I was hired as FanGraphs’ Lead Prospect Analyst just after the 2016 draft and took my first run at evaluating the entirety of the minor leagues on my own the following winter. Enough time has now passed that many of the players from that era of prospecting have had big league careers unfold (or not). Hindsight allows me to have a pretty definitive idea of whether my call on a player was right or wrong in a binary sense, and gauge any gap that may exist between my evaluation and what the player ultimately became. Looking back allows me to assess my approach to grading and ranking players so that I might begin to establish some baselines of self-assessment and see how I perform compared to my peers at other publications. Last offseason, I began compiling the various Top 100 prospect rankings from seven years ago for the purposes of such a self-assessment, an exercise that culminated in the “How’s My Driving?” piece that ran during Prospect Week 2024. This winter, I turned my attention to the 2018 Top 100, which I co-authored with Kiley McDaniel. Below are the results of that audit and my thoughts on them.

Before we get to a couple of big, fun tables and my notes, I want to quickly go over why I’ve taken the approach I have here and discuss its flaws. There are absolutely deeper avenues of retrospective analysis that can be done with prospect lists than what I have attempted below, approaches that could educate us about prospects themselves, and probably also about prospect writers. (Last year, in the first edition of this piece, I proposed a few such potential methods of evaluation and included my thoughts on their limitations. For the sake of brevity, I’ve cut that discussion from this year’s edition, but if you’re curious about that stuff specifically, you’ll want to go back and read the paragraph that begins, “Eventually, someone could pool the lists…”) Read the rest of this entry »

Hello, and welcome to Prospect Week! (Well, closer to Prospect Fortnight — as you can probably tell from the navigation widget above, the fun will continue well into next week, including the launch of our Top 100.) I’m not your regular host – that’d be Eric Longenhagen – but not to worry, you’ll get all the Eric you can handle as he and the team break down all things minor leagues, college baseball, and MLB draft. I’m just here to set the stage, and in support of that goal, I have some research to present on prospect grades and eventual major league equivalency.

When reading coverage of the minor leagues, I often find myself wondering what it all means. The Future Value scale does a great job of capturing the essence of a prospect in a single number, but it doesn’t translate neatly to what you see when you watch a big league game. Craig Edwards previously investigated how prospect grades have translated into surplus value, but I wanted to update things from an on-field value perspective. Rather than look at what it would cost to replace prospect production in free agency, I decided to measure the distribution in potential outcomes at each Future Value tier.

To do that, I first gathered my data. I took our prospect lists from four seasons, 2019-22, and looked at all of the prospects with a grade of 45 FV or higher. I separated them into two groups — hitters and pitchers — then took projections for every player in baseball three years down the line. For example, I paired the 2019 prospect list with 2022 projections and the 2022 prospect list with 2025 projections. In this way, I came up with a future expectation for each player.

I chose to use projections for one key reason: They let us get to an answer more quickly. In Craig’s previous study, he looked at results over the next nine years of major league play. I don’t have that kind of time – I’m trying to use recent prospect grades to get at the way our team analyzes the game today. If I used that methodology, the last year of prospect lists I could use would be 2015, in Kiley McDaniel’s first term as FanGraphs’ prospect analyst.

Another benefit of using projections is that they’re naturally resistant to the sample-size-related issues that always crop up in exercises like this. A few injuries, one weird season, a relatively small prospect cohort, and you could be looking at some strange results. Should we knock a prospect if his playing time got blocked, or if his team gamed his service time? I don’t think so, and projections let us ignore all that. I normalized all batters to a 600 plate appearance projection and all pitchers to a 200 innings pitched projection.

I decided to break future outcomes down into tiers. More specifically, I grouped WAR outcomes as follows. I counted everything below 0.5 WAR per season as a “washout,” including those players who didn’t have major league projections three years later. Given that we project pretty much everyone, that’s mostly players who had either officially retired or never appeared in full-season ball. I graded results between 0.5 and 1.5 WAR as “backup.” I classified seasons between 1.5 and 2.5 WAR as “regular,” as in a major league regular. Finally, 2.5-4 WAR merited an “above average” mark, while 4-plus WAR got a grade of “star.” You could set these breakpoints differently without too much argument from me; they’re just a convenient way of showing the distribution. There’s nothing particularly magical about the cutoff lines, but you have to pick something to display the data, and a simple average of WAR projections probably isn’t right.

With that said, let’s get to the results. My sample included 685 hitters from 45-80 FV. Allowing for some noise at the top end due to small sample size, the distribution looks exactly like you’d hope:

Consider the 55 FV line for an explanation. Of the players we graded as 55 FV prospects, 17% look washed three years later – Jeter Downs, a 2020 55 FV, for example. Another 17% have proven to be backup-caliber, like 2022 55 FV Curtis Mead, or 2019 55 FV Taylor Trammell if you don’t think Mead’s trajectory is set just yet. Continuing down the line, 30% look like big league regulars – 2021 55 FV Alek Thomas, perhaps. A full 31% appear to be above-average major league contributors three years later, like 2019 55 FV Sean Murphy or 2021 55 FV Royce Lewis. Finally, 6% project as stars three years later – Jackson Merrill, a 55 FV in 2022, feels appropriate as an example.

Two things immediately jump out to me when looking at this data. First, the “above average” and “star” columns increase at every tier break, and the “washout” column decreases at every tier break. In other words, the better a player’s grade, the more likely they are to be excellent, while the worse their grade, the more likely they are to bust. That’s a great sign for the reliability of our grades; they’re doing what they purport to do, essentially.

Second, each row feels logically consistent. The 45 FV prospects are most likely to bust, next-most-likely to end up as backups, and so on. The 45+ FVs look like the 45 FVs, only with a better top end; their chances of ending up above average are meaningfully better. The 50 FVs are a grab bag; their outcomes vary widely, and plenty of those outcomes involve being a viable major leaguer. By the time you hit the 55 and 60 FV prospects, you’re looking at players who end up as above-average contributors a lot of the time. The gap between 55 and 60 seems clear, too; the 60 FVs are far more likely to turn into stars, more or less. Finally, there are only six data points above 60 FV, so that’s mostly a stab in the dark.

This outcome pleases me greatly. Looking at that chart correlates strongly with how I already perceived the grades. For a refresher, roughly 30 prospects in a given year grade out as a 55 FV or above, give or take a few. Something like three quarters of those tend to be hitters. That means that in a given year, 20-ish prospects look like good bets to deliver average-regular-or-better performance. The rest of the Top 100? They’re riskier, with a greater chance of ending up in a part-time role and a meaningfully lower chance of becoming a star. But don’t mistake likelihood for certainty – plenty of 55 and 60 FVs still end up at or below replacement level, and 45 FVs turn into stars sometimes. Projecting prospect performance is hard!

How should you use this table? I like to think of Future Value in terms of outcome distributions, and I think that this does a good job of it. Should a team prefer to receive two 50 FV prospects in a trade, or a 55 FV and a 45 FV? You can add up the outcome distributions and get an idea of what each combination of prospects looks like. Here are the summed probabilities of those two groups:

Another way of saying that: If you go with the two-player package that has the 55 and 45 FV prospects, you’re looking at a higher chance of developing a star. You’re also looking at a greater chance of ending up with at least one complete miss, and therefore lower odds of ending up with two contributors. Adding isn’t exactly the right way to handle this, but it’s a good shorthand for quick comparisons. If you want to get more in depth, I built this little calculator, which lets you answer a simple question: For a given set of prospects, what are the odds of ending up with at least X major leaguers of Y quality or better? You can make a copy of this sheet, define X and Y for yourself, and get an answer. In our case, the odds of ending up with at least one above-average player (or better) are 40.7% for the two 50s and 41.4% for the 45/55 split. The odds of ending up with two players who are at least big league regulars? That’d be 28.1% for the two 50 FVs, and 16.1% for the 45/55 pairing. Odds of at least one star? That’s 4% for the two 50 FVs and 6% for the 45/55 group. In other words, the total value is similar, but the shape is meaningfully different.

For example, you’d have to add together a ton of 50 FV prospects to get as high of a chance of finding a star as you would from one 60 FV. On the other hand, if you have three 50 FVs, the odds of ending up with at least a solid contributor are quite high. Meanwhile, even 60 FV prospects end up as backups or worse around a quarter of the time. That description of the relative risks and rewards makes more sense to me than converting players into some nebulous surplus value. Prospects are all about possibility, so representing them that way tracks analytically for me.

Take another look at the beautiful cascade of probabilities in that table of outcomes for hitting prospects, because we’re about to get meaningfully less pretty. Let’s talk about pitching prospects. Here, the outcomes are less predictable:

I have tons of takeaways here. First, there are substantially fewer pitching prospects ranked, particularly as 50 FVs and above. Clearly, that’s a good decision by the prospect team, because even the highest-ranked pitchers turn into backups at a reasonable clip. Pitching prospects just turn into major league pitchers in a less predictable way, or so it would appear from the data.

Second, there are fewer stars among the pitchers than the hitters. That’s true if you look at 2025 projections, too. There are only six pitchers projected for 4 WAR or higher, while 42 hitters meet that cutoff. It’s also true if you look at the results on the field in 2024; 36 hitters and 12 pitchers (22 by RA9-WAR) eclipsed the four-win mark. You should feel free to apply some modifiers to your view of pitcher value if you think that WAR treats them differently than hitters, but within the framework, the relative paucity of truly outstanding outcomes is noticeable.

Another thing worth mentioning here is that pitchers don’t develop the same way that hitters do. Sometimes one new pitch or an offseason of velocity training leads to a sudden change in talent level in a way that just doesn’t happen as frequently with hitters. Tarik Skubal was unmemorable in his major league debut (29 starts, with a 4.34 ERA and 5.09 FIP). Then he made just 36 (very good) starts over the next two years due to injuries. Then he was the best pitcher in baseball in 2024. Good luck projecting that trajectory. Perhaps three-year-out windows of pitcher performance just aren’t enough thanks to the way they continue to develop even after reaching the majors.

There’s one other limitation of measuring pitchers this way: I don’t have a good method for dealing with the differential between reliever and starter valuation. Normalizing relievers to 200 innings pitched doesn’t make a ton of sense, but handling them on their own also feels strange, and I don’t have a good way of converting reliever WAR to the backup/regular/star scale that I’m using here. A 3-WAR reliever wouldn’t be an above-average player, they’d be the best reliever in baseball. I settled for putting them up to 200 innings and letting that over-allocaiton of playing time handle the different measures of success. For example, a reliever projected for 3.6 WAR in 200 innings would check in around 1.2 for a full season of bullpen work. That’s a very good relief pitcher projection; only 20 players meet that bar in our 2025 Depth Charts projections.

In other words, the tier names still mostly work for relievers, but you should apply your own relative positional value adjustments just like normal. A star reliever is less valuable than a star outfielder. A star starting pitcher might be more valuable than a star outfielder, depending on the degree of luminosity, but that one’s much closer. This outcome table can guide you in terms of what a player might turn into. It can’t tell you how to value each of those outcomes, because that’s context-specific and open to interpretation.

This study isn’t meant to be the definitive word on what prospects are “worth.” Grades aren’t innate things, they’re just our team’s best attempt at capturing the relative upside and risk of yet-to-debut players. Being a 60 FV prospect doesn’t make you 17% likely to turn into a star; rather, our team is trying to identify players with s relatively good chance of stardom by throwing a big FV on them. And teams aren’t beholden to our grades, either. They might have better (or worse!) internal prospect evaluation systems.

With those caveats in mind, I still find this extremely useful in my own consumption of minor league content. The usual language you hear when people discuss prospect trades – are they on a Top 100, where do they rank on a team list, what grade are they – can feel arcane, impenetrable even. Breaking it down in terms of likelihood of outcome just works better for me, and I hope that it also provides valuable information to you when you’re reading the team’s excellent breakdown of all things prospect-related this week.

Robert Hassell III has encountered bumps in the road, but he’s confident that he’s finally heading in the right direction. Health and a better understanding of his left-handed stroke are two reasons why. Added to the Washington Nationals’ 40-man roster over the offseason, the 2020 first-rounder — he went eighth overall to the San Diego Padres — is also still just 23 years old. While his path to the big leagues has been anything but smooth, Hassell is far from over the hill in terms of prospect status.

Injuries have hampered his progress. Since turning pro, Hassell has incurred a pair of wrist injuries, including a broken hamate bone, and strained a groin muscle. As a result, he’s played in just 428 games over four seasons. Seldom at full strength for an extended period of time, he’s slashed an uninspiring .260/.350/.385 with 36 home runs and a 105 wRC+.

Hassell didn’t want to dwell on his past injury issues when I spoke to him during the Arizona Fall League season, although he did acknowledge that he “needs to be healthy and on the field” in order to allow his true talent to play. And he definitely has talent. While power has never been part of his profile, Hassell’s combination of bat-to-ball skills, speed, and outfield defense helped make him a primary piece in the multi-player trade that sent Juan Soto from Washington to San Diego in August 2022.

The conversation I had with Hassell in Arizona centered on his development as a hitter — something he views as a work-in-progress in need of nuance, not one that requires an overhaul. Read the rest of this entry »

By all reasonable accounts, the 2024 Kansas City Royals had a successful season. Fortune usually frowns upon a 100-loss team that makes a bunch of low-key free agent signings, but that was not the case for the Royals. The veterans starters they added, Seth Lugo and Michael Wacha, joined Cole Ragans to make up one of the best top-of-the-rotation trios in the majors, and Bobby Witt Jr. ascended from promising young star to MVP candidate. They made some smart deadline moves to bolster their bullpen, and they benefitted from some pleasant surprises along the way. Thanks to all of these things, the Royals won 30 more games in 2024 than they did the year before, and as a result, they made the playoffs for the first time since they won the 2015 World Series. While there was no improbable dash to the World Series this time, the Royals did at least eliminate the Baltimore Orioles, and although they fell to the Yankees in the ALDS, all four games were close. Moral victories may not count for much in professional sports, but Kansas City fans ought to be delighted with what this team accomplished last season.

However, successful doesn’t mean perfect, and the Royals did have some significant flaws. The most glaring one was a team offense that was full of holes. The Royals scored enough runs to support their excellent pitching, enough to rank a healthy sixth in the American League in runs per game (4.54), but it was an extremely unbalanced effort. Witt carried more than his fair share of the overall load, with his 10.4 WAR accounting for more than half of the total 20 WAR Kansas City got from its position players. From three of the four most offense-heavy positions, first base, the outfield corners, and designated hitter, the Royals received an embarrassing lack of production. First base was fine, if unspectacular, manned by Vinnie Pasquantino and Salvador Perez, but the outfield corners combined for an OPS south of .650 and a brutal -2.5 WAR, and Kansas City DHs combined for a 77 wRC+, the fourth-worst production in the majors from that position. With Witt’s season and a bare level of competence from these three positions, Kansas City’s offense should’ve been one of the top three or four in the AL. Instead, what the Royals got from the two corner outfield spots and DH was — and I’ll put it generously — below a bare level of competence. Read the rest of this entry »

Pete Alonso is going back to the Mets. It always felt like the most likely outcome, and to be honest, it would’ve been super weird to see him in any other uniform. Alonso has never been the best player on the Mets, but he does the coolest and most valuable thing you can do on a baseball diamond — hit home runs — with great frequency. That, and an affable attitude that’s endeared him to the fans, has made him an institution in Queens.

Unfortunately, there was something of a disagreement over what all those contributions were worth. Alonso returns to his team of origin on a front-loaded two-year, $54 million contract that features an opt-out. If Alonso does what he’s done his whole career, he can test free agency again next winter, having pocketed $30 million. That’s a handsome one-year salary for any player, but far, far short of Alonso’s expectations. Read the rest of this entry »

I went to the Pirates’ RosterResource page this morning and thought the following thought: “Man, is Isiah Kiner-Falefa really going to lead off for this team? God, that’s depressing.” Not that I have anything against IKF; it’s just symptomatic of a Pirates team that seems built to do little more than participate in the coming season.

The Pirates being an afterthought is nothing new; on the contrary, it’s been the default state of affairs for most of the past 45 years. But recent developments have made this a particularly frustrating time for Pirates fans.

At the risk of oversimplifying things, there are two kinds of good players: Players you can get and players you have to have drop out of the sky for you. Like Willy Adames is a really good player, and worth the monster contract the Giants just gave him. But if he’d signed elsewhere, the Giants could’ve found another player like him.

Not so Paul Skenes. Read the rest of this entry »

Today, we released the first run of our playoff odds for the 2025 season. With both the ZiPS and Steamer projections loaded in and playing time projections added to the mix, the FanGraphs supercomputer (okay, fine, our cloud services account) can get cranking and spit out some predictions. As is customary, I’ll walk through my first thoughts on them, while later today, Michael Baumann will contribute his own takeaways on the teams most likely to surprise our model. Let’s quickly walk through the process, and then get to the takeaways.

The model itself remains simple. We use those aggregated production and playing time numbers I mentioned earlier to create team-level projections, then use BaseRuns to turn individual outcome projections into scoring and run prevention. That gives us team strength against a neutral opponent. We use those values to simulate the season 20,000 times. The odds are a summary of those simulations as of earlier this morning. That might sound intuitive, but intuition doesn’t always match reality, so let’s go division-by-division to look at how our model got there and what I think of it. Read the rest of this entry »

George Lombard Jr. is a promising prospect with a first-round pedigree. Drafted 26th overall in 2023 out of Gulliver Preparatory School in Pinecrest, Florida, the right-handed-hitting shortstop is also the son of former big league outfielder (and current Detroit Tigers bench coach) George Lombard. Assigned a 45 FV by lead prospect analyst Eric Longenhagen, the athletically gifted youngster is no. 4 on our recently released New York Yankees Top Prospects list.

The 19-year-old’s first full professional season was a mixed bag statistically. Over 497 plate appearances between Low-A Tampa and High-A Hudson Valley, Lombard logged a .231/.338/.334 slash line, a 99 wRC+, and 32 extra-base hits, five of which left the yard. Taking advantage of his plus wheels, he swiped 39 bases in 47 attempts.

Lombard discussed his game late in the 2024 season.

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David Laurila: I’ve seen you listed at 6-foot-2, 190 pounds. How accurate is that, and where do you see yourself going forward?

George Lombard Jr: “I’m 6-foot-3 and around 205 pounds. I’ll put on some more weight in the next few years, and I think our goal will end up being around 215, maybe 220. We believe that I can still be fast as I put on weight, so we’re going to continue to do that. A lot of it will just come with physically maturing over time, and putting in the work in the weight room.” Read the rest of this entry »

It was the Before Times, November 21, 2019 to be exact. While dinosaurs no longer roamed the earth, we had yet to learn about COVID-19. Unencumbered, several FanGraphs staffers descended upon Manhattan for a FanGraphs Live event and an Effectively Wild taping. Yours truly was on the Major League Update panel alongside The Athletic’s Lindsey Adler and Marc Carig. Near the end of our half-hour segment, EW co-host Meg Rowley asked us, “What would you change about baseball?… What would you do at this moment, at this juncture, to make baseball more compelling?”

I don’t even recall the answer I intended to give, but after waiting my turn, I built upon one of Marc’s ideas about his desire to see the ball put in play more often. “Start caring about batting average again,” I said. “Because batting average is fun.”

An actual listen to the podcast suggests otherwise, but in my own recollection, it felt like one of those record-scratch moments where everything stops abruptly and you can hear a pin drop. A FanGraphs writer, one with a lengthy track record of applying sabermetric principles, one who made his name with objectivity-based Hall of Fame analysis — that guy, defending batting average? Read the rest of this entry »

I worry that Jackson Merrill’s incredible rookie season has been appropriately recognized but underexamined. For any rookie to put up 5.3 WAR and finish in the top 10 in MVP voting is incredible; for a kid who was 20 years old on Opening Day and learning to play center field on the job, it’s extraordinary.

As impressive as that one-line summary is, Paul Skenes (and to a lesser extent Jackson Chourio) sucked up a lot of the shine that would have accompanied such a performance in most seasons. Shine can be hard to come by for a player on a West Coast non-Dodgers team that’s already got plenty of stars to promote.

So I found myself, in the dead of winter, contemplating what comes after the abstract for Merrill. Specifically, whether a certain nit is worth picking. Read the rest of this entry »