Below is an analysis of the prospects in the farm system of the Oakland Athletics. Scouting reports were compiled with information provided by industry sources as well as my own observations. As there was no minor league season in 2020, there are some instances where no new information was gleaned about a player. Players whose write-ups have not been meaningfully altered begin by telling you so. As always, I’ve leaned more heavily on sources from outside of a given org than those within for reasons of objectivity. Because outside scouts were not allowed at the alternate sites, I’ve primarily focused on data from there, and the context of that data, in my opinion, reduces how meaningful it is. Lastly, in an effort to more clearly indicate relievers’ anticipated roles, you’ll see two reliever designations, both on my lists and on The Board: MIRP, or multi-inning relief pitcher, and SIRP, or single-inning relief pitcher.

For more information on the 20-80 scouting scale by which all of our prospect content is governed, you can click here. For further explanation of Future Value’s merits and drawbacks, read Future Value.

All of the numbered prospects here also appear on The Board, a resource the site offers featuring sortable scouting information for every organization. It can be found here.

Earlier this week, I took a look at the worst bunts of the season. They were all horrible! Balls were hit directly at fielders, lead runners were thrown out, and altogether the worst five bunts produced eight outs and no base advancements. Not great! But that’s only one side of the coin, and today I’d like to look at the bunts that have helped the batting team most so far this year.

You’ll notice that there aren’t any textbook sacrifice bunts on either list. That’s no knock on skilled bunters, but rather a function of the way I’m defining best and worst. Bunts, by their very nature, are hedges. They reduce volatility by definition — exchanging an out for some base advances is neither the worst nor best outcome of a given plate appearance, so a successful sacrifice bunt will inherently have a modest change in win probability relative to a play where something goes very right or very wrong.

Even so, today isn’t solely a showcase of bad defense. There’s some bad defense, but there’s also plenty of bunting for a hit. When you change the math by giving yourself a chance to reach base, bunts become far more valuable. It’s hard to greatly increase your team’s chances of winning while also making an out, so separating the sacrifice from the bunt is a prerequisite for having one of the most valuable bunts of the year.

For the most part, the plays on this list are all baseball being played at a high level. There are some defensive howlers, sure, but there’s plenty of skill here on both sides of the ball. Let’s take a look at the bunts that have helped out the most this year (through June 9), starting with an honorable mention.
Read the rest of this entry »

One of the bigger on-field stories of the 2021 season has been which pitchers are using foreign substances, and how much help they’re getting from it. Whether it’s Giovanny Gallegos and hat-gate, Gerrit Cole’s word salad about Spider Tack, or Trevor Bauer’s wildly fluctuating spin rate, what pitchers do to the ball has been a hot topic. Yesterday, the league opened a new chapter in the saga when they released a memo that details a drastically increased enforcement policy, one that promises more suspensions than seemed imaginable only a year ago.

The new rule is draconian and more or less without exception. If a pitcher is caught with foreign substances on the ball or on their person, they’ll be immediately ejected from the game. They’ll also be automatically suspended. The memo, which FanGraphs obtained a copy of, doesn’t specify a suspension length. It does tie the suspensions to the existing rules and past precedent, however, which suggests a 10-game suspension with pay for any violations, a figure the league made explicit in its press release.

“Any foreign substance” is a massive change from the way baseball is currently played. The rule is intended, at least in theory, to crack down on synthetic grip enhancers, such as Spider Tack, that create huge increases in grip strength and spin rate. Pitchers have used lower-potency grip enhancers for years; mixing sunscreen and rosin or dabbing pine tar on the fingertips are both time-tested practices. Read the rest of this entry »

Jacob deGrom is on another planet right now. You don’t need me to tell you this, but it’s fun to just marvel at his stats. Through 10 starts, deGrom has a 0.56 ERA, a 46% strikeout rate, and a 4% walk rate. He’s produced 3.7 WAR, which is nearly a half-win better than the next-best pitcher, Corbin Burnes, who has “merely” put up 3.3.

deGrom is quite possibly in the midst of one of the best pitching seasons in baseball history, particularly on a per-inning basis. Pedro Martinez’s 1999 campaign currently holds the single-season pitching WAR record at 11.6, and though deGrom almost certainly won’t hit that mark, he’d blow it away if he pitched the same number of innings at his current rate. Give deGrom Martinez’s 213.1 innings, and at this pace, he’d put up 12.3 WAR. Say what you will about injuries and starting pitching workloads in this era, but that’s just a primer on the level of dominance deGrom has reached so far in 2021.

So if you’re a hitter stepping in against deGrom, how in the world do you get a hit off this guy? Batters are slashing just .121/.152/.220 against him, good for a .163 wOBA allowed. That’s the best mark among the 294 pitchers with at least 100 batters faced this season, and deGrom has more than doubled that threshold (223 TBF). If you’re hitting against deGrom, you’re lucky if you just put the ball in play, let alone get on base.

Is there an alternative strategy that works here? deGrom is raking up all of these strikeouts — without allowing virtually any walks — while boasting the seventh-lowest Zone% in baseball. Hitters are flailing against pitches that aren’t even strikes anyway: 60.5% of the time, deGrom is throwing the hitter a ball. If you’re in a two-strike count, he’ll throw you a ball 64.5% of the time, putting him in the 91st percentile in O-Zone%. Read the rest of this entry »

We’re a month away from the 2021 Draft and it’s time for our first mock draft of the season. We have also posted an updated ranking of the prospects, which is available over on The Board. In a typical year, the Draft, which usually leads into the first or second weekend of June, would be wrapping up and teams would be beginning to prep for next year’s affair by heading to PG National in St. Petersburg to watch many of the top 2022 high schoolers. With the pandemic once again shifting the schedule, the draft is instead still a month out, and only now is substantive information circulating that makes a mock based on more than speculation and educated guessing viable.

Below we have names with teams down to pick 17, where the Reds (who also pick 30th and 35th) select. After that we have a smattering of dope and rumors to pass along, but otherwise still think it’s an exercise in futility to connect specific names with clubs toward the back half of the first round. This mock was compiled with info sourced from team personnel (a couple of general managers, scouts, cross checkers, directors, etc.), agents, and our own experiences at games (scouting the scouts and execs), as well as our own logical conclusions. As we receive feedback from more of our sources, and as teams cease scouting and huddle in the draft room for the next month, the rankings will grow and change, and we will update and lengthen our mock. Read the rest of this entry »

Joe Smith has quietly been a good pitcher for a long time. Now 37 years old and playing for his sixth team, the Houston Astros reliever has a 3.06 ERA over 14 big-league seasons. Moreover, his 804 appearances are the most of any active hurler — and that’s not even the eye-catching part. Smith recently moved ahead of Walter Johnson into 49th place on the all-time list, with another legend in his sights. Next up is Nolan Ryan, who logged 807 career outings.

I asked Smith about his ascent in the pitching-appearances category. Could he have imagined this when he debuted with the New York Mets in 2007?

“When I first got called up, I was just trying to figure out what the heck pitching in the big leagues was, “said Smith, who’d been drafted out of Wright State University the previous year. “That offseason, I wrote out some goals and things I needed to get better at, and I was able to accomplish them. At that point I felt like I could do it for a long time. But there’s so much luck in this game. Your health, right? Pedro Martinez was on the team, and everybody would wish him good luck. He’d be, ‘No, wish me good health. If I’m healthy, I’ll be good.’ That really resonated with me. Being able to answer the call is what it’s about, especially when you’re a reliever. You want to be able to post as many days as you can.”

Right now he’s on the shelf. Smith went on the 10-day IL earlier this week, his return date uncertain. The sidearmer told me that everything is structurally sound, yet his forearm had been “grabbing” him (Astros manager Dusty Baker has reportedly referred to it as “elbow soreness”). Read the rest of this entry »

Watching baseball can sometimes feel like watching a chess match, scrutinizing often-motionless players as they try to out-think one another. But if MLB’s brand of baseball is a Queens Gambit-esque affair – quietly self-serious, steeped in tradition, a bit stuffy at times – then college baseball is the more unpolished version you see played in Central Park, with moves coming in frenzied flurries from players who can sometimes seem more caught up in the moment than they are focused on gameplay. But as the NCAA Division-I baseball tournament heads into super regionals this weekend, who can blame these players for letting their emotions run high? There are a number of future major leaguers among the remaining players in the tournament, hoping to boost their draft potential as they attempt to lead their teams to Omaha. But there is also an undoubtedly larger contingent of players who can feel their days of playing competitive baseball dwindling, which can make for a score-enhancing combination of adrenaline-fueled offense and nervy defense.

A brief glimpse at the scores from last weekend’s action is enough to highlight the different brand of ball on display at the college level. There was an average of 12.8 runs scored in each game – a stark contrast to the anemic offensive landscape of the majors. But even with those inflated results, there was still pitching prowess aplenty, with many regular-season storylines stretching into postseason play, including those of much-discussed Vanderbilt starters Kumar Rocker and Jack Leiter. The two are expected to go early in this year’s draft (as early as first and second overall, by some estimates), and were unsurprisingly tapped to start the team’s first two games of the Nashville regional. Rocker started Game One, pitching seven scoreless innings and fanning nine as Vandy shut out Presbyterian, 10-0. In their next game, Leiter faced off against Georgia Tech starter Marquis Grissom, Jr., allowing the nostalgic among us to reminisce about the days when their fathers went head-to-head decades ago. Leiter allowed just one run, and struck out 11 batters over the course of his six innings of work; Vanderbilt went on to win 4-3. Read the rest of this entry »

About a month ago, I wrote about Jack Flaherty and looked at his increased reliance on both his fastball and his slider. I posited that through his first seven starts, Flaherty had effectively been a two-pitch pitcher, with the aforementioned combination of pitches making up about 80% of his total pitches. (His curveball was his third-most used pitch, thrown sparingly at about a 13% clip.)

To investigate if this constituted a negative development and could account for Flaherty’s reduction in strikeouts relative to his career norms, I conducted a series of analyses. I grouped pitcher seasons from 2010-20 and looked at the number of pitches each pitcher had with a usage over 15%. This was somewhat arbitrary; I chose the 15% cutoff so pitchers with mixes like Flaherty’s in 2021 would appear in the bucket with two pitches. I then took each bucket and looked at the group’s strikeout rate, walk rate, FIP-, and WAR per 180 innings pitched. I found that between two, three, and four pitches, there was virtually no difference in any of the measures; the strikeout and walk rates were within a percentage point, as were the FIP- figures, while the prorated WAR numbers were within hundredths of a win. Next, I calculated the third time through the order (TTO) effect for pitchers in each bucket. To my surprise, there again was little difference between the pitcher buckets. My hypothesis was that two-pitch pitchers would struggle to get through the order as effectively as their peers who utilized more pitches. But based on my cutoffs for a relevant pitch (15% usage), this did not seem to be the case.

From there I concluded that Flaherty leaning on his fastball and slider more was not inherently bad; there seemed to be no evidence that being a two-pitch starter was inherently detrimental to striking out batters, preventing runs, and turning over a lineup on more than one, two, or three occasions.

But upon further reflection, I was dissatisfied with my process in arriving at this conclusion. The basis for my dissatisfaction was that my criteria for determining whether a pitcher was a two-pitch pitcher or a pitcher with three to four credible offerings. I chose the criteria, as I explained above, based on the tendencies of a single player I was interested in and in a way that would fit the narrative I was trying to tell. I also felt (anecdotally) there had been an influx of pitchers in the majors who have found success by primarily relying on two pitches; some of those pitchers happened to represent clubs the public deems “smart.” Thus, two-pitch starters were not actually more flawed than their peers with more diverse repertoires.

I will address the latter part of this line of thinking later (spoiler: it is extremely flawed) but this is just how I was trying to rationalize my findings. I have seen the performances of Luis Patiño and Shane McClanahan in 2021 and Tyler Glasnow last year (he added a slider this season) in Tampa with two pitches and thought the Rays may be on to something. Same for the Astros and Framber Valdez, Cristian Javier, and Lance McCullers Jr. (until this year, when he also added a slider). Two of the most surprising break-through pitchers of the past two-plus seasons have been Kevin Gausman and Lucas Giolito, both of whom rely primarily on a fastball/offspeed combination (for Gausman, the pitch is a splitter; for Giolito, it is a changeup). Dinelson Lamet is another pitcher with exceptional results (when healthy) relying only on a four-seamer and slider. As I mentioned above, this is all anecdotal evidence backing up a potentially faulty conclusion. There is no empirical support here. This is not the most rigorous approach to research.

That led me to redo my analysis, this time with more rigor in classifying the “two-pitchedness” of a player. Before I get into my methodology for this determination, I would be remiss if I did not at least introduce the main concept I am trying to measure: the third time through the order effect (which I will denote as TTO for the remainder of this piece). This is a phenomenon that has played a massive part in determining pitching roles and deployment in this era of major league baseball. It consists of the degradation of pitcher performance as he moves through the opposing lineup. No matter how you measure it — wOBA allowed, RA9, ERA — the pitcher population pitches worse the second time through the order compared to the first and the third time through the order versus the second. Generally, the effect is measured relative to the first time through the order. Since I will be using wOBA allowed in this piece, that means the second time through the order effect is the difference in wOBA allowed for the second and first time through the order and the third time through the order effect is the difference in wOBA allowed between the third and first time through the order. For some more background on the subject, I would recommend this piece at Baseball Prospectus by Mitchell Lichtman, which was my introduction to the phenomenon. More recently, Rob Mains did a multi-part series on the TTO penalty for BP. I would also recommend these two articles from Chris Teeter at Beyond the Boxscore; the first link measures the TTO for groundball versus fly ball pitchers and the second gauges the TTO by the type of secondaries a pitcher employs.

Now, onto to my analysis. First, let’s walk through how I grouped pitcher seasons this time around. For every pitcher season from 2010-19 (I threw out the shortened 2020 season) where the pitcher in question threw at least 100 innings, I looked at the percentage of pitches he threw for each pitch type. All the pitches were ranked in descending order based on their usage. I pulled the top two most used pitches for each pitcher and added their usage together. The sum of the usage of the top two pitches was my gauge of the “two-pitchedness” of that pitcher season. To give an example, Walker Buehler’s two most used pitches in 2019 were his fastball and slider. The former he threw 53.2% of the time and the latter he threw 14.2% of the time. Add those two figures together and you get 67.4%. That combined number was the figure I was concerned with for each pitcher season. A pitcher who only has two credible offerings will have a value close to 90%. Pitchers with the most egalitarian mixes will be down towards 50%. So instead of using an arbitrary cutoff to gauge whether a pitcher was a two-pitch pitcher, I used a continuous number that gives us a spectrum that’s not biased in any way (unlike my analysis in the Flaherty piece).

I bucketed the combined usage of the top two pitches in increments of 10 percentage points. All players with a combined usage of their top two pitches greater than 50% and at most 60% were grouped together, then greater than 60% and at most 70%, etc. Note that we are dealing with pitchers who threw at least 100 innings in a season. This means we are considering starters and, in recent seasons, “bulk” guys or pitchers who appear after openers and are tasked with starter-level workloads without the designation of pitching as a starter.

With the pitchers bucketed I went to pitch-by-pitch data from Baseball Savant. Each plate appearance in each regular season game was given the designation of how many times that pitcher faced that spot in the batting order. I appended the information about the pitch usage bucket the pitcher fell into and then collected the data for each bucket.

Before I get to the TTO figures, let me show you the information I described towards the beginning of this article about the performance of pitchers in each bucket, now with the refined pitcher designations:

For the rest of the piece, I am going to neglect the bins with so few players because the generalized results in those bins lack any signal given the size of the sample of pitchers in those buckets. Interestingly, it seems pitchers up to 90% combined usage of their top two pitchers performed best. They tied for the highest strikeout rates and posted the lowest walk rates, lowest park and league adjusted FIPs, and the highest WAR accumulation rates of all the relevant bins. All of these figures steadily decrease as the pitch mixes become less concentrated in the top two pitches.

Case closed! We shouldn’t care if a pitcher throws a useful third and/or fourth pitch, right? I will point out that I made this point in my Flaherty piece. But this is the incorrect conclusion. The pitchers in the 80% and up to 90% bucket faced the fewest batters per appearance, followed by the pitchers in the next lowest bucket. This means that these pitchers are being pulled earlier and do not have to combat the second or TTO penalty as often as the rest of their peers and suffer a degradation in performance. Managers and front offices have realized this effect and naturally have made a conscious effort to pull these types of pitchers before the opposition gets too comfortable in the batter’s box.

So pitchers with only two heavily used pitches post better results than those who leverage more offerings, but we know those performance indicators are biased in favor of those two-pitch pitchers. This performance bias presents itself with the TTO effect, which I calculated for the buckets in the table above.

The second time penalty is the wOBA allowed difference between the first and second time through the order and the last column is the TTO penalty. From the pitcher’s perspective, positive wOBA figures are disadvantageous because this indicates hitters are performing better.

The results here are stark. There seems to be no signal in how well a pitcher performs the second time he pitches through a lineup based on his propensity to throw his top two pitches. The TTO penalty, on the other hand, steadily increases from the lowest bucket in this set to the highest bucket. For pitchers who only use their top two pitches up to 50% of the time, the TTO penalty is worth just 18 points of wOBA. By the time we get to pitchers who are effectively throwing two pitches, the TTO penalty almost doubles relative to the lowest bucket, ballooning to 33 points of wOBA. The magnitude of the TTO penalty increases steadily among the buckets. The penalty for the second bucket (more than 50%, at most 60%) is four points higher than the lowest. The third is three points higher than that, while the fourth is four points higher than the third, and finally the last bucket is four points higher than the third. This is almost a perfectly linear trend. Adding pitches clearly gives pitchers more viable options to eat up innings and go deeper into games. That is not to say pitchers with broader repertoires do not suffer the consequence of the TTO penalty; instead the magnitude of the penalty is muted relative to their peers with arsenals concentrated in just a couple of pitches.

Along these lines and with the TTO penalty results on hand, I tried to determine if adding a pitch in a given season would improve a pitcher’s ability to get through a lineup by dampening the TTO penalty. I took two approaches. The first was more restrictive, where the new pitch in question could not be thrown at all in the season prior. This meant that I took every pitcher season from 2010-19 (with the same 100 innings minimum restriction as before) and for every pitch that pitcher threw, I cross-checked with their prior season and noted if they threw the pitch at all. If the answer to that query was yes, then the pitcher was not marked with utilizing a new pitch. Correspondingly, if the answer to the query was no, I marked the pitcher as having a new pitch. The restrictive nature of this querying and flagging of pitchers and pitches made me skeptical that the results would be relevant on account of the small group of pitchers who add a completely new pitch after not using it the prior year. My skepticism was borne out in the results (Note: a previous version of this table was the exact same as the table you will see later in the article. That mistake has been rectified and the following has the updated results).

In the cases of the second time through the order penalty and the TTO penalty, there is basically no change across seasons when adding a new pitch from scratch, with changes on the scale of single points of wOBA, which is noise. There is also no discernible difference between those who add a new pitch and those who do not, based on this criterion. However, the population of pitchers who truly add a new pitch, one they did not throw prior to the season at hand, is very small.

So I changed the definition of what constituted a new pitch. For the second go around, a new pitch was one the pitcher threw at least 10 percentage points more than the season prior. Yes, 10 percentage points is arbitrary and yes, I talked about arbitrary cutoffs at the start of this piece. But I would offer that the cutoff had to be set somewhere and my choosing of the cutoff was not influenced by the pool of pitchers I was analyzing. Also, I realize that my new criterion does not technically denote a “new” pitch like the first. But the spirit of this portion of the investigation is to flag pitchers who add a pitch the opposing hitter must account for differently in a plate appearance compared to how they would have approached the pitcher in a prior season. So, if a pitcher goes from throwing a pitch 5% of the time in year n-1 to 20% of the time in year n, that is a fundamental change in their repertoire that will have massive ripple effects on how they are scouted and what a hitter is looking for in any count.

The results of my second query were more promising but hardly groundbreaking.

Pitchers who added a new pitch by this criterion shave about two points of wOBA from their TTO penalty while the rest of the population adds about five points year-over-year. One possible explanation for this seven-point wOBA discrepancy is that without making a fundamental shift to your repertoire, major league hitters can get a better handle on you the following season, yielding a more substantial TTO penalty. Another explanation, which goes hand in hand with the fact that pitchers who do not meaningfully add a new pitch actually perform slightly better the second time through the order, is that the population of pitchers who did not add a new pitch includes pitchers who decreased their usage of certain pitches. So this population includes pitchers who became more of a two-pitch pitcher season over season, thus choosing to lean into their best pitches more.

As I said at the top, these two-pitch pitchers perform better on a rate basis but do not pitch as deep into games and suffer harsher TTO penalties. This, at least to me, is the most likely explanation for pitchers who would fall under the designation of the first row of the table improving the second time they go through the order but feel the effects of a more robust TTO penalty. On the flip side, pitchers who make a pitch a more substantial part of their arsenals worsen when they go through the order the second time but make up for it by dampening the TTO penalty.

Is this a worthwhile tradeoff? Would you rather have a pitcher more dominant on a per plate appearance level but who taxes your bullpen more? Or would you want your starter/bulk guy to go deeper into the game? It obviously depends on your roster construction and how often your bullpen has been used leading up to a game, but this is a question front offices and field staff constantly juggle throughout the season and in the offseason when building their teams.

Close to 3,000 words later, what have we learned? First and foremost, when attempting to measure anything or test a hypothesis, upon the conclusion of the research it is important to reflect and ask critical questions of how you approached the problem at hand. After my initial study into the viability of two-pitch starting pitchers centered around Jack Flaherty, I concluded that two-pitch pitchers were just as effective on a per pitch basis and that they suffer no additional TTO penalty. Therefore, I surmised, rostering these types of starting pitchers should have no detrimental effects on how you build your roster and are not a reason to be skeptical of a pitcher as a viable option to churn through an opposing lineup. The issue I found was that my definition of a two-pitch pitcher was flawed, based on an arbitrary cutoff to try to diagnose Flaherty’s lack of strikeouts in the early going.

When I eliminated the arbitrary cutoff and used a more continuous definition of how much a pitcher relies on his top two pitchers, I found that pitchers with more limited repertoires were a little more effective than the rest of their peers, but did not go as deep into games. Furthermore, they suffered a much harsher TTO penalty, which is most likely the explanation for those pitchers not facing as many opposing hitters.

The idea that pitchers with only two viable pitches are better suited for short starts, bulk work, or high leverage innings is not a groundbreaking finding, but I hope putting some empirical justification behind this idea is useful and this approach relatively new (at least on the public side). This confirmation of what many evaluators believed to be true should help us ask critical questions about how players should be deployed and developed, and what sorts of pitchers a roster requires. If the Rays invest in pitchers like Shane McClanahan and Luis Patiño, how should they be used and how does that affect Tampa’s roster? Well, it seems they are following what the research demonstrates: roster a deep bullpen and use these pitchers in three to five inning stints. The same concept holds true for the Astros and Cristian Javier and Framber Valdez or the Padres with Adrian Morejon, Ryan Weathers, and Dinelson Lamet.

Another essential part of this calculus is how we should be evaluating players in the minor leagues or amateurs in the draft. The starting viability of players like Garrett Crochet and Max Meyer has been called into question in recent draft classes; the same goes for Sam Bachman in this upcoming draft. Binning these types of pitchers — with high-end fastball velocity, wipe-out breaking pitches, and a history of starting — as starters or relievers seems foolhardy. Instead, we know pitchers with this skillset can effectively get through a lineup twice but more than that and the manager is playing with fire. Given this breed of pitcher’s effectiveness per plate appearance, actively avoiding acquiring pitchers with only two viable pitches is narrow-minded. Instead, if they make it to the major leagues, teams should be trying to supplement these elite talents with other pitchers who mesh with the roles required to maximize the skills of a Max Meyer or Garrett Crochet type pitcher.

I do not believe this is lost on much of the league. I am merely suggesting two-pitch starting pitchers can be excellent players in the correct environment. But given a TTO penalty almost twice that of starting pitchers with more diverse arsenals, two-pitch pitchers need to be monitored closely. If the league allows teams to carry as many pitchers as they would like, two-pitchedness and flame throwing bullpens are here to stay. Until the rules on pitcher limit take affect, with the correct usage limited pitch mixes will continue to be valuable assets to major league clubs, provided those two pitches are high-end offerings.

Last week, MLB announced that it would begin enforcing one of its rules. Following last week’s owner’s meetings, ESPN’s Buster Olney reported that the league instructed umpires to begin checking pitchers and their equipment for foreign substances. While pitchers have long lathered up the ball with pine tar or sunscreen, the concoctions applied to baseballs have become more sophisticated recently, and they appear to have had a role in dampening offense league wide.

Cracking down on foreign substances is a defensible choice on the league’s part. In 2021, we’ve seen record-breaking strikeout totals and record-low batting averages, a continuation of trends that had already spawned discussions on how to get the ball in play more often. There’s no shortage of ideas on how to best do that and controlling the substances pitchers can use to doctor the baseball has a couple of advantages.

The first is that it’s likely to yield at least a modest result. In recent years, we’ve learned how different substances can affect a ball’s spin rate, and thus it’s trajectory. We’ve also seen how increased spin rates lead to nastier pitches and thus more strikeouts. With the right recipe, a pitcher can enhance his spin rate significantly, and certain spin-gainers have been rewarded handsomely for doing so. While nobody is arguing that a few hundred extra revolutions per minute is the difference between the All-Star game and the scrap heap, the consensus within the league is that the extra spin has given pitchers a leg up against the hitters. Removing that advantage could help restore balance to the sport.

The second benefit is that there’s historical precedent for something like this, and that’s a boon for a tradition-minded sport like baseball. In 1920, MLB banned the spitball for similar reasons. Nobody was talking about spin rates back then, but pitchers had figured out that a good hock of phlegm could make a ball dip unpredictably, and the corresponding decrease in spin was giving batters fits. As was the case 100 years ago, a mandate to keep the ball clean is an easy enough policy for all parties to understand: everyone should be on the same page about the league’s directive here. Read the rest of this entry »

Major League Baseball is preparing to crack down on pitchers’ use of foreign substances, which could have important ramifications for how the game is played not just the rest of this season, but for a long time to come. Such a remarkable midseason change in enforcement — one report from ESPN’s Buster Olney suggested that umpires might randomly check baseballs 8–10 times per game — could alter league-wide offense, perhaps to a rather large degree depending on the number of pitchers who doctor the baseball.

Two things seems fairly certain, though. First, foreign substances increase spin rates; second, spin rates significantly impact pitcher performance. An experiment run by Travis Sawchik at theScore demonstrated that certain substances, like Spider Tack, could add as much as 500 rpms to a fastball. One college pitcher, Spencer Curran from Seton Hall University, saw the baseline rpm on his fastball go from 2,096 without any substances to 2,516 with Spider Tack and without any velocity increase — a jump that likely cannot happen naturally.

“It’s probably pretty hard to change that [fastball spin] ratio for an individual,” University of Illinois physics professor Alan Nathan told Sawchik at FiveThirtyEight. “I can see that you could do it for a curveball because a curveball involves some technique, whereas a fastball is pure power. There is no finesse.”

In a comprehensive story published by Stephanie Apstein and Alex Prewitt at Sports Illustrated, one recently retired pitcher estimated that 80% to 90% of pitchers currently use some form of foreign substances. But even with pervasive use, not all sticky stuff has the same impact. As Sawchik showed in his experiment, some substances — like a sunscreen mix he used — may actually decrease spin rates. Some of it may depend on how much time each pitcher has had to experiment in front of a Rapsodo, trying different concoctions until something works to their liking.

In both articles, the authors highlighted some basic stats to show how spin rate impacts batter performance. Sawchik noted that batters are hitting .264 on four-seam fastballs that range from 2,250–2,350 rpms, but just .217 on those above 2,500. That’s a sizable gap, and numbers like that have definitely caught MLB’s attention. As one executive told SI, though MLB is considering many changes to increase offense, he believes that better enforcement of the foreign substances rule already on the books — Rule 6.02(c) — would go a long way.

“I think people would be absolutely shocked if they actually enforced this, how much you’ll start to normalize things without rule changes,” the executive said.

Read the rest of this entry »