Game 4 of the World Series started like gangbusters for the Houston Astros in Washington. A game-opening strikeout by Patrick Corbin against George Springer was followed with four straight singles, producing two runs to give Houston the first lead of the night. Corbin was able to leave the bases loaded in the top of the first to keep his side in the game, but when his pitcher opponent Jose Urquidy took the mound in the bottom half of the inning, he made quick work of the Nationals, inducing two foul pop-ups and stranding Anthony Rendon after his two-out single.

The rest of the game carried on, well, pretty much exactly like that. Each starter traded scoreless innings in the second and third innings, but then the Astros added on with a two-run homer by Robinson Chirinos in the fourth. Washington put up some fight by loading the bases with one out in the bottom of the sixth to bring Juan Soto up representing the tying run, but all Soto could do was bring in a single run with an otherwise harmless groundout. The Astros got their own bases-loaded opportunity the very next inning, and they didn’t miss it, with Alex Bregman crushing a grand slam to put the game out of reach. Houston got a lead early, and aside from a fleeting moment or two, never really seemed in danger of losing it, eventually tacking on enough insurance to make the Nationals’ final few at-bats little more than a formality. Here’s what the win probability chart looked like from that game:

After the fourth batter of the night, Washington’s win probability was never higher than 40%. After the sixth inning, it was never better than 15%. All told, it looked like a typical one-sided baseball game. There’s nothing wrong with that on its face, but when stacked up next to the other four games that have taken place in this World Series, there’s been a troubling trend. According to our calculations, the loser of Game 1, Houston, never had better than a 36.5% chance to win that game after the fifth inning. In Game 2, Houston’s odds of winning were below 2% entering the eighth. Washington’s highest odds of winning after the fifth inning of Game 3 were just 24.5%, and its odds of winning Game 5 after the fourth inning were never better than 13.2%. Read the rest of this entry »

When the Nationals took an early lead in the World Series, there was a popular cry for the team to knock the Astros out while they could. Expend resources you were planning on saving for later in the series, turn Patrick Corbin into a reliever, maybe bring back some starters on short rest: what does it matter if you hurt your chances of winning Game 7, the thinking goes, if Game 7 never happens?

A softer version of this came up as the Cardinals walloped the Braves in Game 5 of the NLDS. The game was already decided. Why not pull Jack Flaherty so that he could pitch Games 1 and 5 of the NLCS rather than Games 3 and 7? It’s not an identical situation, but it relies on the same logic: earlier games happen more often, so get your pitchers into those.

Tomorrow night, there will be yet another version of this discussion. The Astros are a win away from ending the series. If the game goes into extra innings, say, or Justin Verlander gets knocked around but the offense keeps the team in it, would Houston use Zack Greinke in an attempt to end things right then and there? And should they?

While these questions are similar, they’re not identical. Does this reallocation of win probability matter? The answer, as it often is, is “it depends.” I believe the answers to these three questions are “not much,” “not at all,” and “more than you’d think,” respectively, and I’ll attempt to lay out why I think that is the case here.
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So much for home field advantage. The visitors won for the fifth straight time in this World Series, which means that after losing the first two games of this series to the Nationals, the Astros are up three games to two. They took advantage of Max Scherzer being scratched from his rematch with Gerrit Cole due to neck spasms, tagging emergency starter Joe Ross with a pair of two-run homers. That was more than enough run support for a dominant Cole, though Houston’s lineup tacked on three more runs in the late innings and won 7-1. During the three games in Washington, they walloped the Nationals by a combined 19-3 score, and they’re now one win away from their second championship in three seasons.

A few quick thoughts on the game, which also featured a shaky strike zone from home plate umpire Lance Barksdale, a pair of flashers behind home plate that distracted Cole, and a visit from Donald Trump that did not go as well as the president envisioned…

Pain in the Neck

The character of Sunday night’s Game 5 changed significantly before a single pitch was thrown. Three and a half hours before game time, the Nationals announced that Scherzer, who had allowed two runs in five innings in Game 1 opposite Cole, had been scratched due to spasms and nerve irritation in his right trapezius, problems for which he had begun undergoing treatment on Friday. Though he had been able to play catch on Saturday, Scherzer had woken up on Sunday in intense pain, and “completely couldn’t get out of bed… I had to basically fall out of bed and pick myself up with my left arm,” as he said during a pregame media session during which his pain and immobility were quite apparent.

“I’m as disappointed as I possibly can be not to be able to pitch tonight,” he said. “I’ve pitched through so much crap in my career that would be easy to pitch through at this point. This is literally impossible to do anything with.” He received a cortisone shot in the hopes of being available for a Game 7, if there is one. Read the rest of this entry »

Fresh from the unpleasant surprise department, the Washington National announced Sunday afternoon that Max Scherzer would be scratched from his Game 5 start. Scherzer has suffered neck pain in recent days and in the words of Nationals GM Mike Rizzo, is in “ungodly pain.” In for Game 5 is Joe Ross, whose only appearance so far this postseason was when he threw two shutout innings of relief in Washington’s Game 3 loss to Houston.

Considering that at times this postseason Scherzer has looked as if he would have to be dragged from the mound by a full SWAT team, I would imagine there’s not a great deal of hyperbole involved in the description of his pain. The Silver Hammer’s replacement, Joe Ross, fared well in 2019 when used as a starter, allowing a 3.02 ERA and 3.86 FIP in nine starts, all in the second half of the season. Ross, who once assisted shortstop Trea Turner in making the Wil Myers three-way trade look like a disaster for the non-Washington teams, has otherwise had his career waylaid by injuries.

The larger question, of course, is just what this means for Washington’s bottom-line playoff odds. Initially coming into Game 5, ZiPS projected the Astros to have a 61%-39% edge to win the series. But what scenario are we exactly projecting now? The answer depends on what actually happens with Scherzer’s injury, which is speculation at this point.

Ross’ start is essentially forced by the Nationals’ relief corps. Washington doesn’t have the arms to make a bonafide bullpen game a palatable scenario to the team, and with Austin Voth off the roster, they can’t start him without ruling another pitcher out due to injury. In any case, the Nats certainly don’t want to rule out Scherzer’s return unless they absolutely have to, and one would imagine the league looking very closely at the situation if Fernando Rodney or Tanner Rainey were to “suddenly” suffer injuries that necessitated them being replaced on the roster.

For the ZiPS World Series probabilities, I’m going with the happy scenario for now: Ross starts tonight, with Stephen Strasburg going in Game 6, and Scherzer left for a return in a possible Game 7. If you look at the probabilities right now, you’ll actually see the Nationals’ championship probability get a small bump to a 40%/60% deficit. ZiPS is a noted Aníbal Sánchez skeptic, and projects Ross as a minor improvement, by about two-tenths of a run per nine innings.

That, of course, doesn’t mean that this is welcome news for the Nationals, only that it’s beneficial in one very specific scenario, one the Nationals are far from guaranteed to see. To get an idea of the probabilities in some of the scenarios that are far uglier for the Nats, I re-ran the probabilities with a few of the possibilities, and condensed them into one pretty little chart!

Losing Scherzer for the rest of the World Series would be the worst-case scenario for the Nationals, but not one that dooms them. People tend to drastically overrate the dependability of a great starter’s excellence or a lousy starter’s ineptitude in an individual game. As terrific as Scherzer is, even in his best season, he was “only” worth 0.23 WAR per start, and was “just” 0.17 WAR better than the average pitcher. You want your best pitchers in the actual games, but even without Scherzer, who wins the series will come down to a lot more than his attendance.

The Houston Astros evened up the World Series in convincing fashion Saturday night, defeating the Washington Nationals 8-1 in a game that was only in doubt for a few, relatively brief moments. With this win, the Astros reset the World Series into a best-of-three in which they have home-field advantage. By forcing a Game 6, regardless of the outcome of tonight’s Game 5, Houston guarantees that their last game of the year will be in front of their fans.

If there’s one thing that no one should be surprised about, it’s baseball’s ability to surprise. If you were talking to a friend who hasn’t been following the World Series, and told them a tale of a clutch Astros starter throwing five shutout innings on the sport’s biggest stage, they might think you were referring to the team’s 225-win, future Hall of Famer. Or maybe the Cy Young favorite who went undefeated for most of the season, or at least the ace pitcher picked up from the Diamondbacks in a blockbuster July trade.

Your friend in this theoretical may be extraordinarily well-informed and name Jose Urquidy, but three months ago, few would have expected Urquidy to be Houston’s firewall to prevent the team from falling to a 3-1 World Series deficit. The 24-year-old rookie not only isn’t an established veteran; he can’t even claim to be a phenom prospect making good on unlimited potential. Urquidy was barely on the prospect radar (he is currently 19th in the org on THE BOARD), a pitcher with a decent fastball and changeup, and good command, but little dazzle and an injury-shortened minor league career.

With their rotation ranking fourth in baseball in WAR, the Astros didn’t envision having fourth-starter questions in the playoffs. The acquisition of Zack Greinke appeared to make Wade Miley one of the game’s best fourth starters, completing the team’s playoff rotation. But Houston also didn’t envision that Miley, who sported an ERA under three as late as August, struggling immensely down the stretch. Miley pitched himself out of the rotation and then the playoffs entirely, leaving the Astros with something of a situation. A fourth starter wasn’t needed in the ALDS with its ample off-days, and any awkwardness in the ALCS was compensated for by the fact that the Yankees had the same worry. Read the rest of this entry »

In a technical sense, Game 3 wasn’t a must-win for the Astros. In a practical sense, the odds of Houston winning four straight games against the Nationals are under 10%. The Astros needed the win, and they got it with a 4-1 victory. For those purists of the game who enjoy pitchers batting, Game 3 of the World Series highlighted one of the big differences in strategy between the American and National Leagues: pitchers as hitters.

Greinke’s Bunt

The first potentially important pitcher plate appearance occurred in the top of the second inning. Zack Greinke came to bat with one out and runners on first and third. Greinke’s season wRC+ of 123 doesn’t really represent his true hitting talent, but his career 60 wRC+ also understates his value in this situation. Greinke got down a successful bunt and advanced the runner to second, but the Astros’ win expectancy went down about five percentage points. If Greinke had done nothing, it would have only gone down a single percentage point more. While a double play would have dropped the win expectancy by about 10 percentage points, a sac fly would have moved the Astros up four percentage points, while a single would have moved them up six.

Greinke’s career wRC+ indicates he isn’t a particularly good hitter, but it’s mostly due to his inability to walk or hit for power. With a .225 lifetime average, he hits a decent number of singles, which is what the Astros needed in this situation. With a runner already on third, moving a single runner to second doesn’t help much when there are two outs. The expected situation is a Greinke out, which drops win expectancy by six. The bunt is only one percentage point so we’re really dealing with the chances of a double play versus the chances of a single. Given the large bump from a single compared to the expected out, versus the small drop from the bunt to a double play, the double play would have to have been much more likely than the single to make bunting the right choice. That isn’t in the case here, particularly with Aníbal Sánchez giving up a bunch of loud contact in the first few innings. George Springer followed the bunt with a groundball out to keep the game at a one-run deficit for the Nationals. Read the rest of this entry »

In Game 1 of the World Series, the Nationals found themselves with an interesting decision. They were up three runs on the Astros, but Max Scherzer had labored mightily to hold Houston to two runs. After five innings, he’d thrown 112 pitches. He wouldn’t be heading back out for the sixth.

The Nationals don’t really trust their bullpen. Sure, they could get innings from Sean Doolittle and Daniel Hudson, but they had four innings to cover. Tanner Rainey? Break glass in case of emergency only, and that still leaves an inning. Here is a list of all the relievers the Nationals had used this postseason (as of Game 1) who aren’t Rainey, Doolittle, or Hudson:

Yeesh. Strickland wasn’t on the World Series roster, Suero only made the NLCS roster as a replacement during Daniel Hudson’s paternity leave, and Fernando Rodney — well, we all know the Fernando Rodney Experience. Rainey is no great shakes, either — he was fine this season but uninspiring. Javy Guerra would later pitch an inning in Game 2, but the cupboard was pretty bare.

But Dave Martinez had an answer. Patrick Corbin stepped to the mound to start the sixth. He did his job admirably, striking out two Astros on his way to a scoreless inning, the only blemish a single to Yordan Alvarez. And then he was gone, replaced by Rainey.

Rainey wasn’t good (his four batters: homer, strikeout, walk, walk), but Hudson and Doolittle held on, recording four outs each as the Nationals won 5-4. Martinez squeezed just enough out of the bullpen to make it through the game. Corbin’s inning loomed large: the final margin was one run, and while it’s not automatic that a lesser pitcher would have given up a run in his place, his inning was important. Read the rest of this entry »

I thought that with the advent of the World Series, the intentional walk beat was probably done for. The Astros famously didn’t intentionally walk anyone all year, and Dave Martinez seems to use intentional walks sparingly, albeit at wild times — his intentional walk of Max Muncy was one of the worst of the playoffs.

Imagine my surprise, then, when both managers intentionally walked players last night. The Nationals are always a threat to do that, sure, but the Astros?? If the Astros are intentionally walking someone, you know it’s serious. Let’s dive in.

First, the Nats walk. This one was a classic spot — Yordan Alvarez was at the plate in the sixth with a man on second in a tie game. With Carlos Correa on deck, it’s not as though it got a lot easier, but intentionally walking someone with first base open to switch the platoon matchup is a tactic as old as time.

Being as old as time doesn’t mean a tactic is good, though. Intentionally walking someone with only one out is almost never a good decision — there are just so many ways the inning can go wrong. Indeed, the walk bumped Houston’s win percentage from 60.5% to 62.8%. That 2.3% of a win is a lot to give up with a walk — could it possibly be worth it?

Alvarez has only a tiny platoon split, but with so few plate appearances, he looks like a basically average hitter when it comes to the platoon advantage after regressing his stats. He’s a good hitter overall, though, regardless of handedness. How good of a hitter? Well, Depth Charts doesn’t quite buy the hype; it projects him as a .363 wOBA hitter overall, which works out to .372 against righties. Pretty solid, if not quite Alvarez’s .437 wOBA against righties this year.

How about Correa? He’s a good hitter in his own right; a .355 wOBA per our projections. After applying platoon splits, that works out to .350 against righties. This decision doesn’t look merited unless Strasburg has huge platoon splits — and he emphatically does not. Strasburg has a huge sample of split-less pitching — so much of one, in fact, that even after regressing his line, he’s hardly worse against lefties than righties. Overall, he projects to allow a .278 wOBA to righties and .282 to lefties — basically a scratch. Read the rest of this entry »

I had a recap half-written in my head after six innings of last night’s pivotal Game 2. It focused, as expected, on the pitching matchup of Stephen Strasburg and Justin Verlander; on how, perhaps more unexpectedly, both struggled in the first inning, each giving up two runs; and how they both settled, despite a tight strike zone and a steady stream of baserunners, into the familiar, soothing rhythms of solid-but-not-dominant pitching performances. (There was a little meditation, too, on the already-iconic Verlander leg throw.) Strasburg struck out seven, and Verlander, with his six, cleared the record for the most postseason punch outs of all time.

In the sixth, Verlander pitched his first clean inning of the game, and Strasburg escaped unscathed from a Yuli Gurriel double and an intentional walk of Yordan Alvarez. Through six, and the two teams were knotted at 2-2; Strasburg, with 114 pitches, was surely done for the night, and Verlander would just as surely be coming in for the top of the seventh.

As the broadcast faded to commercial, I settled into my nest of blankets. I know what this game is, I thought, like someone who doesn’t know what’s about to hit them.

***

The seventh inning, for whatever reason, always carries with it a sort of mystique. It’s the time when you rush to grab your last beers, when everyone stretches and you hear the creaking of your sad, aging joints, when the strange little ritual of “Take Me Out to the Ballgame” is performed. It doesn’t have quite the tension of the eighth and ninth, but the mood is clearly distinct from, say, the fifth; if you’re at the game, you’re probably a little tired, a little out of it, getting a little chilly. On midsummer nights, it’s around the time the sun fades away. And ever since I witnessed the life-changing devil magic of the Jose Bautista Bat Flip Inning, I’ve been unable to stop myself from paying a little more attention when the seventh rolls around. It’s usually normal, just another inning in another baseball game. But you never know. You never know when the fabric of the game will begin to rip — or when it might be rent asunder. Read the rest of this entry »

With two outs in the bottom of the eighth inning, the Nationals up by just a single run, and George Springer on second base, Dave Martinez strolled to the mound to summon a pitching change. In the bullpen getting warm was left-hander Sean Doolittle, one of the two relievers Washington has been able to regularly trust this October.

Doolittle has been a National for two-and-a-half seasons now, and though he could become a free agent at season’s end, he has a team option that is almost assuredly to be picked up. He represents just one of Mike Rizzo’s numerous midseason reliever pickups. In 2015, it was Jonathan Papelbon. In 2016, Mark Melancon. In 2017, Doolittle and Ryan Madson. And in 2019, it was a triad of Hunter Strickland, Roenis Elías, and Daniel Hudson. Rizzo has tried and tried again to build a bullpen; his success, at best, has been mixed. With Doolittle though, he struck gold. Read the rest of this entry »