Daulton Varsho must have been bummed. After a breakout 2022, he got traded to Toronto, a World Series contender with a desperate need for outfielders. Then he had a down season, the Jays got swept out of the Wild Card round, and his old team made a surprise run to the World Series. Gabriel Moreno and Lourdes Gurriel Jr., the players Arizona got back for Varsho, were key parts of that run. Oh, what could have been.
The most worrisome of all those happenings, from Varsho’s perspective, was surely his own performance. Everything else was either partially or fully outside of his control, but this one seemed mostly on him, and it’s hard to add value offensively when you’re getting on base at a .285 clip. Yes, he’s a great defensive player and adds value on the basepaths, but most of a position player’s value comes from hitting, and quite frankly, his just wasn’t good enough.
But ah, how the tables have turned. A year after being one of the weakest links on an excellent Toronto offense, he’s one of the best players on a lackluster unit. Among Jays regulars, only Justin Turner and Davis Schneider have hit better. (Danny Jansen hasn’t played enough yet to count as a “regular” in my eyes.) There’s not much he can do about the rest of the team, but Varsho has reversed his own fortunes for the moment. Now there are two questions: How did he do it, and can he keep it going? Read the rest of this entry »
Davis Schneider is a throwback. Not because he’s 5-foot-9, and fought his way through the minor leagues after signing for $50,000 as a 28th-round pick. Or because he has featured at three positions in his brief major league career, or because he hides half his face behind a bushy mustache twice the size of Tom Selleck’s.
We’re not throwing things back that far. Schneider is a throwback to about eight years ago, when the swing plane revolution was in full, um, swing. Back when the baseballs were juicier and fastballs had more sink, undersized infielders with strength and hit tool to burn were taught to uppercut, in contravention of 100 years of baseball orthodoxy. And thus stars were made out of Daniel Murphy, Ozzie Albies, and Schneider’s new Toronto teammate Justin Turner, among others.
Schneider was drafted in 2017, took two full years to make it out of rookie ball, had his first double-digit homer season as a pro in 2022, and only broke out last year. Schneider hit 29 home runs in 122 combined games in Triple-A and the majors, and emerged as a fan favorite in Toronto. Which you would expect, given that the Berlin, NJ, native got off to one of the hottest starts in major league history. Read the rest of this entry »
Welcome back to Top of the Order, where every Monday, Wednesday, and Friday, I’ll be starting your baseball day with some news, notes, and thoughts about the game we love.
On Friday night, after a horrendous 9-24 start to the season, the Marlins waved the white flag barely a month into the campaign when they traded back-to-back batting champion Luis Arraez to the Padres for a quartet of prospects. Arraez almost certainly won’t be the last player Miami will swap for prospects this year as new president of baseball operations Peter Bendix looks to reset his beleaguered roster and build for the future.
Considering the team’s position, there are only two Marlins players who should be off limits to prospective trade partners, starting pitchers Eury Pérez and Sandy Alcantara, who are both out for the season after undergoing Tommy John surgery. Alcantara, who signed a five-year, $56 million extension after the 2021 season, should be ready for Opening Day, while Pérez will miss at least a couple months of next season, too.
Let’s take a look at some of the players the Marlins could deal between now and the July 30 deadline.
Jazz Chisholm Jr., CF
Few players in baseball are more entertaining than the lefty-swinging Jazz Chisholm Jr., who’s been viewed as a key piece for the Marlins since his 2021 rookie year. Back then, Chisholm was their starting second baseman, and he’s yet to play as many games as he did in that season, when he came to the plate 507 times over 124 games. Injuries limited him to 157 games over the past two years, but that full season’s worth of production across 2022 and 2023 offered a tantalizing glimpse of what he could offer if he could just stay on the field: .251/.312/.487 (116 wRC+) with 33 homers, 34 steals, and above-average defense at both second base and center field.
Chisholm’s 2024 hasn’t been great thus far (102 wRC+), but he’s stayed healthy and is taking walks more than ever, with a career-low strikeout rate to go with that more patient approach. Lefties have always given him fits in his career (66 wRC+), but he’s got plenty of utility as the strong side of a platoon in center, and teams may be open to moving him back to second base if that better fits their roster. The 26-year-old Chisholm is earning $2.625 million this year and isn’t a free agent until the conclusion of the 2026 season. Maybe those two years of club control beyond this season would make the Marlins hesitant to trade him, but dealing him now would also probably sweeten the return.
Best Fits: Phillies, Mariners, Royals, Guardians
Jesús Luzardo, SP
The Marlins made a savvy deal back in 2021, when they acquired lefty starter Jesús Luzardo from the A’s for 56 games of Starling Marte. Luzardo missed half the 2022 season with a forearm strain, but he was great in his 18 starts. Last year, the hard-throwing lefty broke out in a big way, posting a 3.58 ERA (3.55 FIP) in 178.2 innings and striking out 28% of the batters he faced.
Luzardo stumbled to start this season, with just 26 innings across his first five starts, allowing 19 runs (6.58 ERA), with his strikeout rate tumbling by four percentage points and his walk rate up above 11% before he hit the injured list with a strained flexor tendon on April 26. Typically, that diagnosis portends a long absence, but Luzardo made his first rehab start on Sunday, so his recovery seems to be progressing fairly swiftly, though there is no timetable yet for his return. Like Chisholm, Luzardo has two more years of club control after this one.
Best Fits: Dodgers, Rangers, Giants, Twins, Astros
Bryan De La Cruz, OF
Bryan De La Cruz hasn’t had a flashy career to date; he has a 99 wRC+ across his four seasons and hasn’t produced 1.0 WAR in any of them. But he’s always felt capable of more: In 2022, his xwOBA and sweet-spot percentage were both elite, with the latter being the best in baseball. His thump took a step back last year, but his sweet-spot percentage remained excellent. This year he’s trading ideal contact for hitting the ball harder; he’s barreling more balls than ever but his sweet-spot rate is down nine points.
It seems as if De La Cruz doesn’t exactly know what type of hitter he should be, with the constant fluctuations preventing a true breakout. He’s never been a good hitter, which limits his utility, but some of the stronger teams at hitting development could look to iron out some kinks with the hope that things will start to click for him. He’s not a free agent until the end of the 2027 season, but he seems as good as any player to benefit from a change of scenery.
Best Fits: Phillies, Rays, Mariners, Cardinals
Of course, the Marlins should look to deal away more than just these three players. The problem is many of their trade candidates are struggling — shortstop Tim Anderson, first baseman and DH Josh Bell, outfielder Jesús Sánchez, starting pitchers Trevor Rogers and Edward Cabrera, and reliever Anthony Bender — while others are injured: starter Braxton Garrett, corner infielder Jake Burger, and reliever A.J. Puk. Closer Tanner Scott is healthy and his 2.77 ERA is promising, but his peripherals (5.54 FIP, .194 BABIP, and a walk rate that is 3.2 percentage points higher than his strikeout rate) are bad enough to suppress the return package.
Some of these players probably will be traded, if for no reason other than to shed some payroll. Anderson, Bell, and Scott are all free agents after this season, so the Marlins should be willing to trade them for a can of beans come late July if they can’t get anything else for them. For the others, Miami can afford to hold onto them if the right deal doesn’t come to fruition before the deadline and look to trade them in the future.
…
Alek Manoah Looks Like Himself, for Better and Worse
On Sunday, Blue Jays righty Alek Manoah returned to a big league mound for the first time since August 10, finally making his way back after months beleaguered by ineffectiveness, injuries and mechanical issues.
The questions surrounding the sharp downturn of Manoah’s career won’t go away after a four-inning outing in which he threw 92 pitches, gave up seven runs, walked four batters, and hit another. Understandably, that performance will evoke far more memories of his troubling 2023 season than it will cause fans to think fondly back to his 2022, when he finished third in Cy Young voting. His command was shaky, featuring plenty of up-and-arm-side misses with his fastball:
That gave the Nationals a lot of easy takes; they offered at just 18% of pitches outside the strike zone, well below the league average of 31%. Batters did make less contact than league average on swings both inside and outside of the zone, but they didn’t do much swinging: Washington swung at only 36% of Manoah’s offerings, 10 percentage points below average.
The good news is Manoah’s velocity ticked up notably from last year, with his heater averaging 94.3 mph compared to 92.6 mph. But ultimately, if he wants to stick in the rotation and resurrect his career, he’ll have to make more competitive pitches; the stuff doesn’t matter if hitters can just wait it out and take their bases. Because the Blue Jays are expected to be without the injured Yariel Rodriguez and Bowden Francis for a while, Manoah should have ample opportunity to figure things out at the major league level.
Spending money can be a lot of fun, but spending someone else’s money is even better. And that’s exactly what we’re doing today!
About a month into the season is typically when I look at some of the players who are prime extension candidates and the possible deals they might work out with their teams. As usual, the contracts here are not necessarily what I would offer the players or what they will get, but what the mean, cold-hearted projections think would amount to a fair agreement. For each player, I’ve included their ZiPS projections with the latest model updates.
Elly De La Cruz, Cincinnati Reds (Nine years, $192 million)
It’s going to be a long time until Elly De La Cruz is eligible for free agency, but if the Reds wish to signal to the fans that the best players they develop will be in Cincinnati for longer than their middle arbitration years, ownership is going to have to make a real commitment to one of them at some point. And who is a better option than De La Cruz? I would have said Matt McLain a few months ago, but his major shoulder surgery makes it a risky time for both team and player to come to a meeting of the minds on a future dollar figure. De La Cruz still has issues making contact, but his plate discipline has continued to improve since his debut. He’s drawing a lot more walks this year and he’s actually been better than the average major leaguer at not chasing pitches. And with better plate discipline should come more power because a greater percentage of his swings will come against pitches that he can actually drive.
As you can see below, he wouldn’t need to exceed his 50th percentile projections for home runs by much to secure a 40/40 season. In fact, after hitting his eighth home run of the year Monday night, De La Cruz is currently on pace for 45 homers and an absurd 101 steals this season — and he still has a lot of polishing left to do. He’s also showing he’s far from a defensive liability at shortstop, even though a healthy McLain is still probably preferable there. This contract buys out some of De La Cruz’s early free agency years and gives him a big wad of guaranteed dough.
ZiPS Projection – Elly De La Cruz
Year
BA
OBP
SLG
AB
R
H
2B
3B
HR
RBI
BB
SO
SB
OPS+
DR
WAR
2025
.250
.320
.462
569
103
142
26
7
27
94
57
187
48
106
-2
3.2
2026
.253
.326
.472
589
109
149
28
7
29
101
62
182
49
110
-2
3.8
2027
.258
.333
.485
594
113
153
30
6
31
105
65
176
47
115
-2
4.2
2028
.258
.336
.488
592
116
153
30
5
32
106
67
169
43
116
-1
4.3
2029
.258
.337
.488
590
116
152
30
5
32
105
69
166
40
117
-1
4.3
2030
.255
.336
.482
589
116
150
30
4
32
104
70
164
36
115
-1
4.1
2031
.255
.336
.483
588
115
150
30
4
32
104
70
164
34
115
-2
4.0
2032
.257
.339
.484
572
112
147
29
4
31
101
69
161
31
116
-3
4.0
2033
.255
.336
.476
573
110
146
29
4
30
100
68
162
29
114
-3
3.6
Corbin Burnes, Baltimore Orioles (Eight years, $210 million)
If you’ve been following my work for a while now, you surely know I’m an Orioles fan. And like many other Baltimore fans, I remember the moment when I became unhappy with the ownership of the late Peter Angelos. My feelings toward him soured because of how he and the Orioles handled their free agent negotiations with Mike Mussina. After Moose had previously taken a hometown discount, the O’s assumed he would continue to pitch for them at a below-market rate, and as a result, they lowballed him the next time he was eligible for free agency. He declined, leading to the second-best pitcher in team history finishing his career wearing Yankee pinstripes and ensuring that his Hall of Fame plaque wouldn’t have an ornithologically correct bird on the cap.
While I still think the team should lock up Grayson Rodriguez long term, it’s far more urgent< for the O’s to extend Corbin Burnes, given that he hits free agency after the season. No better pitcher will be available this winter, and nobody in the minors anywhere, for any team, is a safe bet to be better than Burnes over the next five or six years. New owner David Rubinstein has said all the right things, and he made a nice gesture when he bought everyone at Pickles a round of drinks, but the best way to show that he’s serious about building a perennial contender is to not let his team’s ace sign elsewhere. Given the O’s have just about nothing in the way of financial obligations, there’s no reason not to extend him. If that means paying more than that figure above, so be it.
ZiPS Projection – Corbin Burnes
Year
W
L
ERA
G
GS
IP
H
ER
HR
BB
SO
ERA+
WAR
2025
11
7
3.27
30
30
187.0
145
68
18
53
207
125
4.2
2026
11
7
3.40
29
29
177.3
141
67
17
50
191
120
3.8
2027
10
6
3.51
27
27
169.3
139
66
17
48
177
117
3.5
2028
9
7
3.66
26
26
157.3
134
64
17
45
159
112
3.0
2029
9
6
3.79
24
24
152.0
135
64
17
44
148
108
2.6
2030
8
6
4.03
22
22
140.7
130
63
17
42
132
102
2.1
2031
7
6
4.18
20
20
125.0
119
58
16
40
115
98
1.6
Bo Bichette, Toronto Blue Jays (Seven years, $151 million)
Let’s be clear, despite his uncharacteristic struggles so far this season, I think Bo Bichette will command more than $151 million, and while the Blue Jays may balk any amount greater than that figure, they should still be willing to pay him whatever it takes to keep him around for the bulk of his career. Because of his position and his consistency (again, his first month of this season notwithstanding), Bichette has emerged as the best scion of a baseball family in Toronto, and time’s running out to extend bounty hunter Boba Chette before he hits free agency after the 2025 campaign. I actually think he’ll age better than ZiPS does, at least offensively. Either way, shortstops get super expensive if you wait until they hit the open market. That means that now’s the time for the Blue Jays to extend him if they’re going to keep him, even if that means going over this projected offer to ensure he doesn’t reach free agency.
ZiPS Projection – Bo Bichette
Year
BA
OBP
SLG
AB
R
H
2B
3B
HR
RBI
BB
SO
SB
OPS+
DR
WAR
2025
.292
.333
.462
599
82
175
32
2
22
88
35
121
8
120
-4
3.5
2026
.288
.329
.457
598
81
172
31
2
22
87
35
119
7
117
-4
3.3
2027
.282
.325
.447
589
78
166
30
2
21
84
36
117
6
113
-4
2.9
2028
.278
.322
.437
575
75
160
29
1
20
80
35
114
5
110
-5
2.5
2029
.274
.319
.426
554
70
152
28
1
18
74
34
110
5
106
-6
2.1
2030
.268
.312
.411
530
65
142
26
1
16
68
33
106
4
100
-6
1.5
2031
.268
.313
.411
496
60
133
24
1
15
63
31
100
3
100
-6
1.3
Alex Bregman, Houston Astros (Four years, $101 million)
The Astros have been able to let some of their offensive contributors walk in free agency — Springer and Carlos Correa among them — mainly because they’ve had pretty solid replacements coming up at the same time, such as Yordan Alvarez, Kyle Tucker, and Jeremy Peña. There’s no similar player on the horizon who can take the place of Alex Bregman. And with Houston already reeling with its pitchers, it would be a lot to ask the front office to fill a gaping hole at third base as well.
ZiPS Projection – Alex Bregman
Year
BA
OBP
SLG
AB
R
H
2B
3B
HR
RBI
BB
SO
SB
OPS+
DR
WAR
2025
.255
.356
.421
572
91
146
29
3
20
88
84
84
2
116
1
3.8
2026
.251
.351
.408
542
84
136
27
2
18
79
78
80
2
111
0
3.2
2027
.249
.347
.394
507
76
126
25
2
15
71
72
76
1
107
-1
2.5
2028
.244
.343
.383
467
68
114
22
2
13
62
65
72
1
102
-2
1.9
Max Fried, Atlanta Braves (Six years, $150 million)
Atlanta has a knack for being able to survive epidemics of pitcher injuries in ways that are fascinating if you’re a fan of the team and maddening if you root for another one. But with Spencer Strider already out for the rest of this season after undergoing internal brace surgery for his damaged elbow, can Atlanta really afford to let Max Fried andCharlie Morton depart this offseason? I like what Reynaldo López has done this season, but you don’t really want to go into 2025 counting on his continued success, Chris Sale’s health, and a full recovery from Strider following his second UCL procedure? The Braves reportedly offered six years, $162 million to Aaron Nola; how could they not make a similar offer to Fried, a similarly valued pitcher who has been a large part of their recent success? Now, all reports I’ve heard suggest Fried’s not keen on discussing an extension during the season, but that doesn’t mean he wouldn’t change his mind if Atlanta gives him a good reason to do so.
ZiPS Projection – Max Fried
Year
W
L
ERA
G
GS
IP
H
ER
HR
BB
SO
ERA+
WAR
2025
13
7
3.40
28
28
161.3
154
61
14
45
142
128
3.7
2026
12
6
3.55
27
27
152.0
151
60
15
42
130
122
3.2
2027
11
6
3.73
25
25
144.7
148
60
15
41
122
117
2.8
2028
10
6
3.87
23
23
132.7
140
57
15
39
108
113
2.4
2029
9
7
4.11
22
22
127.0
139
58
15
40
101
106
2.0
2030
8
6
4.40
20
20
110.3
128
54
15
38
85
99
1.4
Josh Naylor, Cleveland Guardians (Four years, $80 million)
Since the start of the 2002 season, the Guardians have received 10,109 plate appearances from first basemen not named Jim Thome, Carlos Santana, or Josh Naylor. Those 57 hitters have combined to hit .253/.324/.426 for 7.7 WAR, or about 0.5 WAR per 600 plate appearances. This is a franchise that has struggled to find solid fill-in first basemen, so it’s hard to imagine the Guardians would be able to find an an adequate replacement if Naylor walks after 2026. And this is hardly a blockbuster deal; it’s similar to what Kyle Schwarber got from the Phillies coming off the best season of his career (2.7 WAR in 2021). Naylor’s not a superstar, but he’s in his prime years. That should be enough incentive for the Guards to pay for him to stick around, and so long as the deal is fair, the fact that Josh’s younger brother Bo also plays for Cleveland might make him more inclined to stay.
ZiPS Projection – Josh Naylor
Year
BA
OBP
SLG
AB
R
H
2B
3B
HR
RBI
BB
SO
SB
OPS+
DR
WAR
2025
.276
.339
.498
554
64
153
36
0
29
100
49
84
8
132
1
2.9
2026
.273
.338
.490
553
63
151
36
0
28
98
50
83
8
130
1
2.8
2027
.270
.336
.478
538
60
145
34
0
26
93
50
81
7
126
1
2.4
2028
.267
.334
.469
520
57
139
33
0
24
87
48
79
6
123
0
2.1
Jackson Merrill, San Diego Padres (Seven years, $95 million)
Jackson Merrill has one of the odder long-term projections according to ZiPS, which expects him to have a long, stable plateau rather than a period of significant growth followed by a steady decline (at least in the years covered below). But ZiPS is increasingly coming around to his reputation as a good bad-ball hitter, and his batting average projections have improved considerably since the winter. Merrill looks to be a solid player, and he’s one the Padres may need toward the end of their long-term deals with infielders Xander Bogaerts, Manny Machado, and Jake Cronenworth.
ZiPS Projection – Jackson Merrill
Year
BA
OBP
SLG
AB
R
H
2B
3B
HR
RBI
BB
SO
SB
OPS+
DR
WAR
2025
.281
.325
.403
590
79
166
23
5
13
72
40
103
15
106
3
2.8
2026
.279
.325
.405
588
80
164
24
4
14
73
42
100
14
106
3
2.8
2027
.276
.325
.408
586
81
162
24
4
15
74
44
97
14
107
3
2.9
2028
.274
.324
.405
585
81
160
24
4
15
74
45
95
13
106
2
2.7
2029
.274
.327
.413
583
82
160
25
4
16
75
47
93
12
109
2
2.9
2030
.271
.325
.407
582
82
158
25
3
16
75
48
92
12
107
2
2.8
2031
.271
.325
.407
582
82
158
25
3
16
76
48
92
11
107
1
2.7
2032
.272
.326
.409
580
81
158
25
3
16
75
48
92
11
107
1
2.7
Pete Alonso, New York Mets (No offer)
Pete Alonso is rightfully a very popular player in New York, and I’ve always had a soft spot for the Polar Bear, both because homers are fun and because ZiPS was in on him very early when he was a prospect (everyone likes looking smart). And with his free agency imminent, this would be a suitable time to extend him on a long-term contract. The problem is, the more I look at the situation, the harder it is for me to think of a scenario in which he and the Mets could come to terms on a deal unless one party was willing to come out of the negotiation feeling very unhappy. ZiPS suggests a four-year, $70 million contract, and I can’t imagine Alonso feeling anything but insulted by an offer like that. I think given Alonso’s place in the organization and the hiccups in the development of Brett Baty and Mark Vientos, the Mets would be willing to pay Alonso more than a projection suggests, but I can’t see them offering him Freddie Freeman or Matt Olson money, either. Because the basic fact is that Freeman and Olson are more well-rounded players than Alonso, who has one amazing dimension. Just to illustrate, below Alonso I’ve included the projections for Freeman and Olson over the next six years.
ZiPS Projection – Pete Alonso
Year
BA
OBP
SLG
AB
R
H
2B
3B
HR
RBI
BB
SO
SB
OPS+
DR
WAR
2025
.247
.338
.480
563
85
139
24
1
35
107
65
134
3
125
-1
2.6
2026
.245
.337
.468
543
80
133
23
1
32
99
63
129
3
122
-1
2.3
2027
.242
.334
.451
517
74
125
22
1
28
89
60
124
2
117
-1
1.8
2028
.236
.329
.431
487
66
115
21
1
24
79
56
119
2
110
-1
1.3
2029
.233
.326
.415
446
58
104
19
1
20
68
51
112
2
105
-1
0.9
2030
.221
.313
.380
376
46
83
15
0
15
53
42
97
1
93
-1
0.1
ZiPS Projection – Freddie Freeman
Year
BA
OBP
SLG
AB
R
H
2B
3B
HR
RBI
BB
SO
SB
OPS+
DR
WAR
2025
.286
.383
.454
555
101
159
34
1
19
72
80
108
12
133
-1
3.4
2026
.279
.376
.438
505
88
141
30
1
16
62
72
102
9
127
-1
2.7
2027
.269
.366
.412
449
74
121
26
1
12
52
63
94
7
118
-2
1.7
2028
.262
.359
.399
393
62
103
22
1
10
43
54
87
6
112
-2
1.1
2029
.250
.345
.370
332
49
83
17
1
7
34
44
77
4
101
-2
0.3
2030
.242
.337
.353
252
36
61
13
0
5
24
33
62
3
94
-2
0.0
ZiPS Projection – Matt Olson
Year
BA
OBP
SLG
AB
R
H
2B
3B
HR
RBI
BB
SO
SB
OPS+
DR
WAR
2025
.243
.351
.472
551
90
134
31
1
31
92
88
144
1
127
1
3.0
2026
.239
.347
.457
527
84
126
29
1
28
83
84
139
1
123
0
2.5
2027
.231
.338
.432
498
75
115
26
1
24
74
78
133
1
114
0
1.7
2028
.227
.334
.414
459
67
104
24
1
20
64
71
125
1
108
0
1.2
2029
.219
.325
.386
407
56
89
20
0
16
53
62
114
1
98
0
0.5
2030
.213
.320
.372
328
44
70
16
0
12
40
49
96
0
93
0
0.2
Alonso projects to be slightly worse than them in the short term and then to be similar in the later years, though that’s likely because he is younger than them. Plus, by the end of 2024, the other players’ contracts already will have covered two additional prime seasons from Olson and three from Freeman. I don’t think any pending free agent has a bigger gulf than Alonso does between the perceived value of his past and the expected value of his future, and as such, this has contract boondoggle written all over it, as big as it was with Kris Bryant a couple years ago. I don’t envy the Mets for the decision they have to make with Alonso, because letting him go, trading him, and keeping him all feel like poor options.
Welcome back to Top of the Order, where every Monday, Wednesday, and Friday, I’ll be starting your baseball day with some news, notes, and thoughts about the game we love.
It’s not easy to be in playoff position — no matter how early we are in the season — with an offense ranked 23rd in wRC+ entering Tuesday. But that’s exactly where the Tigers stood, above .500 despite an offense that’s better than only seven other teams. Spencer Torkelson doesn’t yet have a home run, Colt Keith has been anemic in his first few weeks in the majors, Javier Báez has continued his backslide, and Detroit is getting almost no offense from its catchers. Mark Canha, Riley Greene, and Kerry Carpenter have been great, but three well-performing hitters can’t carry the other six spots in the lineup. So, then, it’s not hard to see what’s keeping the Tigers afloat: the performance of their pitchers.
A FIP of about 4.00 has the Tigers right in the middle of the pack in pitching WAR, but in terms of ERA — however sustainable or unsustainable it may be — they are among baseball’s best teams at preventing runs.
Detroit’s main contributor has been, of course, ace Tarik Skubal. He’s already been worth 1.0 WAR over his five starts, striking out nearly a third of the batters he’s faced and walking less than 5% of them. He’s allowed just two home runs, a major improvement from a few years ago. He surrendered 35 homers over 149.1 innings in 2021, his first full season in the big leagues, when he was a fastball-heavy prospect who tried to shove his heater down batters’ throats, an approach that often led to uneven results. Now that he’s mixing his pitches, Skubal is overwhelming hitters and making it far harder to guess what he’s going to throw, leading to far more weak contact.
Other than Kenta Maeda, who’s struggled badly this year despite his five scoreless innings Tuesday night, the rest of the rotation is doing its job, too. Jack Flaherty has his best strikeout percentage since 2019, when he finished fourth in the NL Cy Young race, Casey Mize is fully healthy, and Reese Olson looks like a solid back-end starter.
Where the Tigers have especially shined is in relief. Their relievers have an incredible 1.83 ERA, which actually went up after Tuesday night’s 4-2 win over the Rays, though it’s worth noting that mark has been aided by an unsustainably low BABIP against. Jason Foley is the headliner in the bullpen, firing high-90s sinkers to keep his ERA spotless through 11 appearances, but he’s had plenty of help. Shelby Miller’s deceptive fastball is difficult to square up, lefties Andrew Chafin and Tyler Holton are getting out right-handed hitters as well as lefties, and Alex Lange has been effectively wild. Even multi-inning relievers Alex Faedo and Joey Wentz, who largely pitch in low leverage situations, are doing well.
Opposing hitters won’t continue to run such a ridiculously low BABIP, but Torkelson won’t go homerless either. Such are the ebbs and flows that come with a long season, and right now the pitching is flowing and the offense is ebbing, with the former doing juuuuuust enough to keep the Tigers in the conversation as true contenders.
Will Daulton Varsho’s Adjustments Stick?
By no means was Daulton Varsho bad in his first season with the Blue Jays, but he was definitely underwhelming. He was still worth over two wins on the strength of his outfield defense — he led the majors in defensive runs saved — after hanging up his catcher’s mitt for good. However, his bat lagged far behind, with his 107 wRC+ from 2022 dropping all the way down to 85 last year. His strikeout and walk rates were similar, and he actually hit more balls in the air, but fewer of his fly balls turned into home runs because he was popping up far more pitches and pulling the ball less.
In working with bench coach and offensive coordinator Don Mattingly to flatten his swing plane a little in an effort to create fewer automatic outs, Varsho is thriving so far in 2024. His hard-hit rate is the highest of his career, with his average exit velocity up a full mph from 2023. Ironically, his IFFB% is actually higher than it’s ever been, but it’s more than outweighed by better contact overall, which has led to six homers (already 30% of last year’s total) and a 158 wRC+.
Varsho still has some holes in his game: Along with the popups, he’s pulling even fewer of his balls in play, and while he’s walking more, he’s also striking out more than ever. His offensive profile right now looks more boom or bust than Varsho and Mattingly intended, and the bust could come as quickly as the boom did. But for now, he and the Blue Jays should keep riding the wave of his boom for as long as it lasts.
RIP to Robert Suarez’s Fastball Streak
All good things must come to an end, and so it has with Robert Suarez’s fastball streak. For 79 pitches, the Padres’ closer threw nothing but four-seam and two-seam fastballs, until, finally, he mixed in a changeup at Coors Field on Monday night.
Although his ERA has fluctuated in his three MLB seasons since coming over from Japan, Suarez has been mostly the same pitcher when looking at xERA, though FIP feels differently about his 2023. At any rate, Suarez is taking a new approach in 2024; his pitch mix was essentially unchanged from 2022 to 2023, but now he’s throwing his two fastballs nearly 90% of the time.
The rest of his pitches are changeups, meaning Suarez doesn’t have any breaking pitches in his arsenal, but hitters have been flummoxed nonetheless. That fastball-changeup combo is enough to give hitters fits. Entering play Tuesday, he’s allowed just one run in 10.2 innings and earned eight saves. That’ll play.
I’ve wanted to write about Daulton Varsho for a long time. As a catcher turned elite defensive outfielder, he’s had a rare career progression. Because of that, he’s been one of my favorite players to watch. But I’m not here to talk about his defense, or even his elite baserunning for that matter. Instead, the focus is going to be on his one non-elite skill: his bat.
Through 1,603 career plate appearances, Varsho has a 96 wRC+. He was a slightly above-average hitter from 2021-2022, but he took a big step back in his first year with the Blue Jays, posting an 85 wRC+ across 581 plate appearances. His peripherals were about the same as they were the previous year, but his output was significantly worse. It was confusing to see. The expectation was that he would make a leap in his third full season, and the projections supported that. ZiPS’ median projection had him pegged for a 117 OPS+; his actual production ended up being a bottom decile outcome. Despite the regression, ZiPS is still confident Varsho can be a little better than league average with the bat this season, with a projected 107 wRC+.
Any hitter who saw as big of a drop as Varsho did last year would be keen to overhaul his process, though at times it can be difficult to determine what part of the profile needs the most attention. Luckily for Varsho, his was an obvious diagnosis that had little to do with his approach; his swing decisions actually improved in 2023. Instead, the problem can be found in his bat tracking data.
Let’s quickly redefine some terms before starting the analysis. First is Vertical Entry Angle (VEA): Sourcing the definition (and data) from SwingGraphs, VEA is the vertical angle of the bat approximately 83 milliseconds before contact, or in other words, the angle of the bat relative to the ground at the start of the down swing. Then there is Vertical Bat Angle (VBA), something I’ve cited many times in previous work. VBA is the angle of the bat relative to the ground at contact. Lastly, there is Attack Angle (AA), which represents the vertical direction of the bat at contact.
Each of these measurements are important for understanding any hitter. The way they work and interact with one another can tell the story of a swing. For Varsho, the way these measurements work together is especially important because he tends to live on the extreme ends of them. Here is a table summarizing his VBA and AA relative to the league:
Varsho Bat Metrics
Year
VBA
VBA Pctile
AA Pctile
2021
25.8
NA
NA
2022
26.5
4th
99th
2023
27.1
9th
60th
SOURCE: SwingGraphs
Varsho’s VBA is consistently one of the lowest in baseball. That means on average, his bat is flatter at the point of contact than most of the league. While it’s important to note that VBA is dependent on pitch height (VBA decreases as you move up in the zone), it’s not as if Varsho is only making contact with high pitches and that alone is the reason for his low mark. In fact, his contact heights are typically average or below average – not exactly the hitter you’d expect to have a VBA this low. Then, when it comes to AA, his mark was among the highest in 2022 and above average in 2023. Both years, he was among the leaders in positive differential between VBA and AA (AA > VBA). That is interesting, and perhaps a big red flag considering his profile as a hitter.
There is no such thing as an absolute in baseball – there is always room for departure from the norm – but it’s typically not optimal for a hitter to change the angle of his bat this much through his swing. If you hit the ball hard, you can probably make it work better than most, but Varsho doesn’t have that kind of room for error. Taking the bat off its natural plane of movement will likely result in lots of mishits. Unsurprisingly, Varsho was among the league leaders in pop-up rate in 2023. This swing profile is far from ideal, especially because he doesn’t have the power to overcome the deficiencies. Now is a good time to pivot to VEA and its role in Varsho’s swing.
I did not include VEA in the table because the number is best represented by a range, since the metric is still a work in progress at SwingGraphs and the capture rate isn’t always consistent. From September 2022 through last season, Varsho’s VEA has fluctuated between 42 and 48 degrees. That means he tends to flatten his bat from the start of the downswing through contact at a range between 16 to 21 degrees. Again, that is among the highest in baseball, if not the very highest.
Here is a quick screenshot of about where VEA is captured:
So, from the point you see above to contact (VEA to VBA), he flattens his bat angle a ton. That helps put the pieces of Varsho’s swing puzzle together. Think about it from a reciprocal movement perspective. How you set yourself up to move will directly impact the next step in the kinetic chain. If your bat is pointing upward as the downswing begins, then its natural response is to have a vertically oriented path through the ball, hence Varsho’s high VEA into high AA. By making his barrel flat at impact (despite moving it on an upward path), he’s forcing it off its natural path, which has a negative effect on his contact quality. Let’s watch a few swings from last year to remember what his swing actually looks like:
There are some swings where it goes right and others where it goes wrong. What’s clear even from this handful is that Varsho tinkered with his hand placement throughout last season, perhaps in an attempt to get comfortable through a bumpy year. When he spoke to David Laurila a few weeks ago, he discussed his mindset at the plate. After Laurila pointed out to Varsho that he pulls the ball more often than any hitter in the league and followed up by asking if Varsho wanted to lift the ball, the Jays outfielder made it clear that his thought process is to hit grounders. This stuck out to me – not because of any criticism of the old school mindset – but because of how he sets his swing up.
As I’ve pointed out, Varsho’s VEA puts him in line for a steep swing, but his intent to hit the ball on the ground plays out through his flat VBA. The flat VBA itself isn’t the issue. Plenty of other hitters have success with it. It’s that he doesn’t optimally set himself up to have a flat swing. If he started his downswing flatter, he would be in a better position to execute on the flat swing he intends to have. Cue 2024 spring training:
Well, I’m intrigued. Yeah, the results are better in the small sample, but that doesn’t really matter here. This is as sound of a process as I could have imagined for Varsho. If his goal is to have a low, line drive oriented swing, then this is how he should set up for it.
He points his bat down in his stance to remind him to keep the bat flat as he starts his swing. The open stance is probably a comfort thing, but it could help create more space for him to get his bat going deeper in the zone. That’s something easier to do with a flat bat path than a steep one. Either way, these adjustments align with his stated plan and the other components of his swing.
As of now, it’s unclear whether these changes will result in the offensive breakout we were expecting last year. We’ll need regular season data to answer that question. But what it does do is prove that Varsho is cleaning up his process and matching his mental plan to his physical mechanics. That’s important. If he can return to his league-average hitting, it’ll be enough to make him a valuable player, given his elite fielding and baserunning. If he can be better than that, he’ll emerge as one of the game’s more talented stars. For now, let’s see how April goes.
Here’s an undeniable truth: Your performance matters most in the biggest spots. It sounds silly to write that, in fact. It’s so obviously true. I’m not just talking about professional sports, or even just sports. No one cares if you nailed your violin solo in your basement when you were practicing it Tuesday evening; they care whether you fumbled the chord progression in Thursday’s big recital.
That self-evident truth has led to decades of squabbling over baseball performances. It’s incontrovertibly true – and yet it seems that players don’t have a lot of control over when they have their best performances. If you want to start an annoying discussion with your uncle (not my uncle, hi Roy, but your generic back-in-my-day uncle), just talk about RBIs or pitcher wins and say something about clutch. You won’t thank me, because just imagining that discussion is giving me anxiety, but you’ll certainly prove my point.
What if we could find a place where players can control their best performance, though? There’s one place in baseball that follows an orderly progression of leverage: the count. The first pitch of an at-bat just matters less, on average, than one thrown with two strikes. That’s true regardless of who’s at bat, regardless of who’s pitching, and regardless of the game situation.
What’s more, there’s an easy way that pitchers can change their performance, and it’s largely in their control. They don’t throw every single pitch the exact same; that would be flatly impossible. Some of the variation in pitch shape is inevitable, caused by minute differences and grip or infinitesimally different release points. But velocity? Pitchers can mostly control that. Read the rest of this entry »
Most professional baseball players were fans of the sport before it became their job. Much like the rest of us, they grew up following their favorite teams and players, watching them on TV and, to varying degrees, reading about them in print or online. Then things changed. With few exceptions, primarily due to new routines and responsibilities, the way they follow the game is now different — in many cases, drastically so. No longer fans, these players have found themselves consuming baseball in a whole new way.
So how does then compare to now? I put that question to 10 players. Here is what they had to say.
———
Grayson Rodriguez, Baltimore Orioles pitcher: “As a kid growing up, I would just watch my favorite teams. I watched a lot of Astros and Rangers; I wouldn’t really watch a lot of other teams unless it was the playoffs or the World Series. Being in the game now, I try to watch everybody. I try to watch different pitchers. I watch their starts. Read the rest of this entry »
When free agent Matt Chapman signed with the Giants this past weekend, most of my analysis focused upon the ups and downs of his 2023 season and the nature of his contract, which looks comparatively team friendly. One thing I underplayed in the analysis was the extent to which San Francisco’s winter stands out relative to the competition. Even before the addition of Chapman, the Giants had spent more money on free agents than any other team besides the Dodgers, and likewise project to receive more WAR from those additions than any team besides their longtime rivals.
Based on the data in our Free Agent Tracker, the Giants have now committed $261.25 million in guaranteed salaries: $113 million to center fielder Jung Hoo Lee, $44 million to righty Jordan Hicks, $42 million to DH/outfielder Jorge Soler, and $8.25 million to catcher Tom Murphy; this accounting does not include the major league salaries that shortstop Nick Ahmed or lefty reliever Amir Garrett will get if they make the big league roster; last month, they each signed minor league deals as non-roster invitees. San Francisco’s additions may not be as eye-catching as signing either Carlos Correa or Aaron Judge would have been last offseason, and the team still projects for a middle-of-the-pack 82 wins after going 79-83 last year, but the Giants may not be done spending some of the money that was burning a hole in their pockets. They remain interested in Blake Snell, especially in the wake of injuries within their rotation.
Of course, the Dodgers blow the field away when it comes to spending, even if we stick to the adjusted salaries once deferred money is factored in, with a total of $853.2 million: $437.83 million to Shohei Ohtani (down from a sticker price of $700 million), $325 million to Yoshinobu Yamamoto, $20.434 million to outfielder Teoscar Hernández (down from $25 million), $10 million to Clayton Kershaw (with incentives that can increase the value significantly for both 2024 and ’25), $9 million apiece to Ryan Brasier and Jason Heyward, $8 million to Joe Kelly, $7 million to James Paxton, and $4 million to Enrique Hernández.
Here’s a look at the 30 teams’ free agent spending. Note that, as above, these figures factor in the applicable deferrals but not incentives, escalator clauses, or split-contract salaries from minor league deals:
Free Agent Spending, 2023-24 Offseason
Team
Free Agents
Major
Minor
$ (Millions)*
Dodgers
12
9
3
$853.2
Giants
7
5
2
$261.3
Phillies
6
4
2
$183.0
Cubs
8
3
5
$142.0
Diamondbacks
7
4
3
$136.5
Reds
10
8
2
$112.7
Royals
10
8
2
$110.5
Cardinals
6
6
0
$107.6
Astros
2
2
0
$107.0
Brewers
9
8
1
$77.3
Braves
6
4
2
$71.4
Blue Jays
6
4
2
$70.5
Mets
16
10
6
$69.2
Angels
15
8
7
$52.3
Padres
4
4
0
$50.0
Red Sox
6
2
4
$48.5
Tigers
6
5
1
$47.5
Rangers
12
5
7
$40.6
Yankees
4
3
1
$40.5
White Sox
16
6
10
$30.1
Pirates
7
5
2
$29.2
Mariners
3
1
2
$24.0
Rockies
5
3
2
$16.5
Orioles
4
1
3
$13.0
A’s
3
3
0
$12.3
Nationals
8
3
5
$9.3
Rays
5
3
2
$9.1
Twins
4
3
1
$7.7
Marlins
5
1
4
$5.0
Guardians
3
1
2
$4.0
SOURCE: RosterResource
* = Total salares adjusted for deferred money, but not including incentives or split-contract salaries for players on minor league contracts.
As you can see, five teams committed less than $10 million each this winter, and of the bottom seven teams, four (the Orioles, Rays, Twins, and Marlins) made the playoffs last year. Free agency isn’t the only route to improve a team, but particularly with regards to the Orioles, one can empathize with fans who are disappointed that last year’s success hasn’t translated into a shopping spree to improve their odds of getting back to the postseason.
The 30 teams have committed a total of $2.74 billion to free agents so far, and even though that figure will increase once Snell and Jordan Montgomery sign, overall spending will still be lower this offseason than in recent ones. Based on the data at RosterResource, teams spent $4 billion last offseason ($2.22 billion on the top 12 free agents alone) and $3.22 billion in the lockout-interrupted offseason of 2021–22. For this winter, spending works out to an average of $91.38 million per team, but that figure is skewed by the top teams to such an extent that the median is just $49.25 million; only nine teams exceeded the mean.
Beyond the dollars, I thought it would be worth revisiting some free agent accounting we’ve done in the past, regarding WAR added and lost in free agency. This isn’t quite as straightforward as it sounds, as we’ll soon see.
Net 2023 WAR Added and Lost in Free Agency
Team
Out FA
Out WAR
In FA
In WAR
Net WAR
Reds
12
-1.0
10
8.7
9.7
Cardinals
5
-0.5
6
8.6
9.1
Royals
8
-0.1
10
8.0
8.1
Dodgers
16
9.0
12 (1)
17.1
8.1
Diamondbacks
9
2.6
7
7.7
5.1
Giants
11
3.5
7 (1)
6.9
3.4
Yankees
11
0.4
4
3.6
3.2
Astros
4
0.2
2
2.8
2.6
Nationals
6
-0.6
8
1.8
2.3
A’s
5
-0.4
3
1.9
2.3
Guardians
8
-1.6
3
-0.2
1.3
Tigers
7
3.5
6
4.7
1.3
Brewers
14
2.6
9
3.4
0.8
Pirates
3
1.9
7
2.7
0.8
Mariners
6
2.4
3
2.7
0.4
Phillies
6
4.4
6
4.4
0.0
Rays
6
1.5
5 (1)
1.0
-0.5
Mets
12
0.7
16
-0.1
-0.8
Marlins
11
-0.7
5
-1.7
-1.0
Cubs
10
6.7
8 (1)
5.5
-1.2
Braves
11
3.3
6
2.0
-1.3
Rockies
6
2.6
5
0.5
-2.1
Red Sox
7
4.0
6
0.8
-3.2
Orioles
7
4.2
4
0.8
-3.4
Angels
12
5.9
15
2.1
-3.8
White Sox
11
2.6
16 (1)
-2.3
-5.0
Rangers
14
6.2
12
1.2
-5.0
Blue Jays
8
9.2
6 (1)
2.8
-6.5
Twins
11
12.6
4
1.9
-10.7
Padres
20
10.8
4 (2)
-2.5
-13.2
Outgoing and incoming counts include players on minor league contracts. WAR figures cover only players who were in MLB in 2023; numbers in parentheses represent players signed from NPB and KBO
This is the most basic accounting, lumping together players signed to major league deals and those who had to settle for minor league ones; the latter inflates the counts of some of these teams well into double digits. It’s worth noting that where players spent time with multiple teams in 2023, I’ve only counted their WAR with their last team on the outgoing side, but their full-season WAR on the incoming side. Consider the case of Jeimer Candelario, who produced 3.1 WAR for the Nationals and then 0.2 WAR for the Cubs. To these eyes, crediting the Reds as adding a 3.3-WAR player properly conveys the impact of a substantial addition. The question is whether to count the Cubs as losing 3.3 WAR (via a player they acquired without intending to retain) or 0.2 WAR (reflecting the transient nature of a late-season addition). I went with the latter option.
The total number of outgoing free agents shown above (277) doesn’t include 11 additional players from the KBO and NPB, eight of whom have signed (all but Trevor Bauer, Adam Plutko, and Yasiel Puig), meaning that from among that total, 73 — about 25% — are unsigned. Most of the unsigned are fairly low impact players, in that just 13 produced at least 1.0 WAR last year, with Montgomery (4.3), Snell (4.1), Brandon Belt (2.3), Mike Clevinger (2.2) and J.D. Martinez (2.2) the only ones above 2.0. Meanwhile, 35 of them produced zero or negative WAR, though to be fair, that was often in limited opportunity.
While the eight foreign players who have signed are counted in the total number of signed free agents above, they didn’t produce any WAR within MLB. Thus, the fact that three teams outrank the Dodgers in terms of net free agent WAR comes with the caveat that the Los Angeles total doesn’t include Yamamoto.
I’ll come back to that issue, but first let’s note the teams at the extremes. Ahead of the Dodgers are three teams who had a bunch of players hit the open market, but who were at best minimally productive in 2023, and who all went out and made at least a few solid moves. Of the dozen Reds to test free agency, including the still-unsigned Joey Votto, only Harrison Bader produced even 1.0 WAR in 2023, and he nonetheless was 0.2 wins below replacement after being acquired from the Yankees. On the other side, in addition to Candelario, the team shored up its pitching by adding starters Nick Martinez and Frankie Montas, relievers Brent Suter and Emilio Pagán, and more — not big moves, but enough to put them at the top. The Cardinals shed five players, most notably Dakota Hudson, and overhauled their rotation by adding Sonny Gray, whose 5.3 WAR as a Twin tied Kevin Gausman for the AL lead, as well as Kyle Gibson and Lance Lynn; they also added Keynan Middleton to the bullpen and staffed their bench with Brandon Crawford and Matt Carpenter. Of the eight Royals who became free agents, only Zack Greinke produced 1.0 WAR, but they beefed up their pitching, with starters Seth Lugo and Michael Wacha; their lineup, with Hunter Renfroe; and their bench, with Adam Frazier and Garrett Hampson to their bench. These moves won’t win them the division, but they’re at least proof of life.
The Dodgers’ figures on both sides of the ledger are inflated by their keeping Brasier, Enrique Hernández, Heyward, Kelly, and Kershaw, but they did shed the still-unsigned J.D. Martinez and Julio Urías, replacing them with the market’s two most expensive players. The Diamondbacks re-signed Lourdes Gurriel Jr. and didn’t lose anybody who produced at least 1.0 WAR for the team, while the only departing Giant to meet that threshold was Sean Manaea.
At the other end of the spectrum, it’s striking that the bottom five teams include three AL postseason participants plus one NL team that barely missed it. Whether they won it all or fell short, their offseasons have resulted in some downsizing of payrolls and perhaps expectations.
In the wake of last year’s $255 million flop, the uncertainty regarding their local broadcast deal, and the death of chairman Peter Seidler, the Padres gutted their pitching staff, with Snell, Lugo, Martinez, Wacha, and closer Josh Hader among those departing, along with catcher Gary Sánchez, whom they plucked off the scrapheap and who had his best season since 2019. Most of the money they’ve spent this offseason was on their bullpen, with Wandy Peralta, Japanese lefty Yuki Matsui and Korean righty Woo-Suk Go joining the fold. The Twins shed Gray, Kenta Maeda, and Tyler Mahle from their rotation, and both Donovan Solano and Michael A. Taylor remain unsigned but unlikely to return; meanwhile their most impactful addition is first baseman Carlos Santana. The Blue Jays let Chapman depart, along with Belt, Hicks and Whit Merrifield; they cobbled together a lower-cost third base solution, which includes the incoming Justin Turner and Isiah Kiner-Falefa, retained center fielderKevin Kiermaier, and took a flier on Cuban righty Yariel Rodriguez, who spent three seasons in NPB. The Rangers may still re-sign Montgomery, but for now he counts only on the outbound side, and they also shed relievers Aroldis Chapman, Chris Stratton, and Will Smith, plus catcher/DH Mitch Garver. Their rotation is full of question marks as they bank on Jacob deGrom, Max Scherzer, and Mahle having strong returns from surgery. Veteran righty David Robertson should bolster the bullpen, and Garver’s departure is mitigated by the eventual arrival of top prospect Wyatt Langford.
Since the impact of the foreign free agents isn’t reflected in the table above, I took one more look at the landscape using projected WAR on the incoming side. Instead of taking it straight from our Free Agent Tracker — that uses Steamer, which is available in time for the opening bell of the offseason, but not ZiPS, which takes longer to prepare — I took the more labor-intensive route by swapping in our Depth Charts projections, which takes an average the two systems:
Net WAR Added and Lost in Free Agency (Projection Version)
Team
Out FA
OutWAR
In FA
In WAR Proj
Net WAR Proj
Royals
8
-0.1
10
9.6
9.7
Cardinals
5
-0.5
6
8.0
8.5
Reds
12
-1.0
10
6.6
7.6
Giants
11
3.5
7 (1)
10.1
6.6
Dodgers
16
9.0
12 (1)
15.2
6.2
Mets
12
0.7
16
6.4
5.7
Brewers
14
2.6
9
7.4
4.8
Diamondbacks
9
2.6
7
6.3
3.6
Guardians
8
-1.6
3
1.4
2.9
Pirates
3
1.9
7
4.4
2.5
A’s
5
-0.4
3
1.9
2.3
Nationals
6
-0.6
8
1.8
2.3
Astros
4
0.2
2
2.4
2.2
Marlins
11
-0.7
5
1.4
2.1
Yankees
11
0.4
4
2.2
1.9
Phillies
6
4.4
6
5.7
1.3
Tigers
7
3.5
6
4.6
1.1
Rays
6
1.5
5 (1)
1.2
-0.3
Cubs
10
6.7
8 (1)
6.2
-0.6
White Sox
11
2.6
16 (1)
2.0
-0.6
Mariners
6
2.4
3
1.7
-0.7
Braves
11
3.3
6
2.4
-0.8
Rockies
6
2.6
5
1.4
-1.2
Red Sox
7
4.0
6
1.2
-2.8
Angels
12
5.9
15
2.2
-3.6
Orioles
7
4.2
4
0.5
-3.7
Blue Jays
8
9.2
6 (1)
4.4
-4.8
Rangers
14
6.2
12
1.2
-5.0
Padres
20
10.8
4 (2)
1.8
-9.0
Twins
11
12.6
4
1.0
-11.6
Outgoing and incoming counts include players on minor league contracts. WAR figures cover only players who were in MLB in 2023; numbers in parentheses represent players signed from NPB and KBO
Despite accounting for Yamamoto, the Dodgers actually fall in the rankings due to known injuries (Ohtani won’t pitch in 2024, while Kershaw could be out until August) and regression (Brasier and Heyward, particularly), while the Giants surpass them with the addition of Lee. Also notable on the upper end are the Mets, mainly due to anticipated rebounds from Manaea, Bader, and Luis Severino. On the other side, the Orioles stand out more than in the previous table, mainly because the only free agent they signed to a major league deal, Craig Kimbrel, is projected to regress. Given that both Kyle Bradish and John Means have been sidelined with elbow injuries to start the season, it seems possible the O’s could add a low-cost starter who might boost their standing here a bit.
Thanks to our tools at FanGraphs, free agency is easy to track, even if I’ve made it more labor-intensive for this exercise. It’s hardly the only route by which teams improve, however. For example, the Orioles traded for Corbin Burnes, who may outproduce any of the starters who were signed. But in the big picture, the patterns I’ve illustrated offer us plenty of hints about what to expect from the upcoming season.
Less than a week after Cody Bellinger signed a three-year deal that allows him to opt out after each of the first two seasons, Matt Chapman has done the same. The 30-year-old third baseman, who spent the past two seasons with the Blue Jays, has agreed to a three-year, $54 million deal with the Giants, with a mutual option for a fourth year — a deal that looks significantly less favorable than that of Bellinger.
Chapman placed seventh on our Top 50 Free Agents list in November, and like Bellinger (who was third on the list) sought and seemed likely to land a larger contract, particularly given the track record of their mutual agent, Scott Boras. That said, Chapman hit free agency after an uneven season, with his overall numbers (.240/.330/.424 for a 110 wRC+ with 3.5 WAR) representing a slight falloff from his 2022 performance (.229/.330/.433, 118 wRC+, 4.2 WAR). A closer look shows that last year Chapman had just two productive months and four bad ones, as well as difficulties hitting with runners in scoring position.
I’ll explore those details below, but the overarching impression I get from this deal — far more so than from Bellinger’s contract, in fact — is that Chapman and Boras overestimated how robust the market for his services would be and had to settle for much less. According to TSN Sports’ Scott Mitchell, the third baseman declined a six-year, $120 million extension offer from the Blue Jays at some point within the past year. His new contract falls short of that average annual value, even though it is half the length.
As initially reported, Chapman is guaranteed $20 million for 2024, $18 million for ’25, and $16 million for ’26, but the breakdown is more complicated. He’ll receive a $2 million signing bonus and a $16 million salary for 2024, with a $17 million player option and $2 million buyout for ’25, an $18 million player option and $3 million buyout for ’26, and then a $20 million mutual option and $1 million buyout for ’27. So if this winds up being a one-year deal, he’ll make $20 million ($2 million signing bonus, plus $16 million salary, plus $2 million buyout); for the two-year deal, it’s $38 million (the initial bonus, salaries of $16 million and $17 million, and a $3 million buyout); and for the three-year deal, it’s $54 million (bonus, salaries of $16 million, $17 million, and $18 million, $1 million buyout). If the mutual option is picked up — which is certainly no guarantee, considering he’ll be entering his age-34 season — the total value of the four-year deal will be $73 million (that $54 million, minus the $1 million buyout, plus $20 million). Got all that?
Chapman’s $18 million AAV is 25% below Ben Clemens’ estimate from our Top 50 list. Ben figured that Chapman would get $24 million per year (five years, $120 million), while our median crowdsource estimate came in at a $20 million AAV (four years, $80 million). By comparison, Bellinger’s $26.7 million AAV actually topped the estimates of $25 million per year by Clemens and $24 million per year by our crowd. What’s more, where Bellinger’s deal appeared to be a slight overpay relative to Dan Szymborski’s ZiPS-projected contract of three years and $70 million, Chapman’s deal falls short of the three-year, $79 million contract projected by the ZiPS model:
ZiPS Projection – Matt Chapman
Year
BA
OBP
SLG
AB
R
H
2B
3B
HR
RBI
BB
SO
SB
OPS+
DR
WAR
2024
.241
.333
.438
502
73
121
27
3
22
65
65
160
3
112
8
3.8
2025
.236
.329
.424
474
68
112
25
2
20
59
61
152
2
107
6
3.2
2026
.232
.324
.409
440
60
102
23
2
17
52
56
143
2
102
5
2.6
For both deals, Dan also provided contract valuations with the opt-outs priced in: three years and $58 million for Bellinger, and three years and $66 million for Chapman. The former exceeded the model’s estimate by about 38%, but the latter fell short by about 18%. That’s quite a haircut, particularly when one considers the questions of sustainability of Bellinger’s performance given his dreadful 2021–22 stretch and last year’s batted ball stats, which reflected a more contact-based two-strike approach. By comparison, for Chapman — who is more than two years older, which is already reflected in ZiPS — the concerns are more garden variety ones about season-to-season variance and aging.
Traditional numbers amplified the perception that Chapman’s decline from 2022 to ’23 was steeper than the advanced stats suggest; his 17 home runs and 54 RBIs last season were a considerable dip from his 27 home runs and 76 RBIs the year before. His career-low full-season RBIs total was in large part the product of a .215/.320/.299 (77 wRC+) performance with runners in scoring position. It was an anomalous showing — he produced a 122 wC+ in 170 PA with runners in scoring position in 2022, and owned a 128 wRC+ in that capacity for the first six years of his career — but it was poorly timed.
Situational hitting aside, Chapman’s monthly splits further shed light on why his season may have been viewed as worse than it actually was:
Matt Chapman 2023 Splits
Split
PA
HR
AVG
OBP
SLG
wRC+
Mar/Apr
114
5
.384
.465
.687
216
May
121
2
.202
.273
.312
63
June
101
3
.200
.277
.356
75
July
102
4
.247
.402
.506
154
August
82
1
.197
.256
.276
49
Sept/Oct
61
2
.167
.262
.370
75
Through August 12
485
15
.255
.346
.449
121
After August 12
96
2
.163
.250
.302
54
Chapman’s strong start was impossible to sustain — he had a 32.9% barrel rate over the first month of the season — but his production didn’t regress so much as it cratered. He posted a .205/.298/.361 (84 wRC+) line after April. The split on the bottom two lines illustrates Chapman’s numbers before and after spraining his right middle finger in a weight room mishap; he initially missed three games after suffering the injury, then went just 5-for-32 with a 40% strikeout rate in nine games before landing on the injured list. He missed 15 games and continued to be unproductive in the 15 games he played between his return and the end of the regular season, though he barreled the ball at a 16.2% clip, with a 51.4% hard-hit rate in that final stretch.
Chapman’s strikeout rate crept up one point from 2022, to 28.4%, but when he made contact, he absolutely pasted the ball. He produced average exit velocities of 92.5 mph or higher and hard-hit rates of at least 51.4% or higher in every month except August (90.0 mph and 42.6%, respectively), while his barrel rates were 10.5% or higher in every month except May (9.2%). His full-season 93.4 mph average exit velocity and 17.1% barrel rate both placed in the 98th percentile, while his 56.4% hard-hit rate trailed only that of Aaron Judge among all hitters. He was unlucky in the power department, in that he fell 3.7 home runs short of his expected total based upon the batted ball specs of his biggest flies, a gap that ranked eighth in the majors. He fell 33 points short of his .457 expected slugging percentage.
Chapman did play very good defense, with 12 DRS, 4.5 UZR, and 3 RAA. Those numbers all represented improvements on his 2022 metrics, even in about 130 fewer innings. That performance didn’t escape recognition, as he took home his fourth Gold Glove.
In all, it was a good-not-great season, one with an arc that didn’t particularly help Chapman’s cause. It was reported back in May that he and the team were both interested in an extension, though it’s not clear when the Blue Jays offered him the $120 million deal. Chapman turned down Toronto’s $20.325 million qualifying offer as well, but in mid-November, the team was still reportedly “making a big push” to keep him.
Yet the Blue Jays, who at one point thought they had landed Shohei Ohtani, and who were viewed as being the favorites to sign Bellinger, instead chose to make a series of smaller moves: They re-signed Kevin Kiermaier to a one-year deal in late December, signed Isiah Kiner-Falefa to a two-year deal soon afterward, and added Justin Turner on a one-year deal in late January. With Kiner-Falefa, Turner, Santiago Espinal, and Cavan Biggio all in the fold, the Blue Jays figured they had third base covered, even if that quartet doesn’t make up for the production that Chapman would have provided. Our Depth Charts projects the Blue Jays to finish with 2.1 WAR at third base; Chapman is projected for 3.3 WAR by Depth Charts. In addition to the roster crunch, Chapman’s salary, even at a discount, was more than what the team was comfortable paying after pivoting to those other players. The Blue Jays’ luxury tax payroll is estimated to be just under $12 million above the first Competitive Balance Tax threshold ($237 million), and they will be paying the tax for a second straight season.
With half a dozen teams — the Angels, Braves, Cardinals, Guardians, Padres, Red Sox — already committing at least $20 million to their third basemen on deals that extend through at least 2026, plus the Dodgers and Yankees prioritizing spending elsewhere and the Mets looking to cut expenses, Chapman only had a limited number of options for landing spots. The Mariners, Cubs, and Giants were the only teams other than the Blue Jays that were publicly connected to him.
This is the latest move for the Giants in a winter that also included a six-year, $113 million deal for center fielder Jung Hoo Lee , four years and $44 million for righty Jordan Hicks, three years and $42 million for DH/outfielder Jorge Soler, and two years and $8.25 million for catcher Tom Murphy. The signing of Chapman bumps J.D. Davis — his college teammate at Cal State Fullerton, incidentally — out of the lineup and provides San Francisco a solid upgrade, particularly in the field, where he’ll be playing behind a staff with three projected starters (Logan Webb, Alex Cobb, and Hicks) who last year had groundball rates above 57%.
Davis hit .248/.325/.413 (104 wRC+) while playing 116 games at third base (105 of them starts), 15 at first base, and 14 at DH. Long saddled with a reputation as a below-average defender, he put in considerable work to improve, and in a career-high 915.2 innings at the hot corner produced a mixed bag of metrics (-11 DRS , 0.8 UZR, 4 RAA). With lefty-hitting LaMonte Wade and righty Wilmer Flores the most likely combination at first base and Soler taking the bulk of the playing time at DH, Davis doesn’t have a clear path to playing time and could be a trade candidate. President of baseball operations Farhan Zaidi acknowledged the team’s surplus of infielders, telling reporters, “We’ll explore different things. It’s certainly possible that a move or two happens before the end of camp.’’
Perhaps more notably, Zaidi refused to rule out another free agent addition and indicated that the team could go over the $237 million CBT threshold. (RosterResource places their payroll at $230.5 million for tax purposes.) With the team already waiting for Cobb and Robbie Ray to return from surgeries at some point during the season, and having just lost Tristan Beck to aneurysm surgery, sources told the San Francisco Chronicle that the Giants remain in the mix for Blake Snell, another Boras client.
As for Chapman, here’s his ZiPS percentile breakdown:
ZiPS Projection Percentiles – Matt Chapman
Percentile
2B
HR
BA
OBP
SLG
OPS+
WAR
95%
39
34
.295
.379
.553
151
6.4
90%
36
31
.280
.367
.532
143
6.0
80%
33
28
.269
.356
.493
132
5.2
70%
31
26
.258
.345
.474
123
4.6
60%
29
24
.249
.339
.455
117
4.2
50%
27
22
.241
.333
.438
112
3.8
40%
26
21
.235
.325
.422
105
3.3
30%
24
19
.226
.318
.405
99
2.9
20%
22
18
.216
.307
.387
93
2.5
10%
19
15
.203
.289
.361
81
1.6
5%
17
13
.188
.279
.335
72
1.0
It’s not hard to envision Chapman putting in a strong enough season to opt out, but it is worth remembering that Oracle Park particularly tends to suppress right-handedpower, which is Chapman’s calling card on offense. All of which is to say that next winter, he could suffer from a similar perception problem if his counting stats don’t rebound, and so to these eyes, he’s carrying a greater share of the risk than he otherwise might have. However much this gets spun as a win-win deal like that of Bellinger, this looks like a case where Boras and his client came up short.