FIPs, and the highest WAR accumulation rates of all the relevant bins. All of these figures steadily decrease as the pitch mixes become less concentrated in the top two pitches.

Case closed! We shouldn’t care if a pitcher throws a useful third and/or fourth pitch, right? I will point out that I made this point in my Flaherty piece. But this is the incorrect conclusion. The pitchers in the 80% and up to 90% bucket faced the fewest batters per appearance, followed by the pitchers in the next lowest bucket. This means that these pitchers are being pulled earlier and do not have to combat the second or TTO penalty as often as the rest of their peers and suffer a degradation in performance. Managers and front offices have realized this effect and naturally have made a conscious effort to pull these types of pitchers before the opposition gets too comfortable in the batter’s box.

So pitchers with only two heavily used pitches post better results than those who leverage more offerings, but we know those performance indicators are biased in favor of those two-pitch pitchers. This performance bias presents itself with the TTO effect, which I calculated for the buckets in the table above.

The second time penalty is the wOBA allowed difference between the first and second time through the order and the last column is the TTO penalty. From the pitcher’s perspective, positive wOBA figures are disadvantageous because this indicates hitters are performing better.

The results here are stark. There seems to be no signal in how well a pitcher performs the second time he pitches through a lineup based on his propensity to throw his top two pitches. The TTO penalty, on the other hand, steadily increases from the lowest bucket in this set to the highest bucket. For pitchers who only use their top two pitches up to 50% of the time, the TTO penalty is worth just 18 points of wOBA. By the time we get to pitchers who are effectively throwing two pitches, the TTO penalty almost doubles relative to the lowest bucket, ballooning to 33 points of wOBA. The magnitude of the TTO penalty increases steadily among the buckets. The penalty for the second bucket (more than 50%, at most 60%) is four points higher than the lowest. The third is three points higher than that, while the fourth is four points higher than the third, and finally the last bucket is four points higher than the third. This is almost a perfectly linear trend. Adding pitches clearly gives pitchers more viable options to eat up innings and go deeper into games. That is not to say pitchers with broader repertoires do not suffer the consequence of the TTO penalty; instead the magnitude of the penalty is muted relative to their peers with arsenals concentrated in just a couple of pitches.

Along these lines and with the TTO penalty results on hand, I tried to determine if adding a pitch in a given season would improve a pitcher’s ability to get through a lineup by dampening the TTO penalty. I took two approaches. The first was more restrictive, where the new pitch in question could not be thrown at all in the season prior. This meant that I took every pitcher season from 2010-19 (with the same 100 innings minimum restriction as before) and for every pitch that pitcher threw, I cross-checked with their prior season and noted if they threw the pitch at all. If the answer to that query was yes, then the pitcher was not marked with utilizing a new pitch. Correspondingly, if the answer to the query was no, I marked the pitcher as having a new pitch. The restrictive nature of this querying and flagging of pitchers and pitches made me skeptical that the results would be relevant on account of the small group of pitchers who add a completely new pitch after not using it the prior year. My skepticism was borne out in the results (Note: a previous version of this table was the exact same as the table you will see later in the article. That mistake has been rectified and the following has the updated results).

In the cases of the second time through the order penalty and the TTO penalty, there is basically no change across seasons when adding a new pitch from scratch, with changes on the scale of single points of wOBA, which is noise. There is also no discernible difference between those who add a new pitch and those who do not, based on this criterion. However, the population of pitchers who truly add a new pitch, one they did not throw prior to the season at hand, is very small.

So I changed the definition of what constituted a new pitch. For the second go around, a new pitch was one the pitcher threw at least 10 percentage points more than the season prior. Yes, 10 percentage points is arbitrary and yes, I talked about arbitrary cutoffs at the start of this piece. But I would offer that the cutoff had to be set somewhere and my choosing of the cutoff was not influenced by the pool of pitchers I was analyzing. Also, I realize that my new criterion does not technically denote a “new” pitch like the first. But the spirit of this portion of the investigation is to flag pitchers who add a pitch the opposing hitter must account for differently in a plate appearance compared to how they would have approached the pitcher in a prior season. So, if a pitcher goes from throwing a pitch 5% of the time in year n-1 to 20% of the time in year n, that is a fundamental change in their repertoire that will have massive ripple effects on how they are scouted and what a hitter is looking for in any count.

The results of my second query were more promising but hardly groundbreaking.

Pitchers who added a new pitch by this criterion shave about two points of wOBA from their TTO penalty while the rest of the population adds about five points year-over-year. One possible explanation for this seven-point wOBA discrepancy is that without making a fundamental shift to your repertoire, major league hitters can get a better handle on you the following season, yielding a more substantial TTO penalty. Another explanation, which goes hand in hand with the fact that pitchers who do not meaningfully add a new pitch actually perform slightly better the second time through the order, is that the population of pitchers who did not add a new pitch includes pitchers who decreased their usage of certain pitches. So this population includes pitchers who became more of a two-pitch pitcher season over season, thus choosing to lean into their best pitches more.

As I said at the top, these two-pitch pitchers perform better on a rate basis but do not pitch as deep into games and suffer harsher TTO penalties. This, at least to me, is the most likely explanation for pitchers who would fall under the designation of the first row of the table improving the second time they go through the order but feel the effects of a more robust TTO penalty. On the flip side, pitchers who make a pitch a more substantial part of their arsenals worsen when they go through the order the second time but make up for it by dampening the TTO penalty.

Is this a worthwhile tradeoff? Would you rather have a pitcher more dominant on a per plate appearance level but who taxes your bullpen more? Or would you want your starter/bulk guy to go deeper into the game? It obviously depends on your roster construction and how often your bullpen has been used leading up to a game, but this is a question front offices and field staff constantly juggle throughout the season and in the offseason when building their teams.

Close to 3,000 words later, what have we learned? First and foremost, when attempting to measure anything or test a hypothesis, upon the conclusion of the research it is important to reflect and ask critical questions of how you approached the problem at hand. After my initial study into the viability of two-pitch starting pitchers centered around Jack Flaherty, I concluded that two-pitch pitchers were just as effective on a per pitch basis and that they suffer no additional TTO penalty. Therefore, I surmised, rostering these types of starting pitchers should have no detrimental effects on how you build your roster and are not a reason to be skeptical of a pitcher as a viable option to churn through an opposing lineup. The issue I found was that my definition of a two-pitch pitcher was flawed, based on an arbitrary cutoff to try to diagnose Flaherty’s lack of strikeouts in the early going.

When I eliminated the arbitrary cutoff and used a more continuous definition of how much a pitcher relies on his top two pitchers, I found that pitchers with more limited repertoires were a little more effective than the rest of their peers, but did not go as deep into games. Furthermore, they suffered a much harsher TTO penalty, which is most likely the explanation for those pitchers not facing as many opposing hitters.

The idea that pitchers with only two viable pitches are better suited for short starts, bulk work, or high leverage innings is not a groundbreaking finding, but I hope putting some empirical justification behind this idea is useful and this approach relatively new (at least on the public side). This confirmation of what many evaluators believed to be true should help us ask critical questions about how players should be deployed and developed, and what sorts of pitchers a roster requires. If the Rays invest in pitchers like Shane McClanahan and Luis Patiño, how should they be used and how does that affect Tampa’s roster? Well, it seems they are following what the research demonstrates: roster a deep bullpen and use these pitchers in three to five inning stints. The same concept holds true for the Astros and Cristian Javier and Framber Valdez or the Padres with Adrian Morejon, Ryan Weathers, and Dinelson Lamet.

Another essential part of this calculus is how we should be evaluating players in the minor leagues or amateurs in the draft. The starting viability of players like Garrett Crochet and Max Meyer has been called into question in recent draft classes; the same goes for Sam Bachman in this upcoming draft. Binning these types of pitchers — with high-end fastball velocity, wipe-out breaking pitches, and a history of starting — as starters or relievers seems foolhardy. Instead, we know pitchers with this skillset can effectively get through a lineup twice but more than that and the manager is playing with fire. Given this breed of pitcher’s effectiveness per plate appearance, actively avoiding acquiring pitchers with only two viable pitches is narrow-minded. Instead, if they make it to the major leagues, teams should be trying to supplement these elite talents with other pitchers who mesh with the roles required to maximize the skills of a Max Meyer or Garrett Crochet type pitcher.

I do not believe this is lost on much of the league. I am merely suggesting two-pitch starting pitchers can be excellent players in the correct environment. But given a TTO penalty almost twice that of starting pitchers with more diverse arsenals, two-pitch pitchers need to be monitored closely. If the league allows teams to carry as many pitchers as they would like, two-pitchedness and flame throwing bullpens are here to stay. Until the rules on pitcher limit take affect, with the correct usage limited pitch mixes will continue to be valuable assets to major league clubs, provided those two pitches are high-end offerings.