Reese Olson has a chance to be a top-of-the-rotation starter in Detroit, and it is notable that the Tigers acquired him via trade. On July 30, 2021, then-general manager Al Avila dealt Daniel Norris to the Milwaukee Brewers in exchange for the now-24-year-old right-hander, who at the time had a 4.30 ERA in High-A and was flying below most prospect radar. Talented but raw, he ranked seventh in a system that wasn’t particularly well-regarded.

Olson made his MLB debut this past June, and by season’s end he was showing signs that he could emerge as a No. 1 or a No. 2.on a promising young staff. Over his last six starts, the plain-spoken Gainesville, Georgia native allowed just 18 hits and six earned runs in 35-and-two-thirds innings. On the year, he had a 3.99 ERA and a 4.01 FIP to go with a 24.4% strikeout rate and a .214 BAA. He fanned 102 batters in 103-and-two-thirds innings.

Scott Harris doesn’t believe in labels like No. 1 starter or No. 2 starter. He does believe in the fast-rising righty.

“Reese has three distinct secondary pitches that miss bats,” Detroit’s President of Baseball Operations told me at this week’s GM meetings. “That’s really hard to find. He also has two different fastballs that reach the upper 90s. I also think he did some things this summer that reminded me of what other really good pitchers do in their first year in the big leagues. I’m not going to throw those expectations on him, but his ceiling is as high as anyone’s.” Read the rest of this entry »

Caleb Ferguson is far from the biggest name on a Los Angeles Dodgers team that won 100 games during the regular season. Much for that reason, people who don’t closely follow the perennial NL West powerhouse probably don’t know how effective he’s been. To little fanfare, the 27-year-old southpaw made 68 appearances and went 7-4 with three saves while posting a 3.43 ERA and a 3.34 FIP over 60-and-a-third innings. Moreover, his numbers were even better if you discount the seven times he served as an opener. As a reliever, Ferguson won seven of nine decisions with a 3.02 ERA and a 3.07 FIP. His K-rate out of the pen was a tasty 27.5%.

Home cooking has been to his liking. Pitching at Chavez Ravine — Dodger Stadium if you will — the Columbus, Ohio native logged a sparkling 1.10 ERA while holding opposing hitters to a paltry .190/.258/.267 slash line.

Those things said, Ferguson is a square peg in a round hole when it comes to one of the organization’s well-known strengths. Analytics aren’t his thing.

“I guess it has the characteristics of a high-spin fastball,” Ferguson replied when I asked about the movement profile of his mid-90s four-seamer, a pitch he relied on 66.5% of the time this year. “But I don’t really look at the metrics, to be honest. I just come in and try to make good pitches. More than anything, I try to throw the ball in the safest spot to each guy. When I look at scouting reports, it’s basically just the safe zones and the danger zones.”

Ferguson likewise claimed not to know the metrics on his 33.5 percent-usage slider (Baseball Savant classifies the pitch as a cutter). Nor is he interested in knowing. Read the rest of this entry »

Back in August, my colleague Ben Clemens crafted an article titled Wait, Zack Littell is a Starter Now?! It was an apt headline. Not only had the 27-year-old right-hander been DFA’d by the Red Sox a few months earlier — Boston having been his third organization in as many years, and his sixth overall — he’d logged a 4.08 ERA over 145 big-league appearances, all but four out of the bullpen, with just three saves. As Clemens pointed out, Littell “wasn’t even a dominant reliever.”

Of course, this was the Tampa Bay Rays who’d moved him into their rotation. Much for that reason, Clemens qualified his skepticism by saying, “What else can we do but wait and see the results?”

The results have remained largely positive. Littell has a not-so-great 6.75 ERA in 14 appearances out of the bullpen this year, but in the same number of outings as a starter his ERA is 3.41. Moreover, he’s consistently gone five-plus innings. As Rays beat writer Marc Topkin told me for an article that ran here at FanGraphs on Friday. the under-the-radar righty “has basically saved the starting rotation.”

How did the opportunity come about? Read the rest of this entry »

There are certain stats that seem likely to always move in tandem. A high walk rate will, almost by definition, result in a high on-base percentage. A low whiff rate seems to naturally beget a high contact rate. But sometimes things don’t line up in the way intuition would dictate.

The other day I was perusing the minor league pitching leaderboards and when I sorted them by swinging strike rate, a crop of standouts topped the list, posting rates higher than 16% (the minor league average is around 12% for pitchers with at least 100 innings pitched). Curious, I re-ordered the list to see how these pitchers stacked up in terms of strikeout rate – a stat my brain assumed would result in a similar list of names, if slightly reordered. To my surprise, however, many of the top-ranked swinging-strike inducers skidded down the list when it was re-sorted by strikeout rate:

This caught me off guard, so I pulled up the major league leaderboards and repeated the same steps, first sorting by swinging strike rate, then by strikeout rate. At the major league level, no pitcher even falls out of the top 30, let alone tumbling as tremendously as some of the top bat-missers of the minor leagues:

It seems like the recipe that whips up minor league pitching success isn’t the same as the one that results in being a bat-missing major leaguer.

So, what gives?

Let’s start with the obvious. Perhaps the clearest difference between pitching in the minors and pitching in the majors is the caliber of the opponents. Specifically, it’s much more difficult to induce a swinging strike on a junky pitch when facing an advanced hitter than it is against a less-experienced minor leaguer. Thus, it stands to reason that in-zone swinging strike rate is a more reliable indicator of the sustainability of minor league results, as it diminishes the impact of a batter being duped. Testing this theory against the major league pitching leaderboard supports this idea, as the list of high-achievers stays relatively constant when sorted by in-zone contact rates.

That logic still holds true when we look to the minor league leaderboards. Indeed, of the 10 pitchers leading the minors in swinging strikes, only two (Drew Thorpe and Yoniel Curet) have in-zone swinging strike rates that are better than their overall mark in that column. And wouldn’t you know it, those are the only two pitchers who stay in the top 10 when the list is instead sorted by strikeout rate. The other three minor leaguers with overall swinging strike rates above 16% (Chih-Jung Liu, Cristian Mena, and Nick Nastrini) all have in-zone swinging strike rates that are lower than their overall swinging strike rates, and each of these pitchers falls by a few dozen spots when the list is re-ordered by K-rate. This illustrates the importance of missing bats in the zone, particularly when it comes to alchemizing whiffs into punchouts.

It also stands to reason that promotion to a higher minor league level would result in a dip in these types of pitching statistics. Assuming, as we do, that it’s easier to fool a Double-A hitter into offering at an unhittable breaking ball out of the zone than it is a Triple-A hitter, then promotion from one level to the next would presumably expose a pitcher’s reliance on chase swings as opposed to those precious in-zone whiffs. Lucky for us, two of the aforementioned pitchers – Nastrini and Mena – are not only in the same org and have virtually identical Double-A stats, but they also received simultaneous Triple-A promotions at the end of August. So, let’s take a look at how they compare and assess what their results might indicate about the sustainability of their minor league success.

Looking at how Nastrini and Mena performed on paper at Double-A makes them seem like virtually the same player. They’re both in the White Sox system, with similar stats in terms of swinging strikes, walks and strikeouts. They also feature the same arsenal – four-seamer, slider, curveball, changeup – and made their Triple-A debuts within a couple days of one another. But within those similarities, there are key distinctions between them that might alter our expectations of them.

Let’s start with how they ended up with the White Sox. Mena was signed for $250,000 out of the Dominican Republic in 2019, and while the start of his pro career was delayed by the pandemic, he was still just 18 when he took the mound for the first time in 2021. Having been largely untested before then, he quickly ascended through the org as part of Project Birmingham and is now the youngest pitcher to reach Triple-A this year. Conversely, Nastrini, who is several years older, was acquired mid-season as part of the Joe Kelly trade with the Dodgers and boasts a more robust track record than Mena, having been a fourth-round pick in 2021 out of UCLA.

In terms of statistics, their walk rates were identical at Double-A, each posting an unsavory 11.3% mark in that column. Their strikeout rates were similar to one another as well, each hovering above 25%, and their swinging strike rates differed by just .1%, with Nastrini’s coming in at 16.5%, and Mena’s at 16.6%. But before we chalk up those similarities to these guys being the same pitcher in different fonts, let’s investigate how they’re producing these numbers and see what we might expect from each going forward.

While Nastrini and Mena feature the same pitch mix, they use their arsenals in very different ways. Mena has long boasted an impeccable ability to spin his curveball, to the point that he’s been tasked with building his arsenal around that pitch. Since turning pro, he’s worked on adding a slider to his mix, and while it’s developed a slightly more distinct shape this season (tighter, with more horizontal action), it still blurs with his curveball, with both pitches acting in similar ways to miss bats on offerings out of the strike zone.

While Nastrini’s breaking balls don’t cause jaws to drop the way Mena’s curveball has throughout his career, their shapes are much more distinct from one another, and there’s roughly 7 mph of velocity separation between them.

Both pitchers throw a changeup between 13-14% of the time, and both favor the cambio against lefties. Nastrini’s changeup has a sharp shape to it, with its velocity and arm-side movement geared at mirroring the movement of his slider, allowing the changeup to work against lefties the way that his slider works against righties.

Mena’s changeup is also most effective when he’s able to play it off of the shape of his slider, in the hopes of getting lefties to flail at it off the plate. Unfortunately, his changeup is much faster than the slider, flirting with 90 mph, and its shape doesn’t feature much horizontal action.

Meanwhile, Mena’s fastball has lost some of its ride, as well as a tick or two of velocity, so it tends to hover in the 91-92 mph band, and without the bat-missing ride, its shape and velocity are too similar to those of the changeup for either pitch to be a reliable in-zone bat-misser.

As a result, Mena’s lukewarm heater has been frighteningly hittable this season, contributing to a very high home run rate for the young hurler. Nastrini’s four-seamer, on the other hand, has been much more successful, with a flatter, more deceptive shape. It’s thrown from a release point that’s more difficult to pick up due to Nastrini’s setup towards the third base side of the rubber. His fastball has maintained a higher average velocity, eliciting significantly more swinging strikes and a more anemic resulting slash line than that induced by Mena’s heater. This in turn has resulted in more whiffs throughout the strike zone, particularly at the top of it, and confirms that Nastrini’s overall swinging strike rate doesn’t rely as heavily on chase as Mena’s does.

That said, Nastrini’s command is worse than Mena’s, as he offers up a greater number of non-competitive wild pitches compared to Mena’s strategic out-of-zone offerings. Their matching walk rates at Double-A were arrived at very differently, with Mena’s coming as a side effect of intentional out-of-zone offerings, whereas Nastrini’s were more indicative of legitimate mistakes. This has held true at the higher level, with both pitchers now a few starts into their time with Triple-A Charlotte. In fact, many of the assumptions that could be drawn from their time at Double-A have come to fruition since their promotion.

In Mena’s first start, only three of his 88 pitches resulted in a swinging strike, due largely to Triple-A batters’ collective ability to lay off his breaking balls. His second and third starts were better in this regard, but he still struggled to induce chase on the outer half against righties, which was a key ingredient in the elixir that allowed his stuff to play up at lower levels. The patience of his opponents has resulted in a relative downtick in strikeouts, along with an uptick in walk rate. He has also given up an inordinate number of hits, due in large part to the hittablity of his heater. Nastrini, on the other hand, has kept opposing bats off his offerings but has struggled to maintain command. His second start with Triple-A Charlotte featured four wild pitches, including one with the bases loaded, which nearly allowed two runs to score when the ball bounced several feet in front of the plate and caromed off the catcher’s gear into the visitors dugout.

It’ll take more than a few starts apiece to get a sense for how Mena and Nastrini adapt to the higher level, but their outings have been in keeping with our expectations so far. Mena is young and athletic enough to hope that he’ll be able to tack additional velocity onto his fastball, while also working to refine the look of his entire arsenal to induce more in-zone whiffs. Expectations-wise, this likely means Mena’s on his way to a big league role at the back of a rotation, with multi-inning relief as a fallback option. Nastrini is more fully developed in terms of the look of his stuff, so his more urgent task will be to refine his command, such that his entire repertoire can play to its potential. As such, his ceiling is higher, and a spot near the front of a rotation is attainable if the command piece falls into place. Otherwise, he has the look of an impactful late-inning reliever.

All in all, if either Mena or Nastrini hope to remain atop the swinging strike leaderboard at Triple-A and beyond, there are key improvements to be made and flaws to be addressed, and despite their seeming similarities, their respective flaws (and necessary improvements) are distinct from one another. While it seems neither is likely to emerge as the next Spencer Strider, they both have a good shot at firming up an important big league role within the next season or two.

The White Sox are going to miss the playoffs in the AL Central, which is the baseball equivalent of failing driver’s ed. It’s disappointing but not particularly surprising; since winning the World Series in 2005, the Sox have made the postseason just three times and won a grand total of three games across all of those trips.

Shockingly, the White Sox have enjoyed remarkable front office continuity over that time. For most of the 21st century, the duo of Kenny Williams and Rick Hahn, in some combination of titles, was running the show. I say “was” because, as you well know, Williams and Hahn were fired on Tuesday.

There’s no structural reason the White Sox can’t be successful. They have history and branding half the league would kill for. They play in the third-largest media market in the U.S., and though they share it with a richer and more popular neighbor, if Houston and Philadelphia and Toronto can spend enough to put out a winning team, so can the White Sox. Most important, they play in the easiest division in baseball, where the last-place club in the AL East would have a decent shot at winning the division.

They’re also lucky enough to have an owner, Jerry Reinsdorf, who cares whether the team wins. Not every team can say the same. Unfortunately, Reinsdorf seems to care how the White Sox win. Read the rest of this entry »

While some of the biggest names available did not find new homes on Tuesday, a whole lot of relievers are wearing new duds. So let’s get down to business.

The New York Yankees acquired pitcher Keynan Middleton for pitcher Juan Carela

With all the relief trades made by the White Sox, Middleton must have felt a bit like the last kid taken in gym class this weekend. This has been the year he’s put it all together, thanks to a much-improved changeup that has become his money pitch, resulting in hitters no longer simply waiting around to crush his fairly ordinary fastball. He’s a free agent after the season and certainly not meriting a qualifying offer, so the Sox were right to get what they could.

I’m mostly confused about this from the Yankees’ standpoint. He does upgrade the bullpen, which ranks below average in our depth charts for the first time I can recall. But unless they really like him and hope to lock him up to a contract before he hits free agency, I’m not sure what the Bombers get out of tinkering with their bullpen a little when the far more pressing problems in the lineup and rotation went unaddressed. As for Carela, he’s been solid in High-A ball this year, but he really ought to be as a repeater. Just how much of a lottery ticket he is won’t be better known until we see if he can continue his improvement against a better quality of hitter. Read the rest of this entry »

This past offseason, the Marlins prioritized contact in free agency and trades, acquiring Yuli Gurriel, Jean Segura, and Luis Arraez to fill out an infield that already had Joey Wendle. I think we can all agree that results on those moves has been mixed. Nevertheless, the Marlins currently sit at 57–50 and are eyebrows-deep in the playoff race. The bubble season notwithstanding, Miami hasn’t made the playoffs since 2023; bucking that trend would mean the world for the Marlins.

In pursuit of that goal, Miami shifted its focus and acquired Jake Burger from the White Sox. Picture Segura or Gurriel in their prime, or Arraez now. Burger is the opposite of that: a hitter with unbelievable power who strikes out more in a week than Arraez does in a month. In exchange, Miami sent left-handed pitching prospect Jake Eder to Chicago. This exchange of Jakes will probably go under the radar given the big names who were moved, or at least discussed, this deadline, but it’s a fascinating trade all the same. Read the rest of this entry »

The White Sox sent closer Kendall Graveman to the Astros for catching prospect Korey Lee on Friday afternoon. Graveman, signed by the White Sox to a three-year contract days before the 2021–22 lockout started, put up a 3.30 ERA and a 4.00 FIP in 110 appearances with Chicago. This caps off a busy end-of-week flurry for the Sox: Graveman is now the fifth pitcher they’ve traded in 24 hours, after Lucas Giolito, Reynaldo López, Lance Lynn, and Joe Kelly.

Graveman’s peripheral numbers have slid this season as his strikeout and walk rates have continued to deteriorate, and the six homers he’s allowed this season almost match the eight he surrendered in 2021 and ’22 combined, but I’m slightly less concerned about this than I would be in many similar situations. For one, his plate discipline-against numbers don’t support his problems in these departments. Batters are making contact against Graveman less often than any time in his career (ignoring his five-appearance debut season), and his first-strike percentage, a useful leading indicator of walk rate, is better than ever.

Some of the changes seem to be from conscious approach decisions. Graveman started throwing his four-seamer a lot more often in 2022 and has continued that this year but is now almost exclusively throwing it center-high. The result has been a lot more loft on these pitches. In fact, basically all of Graveman’s pitches, including his sinker, have been hit about 10 degrees higher than last year. It’s been enough to transform him from a reasonably strong groundballer in recent years to a pitcher allowing more fly balls than average. On the negative side, his slider has lost some bite, with its break closer to league-average than at his peak, leading to a lower whiff rate (35%) than in 2022 (43%) or ’21 (44%). ZiPS sees him with a 3.59 FIP for the rest of 2023 in Houston and a 3.72 mark in 2024. Read the rest of this entry »

A week ago, the city of Chicago looked like it had a new boom industry: deadline rentals. The Cubs and White Sox have a ton of players set to depart after 2023, and neither looked like a playoff hopeful. The Cubs have played well enough lately to get out of that realm and into the buyers column, but that’s okay, because the White Sox have leaned into their role as sellers to compensate. After moving Lucas Giolito and Reynaldo López earlier in the week, they’re continuing to dismantle their pitching staff. On Friday, they sent Lance Lynn and Joe Kelly to the Dodgers in exchange for two pitching prospects and outfielder Trayce Thompson.

I won’t try to sugarcoat it: Lynn has been awful this year. His 6.47 ERA is the worst in baseball for qualifying starters, and while there’s some encouragement to be found under the hood, it’s still not a lot of encouragement. Also, that linked article was about how he couldn’t possibly keep giving up homers at such an extreme rate, and then he gave up six in his next three starts. Whoops.

Yes, that ERA is gruesome. Yes, Lynn has looked lost on the mound, lobbing pipe shots down the middle and walking more batters than normal anyway. But his body of work before this year suggests his season can be salvaged. The Dodgers know a thing or two about getting the most out of pitchers, and Lynn is missing bats at a career-best rate even while he gets shelled. Our projection systems think he’ll pitch to a roughly 4.25 ERA the rest of the season, but going to Dodger Stadium might even shade that lower. (A countervailing concern is that Lynn hasn’t looked comfortable with the pitch clock, and there’s no accounting for that in our models.) Read the rest of this entry »

On Wednesday, the Angels made the most consequential decision they’ll make all year: they decided to pull Shohei Ohtani off the trade market and attempt to make the playoffs. They followed that decision up almost immediately with a complementary one, acquiring Lucas Giolito and Reynaldo López from the White Sox in exchange for prospects Edgar Quero and Ky Bush, kicking the trade deadline off in earnest by landing one of the best starters on the market, plus an interesting relief flier.

If you came here for a tallying up of the relative merits of the four players involved in this deal, you’ll definitely get it, but I’ll be frank: I don’t think that’s the most interesting thing to discuss about this trade. If that’s what you’re after, search for the phrase “get down in the mud and count beans.” You can read the second half of this article and come back up here later. First, though, I want to talk about the bigger picture here for both the Angels and the Sox. For my purposes here, we’ll just ballpark it: Giolito is a solid third starter. López is a high-risk, high-reward setup man. Quero is a 50 FV catcher, a middle-of-the-top-100 prospect. Bush is a future back-of-rotation starter. There’ll be more than that later, but that’s a good starting place.

Deciding whether or not to trade Ohtani is a responsibility I wouldn’t wish on anyone. It goes beyond counting up value and cost, weighing playoff odds against organizational soundness. It’s not about wins and losses, even. Voluntarily sending the best player in baseball out of your city is a legacy question, a fan interest question, the kind of thing disgruntled fans might cite for why they fell out of love with the team. On the flip side, turning a rental into multiple top prospects might be the kind of move that builds a competitive core around the tail end of Mike Trout’s prime. This isn’t your average buy/sell decision; when they write Perry Minasian’s baseball biography, what he did with Ohtani will likely be in the first paragraph. Read the rest of this entry »