Major League Baseball will look significantly different in 2023 due to several new rules, but there’s another change that won’t attract as much attention as a pitch clock or all that steamy base-on-base action. Ten veteran umpires have retired and 10 new ones will be taking their place. I’d like to explore the effect these new umpires might have, but first, let’s look at the state of umpiring right now.
The short version is pretty simple: Since the beginning of the pitch tracking era in 2008, umpires have improved their accuracy in calling balls and strikes every single year. Accuracy has gone from 81.3% to 92.4%. If an improvement of 11.1% in 15 years doesn’t sound particularly big, consider it this way: incorrect calls have been cut by nearly 60%.
Last week, I wrote about arm angles, Nestor Cortes, and some appearance-based expectations hitters might have about a pitcher’s craftiness. During my data mining, I also noticed that Rich Hill popped up at or near the top of many arm angle rankings. Specifically, among the 473 hurlers who threw at least 500 pitches in 2022, Hill had the broadest range of arm angles and the second-highest arm angle standard deviation. Below are his release points in colorful dot form (via Baseball Savant) and his arm angle frequencies in histogram configuration:
Hill typically comes at hitters from a three-quarters slot, though he does near a completely overhand slot at times. When he drops down, he provides his foes with anything from a sidearm to a fully submarine look. Cortes, for his part, placed second in range (just 0.4 degrees behind Hill) and fourth in standard deviation (2.5 degrees behind). But as you can see below, Cortes’ more significant drop-downs were not only less frequent than Hill’s but also closer to a more typical Cortes look. Whereas Hill has a very obvious gap between his drop-down and standard release, Cortes runs the gamut of angles between the two:
For the past few weeks, I’ve been delving into exit velocity readings in an attempt to find out what really matters and what’s just noise. I found that 95th-percentile exit velocity and contact rate are the two stickiest metrics from one year to the next, with exit velocity slightly more likely to remain the same from one year to the next.
Of course, that doesn’t mean it can’t change. In fact, players change their top-end power readings by a good amount every year. Sure, any individual player might be unlikely to do it, but there are tons of players in baseball. I found that only 4% of hitters change their 95th-percentile exit velocity (EV95) by one standard deviation from one year to the next, but 408 batters put at least 100 batted balls into play in 2022. Four percent of 408 is a lot more than zero.
With that in mind, I thought I’d take an inventory of those exit velocity changers and see what their improvement meant going forward. To do so, I created two groups: hitters whose EV95 improved by at least half a standard deviation from one year to the next, and the opposite, hitters whose EV95 declined by at least half a standard deviation. I picked half an SD instead of an entire one to bulk up the sample size. Read the rest of this entry »
Last week, pitching prospect Grayson Rodriguez was asked a great question on The Baseball Barb-B-Cast. Rodgriguez is ranked third in an excellent Baltimore system, and as a player who was drafted in 2018, his tenure with the club spans both the Dan Duquette and Mike Elias eras. The question was: How has the organization changed over time?
Rodriguez started his answer with, “Everything about the organization changed but the name.” He touched on technology, pitch development, and the turnover in the coaching staff, but the part I want to focus on came right at the beginning, when he was describing the Duquette era: “Our pitching philosophy was, it was like, ‘Hey, you know, as a starter we’re going to go out in the first three innings and we’re just going to throw nothing but fastballs, and we’re going to see if that works.’ And, like, terrible. Terrible idea.”
Yup. That does indeed sound like a terrible idea. It also made me wonder whether teams are as focused on establishing the fastball as they once were. A reduction in first inning fastball rate would make sense for a couple reasons. First, fastballusage has dropped overall as teams have learned that pitchers should throw their best pitch more often, and fastballs themselves have become less effective:
Originally a 36th-round pick in the 2013 draft by the Yankees, Nestor Cortes spent time with the Orioles and Mariners before returning to the Bronx and putting it all together toward the end of the 2021 season, his age-26 year. Even upon breaking out, he was dubbed an “everyman” by the New York Post, overlooked by scouts because he didn’t stand as tall as other hurlers and because he lacked overpowering velocity. Yet in 2022, Cortes mowed hitters down to the tune of a 2.44 ERA and 20.3% K-BB rate. Far from an everyman, he was a standout athlete.
The southpaw’s breakout wasn’t a product of a mid-career growth spurt. If anything, his emergence came in spite of his 5-foot-11 height; his 159 ERA+ in 2022 tied him for the 27th-best mark among sub-six-foot hurlers since the Live Ball era began in 1920. Rather, the most concrete reasons for Cortes’ improvements include a velocity jump in both 2021 and ’22 (though his velo is still below average) and the introduction of a cutter paired with a revamped slider. Yet despite the ambiguous impact it has on his game, what perhaps differentiates Cortes the most from other pitchers is his approach on the mound, including but not limited to his varying arm angles.
The hurler’s drop-down moves have been the subject of many an article, including Lucas Kelly’s piece on this very site. The discussion on arm angles more broadly, however, has been rather muted, save for Logan Mottley’s (now of Fanatics, previously of the Texas Rangers) post describing how they can be calculated from Statcast data and Ben Palmer’s piece for Pitcher List digging into the Mottley data.
Even in these articles, there is no mention of how stature might play into the effectiveness of certain arm angles. Instead, there seems to be an implicit assumption that if one arm slot proved more effective on average (which, to be fair, no one has concluded), it should automatically be utilized more, without regard for what might feel most natural for a given pitcher. What would happen if we tried to convert more pitchers to a sidearm slot, or at least push them to vary their arm slots a la Cortes? Using Mottley’s calculations, I took a crack at these questions myself. Read the rest of this entry »
Last week, I spent a few articles idly hunting for hitter breakouts. I centered my search on players with admirable top-end power numbers but who reached that summit rarely. I found that when those players increased their contact rate, they improved their overall line significantly. I think that finding tracks with intuition in addition to having data to back it up, so I’m overall pleased with that research.
That said, all this downloading and scraping of exit velocity data made me wonder about the opposite side of this spectrum: can hitters add power and break out from the other direction? Hitters who make a ton of contact but don’t hit the ball with much authority feel somewhat capped offensively; in my head, Luis Arraez has a 0% chance of turning in a 20-homer season. I didn’t have the numbers behind that, though, so I gathered up the same pile of data I’d used before and started hunting.
The main thing I learned from the data is something that you’ve heard over and over again: maximum exit velocity (and 95th-percentile exit velocity, which I’m using) is sticky. How hard you hit the ball in one year does a great job of determining how hard you’ll hit the ball in the next year.
More specifically, I took a sample of players with at least 100 batted balls in two consecutive seasons. I sampled from 2015 to ’22, which gave me seven year-pairs, though the ones involving 2020 were light on qualifying players thanks to the abbreviated season. From there, I asked a simple question: how much did each player’s 95th-percentile exit velocity change from one year to the next? Read the rest of this entry »
Growing up a Yankees fan, I quickly became familiar with many Michael Kay-isms. Every home game starts with a “let’s do it here in the Bronx,” every home run elicits a “see ya!” and every caught stealing followed by a home run prompts a lecture on the fallacy of the predetermined outcome. Some of these sayings are worthy of further examination. For example, Kay’s favorite “fallacy” — assuming that the runner who was caught stealing would have scored had he not failed to swipe a bag — warrants a second look, but there’s another one that I’ve always been especially intrigued by, one more ripe for analysis.
When a hitter expands the zone on two strikes, waving in the wind to try to extend the at bat with a foul, Kay describes their swing as an “emergency” or “defensive hack.” There’s no doubt that hitters chase more with two strikes: in 2021, they pulled the trigger on 39.0% of two-strike balls but only 22.0% of other wild ones. In 2022, those numbers were 40.3% and 23.5%, respectively. But given the ever-present nature of strikeouts in today’s game, I’ve wondered if some players have lost any semblance of two-strike panic, not minding the K and not bothering to try to fight off pitches. On the other hand, maybe the increase in strikeouts indicates a further expansion of the zone in tandem with less contact in this era rife with three true outcomes types (see Gallo, Joey). Read the rest of this entry »
Hello, and welcome to an article where I’m wrong about everything. Like literally all of the things. Here’s what happened. I was thinking about the long, glorious farewell tour of Albert Pujols. After a five-year stretch during which he posted a wRC+ of 84, he put up a 151 wRC+ in 2022. That was the best he’d hit since his age-30 season. Pujols largely put up those numbers by smashing lefties. His 113 wRC+ against righties was good, but against lefties that number was 214. MVP Paul Goldschmidt was the only batter who performed better against lefties (minimum 130 plate appearances vs. southpaws).
Pujols’ resurgence really started in 2021, when he had a 145 wRC+ against lefties and a 35 against righties. That’s the season I was more interested in. As I thought about it, I started wondering whether the last part of his journey — established veteran defies the aging curve by settling comfortably into a platoon role — is happening more frequently. I had the sense that it was happening more frequently.
I was wrong. It is not happening more frequently. Here’s a graph comparing the last 11 years to the previous 10 years:
Earlier this week, I wrote up a side project I’ve been working on recently: looking through exit velocity distributions to find interesting hitters. You can read that if you’d like (obviously, that’s how the internet works), but as a refresher, I looked through 2022 batted ball data for hitters whose 95th-percentile exit velocity was high but whose average exit velocity was low, as well as hitters who hit the ball hard consistently but didn’t have the results to show for it.
With a little more time to monkey around with the data, I’ve come to a few conclusions about this line of analysis. If you just want to read the article for those conclusions, no sweat: just search for the words “phenomenal cosmic power.” It’s been too long since I’ve used an Aladdin reference in an article, so I promise to shoehorn that one in somehow just before I explain my conclusions.
Okay, great, now that we’ve dispensed with the casuals, let’s talk through a bunch of procedure. You nerds (I say this with affection) love the procedure, I know. First things first: I took Baseball Savant data for all batted balls and grouped them by player and season. I skipped 2020 due to sample size issues and last season because we don’t have subsequent-year data. That left me with approximately 3,000 player-seasons of at least 50 batted balls. Read the rest of this entry »
Insofar as I’ve given thought to who my favorite manager of all time is, my favorite manager of all time is Earl Weaver. He exemplified the ideal shouting, dirt-kicking, umpire-haranguing baseball boss; every image and video of a red-faced Weaver screaming up at an umpire a foot taller than him is a blessing upon our society. But the man was legitimately a tactical mastermind; if baseball could be influenced by coaches the way other sports can, we’d talk about Weaver the way soccer people talk about Rinus Michels.
A lot of “great managers” really just manage a lot. Weaver, despite his hyperactive and combative personality, knew to keep his hands off his offense and let the multiple future Hall of Famers on his roster cook. Weaver’s overall recipe for success usually gets cited as “pitching, defense, and three-run homers” or something similar.
Marr: Bill Whitehouse…from Frederick, Maryland, wants to know why you and the Orioles don’t go out and get some more team speed.
Weaver: Team speed! For Christ’s sake, you get [expletive] [expletive] little fleas on the [expletive] bases gettin’ picked off, tryin’ to steal, gettin’ thrown out, takin’ runs away from you. Get them big [expletive] who can hit the [expletive] ball out the ballpark and you can’t make any [expletive] mistakes.
Marr: Well, certainly this show is gonna go down in history, Earl!
