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We’ve talked a couple of times over the last few months about the current stalemate between the former California Angels and the city of Anaheim. Even after a recent short-term lease extension, the Angels have to vacate Angels Stadium at the end of the 2020 season. Given the Angels’ desire for a new, publicly-funded stadium – one which Anaheim has no desire for, given the current fractured relationship between the parties – the team has been casting about somewhat publicly for a new home. An obvious local alternative site has yet to materialize, however, leading to speculation that the team may consider Las Vegas or the new ballpark being built in Portland as a potential new home.

Recent developments, however, have taken this saga in an unexpected direction. Earlier this week, the City of Long Beach confirmed that it had reached out to the Angels to discuss the possibility of the team moving to a planned waterfront ballpark. The site in question is the former home of the Ringling Brothers circus, and is known as the “elephant lot.”

Now, the Long Beach municipal government, for its part, downplayed the extent of the talks.

“As part of our efforts to create a downtown waterfront development plan, we are exploring the feasibility of a downtown sports venue on the Convention Center parking lot,” Long Beach Mayor Robert Garcia said in a statement.

‘We are in the early stages of our due diligence and are exploring a variety of options for this property. We have approached the Angels to express our interest and discuss the possibilities of this opportunity. This is very preliminary and discussions are ongoing.”

That said, there’s reason to believe that a move to Long Beach could be a plausible outcome for the Angels, and an attractive one for the City. First, Long Beach has been discussing the possibility of offering the Angels not only a publicly funded stadium but a publicly funded headquarters as well, and reportedly has been looking for a building to purchase for that purpose. Second, the team does have history with Long Beach, and nearly ended up there instead of Anaheim.

The Angels negotiated with Long Beach in the 1960s, but the talks ended when then-owner Gene Autry rejected Long Beach City Manager John Mansell’s demand that the team be called the Long Beach Angels.

But most interestingly, Long Beach is already going to be developing the elephant lot for the 2028 Olympics, which are slated to be held in Los Angeles.

Essentially, the Long Beach waterfront will become a waterfront sports park, hosting a variety of sports and events including BMX, water polo, sailing, marathon swimming, triathlon events, and the good ol’ nail-biter that is handball. Like the Valley Sports Park being proposed at the Sepulveda Basin Recreational Park, much of Long Beach will have temporary structures that are decorated with purple-pink-yellow spectrum of the Olympic bid’s branding.

The problem for Long Beach is that the odds of an economic boon from hosting the Olympics are low, because the costs of hosting the Games are staggeringly high. The Council on Foreign Relations, for example, reported last year that cities have actually begun withdrawing bids because of the cost of building the necessary infrastructure.

Altogether, these infrastructure costs range from $5 billion to over $50 billion. Many countries justify such expenditures in the hopes that the spending will outlive the Olympic Games. For instance, some 85 percent [PDF] of the Sochi 2014 Games’ more than $50 billion budget went to building non-sports infrastructure from scratch. More than half of the Beijing 2008 budget of $45 billion went to rail, roads, and airports, while nearly a fourth went to environmental clean-up efforts.

And those infrastructure costs are often not recouped, as structures built for the Olympics can sit unused and vacant for years on end.

Also problematic are so-called white elephants, or expensive facilities that, because of their size or specialized nature, have limited post-Olympics use. These often impose costs for years to come. Sydney’s Olympic stadium costs the city $30 million a year to maintain. Beijing’s famous “Bird’s Nest” stadium cost $460 million to build and requires $10 million a year to maintain, and sits mostly unused. Almost all of the facilities built for the 2004 Athens Olympics, whose costs contributed to the Greek debt crisis, are now derelict. Gangwon, the South Korean regional government responsible for most of the 2018 Games’ infrastructure, is expected to incur an $8.5 million annual deficit due to upkeep of unused facilities.

A comprehensive study of the 2010 Salt Lake City Games found that these costs weren’t defrayed by economic growth. In fact, the study’s authors found that “the Games had a modest short-run impact on employment and no significant
impact on total employment in the long run.” More recently, an analysis of the Sochi Games predicted that “the accounting loss will probably be one of the highest on record, as average official ticket prices are generally lower than at comparable recent events while costs may be the highest in the history of the Games (estimates have been revised multiple times since 2007, to reach around US$ 50 billion but are yet to be confirmed).” And current analysis has found that the Olympics have no long-term positive impact on economic growth.

The end result is what are called “Olympic Ruins” – abandoned structures that require millions of dollars in upkeep, yet have no real purpose. The “Bird’s Nest” stadium in Beijing is among the most famous examples of this, but it’s hardly alone.

So if you’re Long Beach, about to spend a significant amount of money constructing venues and infrastructure for the Olympic Games, it makes a lot of sense to think about what would happen to those venues after the pomp and circumstance ends. In that vein, inviting the Angels to Long Beach makes a lot of sense. A modern multi-sport venue could potentially both host the Angels and the 2028 Games, and ensure that the venue doesn’t sit vacant for months or years after the closing ceremonies. That doesn’t make publicly funding the Angels’ new ballpark a good idea – the data consistently says it isn’t – but if Long Beach really is committed to hosting the 2028 Games, having the Angels occupy the Olympic arena before and after the Games may make a certain amount of economic sense, if for no other reason than to mitigate very real economic damage by keeping some part of those facilities in use after the Olympics leave town.

And if you’re the Angels, this is – for the most part – a dream come true: a publicly funded, modern stadium, close to Los Angeles and in a large market, complete with corporate headquarters. The question is whether the Angels are willing to share the park in 2028.

None of this means a deal is done, or is even likely to get done. But a marriage between the Angels and Long Beach arguably makes more sense than continuing the existing pact between Anaheim and the team, which may be fractured beyond repair after years of animosity. If nothing else, it will be fascinating to see how this unfolds.

Major league baseball is at its best when the game’s most talented players are able to showcase their skills at the sport’s highest level. Anything that serves to limit these displays is to baseball’s detriment. Of course, sometimes, fate intervenes. The game’s best players are susceptible to injury, and though major league organizations and the players themselves take great care to try to stay on the field, seasons are lost to tweaked knees and torn elbow ligaments. Some obstacles are impossible to avoid fully. But other absences are the result of careful, intentional planning. Take the example of service time manipulation.

Vladimir Guerrero, Jr. is generally considered to be the best prospect in baseball. He probably earned a callup last season when he was destroying minor league pitching. Right now, Steamer projects the younger Guerrero to put up 4.6 WAR in 545 plate appearances. That’s the 13th-best projection among position players, right behind Nolan Arenado and just ahead of Jose Altuve. He’s not a player who needs to spend more time in the minors, and yet yesterday, Blue Jays General Manager Ross Atkins said that, “I just don’t see him as a major league player. He’s 19.” To start with, Guerrero is older than Juan Soto was when the latter debuted last year, and will turn 20 before Opening Day. Atkins assertion that Guerrero isn’t ready is belied by his minor league performance and industry consensus, and it is hard to interpret the GM’s comments as anything other than an attempt to provide some public, baseball-related justification for keeping Guerrero in the minors so that he can stay under team control through 2025 instead of hitting free agency after the 2024 campaign. That’s service time manipulation.

The practice isn’t unique to Toronto. Kris Bryant was famously held down at the beginning of 2015; he won’t be a free agent until after the 2021 season instead of in 2020. Last season, Ronald Acuña didn’t start the season with the Braves. The White Sox’s Eloy Jimenez is likely to spend time cooling his heels in Charlotte despite being much better than the players ahead of him on the depth chart. Vladimir Guerrero, Jr. is ready now, and the Blue Jays will be worse for every game that Guerrero spends in Buffalo, but that is exactly where he figures to begin this season.

The incentives for teams are obvious, but they are deliberately choosing not to field their best roster, depriving the sport of its best possible product, and delaying deserving players from fulfilling life-long dreams and obtaining market contracts. The easiest solution would be for teams to simply call up players when they are capable of meaningfully contributing, but given that teams could easily do that right now and don’t, another solution is likely necessary. Others have offered solutions to this issue in the past. In 2015 in response to the Cubs’ treatment of Bryant, FanGraphs alum Mike Petriello proposed changing the a full year of service to time to 100 days on the major league roster. Erstwhile Baseball Prospectus scribe Russell Carleton proposed an age-based free agency model as a means of curtailing the practice. Sheryl Ring proposed that a player accrue a year of service if he spends the majority of the league year on the major league roster. And while a solution might not even be possible until the players and owners negotiate a new Collective Bargaining Agreement in 2021, I’d like to put forth my own proposal to eliminate service time manipulation. The problem is fairly straightforward, but as most potential solutions have unintended consequences, this one is a multi-parter.

First, a player’s first year of service time will be reached with 90 days of MLB service. This is a fairly direct solution, but unfortunately, it could also incentivize teams to keep players down even longer than they do now. While it might make clubs’ decisions more difficult if they are potential contenders, organizations might still opt to keep players in the minors, and non-contending teams might be more likely to do so than those with playoff aspirations; in a year where the Blue Jays are only projected for 77 wins, they might decide that Vlad Jr.’s defense at third needs yet more time, bad PR and a potential grievance be damned.

As a result, it will be necessary to give players half-service time for their days on the 40-man roster. If a player spends the entire season on the 40-man roster in the minors, he will reach 90 days of service time at the end of the season. To prevent shenanigans for those with MLB experience, players can earn one year of MLB service time in the minors at any point in their careers, but can only accrue one year this way. This will get some players closer to free agency without actually playing in the big leagues, and incentivizes putting a team’s best players on the active roster. After all, if a player’s free agency clock is going to start anyway, why not have him lend his talents to the big league club if he’s ready? Unfortunately, teams don’t put players on the 40-man roster until they have to, and many top prospects won’t be on the 40-man roster as a result.

To combat the phenomena described in the previous paragraph, it will be necessary to put more teeth behind the Rule 5 draft by making players draft-eligible a year earlier than they are under the current system. Players who signed their first pro contract at age 18 or younger would now be eligible after four years of minor league service instead of five, while those who did so at age 19 or older would be eligible after three years instead of the current four. This would make many more good prospects eligible for the Rule 5 draft and in order to protect them, teams would then put them on the 40-man roster.

Unfortunately, making so many more players eligible for the Rule 5 draft would create a massive roster crunch, and could result in teams being unable to get the prospects they develop to the majors. To prevent this situation, and to keep the Rule 5 draft roughly as it is, the 40-man roster would become a 50-man roster. Teams would then have no difficulty protecting eligible players, but would still be encouraged to promote their prospects as those prospects would end up with a year of service time. While teams would move more players to the majors earlier, those players accruing service time in the minors are a limited set of players: those who are close to the majors or have star potential after multiple years in the minors, hence creating the need to protect them from the Rule 5 draft. For players, it would also have the added benefit of welcoming hundreds more players into the union with better minor league wages as players who have been named to the 40-man, now 50-man, roster are paid at a higher rate thanks to union protections. As a benefit to teams, an additional option year could be added.

So to review:

• Players receive their first, and only first, year of service time after 90 days
• Players receive half-service time for days spent on 50-man roster, but not in the majors
• Rule 5 Eligibility moved up one year
• 40-man roster increased to 50 players
• Teams receive an extra option year

This proposal is admittedly complicated. The irony of this idea is that Kris Bryant, the poster-boy for service time manipulation, actually wouldn’t have been spared due to his rapid ascent to the majors, though the Cubs would have had to hold Bryant out until the All-Star Break in 2015 to get an extra year of his services. While this deal favors the interests of the players at the expense of teams and team owners, it is a much more reasonable proposal from ownerships’ perspective than cutting the service time necessary for free agency to less than six years. A union proposal that cuts free agency down to five years and deals with service time manipulation in some other way would mean less team control for those young, ready stars that this proposal is designed to protect, and might make it a non-starter come 2021. Negotiating this solution is likely to be difficult and part of a much larger deal. Teams are going to be highly resistant to any change that deprives them of cost controlled years of their best players. But the union focusing some of their attention on getting players like Vlad Jr. to the majors, as well as getting better benefits to the minor leaguers left behind, can only be to the game’s benefit. Many of baseball’s stars of tomorrow are ready today. Let’s watch them play, shall we?

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Ty Buttrey has come a long way since being selected by the Red Sox in the fourth round of the 2012 draft out of a Charlotte, North Carolina high school. Following six often-tumultuous seasons in the minors, the 25-year-old turned a developmental corner last year and made his MLB debut in August. He did so with the Los Angeles Angels, who acquired him in the trade deadline deal that sent Ian Kinsler to Boston.

His future is bright. As Eric Longenhagen and Kiley McDaniel wrote in yesterday’s Angels Top Prospect list, Buttrey will likely be a significant part of the team’s bullpen this season. He logged four saves in last year’s 16-game, 16.1-inning cameo, and could very well earn the closer’s job.

His biggest strides have been mental. The power arm has always been there — Buttrey’s fastball sits in the mid-90s, and he’s reached triple digits — but as he readily admits, his mindset wasn’t where it needed to be. Rather than staying true to what came naturally, the 6-foot-6 righty too often found himself trying to fix things that weren’t necessarily broken. In short, he became a tinkerer.

———

Buttrey on finding himself as a pitcher: “Starting out, I was listening to too many people, versus going out there and doing what makes me who I am, doing what got me drafted. There was a lot of noise that I wasn’t able to block out. I was trying to do so many things, just to make people happy. The next thing you know, I’d gotten really mechanical. I lost some ground on who I was as a pitcher.

“All coaches have things they preach, and some things work for players and others don’t. I’m not saying any of it was bad, or ill-intended, but if you listen to too many people, everything just kind of clouds over. You’re hearing, ‘Hey, stay taller on your back side,’ or ‘Let’s change this grip on this pitch,’ or it could be ‘Let’s get your front side at a different angle.’ Everyone is telling you something. Read the rest of this entry »

Ben Lindbergh and guest co-host Zach Kram of The Ringer banter about Clayton Kershaw’s bum arm, a rash of semi-suspiciously-timed signings, the Atlantic League as a testing ground for MLB rules changes, the latest Bryce Harper rumors, extensions for Nolan Arenado, Miles Mikolas, and Aaron Hicks, the Marwin Gonzalez signing and its implications for Willians Astudillo, and Matt Wieters joining the Cardinals, then preview the 2019 Tampa Bay Rays (36:44) with The Athletic’s Rays beat writer Josh Tolentino, and the 2019 San Diego Padres (1:03:53) with The Athletic’s Padres beat writer, Dennis Lin.

Audio intro: Aaron Lee Tasjan, "The Rest is Yet to Come"
Audio interstitial 1: Frank Sinatra, "South – To A Warmer Place"
Audio interstitial 2: Sloan, "Have Faith"
Audio outro: Wilco, "Please Be Patient With Me"

Link to Atlantic League report
Link to Zach’s Arenado post
Link to Wieters projection article
Link to Josh on the pitch clock
Link to Ben on the Padres
Link to Dennis on Stock
Link to Passan report
Link to preorder The MVP Machine

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The St. Louis Cardinals answered one of their long-term rotation questions Tuesday afternoon, signing starting pitcher Miles Mikolas to a four-year, $68-million extension that keeps last year’s 6th-place NL Cy Young finisher from hitting free agency until 2023.

Bringing in Mikolas was one of the league’s best free-agent signings last year, as St. Louis reeled him in from Japan on a two-year, $15.5-million contract. At the time, both my computer and I saw him as a slightly above-average innings-eater who would solidify the middle of the team’s rotation. This was an especially crucial need for the team with Alex Reyes needing Tommy John surgery, Adam Wainwright declining, Mike Leake traded to Seattle, and Lance Lynn a free agent.

The Lizard King was better than that, going 18-4 with a 2.83 ERA, a 3.28 FIP, and 4.3 WAR for the Cardinals in an All-Star campaign. Mikolas’s return to the United States resembled in many ways the career path of Colby Lewis, a struggling Rangers prospect rapidly declining into journeyman-player status found his way to Japan before coming back as a pitcher with much improved command of his pitches. Lewis had a nice little career after his return, with four two-WAR seasons in Texas before joining the front office last year.

Time was crucial for the Cardinals in signing Mikolas. Even though he only has two years worth of service time, he signed with the team as a bonafide free agent from overseas, and as such, had more leverage than most players with his service time might; his original deal would have made him a free agent after 2019. Read the rest of this entry »

Earlier this month, I made the case for the Rockies to sign Nolan Arenado to an extension that could rival Miguel Cabrera’s eight-year, $248 million deal for the largest average annual value of any position player contract. My suggestion wasn’t coming out of left field, as the going-on-28-year-old third baseman had just set a record for an arbitration-eligible player by agreeing to a $26 million salary for 2019, and had reportedly indicated a willingness to work out a long-term deal. That willingness has resulted in the completion of an eight-year contract reportedly worth $260 million, the fourth-largest guaranteed salary in MLB history.

The exact breakdown of Arenado’s contract has not been reported at this writing, but the deal replaces or incorporates the aforementioned $26 million salary for this year and runs through 2026, for a $32.5 million AAV, the highest of any player besides Zack Greinke ($34.17 million). The dollar value currently trails only those of Giancarlo Stanton (13 years, $325 million), Manny Machado (10 years, $300 million), and Alex Rodriguez (10 years, $275 million) in terms of overall value, though according to Craig Edwards’ inflation-adjusted conversions of MLB’s biggest deals into 2019 dollars, the amount would place just 19th. Taking account of Rockies history, that’s three spots behind the current $277 million valuation of Todd Helton‘s nine-year, $141.5 million extension, which covered 2003-11, and six spots ahead of the current $248 million valuation of Troy Tulowitzki’s 10-year, $157.75 million extension covering 2011-20. Arenado’s contract includes an opt-out after 2021, which would allow him to become a free agent after his age-30 season, and also gets him full no-trade protection now instead of waiting until the point in early 2023 when his 10-and-5 rights would kick in. Read the rest of this entry »

If you watch American football, you’re probably familiar with the concept of “icing the kicker.” For the uninitiated, icing the kicker is not actually the process of freezing the kicker in Carbonite, though that would probably be more fun. Instead, icing the kicker refers to the opposing team calling a time out just before the kicker is about to attempt a field goal or extra point, with the aim of disrupting the kicker’s timing or focus, and causing the kicker to miss said attempt. We saw it happen to the Chicago Bears’ Cody Parkey in the most recent NFC Wildcard game.

Why does this matter? Because a recent rule change has raised the question of whether such a tactic would work in baseball. The twenty-second pitch clock is currently being tested in spring training.

While this has been the rule in the minors for a while, it will be an adjustment for major league veterans who came up before 2015 and aren’t as familiar with it. And that’s led to the question of whether hitters should attempt the tactic of icing the pitcher. FanGraphs alum Travis Sawchik explained the reasoning thusly, while our own Dan Szymborski highlighted the loophole that makes it possible:

In other words, the new rule says that a pitcher has 20 seconds to begin his windup and come set from the time he receives the ball, provided it isn’t the first pitch of an at-bat. However, the rule doesn’t require the hitter to stay in the batter’s box during that time. So is Travis right? Could hitters “ice the pitcher” by waiting until five seconds before the pitch clock expires, thus forcing the pitcher to rush his delivery?

The answer is actually fairly complicated. The idea behind icing the pitcher is that it will make him deliver a worse pitch. It’s a mind game. But it might not be a mind game that works all that well. The evidence from other sports is mixed as to whether such a mind game would even be effective. Older research suggested a correlation between icing the kicker and missed field goals, but more recent research is all over the map. Some studies, for example, have found that icing the kicker can be effective, but only on longer distance kicks. Other studies of the effectiveness of iced kickers have found no statistically significant difference between the success rates of iced kickers and those who were allowed to proceed with their kicks without interruption. In fact, some of the research even found that the effectiveness of iced kickers was better than kickers who weren’t iced.

Now obviously, there’s a significant difference between kicking a football and throwing a baseball. So let’s look at the other sport where “icing” is a thing: basketball, where teams sometimes ice the opposing team’s free throw shooters. There, too, there’s no real evidence that icing a free throw shooter reduces the odds of making a free throw. The odds of a successful free throw are pretty much the same, whether or not the other team decides to ice the player. Interestingly, though, there is some evidence that icing can be effective when used against specific players. Pitchers are creatures of routine, and presumably could suffer from mind games just as their compatriots in other sports might. Further study would be required to verify if the practice had any baseball-specific effects. But the results from football and basketball suggest the practice’s efficacy might be limited.

So how likely are we to see icing the pitcher when the pitch clock makes its way to the majors? It’s unclear. We don’t see much – if any – pitcher icing in the minors, where the pitch clock has been in use for years. That might be the result of minors prioritizing player development over winning, but you’d think if it was at all effective, at least a few teams would have tried it.

And remember that a rule was implemented in 2015 that required hitters to keep one foot in the batter’s box between pitches, which could preempt this strategy. That is, it could preempt the strategy if the rule were enforced, which it really isn’t. As Eduardo Encina explained:

In 2015, MLB made a rule that hitters had to keep at least one foot in the batter’s box, but enforcement of the rule varied. Hitters received warnings for being slow and repeat violators were fined, but no penalty impacted the game itself.

But even if hitters followed this rule, a hitter could still ice the pitcher just by waiting to put his second foot in the batter’s box until five seconds were left on the pitch clock. Icing the pitcher as a strategy might be reduced, but it wouldn’t be eliminated.

So what could pitchers do instead? Under the proposed rule being tested in spring training, a pitcher has a few options. He could, first of all, come set and then step off the pitching rubber, thereby icing the hitter right back. Depending on how often this is used, the pitch clock could thereby actually lengthen games if we had a lot of the tit-for-tat icing contests, though I assume at some point we’d reach a homeostasis of sorts. The pitcher, if there’s a runner on base, could simply feint a throw there. Most relief pitchers, who are likely in the game in the highest-leverage spots, pitch from the stretch anyway, meaning it takes not much time at all to go from “staring in” to “coming set.” Even Dellin Betances, who is notoriously slow to the plate, doesn’t need five seconds to do that. And it’s worth noting that the pitcher might not even have to rush his delivery, even if he did have only five seconds left. The rule says that the pitcher merely has to begin his windup, not that he has to actually deliver the ball. In other words, it really doesn’t matter how fast you are to the plate. It just matters how quickly you can come to a set position, though pitchers will likely be loath to alter their mechanics in such a manner.

It’s also possible – though perhaps unlikely – that the catcher might be impacted by icing if a hitter waited fifteen seconds to get in the box. All of a sudden, the catcher has to call a pitch and get the pitcher to agree to it, in five seconds. The catcher can, of course, think about what to call when the hitter’s not in the box, but he can’t give the signs until the hitter settles in. Ordinarily, we’d probably see the catcher trot out to talk to the pitcher about it…but there’s that pesky mound visit rule. Of course, right now there’s no real way to quantify this, because it’s all theoretical, but it would be interesting to look at in a baseball-specific study of the phenomena.

All in all, icing pitchers seems unlikely to be a widely used strategy. Even if it became a Thing, it might be one of the more easily fixable Things in baseball history. One would imagine that if batters tried to press their advantage, opposing pitchers and managers would certainly have something to say about it. The desire to gain a small advantage might finally inspire greater adherence to the one-foot-in-the-batters-box. After all, all umpires would have to do to address the issue is start enforcing that rule, and icing would be essentially mitigated. In fact, it might make sense for umpires to start enforcing that rule now, along with the pitch clock. After all, the pitcher can’t delay a game all by himself.